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The American Revolution cannot be fully understood without coming to terms with why 
workers and merchants within the New England cod fishing industry resisted British authority 
and how their labor and capital contributed to the war effort.  The Revolution began in New 
England with the shot heard around the world in Concord, Massachusetts.  New England 
provided the most manpower for the American military each and every year of the war.  And cod 
represented the most lucrative trade good in all of colonial New England.  Between 1768 and 
1772, fish represented 35% of New England’s total export revenue.  The second most valuable 
export commodity, livestock, represented only 20% of this revenue stream.  By 1775, an 
estimated 10,000 New Englanders, or 8% of the adult male working population, labored in the 
fishing industry.  Yet, to date there has not been a systematic effort to investigate the relationship 
between this vital colonial industry and the Revolutionary War. 
In order to get at the linkages between the worlds of commerce and the way of war I 
triangulated data culled from merchant ledgers, ship’s log books, customs records, shipping 
records, diaries, newspapers, and military service records.  Drawing on these sources, the 
dissertation defends a two-fold argument.  First, economic competition between vested interests 
in the British Empire, principally New England fish merchants, West Country fish merchants, 
and West Indian sugar planters, resulted in a series of commercial regulations and naval police 
actions aimed at restricting New England’s economic expansion.  These regulations and actions 
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culminated in the British state’s fateful decision in 1775 to close the New England cod fishing 
industry, which ultimately motivated colonists to go to war.  Second, fishermen and fish 
merchants played key roles in winning the war.  Merchants converted trade routes into military 
supply lines and transformed their fishing vessels into warships.  Fishermen armed and manned 
the first American navy, served in the first coast guard units, manned privateers, and fought on 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
“The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a narrative of 
contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of violence frequently culminating 
in war.”  - Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 
1660-1783 (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1987; originally published by 
Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, in 1890), 1. 
After a long transatlantic journey, which included a sailing time of approximately eight weeks, 
the brig Pitt Packet was homeward bound on April 22, 1769.  A rising April sun would have 
melted fog and warmed chilled hands in the early spring morning as the brig’s crew made 
preparations to enter the harbor at Marblehead, Massachusetts.1  Thomas Power, the Pitt 
Packet’s master, probably shouted orders for tack and sheet lines to be hauled-in and secured as 
the brig angled toward the harbor mouth.2  A chorus of barefoot seamen would then sing pulling 
songs, or sea chanties, in order to lend a cadence to barehanded tacking labors.3  Singing and 
working, anticipating long absent family and friends, the Pitt Packet’s crew prepared to come 
home. 
                                                 
1 Marblehead weather patterns for the month of April were observed and recorded by Ashley Bowen in his 
journals.  Phillip Chadwick Foster Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol.1-2, (Portland, 
Maine: Anthoensen Press, 1973).  While Bowen did not record the weather for April, 1769, he did make such 
observations for the two previous Aprils.  See, ibid., Vol. 1, 153, 175.  The Pitt Packet’s crew comprised a captain, a 
mate, a master mariner, a cook, and four common seamen.  L. Kinvin Wroth and Hiller B. Zobel, eds., Legal Papers 
of John Adams, Vol. 2, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965), 277, 313-320.  The average sailing time was 
based on the round trip from Boston to London in the eighteenth century.  Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675-
1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 57.   
2 See, John Harland, Seamanship in the Age of Sail: An Account of the Shiphandling of the Sailing Man-of-War, 
1600-1860, Based On Contemporary Sources (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1984), 145-154. 
3 Frederick Pease Harlow, Chanteying Aboard American Ships (Meriden, CT: Barre Publishing Company, Inc., 
1962). 
  2
 The brig belonged to Robert “King” Hooper, proprietor of one of the largest fish 
merchant houses in Marblehead, which was then the principal commercial fishing port in New 
England in terms of capital investment, number of vessels, and manpower.4  The Pitt Packet’s 
crew had transported their dried, salted cod to overseas markets in Spain, just as had a smaller 
percentage of other colonial crews in the eighteenth century.5  There, the processed fish was sold 
to merchants in ports such as Bilbao and Cadiz.  Typically, crews returned with fruits, loads of 
salt, lines of credit, and manufactured goods from England.  On this particular voyage, the Pitt 
Packet was returning directly from Cadiz with salt for Marblehead’s commercial fishing 
industry.6 
 The brig did not reach Marblehead’s harbor that chilly April morning, however.  Dawn’s 
early light also illuminated bent backs and busy hands on board the British Naval frigate Rose, 
which was patrolling Atlantic waters along New England’s coastline.  The Rose’s Captain, 
Benjamin Caldwell, sent Lieutenant Henry Gibson Panton with several armed men to board the 
Pitt Packet early Saturday morning on the pretext of searching for contraband.  But, Caldwell’s 
real intent was to press men into naval service.7  With its sails trimmed in preparation for 
homecoming the Marblehead brig could not evade the Rose and its press gang. 
                                                 
4 In addition to his involvement in the transatlantic fish trade, Hooper owned a ropewalk and donated funds for 
Marblehead’s first fire engine.  Marblehead Town Records, Office of the Town Clerk, Abbot Hall, Marblehead, 
Massachusetts, March 19, 1751.  For more on Hooper, see the short biography in Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley 
Bowen (1728-1813), Vol. 2, 661.  For more on Marblehead, see Christopher P. Magra, “‘Soldiers…Bred to the Sea’: 
Maritime Marblehead, Massachusetts and the Origins and Progress of the American Revolution,” New England 
Quarterly, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 4, (December 2004), 531-562. 
5 A majority of colonial shipments of dried cod went to the West Indies in the eighteenth century.  See chapter 
three. 
6 For the Pitt Packet’s cargo on the day of its impressment and seizure, see Customs Commissioners to Salem 
Customs Officers, April 27, 1769, Salem Custom House Record Book, 1763-1772, folders 280-281, JDPL.  For 
more on the Atlantic trading nodes associated with the Hooper House and Pitt Packet, see Smith, ed., The Journals 
of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol.1-2. 
7 On Captain Caldwell’s orders, and his intent to impress, see the eyewitnesses’ testimony compiled in “Adams’ 
Minutes of the Trial,” Wroth and Zobel, eds., Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 2, 293-322. 
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 The crewmembers on board the Pitt Packet, however, were not willing to surrender once 
Panton and the press gang boarded the brig.  Michael Corbet, Pierce Fenning, John Ryan, and 
William Conner, Irishmen who called Marblehead home, picked up “fish gig, musket, hatchet, 
and harpoon,” and stood ready to forcibly resist impressment.8  It is likely that the brig served 
double duty in Hooper’s employ as a fishing vessel and a trading vessel, and the work tools had 
simply been left on board during the trade voyage.  In any case, the four common seamen, those 
directly in danger of being impressed, armed themselves with fishing implements and retreated 
inside the brig.   
The resistance quickly escalated.  After a tense standoff amidst piles of salt in the 
forepeak, Corbett drew a line on the floor using salt and dared the press gang to cross it.  Panton 
unwisely took up this challenge, stepped over the salt line and advanced towards “the Ship’s 
People.”  Corbet then launched the harpoon he had been holding, which struck Panton in the 
neck severing his jugular vein.  The British Lieutenant fell, his men carried him to the main deck, 
and he bled to death.  During the ensuing mêlée, two Marbleheaders were shot and severely 
wounded.  The fishermen were then arrested and tried for murder.9  Their trial gained notoriety 
throughout the colonies.10  In the end, the maritime laborer’s defense attorney, who was none 
other than John Adams, was able to get the men acquitted on the basis that Panton’s death 
occurred as a result of justifiable homicide in self-defense.   
 The Pitt Packet affair raises questions about the nature of colonial resistance to British 
authority during the 1760s and early 1770s.  Who were these seafaring men?  Were they 
                                                 
8 Wroth and Zobel, eds., Legal Papers of John Adams, Vol. 2, 277.   
9 For more on this event, see Magra, “‘Soldiers…Bred to the Sea,’” 531-562. 
10 Boston Chronicle, April 27, 1769; Boston Gazette, May 1, 1769; for coverage in the Boston Evening Post, the 
New York Journal, and the Pennsylvania Chronicle, see Oliver Morton Dickerson, comp., Boston Under Military 
Rule, 1768-1769, As Revealed In A Journal of the Times (Wesport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1971; orig. pub., 
1936), 94-95, 104-105. 
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fishermen, mariners, or both?  How did their labor skills and the nature of their sea work 
contribute to their resistance and their willingness to resist?  Why was the British Navy 
patrolling colonial waters, intercepting vessels, and impressing colonial seamen?  How did the 
wider colonial maritime community, merchants and laborers, react to these transgressions?  Were 
people in coastal communities, people like these seafarers, more prone to join the revolutionary 
movement than others?  Did Parliament condone the Navy’s actions in North Atlantic waters?  
All of these questions center on the sea and require an investigation of the maritime dimensions 
of the American Revolution. 
 This dissertation shows that the Pitt Packet affair revealed deep internal tensions, 
predicated upon command of the sea, within the early modern British Empire.  Alfred Thayer 
Mahan, the most prominent American naval theorist, was only partially correct when he asserted 
that the race to dominate the seas commercially and militarily was “a narrative of contests 
between nations.”11  To be sure, European powers fought with each other for maritime 
supremacy all over the world during the early modern period, 1500-1800.  Spain sent its armada 
to the shores of England in part to prevent Elizabethan pirates from plundering New World 
treasure fleets in the Atlantic.  The naval arms race and maritime commercial rivalry between the 
Dutch Republic and England in the early seventeenth century contributed to tensions that 
resulted in the first of a series of global wars between these two powers.12  It cannot be denied 
that maritime matters played roles in causing wars between European powers.   
                                                 
11 Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: Dover Publications, 
Inc., 1987; originally published by Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, in 1890), 1.  Emphasis my own. 
12 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806, 4th ed., (Oxford, England: 
Oxford University Press, 1998); Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959); and Charles 
Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch Wars (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957).  For 
the modern era, see Robert K. Massie, Dreadnought: Britain, Germany, and the Coming of the Great War (New 
York: Random House, 1991); and Bruce Mitchell, “Politics, Fish, and International Resource Management: The 
British-Icelandic Cod War,” Geographical Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (April, 1976), 127-138. 
  5
 Yet, struggles over the sea also fostered internal divisions within empires.  Over the 
course of time, from the first permanent settlement of a resident fishing station in Marblehead, 
Massachusetts in 1631 to the shot heard around the world in April, 1775, colonial New 
Englanders built a maritime industrial complex that eventually challenged England’s (and, after 
1707, Great Britain’s) commercial control over the Atlantic Ocean.  Robert “King” Hooper, like 
other colonial merchants, believed it was his right to conduct overseas trade.  Michael Corbett, 
his shipmates, and others like them felt they had the right to earn wages to provide for 
themselves and their families through maritime labor.  For their part, Captain Caldwell and 
Lieutenant Panton were following not only naval tradition but specific orders handed down from 
the King, Parliament and the Admiralty in halting colonial shipping and forcibly taking workers 
into naval service.  In short, at the heart of the American Revolution lies a complex sea story 
about colonial New Englander’s maritime expansion and the British state’s attempt to control 
and command the colonists’ relationship to the wider Atlantic world. 
 Excellent work has been done on the rise of a maritime industrial complex in colonial 
New England.13  Particular attention has been given to the roles merchants played in the 
development of overseas trade routes and the construction of wharves, warehouses, and other 
forms of maritime commercial infrastructure.14  Important research has also been done on the 
                                                 
13 For general overviews, see Benjamin W. Labaree, William M. Fowler, Edward W. Sloan, John B. Hattendorf, 
Jeffrey J. Safford, and Andrew W. German, America and the Sea: A Maritime History (Mystic, Conn.: Mystic 
Seaport Museum Publications, 1998); and Robert G. Albion, William A. Baker and Benjamin W. Labaree, New 
England and the Sea (Mystic, Connecticut: Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 1972).  Also, see the collected essays in 
Seafaring In Colonial Massachusetts: A Conference Held By the Colonial Society of Massachusetts, November 21 
and 22, 1975 (Boston: The Society; distributed by the University Press of Virginia, 1980). 
14 Stephen J. Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power In Early Modern British America 
(Hanover: University Press of New England, 2005); Simon D. Smith, “Gedney Clarke of Salem and Barbados’s 
Transatlantic Super-Merchant,” New England Quarterly, Vol. 76, No. 4 (December 2003), 499-549; Phyllis 
Whitman Hunter, Purchasing Identity in the Atlantic World: Massachusetts Merchants, 1670-1780 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press, 2001); Stephen Innes, Creating the Commonwealth: The Economic Culture of Puritan 
New England (New York: W.W. Norton, 1995); Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth 
  6
roles women played in the economic expansion and social development of colonial ports in the 
region;15 the rise of New England’s shipping and merchant marine;16 and the development of 
lumbering and shipbuilding industries.17  In addition, whaling has been demonstrated to have 
played a role in New England’s economic development.18  In all these ways and more, the sea 
contributed directly to New England’s commercial expansion between the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries. 
 Burgeoning colonial maritime enterprises, as several scholars have suggested, posed a 
direct challenge to British authority during the Revolutionary Era.  The literature on smuggling, 
or illicit trade, and imperial efforts to curtail these activities has been substantial and 
sophisticated.19  These works clearly demonstrate the contest of wills that existed between 
                                                                                                                                                             
Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1955); and William T. Baxter, The House of Hancock: 
Business in Boston, 1724-1775 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945). 
15 Lisa Norling, Captain Ahab Had a Wife: New England Women and the Whalefishery, 1720-1870 (Chapel 
Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); Elaine Forman Crane, Ebb Tide in New England: Women, 
Seaports, and Social Change, 1630-1800 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998).  Also, see Alfred F. Young, 
“The Women of Boston: ‘Persons of Consequence’ in the Making of the American Revolution,” in Harriet B. 
Applewhite and Darline G. Levy, eds., Women & Politics in the Age of the Democratic Revolution (The University 
of Michigan Press, 1990), 181-226. 
16 Daniel Vickers, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers In the Age of Sail (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 2005); W. Jeffrey Bolster, Black Jacks: African American Seamen in the Age of Sail (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1997); Bailyn, Bernard and Lotte Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping, 1697-1714: A 
Statistical Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959). 
17 Charles E. Clark, The Eastern Frontier: The Settlement of Northern New England, 1610-1763 (New York: 
Alfred A Knopf, 1970); Joseph A. Goldenberg, Shipbuilding In Colonial America (Charlottesville: Published for the 
Mariners Museum, Newport News, Virginia, by the University Press of Virginia, 1976); and Robert Greenhalgh 
Albion, Forests and Sea Power: The Timber Problem of the Royal Navy, 1652-1862 (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1926). 
18 Norling, Captain Ahab Had a Wife; Daniel Vickers, “Nantucket Whalemen in the Deep-Sea Fishery: The 
Changing Anatomy of an Early American Labor Force,” Journal of American History, 72 (1985), 277-96; Richard 
C. Kugler, “The Whale Oil Trade, 1750-1775,” in Seafaring In Colonial Massachusetts, 153-174; and Edouard A. 
Stackpole, The Sea Hunters: The New England Whalemen During Two Centuries, 1635-1835 (Philadelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott Company, 1953). 
19 Conrad Edick Wright and Katheryn P. Viens, eds., Entrepreneurs: The Boston Business Community, 1700-
1850 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1997); John W. Tyler, Smugglers & Patriots: Boston Merchants and 
the Advent of the American Revolution (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1986); Joseph R. Frese, S.J., 
“Smuggling, the Navy, and the Customs Service, 1763-1772,” in Seafaring In Colonial Massachusetts, 199-214; 
Benjamin W. Labaree, Patriots and Partisans: The Merchants of Newburyport, 1764-1815 (New York: W.W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 1975); Thomas C. Barrow, Trade and Empire: The British Customs Service in Colonial 
America, 1660-1775 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); Jack M. Sosin, Agents and Merchants: British 
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entrepreneurial colonial merchants seeking the highest profits at the lowest cost irrespective of 
imperial boundaries and political leaders in the British state who wanted colonists to work solely 
for the good of the Empire.   
 What has not received sufficient attention is the fundamental role played by the 
commercial cod fishing industry in New England’s maritime expansion.  The cod fisheries 
brought great wealth to colonial New England.  By 1770, 8% of adult male workers in the region 
were employed in the fishing industry.  At the same time, fish brought in 35% of the area’s total 
annual export revenue, making it the single most lucrative trade good in the entire region.  This 
employment and capital, in turn, had a “spread effect” on maritime New England, stimulating 
growth in overseas trade, shipbuilding, ship rigging, sail making, and waterfront business 
development.20  Such a relationship between the sea and commercial development is not unique 
to colonial New England.  According to Mahan: “The due use and control of the sea is but one 
link in the chain of exchange by which wealth accumulates; but it is the central link, which lays 
under contribution other nations for the benefit of the one holding it, and which, history seems to 
assert, most surely of all gathers itself riches.”21   
 Despite what could be considered the economic primacy of the New England fisheries, 
to date only two scholarly works, separated by almost one hundred years, have systematically 
treated the subject.  Raymond McFarland’s A History of the New England Fisheries, published in 
1911, traced in broad terms the rise of the industry prior to the American Revolution, its 
                                                                                                                                                             
Colonial Policy and the Origins of the American Revolution, 1763-1775 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1965); Oliver M. Dickerson, The Navigation Acts and the American Revolution (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1954); Baxter, The House of Hancock; and Arthur Meier Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants 
and the American Revolution, 1763-1776 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1918). 
20 See chapter two. 
21 Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 225-226. 
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devolution as a result of the war, and its nineteenth century rebirth.22  More recently, Daniel 
Vickers has compared and contrasted the evolution of labor processes involved with farming and 
commercial fishing in Essex County, Massachusetts.23  But these excellent works have not been 
able to convey the full and vital importance of commercial fishing to colonial New England.  
Nor do they adequately treat the critical relationship between the fishing industry and the 
American Revolution.24   
 The maritime dimensions of the American Revolution have also been underemphasized.  
For the most part, maritime historians interested in the Revolution have focused on naval 
activities that took place during the war years.25  These naval histories have especially 
emphasized the U.S. Navy’s formation, command structure, and tactics.26  Naval historians have 
                                                 
22 Raymond McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 1911). 
23 Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fisherman: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1830 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994).  Harold Adams Innis also discussed the New England 
cod fishing industry in the elaboration of his staple thesis.  See, Harold Adams Innis, The Codfisheries: The History 
of an International Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940).  However, Innis’ primary focus is on 
Newfoundland, not New England.  James G. Lydon has explored the volume of the New England fish trade to 
Iberian ports in a series of articles: “Fish for Gold: The Massachusetts Fish Trade with Iberia, 1700-1773,” The New 
England Quarterly, Vol.54, No.4 (Dec., 1981), 539-582; “North Shore Trade in the Early Eighteenth Century,” 
American Neptune, Vol. 28, (1968), 261-274; and “Fish and Flour for Gold: Southern Europe and the Colonial 
American Balance of Payments,” Business History Review, Vol. 39, (1965), 171-183. 
24 McFarland devotes only one chapter to the Revolution and Vickers only a few comments.  Indeed, Vickers 
has recently asserted that “the locals” in colonial Marblehead, Massachusetts were “cautious about political 
engagement” and remained “more nervous about engaging in radical action” during the Revolution.  See, Daniel 
Vickers, “Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers in the Age of Sail: A Roundtable Response,” International 
Journal of Maritime History, Vol. 17, No. 2 (December, 2005), 365. 
25 Exceptions include Paul A. Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront: American Maritime Culture in the Age of 
Revolution (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004); Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The 
Many-Headed Hydra: Sailors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary Atlantic (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2000); Jesse Lemisch, Jack Tar vs. John Bull: The Role of New York’s Seamen in Precipitating the 
Revolution (New York: Garland Publishers, 1997); Neil R. Stout, The Royal Navy In America, 1760-1775: A Study 
of Enforcement of British Colonial Policy In the Era of the American Revolution (Annapolis, Maryland: Naval 
Institute Press, 1973); Arthur L. Jensen, The Maritime Commerce of Colonial Philadelphia (Madison: State 
Historical Society of Wisconsin for the Department of History, University of Wisconsin, 1963).  Most of these 
otherwise excellent works do not address the commercial fishing industry in colonial America.  Gilje does briefly 
discuss the industry, but it is not a point of emphasis. 
26 E. Gordon Bowen-Hassell, Dennis M. Conrad, and Mark L. Hayes, Sea Raiders of the American Revolution: 
the Continental Navy in European Waters (Washington: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 2003); 
Nathan Miller, Broadsides: The Age of Fighting Sail, 1775-1815 (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2000); 
James A. Lewis, Neptune's Militia: the Frigate South Carolina During the American Revolution (Kent, Ohio: Kent 
  9
also concentrated on military leadership in a biographical mode.27  Recently, Richard Buel, Jr. 
has explored the significant impact the British Naval blockade had on the American economy,28 
while scholars studying privateering, maritime prisoners of war, and the proceedings of Vice 
Admiralty courts have also focused on wartime events.29  These works largely overlook the 
fishing industry, and as a result the significant influence of New England maritime traditions on 
the war has been neglected.30  Such disregard has, for example, caused naval historian Frank C. 
                                                                                                                                                             
State University Press, 1999); Robert Gardiner, ed., Navies and the American Revolution, 1775-1783 (London: 
Chatham Publishing, in association with the National Maritime Museum, 1996);  Chester G. Hearn, George 
Washington’s Schooners: The First American Navy (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1995); Nicholas Tracy, 
Navies, Deterrence, & American Independence: Britain and Seapower in the 1760s and 1770s (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 1988); Maritime Dimensions of the American Revolution (Washington, D.C.: 
Naval History Division, Department of the Navy, 1977) (author’s note: this a thirty-six page pamphlet consisting of 
two short conference papers devoted to the U.S. Navy and three brief comments); William M. Fowler, Jr., Rebels 
Under Sail: The American Navy During the Revolution (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1976); Nathan Miller, 
Sea of Glory: A Naval History of the American Revolution (Charleston, South Carolina: The Nautical & Aviation 
Publishing Company of America, 1974); William Bell Clark, George Washington’s Navy: Being An Account of his 
Excellency’s Fleet in New England (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1960); Gardner Weld Allen, A 
Naval History of the American Revolution, Vols. 1-2, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1913); and Charles 
Oscar Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution: Its Administration, Its Policy, and Its Achievements (Chicago: 
The Burrows Brothers, Co., 1906). 
27 See, for example, Charles E. Claghorn, Naval Officers of the American Revolution: A Concise Biographical 
Dictionary (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1988); Samuel Eliot Morison, John Paul Jones, A Sailor’s Biography 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1959); William James Morgan, Captains to the Northward: The New England 
Captains in the Continental Navy (Barre, Mass.: Barre Gazette, 1959); William Bell Clark, Lambert Wickes, Sea 
Raider and Diplomat: The Story of A Naval Captain of the American Revolution (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1932); Dudley W. Knox, Naval Genius of George Washington (Boston: Printed by the Riverside Press for 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1932); James L. Howard, Seth Harding, Mariner: A Naval Picture of the Revolution 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930). 
28 Richard Buel, Jr., In Irons: Britain's Naval Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).  Also, see David Syrett, The Royal Navy In American Waters, 1775-1783 
(Brookfield, Vt.: Gower, 1989).  For the French Navy, see Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American 
Independence: A Study of Arms and Diplomacy, 1774-1787 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
29 See, Francis D. Cogliano, American Maritime Prisoners in the Revolutionary War: The Captivity of William 
Russell (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001); Carl Ubbelohde, The Vice-Admiralty Courts and the 
American Revolution (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1960); Louis F. Middlebrook, Maritime 
Connecticut During the American Revolution, 1775-1783, Vols. 1-2, (Salem, Mass.: The Essex Institute, 1925); and 
Octavius Thorndike Howe, Beverly Privateers In The American Revolution (Cambridge, Mass.: John Wilson and 
Son, 1922). 
30 Roger Morriss provides a two-page introduction to “Colonial seafaring” in Gardiner, ed., Navies and the 
American Revolution, 1775-1783, 12-14.  Morriss briefly acknowledges that fishing was part of the colonial 
maritime tradition (13), but the connections between the commercial fisheries and the Revolution are left 
unexplored.  Such a cursory nod to the fishing industry is common among naval histories. 
  10
Mevers to assert incorrectly that colonial Americans did not arm vessels for war prior to the 
Revolution.31 
 The scholarly neglect of the relationship between colonial maritime life and the 
Revolution can be attributed to a “terra-centric” perspective on this formative event that 
discounts, or overlooks entirely, colonists’ experience with the sea.32  Historians have 
overwhelmingly emphasized the roles farmers and land campaigns played in the Revolution.33  
As a result, the dominant view of the Revolution includes men shivering at Valley Forge rather 
than on the decks of vessels such as the Pitt Packet crossing the North Atlantic seas.  Isolated 
among inland farming communities, the land-based story goes, men only agreed to fight when 
British regulars trampled agricultural crops and threatened town meetings in 1775.  Moreover, 
men went home to plant crops in the spring and then to harvest in the fall, making them reluctant 
                                                 
31 Frank C. Mevers, “Naval Policy of the Continental Congress,” in Maritime Dimensions of the American 
Revolution, 3.  Colonists armed vessels for war in the Battle for Louisburg in 1745 and during the Seven Years’ 
War.  See, Phillip Chadwick Foster Smith, “King George, The Massachusetts Province Ship, 1757-1763: A Survey,” 
in Seafaring In Colonial Massachusetts, 175-198; and Howard Millar Chapin, “New England Vessels in the 
Expedition Against Louisbourg, 1745,” New England Historic Genealogical Register, Vol. 77, No. 1 (January, 
1923), 95-110.  According to Smith: “The maintenance of armed vessels by the Provincial government was no 
innovation at the beginning of the French and Indian War, for in one form or another it had become an established, 
routine practice in wartime since King William’s War at the end of the seventeenth century.”  Smith, “King 
George,” 175.  In Chapin’s words: “The American Navy did not spring forth full-fledged at the outbreak of the 
Revolution, like Pallas Athene from the head of Zeus.”  See, Chapin, “New England Vessels in the Expedition 
Against Louisbourg, 1745,” 1. 
32 For more on the concept of “terra-centrism,” see Marcus Rediker, “Toward a People’s History of the Sea,” in 
David Killingray, Margarette Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby, eds., Maritime Empires: British Imperial Maritime Trade in 
the Nineteenth Century (Rochester, NY: Boydell, in association with the National Maritime Museum, 2004), 195-
206. 
33 Examples of this terra-centric focus include: Don Higginbotham, War and Society in Revolutionary America: 
The Wider Dimensions of Conflict (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1988); Richard L. 
Bushman, King and People in Provincial Massachusetts (Chapel Hill: North Carolina University Press, 1985); E. 
Wayne Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure: Continental Army Administration and American Political Culture, 
1775-1783 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984); Richard Buel, Jr., Dear Liberty: Connecticut’s 
Mobilization for the Revolutionary War (Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1980); John Shy, A People 
Numerous and Armed: Reflections on the Military Struggle for American Independence (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1976); and Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World (New York: Hill and Wang, 1976).  Typical of 
this view is Higginbotham, who discusses “the provincialism,” “the rural isolation, the traditions of localism,” that 
defined “a predominantly agrarian society.”  He also maintains “the War of Independence was for Americans mainly 
a defensive type of struggle waged on the patriots’ soil.”  Soldiers in the Continental Army, we are told, “were 
mainly farmers, blacksmiths, tanners, and artisans.”  Higginbotham, War and Society in Revolutionary America, 7, 
11, 12, 13, 21.   
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part-time patriots.  Such a portrait of the Revolution fails to capture the reality of an event that 
began primarily as a result of maritime disputes, that concerned thousands of laborers and 
merchants involved in maritime commerce, and that involved an empire held together chiefly by 
maritime power and communication.  
 This dissertation is the first full-length study of the relationship between New England’s 
commercial cod fishing industry and the American Revolutionary War.  I take a wide-ranging 
approach to explore this relationship.  History from below, or history from “the bottom up,” has 
shifted our understanding of the American Revolution away from an interpretive framework 
focused exclusively on wealthy white male Congressional authorities, military leaders, and 
Parliamentarians, and toward an inclusion of working peoples and minorities.34  This dissertation 
utilizes a bottom up approach to investigate the ways in which maritime laborers involved with 
the New England fishing industry directly contributed to the American war effort.35  Diaries, 
journals, merchant account books, newspapers, ship’s log books, and military service records 
help to recover this history from below.   
                                                 
34 Alfred F. Young attributes this historical approach to Jesse Lemisch.  Young, “An Outsider and the Progress 
of a Career in History,” William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 52, No. 3 (July, 1995), 505.  Jesse Lemisch, 
“The American Revolution Seen from the Bottom Up,” in Barton Bernstein, ed., Toward a New Past: Dissenting 
Essays in American History (New York, 1968), 3-45.  History from below has influenced different sub-fields in 
history.  Examples of “new” maritime history include Gilje, Liberty on the Waterfront; Linebaugh and Rediker, The 
Many-Headed Hydra; and Margaret S. Creighton and Lisa Norling, eds., Iron Men, Wooden Women: Gender and 
Seafaring in the Atlantic World, 1700-1920 (The John Hopkins University Press, 1996).  For “new” military history, 
see Holly A. Mayer, Belonging to the Army: Camp Followers and Community during the American Revolution 
(Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1996); and Charles Patrick Neimeyer, America Goes to War: A 
Social History of the Continental Army (New York University Press, 1996).  For “new” social history, see Alfred F. 
Young, Liberty Tree: Ordinary People and the American Revolution (New York: New York University Press, 
2006); Gary B. Nash, The Unknown American Revolution: The Unruly Birth of Democracy and the Struggle to 
Create America (New York: Viking, 2005); and Nancy L. Rhoden and Ian K. Steele, eds., The Human Tradition In 
the American Revolution (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2000). 
35 For a path-breaking study linking labor and military histories in a study of the eighteenth-century British 
Army, see Peter Way, “Rebellion of the Regulars: Working Soldiers and the Mutiny of 1763-1764,” The William 
and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 57, Issue 4 (October, 2000), 761-792. 
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 This dissertation is an example of Atlantic history, which has broadened our 
understanding of early America.36  It is no longer tenable to view colonial regions within a 
parochial vacuum or explain major events such as the Revolution solely through local, regional, 
or proto-national developments.  I have relied on archival material from research institutions in 
the United States, Canada, and England in order to explore colonial New England’s connection 
with the wider Atlantic world.  Secondary works on the Caribbean, South America, Africa, and 
the Portuguese Atlantic islands helped to round-out these Atlantic connections. 
 The dissertation is conceptually divided into two parts, each in its own way addressing 
the why and how of the American Revolution.  Chapters one and four examine how labor and 
capital in the fishing industry functioned, and how each contributed to the Revolutionary War.  
Chapters two and three focus on why members of the fishing industry, merchants and workers, 
were willing to resist British authority during the imperial crisis.  The central argument is 
twofold: New England’s maritime expansion provoked a series of prejudicial Parliamentary 
legislation in which the British state attempted to regulate colonial overseas commerce, all of 
which helps to explain why the Revolution began in New England and why a majority of the 
men who fought in the war called this region home.  The second part of the argument is that the 
nature of work in the commercial cod fishing industry uniquely prepared fishermen and fish 
merchants to play leading roles in securing American independence.  The dissertation reveals a 
                                                 
36 Accounts of the rise of Atlantic history can be found in Bernard Bailyn, Atlantic History: Concept and 
Contours (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas, eds., The 
Creation of the British Atlantic World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005), esp. the introduction 
by Carole Shammas, 1-16; David Armitage, “Three Concepts of Atlantic History,” in David Armitage and Michael 
Braddick, eds., The British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (London: Palgrave, 2002), 11-27, 250-254; Nicholas Canny, 
“Atlantic History: What and Why?” European Review, Vol. 9, No.4 (2001): 399-411; Linebaugh and Rediker, The 
Many-Headed Hydra; and Alan L. Karras, “The Atlantic World as a Unit of Study,” and J.R. McNeill, “The End of 
the Old Atlantic World: America, Africa, Europe, 1770-1888,” both in Karras and McNeill, eds., Atlantic American 
Societies (London: Routledge, 1992), 1-15 and 245-268. 
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deep historical relationship between the world of commerce and the way of war.  It moors the 
American Revolution in maritime history.   
 John Adams long ago recognized the importance of studying the maritime dimensions of 
the American Revolution.  Having succeeded in getting the charges against the Marblehead 
mariners dropped in 1769, Adams believed this legal victory, this resistance, and the 
impressment behind both, to be more significant in stirring popular sentiment for the cause of 
independence than the trials surrounding the Boston Massacre, in which he defended the British 
soldiers.  Adams would later write to a friend, “Panton and Corbet ought not to have been 
forgotten,” adding, “Preston and his soldiers ought to have been forgotten sooner.”37 
                                                 
37 Charles Francis Adams, The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States, Vol. 10, (Boston: 
Little, Brown and Company, 1856), 210. 
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2.0  THE NATURE OF WORK IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 
MASSACHUSETTS COD FISHING INDUSTRY 
“It is known to be one of the most laborious employments; that those who carry it 
on get to themselves but a bare subsistence…”  “Montesquieu,” on “The profits 
accruing to the [eighteenth century Massachusetts] fishery,” Boston Evening Post, 
November 28, 1763.   
In the summer of 1774, Joshua Burnham, George Pierce, Stephen Low, James Andrews, Samuel 
Burnham, Daniel Andrews, and Peter Edwards left Ipswich, Massachusetts in the schooner Polly 
on a commercial fishing expedition, or “fare,” to the Grand Bank off Newfoundland.1  Their 
vessel, like most others operating in the New England cod fishing industry at this point, was a 
schooner.  The size of their crew was normal.  The home port, Ipswich, was similar to other 
North Shore Massachusetts fishing ports in that it had expanded its commercial activities during 
the middle of the eighteenth century, and the destination would not have been unusual at all for 
commercial fishermen on the eve of the American Revolution.2  In many ways, the Polly’s fare 
was typical for the period.  Following the crew through their experiences will therefore enable us 
to glimpse what it was like to live and work in one of colonial Massachusetts’ oldest, most labor 
intensive, and most lucrative industries.  
                                                 
1 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Box 1, Shipping Papers, Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Folder 4, JDPL. 
2 See, Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-
1830 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994). 
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Figure 1:  17th century New England towns. 3 
                                                 
3 Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, 3rd ed., (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 130. 
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A significant portion of New England’s population worked in the cod fishing industry.  
Of the 581,100 people living in New England in 1770, 10,000 – or 7.8% - of the adult male 
working population found employment in this sector of the economy.4  In 1765, there were 4,405 
workers employed in the Massachusetts cod fisheries, 8.1% of the 245,698 people counted in the 
colony’s census.5  Their labors remained vital to the economic development of the entire New 
England region.  
Cod was king in late eighteenth-century New England.  Between 1768 and 1772, fish 
represented 35% of the region’s total export revenue, making it the single most valuable export 
for this section of the British North American colonies at this time.6   Massachusetts was the site 
of the principal fishing ports and shipping centers in the region throughout the colonial period 
(See Figure 1).  Its coastal communities were responsible for shipping 99.5% of the total quintals 
(112 lbs. dry weight; pronounced “kentals”) of cod exported to Southern Europe and the Wine 
Islands between 1771 and 1772.  The same ports were responsible for shipping 44.8% of the total 
quintals of cod to the West Indies during this period.  Combined, Massachusetts ports shipped 
                                                 
4 For the number of workers, see Robert G. Albion, William A. Baker and Benjamin W. Labaree, New England 
and the Sea (Mystic, Connecticut: Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 1972), 29-30.  One contemporary estimate placed 
the number of workers “employ’d in the Cod fishery” as high as 13,000.  Boston Evening Post, January 20, 1766.  
For the population figure, see John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-
1789 (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 103, Table 5.1.  The 8% 
calculation was made following Vicker’s method of first factoring a 55% male population and then factoring a 40% 
demographic of men aged 15-45: “the male working population.”  Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 194n. 
5 For the size of the workforce, see Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, Report on the State of the Cod 
Fisheries, 1791, American State Papers: Commerce and Navigation, I:13, Table 2.  For the population figure, see 
Robert V. Wells, The Population of the British Colonies in America before 1776: A Survey of Census Data 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1975), 79. 
6 The second most valuable export commodity, livestock, represented only 20% of this revenue stream.  
McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789, 108, Table 5.2.  New England fish ranked 
sixth in terms of the value of British North American and Caribbean exports, 1764-1775, behind sugar products, 
tobacco, Newfoundland fish, bread and flour, and rice, in that order.  See, Stephen J. Hornsby, British Atlantic, 
American Frontier: Spaces of Power In Early Modern British America (Hanover: University Press of New England, 
2005), 26-28, esp. Figure 2.1. 
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85.2% of all the fish caught in the colonies in the early 1770s.7  By themselves, Marblehead and 
Gloucester, Massachusetts accounted for 60% of all the fish caught annually in the entire New 
England region.8  Although there were certainly commercial fisheries in other colonies, none 
were as extensive or commercially significant as those in Massachusetts.  The expansion of labor 
and capital in the fishing industry also had a “spread effect” encouraging the development of 
other sectors of the domestic economy, especially lumbering, shipbuilding, and ship rigging, but 
also farming.9  In this way, the work of eighteenth-century Massachusetts fishermen was 
important to the economy of much of New England. 
Despite the centrality of labor in the cod fishing industry to New England’s economic 
development, scholarship on the subject has been limited.  Almost a century ago, Raymond 
McFarland described eighteenth-century fishermen as deep-sea workers, employed year-round 
“on their own hook,” or, on a count system whereby men were paid for the number of fish they 
                                                 
7 British North American Customs Papers, 1765-1774, MHS. 
8 Albion, Baker and Labaree, New England and the Sea, 30.  Because the Massachusetts fishing industry took 
such a majority of the share of the catch from the entire region, and maintained such a large proportion of fishermen 
and fishing vessels, Daniel Vickers has gone so far as to assert that during the colonial period the New England and 
Massachusetts fishing industries “can be treated as roughly equivalent.”  Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 154, 
Table 4.   
9 For more on the economic concept of “spread effects,” see McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British 
America, 1607-1789, 23.  Threatened by the loss of the fishing industry during the American Revolution, a Boston 
town meeting resolved: “It is hence also easy to conceive (though we apprehend needless to urge) of how vast an 
importance the preservation of this trade is to every other part of the Commonwealth [the “Federal Republic” of the 
United States].  The various mechanics, necessarily employed in the building, rigging and fitting out such a number 
of vessels, must without it be destitute of subsistence.  And the great quantities of provisions, expended by our 
fishermen, and the timber made use of in building the vessels, together with the staves, hoops, &c. made use of in 
the exportation of the fish and oil, will convince us that the loss of the Fishery must essentially affect our inland 
brethren.”  Gentlemen, the inhabitants of the town of Boston… (Boston: Benjamin Edes and Sons, 1781), Early 
American Imprints, Series I: Evans #17105.  For more on the cod fishing industry’s spread effect in colonial 
Massachusetts, see Daniel Vickers, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers In the Age of Sail (New Haven, 
Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005); and Farmers and Fishermen.   Commercial fishing had similar effects around 
the early modern Atlantic world.  See, Peter E. Pope, Fish Into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the 
Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); David J. Starkey, Chris Reid, and 
Neil Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries: The Commercial Sea Fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 
(London: Chatham Publishing, 2000); and Jan De Vries and Ad Van Der Woude, The First Modern Economy: 
Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), 267-268.   
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caught.10  More recently, Daniel Vickers has provided an in-depth examination of life and work 
in the colonial Massachusetts fishing industry.  He agrees with McFarland that by the opening 
decades of the eighteenth century fishermen were operating in deep-sea vessels off the 
Northeastern shoreline of North America and the coast of Newfoundland.  His social history 
goes far beyond McFarland’s broad overview, however.  For Vickers, being a fisherman meant 
hard manual labor and chronic debt through one’s teenage years, into one’s twenties.  Some men 
“used an apprenticeship in the fishery as a springboard into a seafaring career.”  But the 
“majority” of fishermen labored into their early thirties, “relinquished their berths to younger 
men,” and then “some floated into the merchant marine and managed to eke out a living for a 
few years as common seamen.”11     
                                                 
10 Raymond McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries (New York: D. Appleton & Company, 
publishers for the University of Pennsylvania, 1911), 96-97. 
11 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, ch. 4, esp. 150-151, and 167-191.  Quotes taken from 149-150, 184.  This 
chapter owes much to Daniel Vickers’ written work and his useful advice.   For works that discuss the colonial New 
England cod fishing industry but do not focus on the subject, or spend much time on the fishermen and the labor 
process involved in commercial fishing, see Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier; Deborah C. Trefts, 
“Canadian and American Poliy Making in Response to the First Multi-Species Fisheries Crisis in the Greater Gulf of 
Maine Region,” in Stephen J. Hornsby and John G. Reid, eds., New England and the Maritime Provinces: 
Connections and Comparisons (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2005), 206-231, esp. 206-217;  Pope, 
Fish Into Wine; Phyllis Whitman Hunter, Purchasing Identity in the Atlantic World: Massachusetts Merchants, 
1670-1780 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001); Benjamin W. Labaree, William M. Fowler, Edward W. 
Sloan, John B. Hattendorf, Jeffrey J. Safford, and Andrew W. German, America and the Sea: A Maritime History 
(Mystic, Conn.: Mystic Seaport Museum Publications, 1998); Mark Kurlansky, Cod: A Biography of the Fish That 
Changed the World (Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 1997); Faith Harrington, “‘Wee Tooke Great Store of Cod-
fish’: Fishing Ships and First Settlements on the Coast of New England, 1600-1630,” in Emerson W. Baker, et al., 
eds., American Beginnings: Exploration, Culture, and Cartography in the Land of Norumbega (Lincoln: University 
of Nebraska Press, 1994), 191-216; D. W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A Geographical Perspective On 500 
Years of History, Volume 1, Atlantic America, 1492-1800 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); Alaric 
Faulkner, “Archeology of the Cod Fishery: Damariscove Island,” Historical Archeology, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1985), 57-
86; Christine Leigh Heyrman, Commerce and Culture: The Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachusetts, 
1690-1750 (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1984); Douglas R. McManis, Colonial New England: A 
Historical Geography (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); George A. Rawlyk, Nova Scotia’s 
Massachusetts: A Study of Massachusetts-Nova Scotia Relations, 1630-1784 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 1973); Albion, Baker and Labaree, New England and the Sea; Charles E. Clark, The Eastern Frontier: The 
Settlement of Northern New England, 1610-1763 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1970); Bailyn, The New England 
Merchants in the Seventeenth Century; William T. Baxter, The House of Hancock: Business in Boston, 1724-1775 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1945); Harold Adams Innis, The Codfisheries: The History of an 
International Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940); Richard A. Preston, “Fishing and Plantation: 
New England in the Parliament of 1621,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October, 1939), 29-43; 
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As useful as both of these works are, they have limitations.  Both scholars largely confine 
their discussions to labor on off-shore banks.  There is also a tendency to homogenize the crew, 
that is, to see all the men above the cuttail rank as roughly the same.12  There is one category for 
skilled fishermen, just as there has only been one definition of fishermen, and everyone old 
enough and experienced enough has been placed into this category.13  Vickers, for example, sees 
little difference between skippers and the other sharesmen in fishing crews.  He writes, “the 
skipper was merely the first among equals.  Like his mates, he took a turn at the helm, hauled on 
the sheets, and tended his lines, and at the end of the voyage he was paid on exactly the same 
terms they were.”  Vickers further asserts that a fishing skipper lacked the legal authority to beat 
his crew, while the master of a merchant vessel was so empowered.14  In this interpretation the 
divisions between a skipper and his crew were not as rigid as they were between a master and his 
mariners.15  This chapter explores the issue in depth. 
 Restricting our interpretation of eighteenth-century fishermen to deep-sea hand-liners of 
cod does not fully capture what it meant to live and work in this vital and vibrant industry.  
Viewing Massachusetts fishermen in this way cannot account for the fact that these men 
                                                                                                                                                             
Ralph Greenlee Lounsbury, The British Fishery at Newfoundland 1634-1763 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1934); Charles Judah, The North American Fisheries and British Policy to 1713 (Urbana, IL: University of 
Illinois Press, 1933); Samuel E. Morison, Maritime History of Massachusetts, 1783-1860 (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 1921); and Arthur Meier Schlesinger, The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763-1776 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1918).  Also, see Faith Harrington, “Sea Tenure In Seventeenth Century 
New England: Native Americans and Englishmen In the Sphere of Marine Resources, 1600-1630,” (Ph.D. 
Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1985); and Edwin A. Churchill, “Too Great the Challenge: The 
Birth and Death of Falmouth, Maine, 1624-1676,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maine, 1979). 
12 The term “cuttail” referred to a younger worker in the fishing industry below the rank of sharesman.  There 
were usually four cuttails on each fishing fare: the “single;” “double;” “swallow;” and “stump.”  These terms 
pertained to the markings each worker made on the tails of the fish in order to indicate the number they caught.  The 
names for each cuttail can be found in the merchant account books described below in footnotes 34-43. 
13 The term “skilled” fisherman is used here and throughout to refer to the skipper of a fishing vessel and the 
sharesmen, the older, more experienced hands who earned a share of the profits from the sale of the catch.  
14 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 151, and footnote #12 on 152.   
15 Vickers has complicated this picture in his latest work by arguing that the master’s legal authority on 
merchant vessels was greatly mitigated by kinship ties, community relations, and sea-borne camaraderie.  See, 
Vickers, Young Men and the Sea, 90-95 and ch.7. 
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commonly worked as merchant mariners, or tars, and day laborers while they were employed in 
the fishing industry.  Nor can dissolving or minimizing the boundaries between skippers, 
sharesmen, and cuttails get us close enough to the nature of ship life in the fishing industry.  If 
divisions did not exist among fishing crews, and if men received no extra earnings and no 
additional authority, then it is not clear why anyone would have chosen to take on the additional 
responsibilities associated with being a skipper, including being held personally accountable for 
assembling the crew, choosing the location of fishing, handling the vessel in rough seas, and 
keeping count of each cuttails’ catch of fish in addition to the total fish count for the vessel.  Men 
did not simply use the fishing industry as a “springboard,” and they did not just rely on the 
merchant service as a “safety net” to fall back on upon retirement from fishing.  The eighteenth-
century commercial fishing industry in Massachusetts operated on a vernacular basis in which 
occupational identities were multi-functional.16   
 This chapter will broaden the definition of an eighteenth century Massachusetts 
fisherman to include forms of labor associated with the commercial fishing industry beyond 
deep-sea handling for cod.  Shifting our focus in this way makes it possible to develop a 
definition for an eighteenth-century fisherman that encompasses his full working experience.  
Only then is it possible to determine what it was like to work in this important industry and why 
men would want to become a skipper.   
                                                 
16 Pope has drawn a distinction between early modern “vernacular” and “directed” industries.  On a continuum, 
vernacular industries represent locally defined enterprises guided by customs at one end of the spectrum.  A directed 
industry “is conceived, often by a board of directors, before it physically exists and is a project, closely controlled in 
many particulars, not by custom, but by directive.  The ability to transmit information as text using standardized 
terms is decisive.”  While his efforts are specifically aimed at understanding the commercial fishing industry in 
seventeenth century Newfoundland, he maintains the generality of this analytic model.  He writes, “the vernacular-
directed distinction…is, in fact, intended to address some of the analytic shortcomings of ‘merchant capitalism’ as 
an adequate description of the economic context of early modern industry.”   Pope, Fish Into Wine, 30-31.  Here, the 
term vernacular industry is used to reflect the fact that the eighteenth-century commercial fishing industry in 
Massachusetts was not completely standardized in terms of occupational identities or structural organization.   
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Ideally, there would be extensive first-hand evidence in which eighteenth-century 
fishermen discussed and defined the nature of their own work.  Yet, few writings of literate 
laborers have survived the centuries, and these only provide sparse, anecdotal primary evidence.  
Christopher Prince, for example, was born in Kingston, Massachusetts, in 1751, and went deep-
sea hand-lining for cod at the age of thirteen, “though I was young and small, too much so to 
catch fish and lift them out of the water on deck, which my father knew I was unable to do.”17  
Between 1764 and 1765 Prince worked with a total of two fishing crews on an unspecified 
number of fares.  He described the work as very physically demanding, “the most trying of any 
employment,” and the work culture as decidedly irreligious, or “profane.”18  After a brief stint in 
fishing vessels, Prince switched to the merchant marine.  Ashley Bowen was born in 
Marblehead, Massachusetts in 1728, and labored on and off in the fishing industry from 1739 to 
1763.  During this time he went to sea with fishing crews and brought back catches, and he 
sought berths on merchant vessels freighting fish and other goods around the Atlantic world.19  
Bowen never detailed the labor involved, and said little about how it felt to be a member of the 
fishing industry, to join a crew, and to hand-line for cod on the Atlantic Ocean, although his 
work in the eighteenth-century Massachusetts commercial fishing industry took him through a 
range of experiences.  Benjamin Bangs’ diary paints a similar picture.  He was born in Harwich, 
Massachusetts on Cape Cod in 1721.  His father worked as a fisherman and owned a small farm 
and tanyard.  Young Bangs went on cod fishing expeditions between 1743 and 1746.  During this 
time, he supplemented his income in the fishing industry by teaching “young Rogues” in a local 
                                                 
17 Michael J. Crawford, ed., The Autobiography of A Yankee Mariner: Christopher Prince and the American 
Revolution (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 2002), 11-18.  Quote taken from 13. 
18 Crawford, ed., The Autobiography of A Yankee Mariner, 16. 
19 Phillip Chadwick Foster Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol.1, (Portland, Maine: The 
Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1973), 7-137.  For more on Bowen’s sailing career, see Vickers, Young Men and 
the Sea, 96-105, esp. Table 4.1.  Also, see Daniel Vickers, “An Honest Tar: Ashley Bowen of Marblehead,” New 
England Quarterly, Vol. 69, No. 4 (December, 1996), 531-53.  
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school.  Bangs also fished for mackerel, haddock, and even whales.  In addition, he helped his 
father run the six-acre family farm, which maintained a flock of sheep and produced corn and 
hay.20  Like Bowen and Prince, Bangs did not describe his experience as a fisherman in great 
detail, and none of these men made commercial fishing life-long careers.  For Bowen and Bangs, 
work in the fishing industry routinely involved other types of labor and a variety of experiences.  
They were not alone in this respect.     
It is possible to supplement these scant first-hand accounts through an examination of 
merchant’s account books, shipping papers, log books, and newspapers.  Merchants involved in 
the commercial fishing industry scrupulously recorded their employees’ names and their labor 
activities for a given year, in addition to the types and amounts of goods they purchased.  These 
records enabled merchants to keep track of worker’s earnings, productivity, and debts.  They 
provide us with crew lists, earnings, debt, promotion rates, catch sizes, fish prices, capital 
outlays, food and drink consumed, duration of time at sea, length of employment, types of 
employment and kinship ties.  The shipping papers compliment the ledgers by providing crew 
lists, cargoes, destinations, and wages for vessels engaged in overseas trade affiliated with the 
industry.  This information deepens our understanding of what sorts of activities men 
accomplished on a yearly basis in the fishing industry for the same employers.  Precious few log 
books for eighteenth century fishing schooners have survived the ravages of time.21  Yet those 
few that do remain enable us to trace routes fishermen used, weather they experienced, the time 
involved in travel and fishing, depths in which they fished, vessels “spoke” with, and the amount 
of fish they caught.  In addition, colonial newspapers printed accounts of work-related injuries 
                                                 
20 Benjamin Bangs Diary, 1742-1765, MHS. 
21 Of the 3,000 log books housed at the JDPL, only three pertain to eighteenth century fishing vessels.  The 
MHS also maintains a small collection.  There is one held at the MHDHS. 
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and deaths associated with the commercial fishing industry.  In short, despite the dearth of first-
hand accounts it is possible to piece together the work experience of eighteenth-century cod 
fishermen in the colony where Joshua Burnham lived. 
2.1 TRANSITION  
There were marked differences in the commercial cod fishing industry in colonial Massachusetts 
between the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries.22  For much of the earlier era, the industry 
was prosecuted on an inshore, as opposed to offshore, basis.23  Smaller, three-man crews, 
consisting of a foreshipman, midshipman, and steersman, worked close to shore and near home 
ports in shallops.  Vessel ownership was widespread.  Fishermen tended to be foreign-born, and 
they frequently contracted heavy and long term debts as a result of the loose credit terms 
merchants offered in order to attract workers in a scarce labor market.   
 In the eighteenth century, by contrast, most commercial fishermen headed to offshore 
banks to ply their trade.  Seven-to-eight-man crews worked on schooners far from home.  At the 
top of the labor hierarchy sat the skipper.  He was responsible for recruiting crews, choosing 
where to fish, navigating the vessel, fishing, and keeping a count of the fish caught.24  The 
sharesmen were the older, more experienced hands on board the schooner.  Their primary duties 
revolved around handlining for cod and helping to process the catch.  The cuttails were the 
                                                 
22 The following discussion leans heavily on Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, chapters 3 and 4, esp. pgs. 122-
126 and 146-167. 
23 Pope provides a concise definition of these two fisheries: “Inshore fisheries are prosecuted from shore in day-
to-day voyages by open boats on fishing grounds close to the coast; offshore fisheries are prosecuted from ships 
voyaging for weeks at a time to fishing banks, which may be days or even weeks sailing from land.”  Pope, Fish Into 
Wine, 14. 
24 These duties will be described in detail in subsequent sections. 
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younger, inexperienced greenhands.  They were mainly responsible for cutting bait, baiting 
hooks, and processing the catch, although they did help out with fishing.  Vessel ownership had 
contracted, and very few workers owned even a share of the schooner on which they went to sea.  
During this era, fishermen tended to be born locally.  And while these workers still went into 
debt, merchants had tightened the credit terms as a result of large local labor pools and the 
availability of labor.     
2.2 LABOR RECRUITMENT 
Burnham (1736-1791) was skipper of the schooner Polly in 1774.  He and his younger brother 
Aaron were sons of Jeremiah Burnham, a middling farmer and part-owner of a sawmill in the 
Cape Anne parish of Chebacco, near Gloucester.  Aaron fished commercially until he was forty 
years old, when his clothes and part of the vessel he was working on washed up on shore in 
1782.  For his part, Joshua fished and mastered at least twelve vessels for various Massachusetts 
merchants between 1761 and 1790.  Like so many other workers in the colonial fishing industry, 
he died “sick from the West Indies.”25     
 As a skipper, it was primarily Burnham’s responsibility to recruit a crew, or “company,” 
for the fishing fare.26  While it was theoretically possible for him to have chosen women, older 
men, African-Americans, and Native-Americans who lived in the area, Burnham chose none of 
these people and he was not alone in his recruiting decisions.  In the eighteenth-century, skippers 
                                                 
25 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, JDPL.  EVREC, Vols. 1-2, 61, 505, 506.  Vickers, Farmers and 
Fishermen, 200-201, 265.   
26 See, “Petition of the Selectmen of Marblehead [To Governor Francis Bernard and the Massachusetts General 
Court] asking for the passage of an act relating to the Cod-fishery, with a copy of said act,” 1768, MSA Collections, 
Vol. 66, Maritime, 1759-1775, 406-409. 
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ordinarily recruited white, young men for the work of deep-sea fishing.27  At this time, female 
settlers in Newfoundland were mobilized for shore duty, drying and processing catches.28  
Female labor was certainly available in colonial Massachusetts, but women were not to be found 
at sea or on land engaged in the fishing industry in any capacity.  Demographic factors such as 
natural increase, marriage rates, and family size may have contributed to the formation of 
prohibitive gender norms in Massachusetts by the eighteenth century, when off-shore fishing 
relocated shore work to port towns.  By contrast, maintaining a stable population in 
Newfoundland proved problematic, and women only began coming to Newfoundland in 
significant numbers around the time residents developed an off-shore fishery in the first half of 
the eighteenth century.  Thus, there may have been few gender norms in place on this northern 
island when demand increased for domestic shore work. 
 Race also seems to have been a factor in determining who worked in the commercial cod 
fishing industry.  There is very little evidence of African-American participation and nothing on 
Native Americans.  By contrast, Native-Americans and African-Americans were actively 
involved in the colonial whaling industry throughout the eighteenth century, although in 
diminishing numbers over time.  Their presence in this maritime occupation was stimulated by 
the chronic labor shortage the whaling industry faced.  Given a choice between work hand-lining 
                                                 
27 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 173-176; and W. Gordon Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women: 
Origins of English Settlement in Newfoundland (St. Johns, Newfoundland: Breakwater Books, 1989), 40, 60-64.     
28 Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women, 31-32; and C. Grant Head, Eighteenth Century 
Newfoundland (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976), 218, 232.  For the use of female labor in 
seventeenth century Newfoundland, see Pope, Fish Into Wine, 56-57.  More work needs to be done on the role 
gender norms played in the colonial cod fishing industry to explain why female labor was not mobilized in New 
England to the extent to which it was in Newfoundland.   
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for cod from a large schooner and chasing whales with a harpoon in a small boat across the 
Atlantic Ocean, most Europeans chose life and work in the former.29     
 Age also affected labor recruitment.  Throughout the colonial period, commercial cod 
fishermen tended to be younger workers between the ages of ten and thirty.30  A major reason 
why, soon to be explained in detail, was that the work of cod fishing proved physically very 
demanding.  Moreover, employers typically saw diminishing returns on the productive 
capabilities of older hands past the age of thirty.31  The nature of the work, and the demands of 
productivity, made the eighteenth-century New England cod fishing industry concentrate on 
youth.   
Kinship ties, it has been argued, played a decisive role in recruitment for the fishing 
industry.32  Yet, Joshua Burnham took only one of his family relations, Samuel, on the summer 
fare in 1774, and as a labor recruiter, he was not alone in this decision.  The familial bonds 
between vessel-owning merchants, who played limited roles in labor recruitment, and 
crewmembers on fishing vessels were particularly weak.33  First, we will look at those occasions 
                                                 
29 Daniel Vickers, “Nantucket Whalemen in the Deep-Sea Fishery: The Changing Anatomy of an Early 
American Labor Force,” The Journal of American History, Vol. 72, No. 2. (September, 1985), 290-292.  I am 
grateful to Professor Vickers for bringing this article to my attention.  He notes that the ability of minorities to obtain 
work in the whaling industry weakened over the course of the eighteenth century, as increased earning potential 
attracted more and more white laborers.  Yet, minorities remained part of the workforce in the whaling industry.  It 
will be discussed later that those few African Americans who did work in the cod fisheries faced more pressures 
than any of their fellow workers. 
30 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 172; Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women, 243-248, esp. Table 11.1; and 
Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 182-185, esp. Table 7. 
31 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 179-180, esp. Figure 2. 
32 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 165-167, 196.  Vickers has also stressed the important role kinship ties 
played in labor recruitment in colonial Salem’s merchant marine.  See, Vickers, Young Men and the Sea, 78-79. 
33 What follows is an examination of three databases compiled by examining the ledger books of merchants 
involved in the commercial fishing industry.  In order to evaluate kinship ties between vessel owners and all 
workers, I first counted every record in which a laborer worked for a particular vessel owner.  Included here are 
partial crew lists, skippers, and crewmembers.  Thus, the total data set was the largest (2,114 possible berths).  I then 
searched for instances in which worker’s surnames matched the vessel owner’s surnames.  Servants and slaves were 
not calculated as kin in any of the databases.   
Certain limitations complicate this data.  It may have been possible for some of the workers in these data sets to 
have had extended family relations, including nephews or cousins, with alternate surnames.  However, in the one 
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when some berths were filled by the vessel-owner’s relatives.  Of the 214 instances in which 
fishermen went to sea for William Knight of Marblehead between 1767 and 1775, workers 
shared the owner’s surname on forty-four occasions, or 20.6% of the time.34  Of the 280 
instances in which fishermen went to sea for Thomas Pedrick of Marblehead between 1760 and 
1774, workers shared the owner’s surname on fourteen occasions, or 5% of the time.35  
Similarly, of the 185 instances in which fishermen went to sea for Richard Pedrick of 
Marblehead between 1766 and 1774, workers shared the owner’s surname on four occasions, or 
2.2% of the time.36  Also, of the 79 instances in which workers went to sea for Francis and John 
Choat of Ipswich between 1768 and 1777, workers shared the owner’s surname on only two 
occasions, or 2.5% of the time.37  In aggregate, among the 758 berths, only 64, or 8.4%, were 
occupied by workers sharing the vessel owner’s surname.     
 On many vessels there were no kin relations between owner and crew.  There were no 
Choats in Burnham’s company in the summer of 1774, and this was not unusual.  Of the 527 
instances in which fishermen went to sea for Daniel Rogers of Gloucester between 1770 and 
1790, none were related to the owner.38  Of the 259 instances in which fishermen went to sea for 
                                                                                                                                                             
instance in which Vickers painstakingly measured these extended kinship ties and combined them with surnames for 
William Knight of Marblehead, he found that 55% of the time workers were not related to the vessel owner.  
Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 166.  Moreover, Knight was exceptional when it came to employing his family 
members, as evidenced in the paragraph above.  If ever there was a case to be made for kinship ties playing a 
decisive role in labor recruitment a majority of the time, Knight would have been the best illustration. 
In addition, assembling crew lists from merchant ledgers and shipping papers can be problematic.  At times, 
incomplete or illegible ledgers made it impossible to compile lists for certain fares.  Such fragmentary crew lists 
were only used in those cases when this was warranted.  Partial crew lists were included along with complete crew 
lists in the first two databases where I test whether skippers or vessel owners had more of a say in labor recruitment 
in order to get at as much of this picture as possible.  Only full crew lists were used in evaluating kinship ties 
between crewmembers.  In this way, the calculations reveal the highest degree of reliability. 
34 Data compiled from William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
35 Data compiled from Thomas Pedrick Account Book, 1760-1790, MDHS. 
36 Data compiled from Richard Pedrick Account book, 1767-1784, MDHS. 
37 Data compiled from Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, JDPL. 
38 Data compiled from Daniel Rogers Account Book, 1770-1790, JDPL. 
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John Stevens of Gloucester between 1767 and 1775, none shared the owner’s surname.39  Also, 
of the 41 instances in which fishermen went to sea for Richard Derby of Salem between 1756 
and 1765, none shared the owner’s surname.40  Similarly, of the 326 instances in which 
fishermen went to sea for Timothy Orne of Salem between 1752 and 1767, none shared the 
owner’s surname.41  Of the 69 instances in which fishermen went to sea for Miles Ward of Salem 
between 1765 and 1766, none shared the owner’s surname.42  Of the 134 instances in which 
workers went to sea for Thomas Davis of Beverly between 1771 and 1773, none shared the 
owner’s surname.43  In aggregate, none of these 1,356 berths was occupied by an identifiable 
relative of the vessel owner.  In total, then, just 64 of the 2,114 berths, or 3%, were occupied by 
workers with kinship ties to vessel owners.  While certain employers, such as William Knight, 
were more inclined than others to hire relatives, most did not. 
 The picture is similar when we examine the kinship ties between skippers and 
crewmembers.  First, we will examine those crew lists in which the surname of at least one 
crewmember matched the skipper’s last name.  On 11 fares in which Joshua Burnham skippered 
vessels for Francis and John Choat of Ipswich between 1768 and 1777, there were four fares 
(four of seventy-seven berths) in which a single worker shared the skipper’s surname.44   
 Skippers in Gloucester did not behave differently.  Between 1767 and 1774, two 
Gloucester skippers, Captain John Babson and William Babson, worked on a combined 23 fares 
for vessel owner John Stevens.  On eleven of these fares a single worker shared the skipper’s 
                                                 
39 Data compiled from John Stevens Account Book, 1769-75, JDPL. 
40 Data compiled from Richard Derby Ledger, 1757-1776, JDPL. 
41 Data compiled from Timothy Orne Shipping Papers, JDPL; and Timothy Orne Ledgers, 1762-1767, JDPL. 
42 Data compiled from Miles Ward Ledgers, 1765-1772, JDPL. 
43 Data compiled from Thomas Davis Account Book, 1771-78, JDPL. 
44 Data compiled from Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, JDPL. 
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surname, and there were three fares when two such workers went to sea.45  Thus, 17 of the 
possible 161 berths were filled with relatives of these two skippers.  From 1771 to 1775, nine 
Gloucester skippers, John Collens, Alford Davis, John Morgan, Lemuel Collings, John Parsons, 
Joshua Parsons, Lemuel Stanwood, Isaac Lane, and Theophilus Lane, worked on a combined 49 
fares for vessel owner Daniel Rogers.  On 23 of these fares a single worker shared the skipper’s 
surname, and there were seven fares when two such workers went to sea and nine fares when 
there were three such workers.46  In other words, 64 of the possible 343 berths were filled with 
relatives of these eight skippers.  In aggregate, the eleven Gloucester skippers between 1767 and 
1775 filled 81 of the 504 berths, or 16.1%, with men who shared their surnames.   
 The story was much the same in Marblehead.  Between 1766 and 1774, five Marblehead 
skippers, Jeremiah Roles, John Dixey, Thomas Brimblecom, Samuel Smith, and John Lewis, 
worked on a combined 22 fares for vessel owner Richard Pedrick.  On 15 of these fares a single 
worker shared the skipper’s surname.  There were also two fares in which two such workers 
went to sea and one fare when there were three such workers.47  Thus, 22 of the possible 154 
berths were filled with relatives of these five skippers.  From 1761 to 1775 five Marblehead 
skippers, Ambrose Lovis, Andrew Stacey, Richard Dixey, Nicholas Girdler, and Jonas Dinnis, 
Jr., worked on a combined 25 fares for vessel owner Thomas Pedrick.   On 18 of these fares a 
single worker shared the skipper’s surname, and there were two fares when two such workers 
went to sea.48  In other words, 22 of the possible 175 berths were filled with relatives of these 
five skippers.  Moreover, from 1767 to 1775, three Marblehead skippers, Robert Knight, Jr., 
                                                 
45 Data compiled from John Stevens Account Book, 1769-75, JDPL.  The accounts provide data for previous 
years, beginning in 1767. 
46 Data compiled from Daniel Rogers Account Book, 1770-1790, JDPL. 
47 Data compiled from Richard Pedrick Account book, 1767-1784, MDHS. 
48 Data compiled from Thomas Pedrick Account Book, 1760-1790, MDHS. 
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John Chin Knight, and Phillip LeCraw, worked on a combined 35 fares for vessel owner William 
Knight.  On 23 of these fares a single worker shared the skipper’s surname.49  Thus, 23 of the 
possible 245 berths were filled with relatives of these three skippers.  In aggregate, the thirteen 
Marblehead skippers between 1761 and 1775 filled 67 of the 574 berths, or 11.7%, with men 
who shared their surnames.   
 Beverly skippers behaved similarly.  Between 1771 and 1772, two Beverly skippers, 
Richard Ober and John Lovett, worked on a combined eleven fares for vessel owner Thomas 
Davis.  On eight of these fares a single worker shared the skipper’s surname, and there were 
three fares when three such workers went to sea.50  In short, 17 of the possible 77 berths, 22.1%, 
were filled with men who shared the skippers’ surnames.   
 Recruitment patterns were not quantitatively different in nearby Salem.  Between 1752 
and 1764, three Salem skippers, Benjamin Henderson, John Felt, and John Cloutman, worked on 
a combined 60 fares for vessel owner Timothy Orne.   On 30 of these fares a single worker 
shared the skipper’s surname.51  Then, in 1766, John Robertson skippered three fares for the 
Salem vessel owner Miles Ward.52  On all three fares a single worker shared the skipper’s 
surname.  Thus, 33 of the possible 441 berths in Salem, or 7.5%, were filled with relatives of the 
four skippers.  In aggregate, on 239 fares, 193 out of 1,673 possible berths (11.5%) were 
occupied by men who shared the skippers’ surnames. 
 Now we will look at those instances in which none of the crewmembers shared skippers’ 
surnames.  Between 1769 and 1774, two Gloucester skippers, Isaac Ball and David Walles, Jr., 
worked on a combined 23 fares for vessel owner John Stevens in which none of the workers 
                                                 
49 Data compiled from William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
50 Data compiled from Thomas Davis Account Book, 1771-78, JDPL. 
51 Data compiled from Timothy Orne Shipping Papers, JDPL; and Timothy Orne Ledgers, 1762-1767, JDPL. 
52 Data compiled from Miles Ward Ledgers, 1765-1772, JDPL. 
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shared the skippers’ surnames.53   From 1770 to 1773, four Gloucester skippers, David Walles, 
Jr., Joshua Haskell, William Morgan, and Abraham Riggs, worked on a combined 16 fares for 
vessel owner Daniel Rogers in which none of the workers shared the skippers’ surnames.54  In 
other words, on 39 fares out of Gloucester between 1769 and 1774, none of the 273 berths were 
occupied by men who shared the skippers’ surnames. 
 The story was similar in Marblehead.  In 1772, John Spinney skippered three fares for 
Richard Pedrick of Marblehead, and there were no fares in which any worker shared the 
skipper’s surname.55  Between 1762 and 1768, three Marblehead skippers, William Vickery, 
William Trefry, and Robert Smith, Jr., worked on a combined nine fares for vessel owner 
Thomas Pedrick, and there were no fares in which any worker shared the skippers’ surnames.56  
Thus, on 12 fares out of Marblehead between 1762 and 1772, none of the 84 berths were 
occupied by men who shared the skippers’ surnames. 
 In other ports, there were fares in which no crewmember was related to the skipper.  
David Felt skippered six fares for Timothy Orne of Salem between 1758 and 1759, and there 
were no fares in which any worker shared the skipper’s surname.57  Joseph Lovett skippered six 
fares for Thomas Davis of Beverly between 1771 and 1772, and there were no fares in which any 
worker shared the skipper’s surname.58  Taking Gloucester, Marblehead, Salem, and Beverly 
together, there were 63 fares, or 441 berths, in which none of the crew shared the skipper’s 
surnames.     
                                                 
53 Data compiled from John Stevens Account Book, 1769-75, JDPL. 
54 Data compiled from Daniel Rogers Account Book, 1770-1790, JDPL. 
55 Data compiled from Richard Pedrick Account book, 1767-1784, MDHS. 
56 Data compiled from William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
57 Data compiled from Timothy Orne Shipping Papers, JDPL; and Timothy Orne Ledgers, 1762-1767, JDPL. 
58 Data compiled from Thomas Davis Account Book, 1771-78, JDPL. 
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 Now, we must combine these two differently structured ship-borne labor environments - 
vessels in which labor recruiters were somewhat inclined to let family members on board, and 
vessels in which recruiters were not so inclined.  In aggregate, the skippers were responsible for 
a total of 302 fares.  This figure corresponds to 2,114 occasions, or berths, when it was possible 
for a skipper’s family member to go with him to sea.  Overall, such familial recruitment only 
occurred 193 times, or 9.1%.  The fact that more than three-times as many workers were 
recruited with kinship ties to skippers (9.1%) as opposed to vessel owners (3%) underscores the 
dominant role the former played in the recruiting process.  Although it is hard to be precise about 
the motivations of labor recruiters, it appears that kinship played a smaller role than gender, age, 
or race in the selection of crews.  A majority of the time labor recruiters were very particular 
about who could work in the industry, and by-and-large they chose young, white, male, non-
family members to go to sea with them.59   
 Kinship may have played a minor role in labor recruitment in the cod fisheries because 
skippers and merchants did not want to subject their family members to the rigors and dangers of 
deep sea fishing.  Christopher Prince’s father, for example, who was a seaman-turned-farmer, 
knew that commercial fishing was by no means an easy way to make a living.  Indeed, that is 
precisely why he allowed his son to join a cod fishing company in the first place.  According to 
Prince, who ended up not pursuing a career in commercial fishing, his father acknowledged “he 
had hopes from the commencement by my going a fishing would wean me from pursuing” a life 
at sea.60  Fathers like Prince’s wanted a better, easier life for their sons. 
                                                 
59 87.9% of the time labor recruiters chose non-family members to go to sea with them based on the above 
calculation of surnames.  If we were to double the 12.1% to roughly estimate female kinship ties, then the total 
would be 75.8%.   
60 Crawford, ed., The Autobiography of A Yankee Mariner, 18. 
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There was a demographic shift throughout eighteenth-century British North America, 
particularly in Massachusetts fishing ports, that enabled labor recruiters to find alternatives to 
family labor.  The total population in New England grew from 22,900 in 1650 to 170,900 in 
1720, realizing slightly more than a 7.7-fold increase.61  Between 1650 and 1725, fishing ports in 
Essex County, Massachusetts experienced a ten-fold increase in population.62  Salem, Beverly, 
Manchester, and Gloucester grew from a combined population of 3,500 in 1690 to 16,000 in 
1765.63  Within this county-wide expansion, Marblehead experienced the fastest growth.  Some 
1,200 people lived there in 1700, one-third the number in nearby Salem.  As early as 1720, the 
two ports housed 2,000 people apiece.64  By 1744, one observer estimated that 5,000 people 
lived and worked in Marblehead.65  By comparison, Boston’s population expanded from 6,000 in 
1690 to 17,000 in 1740.66  This growth virtually eliminated the endemic labor scarcity that 
plagued New England during the seventeenth century, enabling employers to discriminate in 
their hiring practices and dip into local labor pools for help.67   
As distinct from merchants and skippers, laborers in the commercial cod fishing industry 
in colonial Massachusetts oftentimes had no alternative but to take their family members with 
them to sea in the same vessel.  Mothers and wives may have wanted their sons and husbands to 
work on separate vessels in order to lessen the risk of losing multiple loved ones in a storm or 
work-related accident.  However, the same demographic shift that enabled labor recruiters to 
                                                 
61 McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789, 103, Table 5.1. 
62 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 156. 
63 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 211. 
64 Heyrman, Commerce and Culture, 245. 
65 Carl Bridenbaugh, ed., Gentleman’s Progress, The Itinerarium of Dr. Alexander Hamilton, 1744 (Chapel 
Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1948), 5. 
66 Gary B. Nash, The Urban Crucible: Social Change, Political Consciousness, and the Origins of the American 
Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 54-55.  For more on this population growth, and the 
causes behind it, see chapter three. 
67 For more on the localism of eighteenth century labor recruitment in the cod fisheries, see Vickers, Farmers 
and Fishermen, 166; and Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women, 145-216. 
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discriminate in their hiring practices also worked against laborers by generating 
underemployment.  As soon as there were more men in Massachusetts than jobs, a chronic and 
lasting problem emerged in maritime communities as it had in farming communities.68   
 When a skipper required hands, workers grabbed their out-of-work relation and joined 
the company in need.  James Andrews and Daniel Andrews shipped together on the Polly for the 
summer fare out of Ipswich in 1774.  John and James Bowden joined the company of the 
Marblehead schooner Barnett for a fall fare in 1773.69  James and William Jones joined the 
company of the Gloucester schooner Britannia for all three fares in 1772.70  Jeremiah and 
Jonathan Foster joined the company of the Beverly schooner Swallow for two fares in 1771.71  
Benjamin Peters and his son, Benjamin Jr., joined the company of the Salem schooner Lucretia 
for the second and third fares in 1765.72  Out of 1,608 individual berths between 1752 and 1775 
for which there is sufficient data, slightly more than half (53.7%) of the time at least two 
crewmembers shared the same surname.  12.7% of the time there were two kinship ties between 
the crewmembers.  However, only 3% of the time there were three such ties on board.  Clearly, 
horizontal social networks among fishing crews were denser than the vertical networks between 
crewmembers and those responsible for labor recruitment in the industry.  And this was not the 
only difference between skippers and the rest of their fishing companies. 
 
 
                                                 
68 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 187-188; and Robert A. Gross, The Minutemen and Their World (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1976), 78-79, 86-89.  Gross describes the farming community of Concord, Massachusetts as 
“an economy of increasing scarcity in an environment of spreading blight” on the eve of the American Revolution.  
Ibid., 88. 
69 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
70 John Stevens Account Book, 1769-75, JDPL. 
71 Thomas Davis Account Book, 1771-78, JDPL. 
72 Miles Ward Ledgers, 1765-1772, JDPL. 
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2.3 LABOR HIERARCHY 
Enlarged local labor pools combined with new vessel design to widen the labor hierarchy in the 
cod fisheries, expanding the gulf between the skipper and the rest of his crew.  Schooners such as 
the Polly began replacing smaller shallops around the turn of the eighteenth century.73  They 
were typically 20 to 100 tons in burden, “two-masted oceangoing craft – thirty-five to sixty-five 
feet in length and fully decked with a raised forecastle or cabin abaft.”74  Whereas seventeenth 
century fishing vessels were typically manned by three, mostly experienced fishermen, 
eighteenth century vessels averaged seven-man crews.75  Larger crew sizes brought increased 
variation in age and skill, and by the middle of the eighteenth century there was a hierarchy in 
                                                 
73 The origins of the schooner are as yet obscure.  John J. Babson, a Gloucester, Massachusetts native, first 
placed the time and date of the schooner’s birth at precisely Gloucester, 1713, owing to the unsubstantiated claim of 
Captain Andrew Robinson, another native of Gloucester.  John J. Babson, History of the Town of Gloucester, Cape 
Ann, Including the Town of Rockport (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith Publisher, Inc., 1972; orig. pub. 1860), 248-
255.  In succession, McFarland, Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Jennie Barnes Pope, Innis, and Vickers followed 
Babson’s lead.  McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries, 82; Robert Greenhalgh Albion and Jennie 
Barnes Pope, Sea Lanes In Wartime: The American Experience, 1775-1942 (New York: W.W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1942), 20; Innis, The Codfisheries, 166; and Vickers, Young Men and the Sea, 75.  However, 
William Avery Baker forcefully contends: “The story of the supposed invention of the schooner in Gloucester about 
1713 need not be repeated here, for the schooner rig…existed before that date.”  William Avery Baker, “Vessel 
Types of Colonial Massachusetts,” in Seafaring In Colonial Massachusetts: A Conference Held By the Colonial 
Society of Massachusetts, November 21 and 22, 1975 (Boston: The Society; distributed by the University Press of 
Virginia, 1980), 19.  For his part, Peter Pope has referred to the ketch, “a small, seaworthy, beamy, flush-decked, 
double-ended vessel” developed in the mid-seventeenth century, as “a protoschooner.”  Pope, Fish Into Wine, 153.  
The most systematic effort to get at the schooner’s origins can be found in Basil Greenhill, The Merchant 
Schooners, 2nd ed., (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1988; first published in 1951), 6-14.  Greenhill argues 
that, “as far as it is possible to tell,” the brigantine evolved into the schooner over “the course of the eighteenth 
century.”  Ibid., 6.  However, he notes that schooners may have been derived from similar Dutch models dating from 
the turn of the seventeenth century.  For similar arguments that the schooner rig was not first designed in America, 
see William M. Fowler, Jr., Rebels Under Sail: The American Navy During the Revolution (New York: Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1976), 265, footnote #17; and Howard I. Chapelle, The Search for Speed Under Sail, 1700-1855 
(New York: Norton, 1967), 11. 
74 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 145.  By comparison, shallops averaged six tons burden in 1676.  Ibid., 
121n.   
75 Boatmasters, or steersmen, and midshipmen tended to be more experienced, skilled laborers, while 
foreshipmen were usually unskilled boys and green hands.  These early workers were supported on shore by skilled 
laborers such as the splitter, header, and salter.  Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 123-125; and Pope, Fish Into 
Wine, 176-177, esp. Table 9n.  According to one seventeenth century observer at Newfoundland, “the boats’ 
masters, generally, are able men, the midshipman next, and the foreshipmen are generally striplings.”  Quote taken 
from Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, 3.  The average crew size was 7.4 men.  This figure was calculated 
from sources listed above in footnotes 34-43. 
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the commercial fisheries with skippers at the top, sharesmen in the middle, and cuttails at the 
bottom. 
 There were important differences that separated skippers from the rest of the crew.  First 
and foremost, commanders of fishing vessels were skilled in the art of navigation.  They were 
responsible for taking daily observations, recording the speed and direction of winds and ocean 
currents, writing down depth levels, noting the condition of the sea and weather, and calculating 
longitude and latitude.  Moreover, skippers were charged with plotting a course to and from the 
home port and the fishing waters.76  Such knowledge distanced a skipper from his crew in the 
same way that it separated a merchant captain from his tars. 
 Skippers had a variety of responsibilities that further set them apart.  They were expected 
to use their navigational skills and experience to make arguably the most important decision of 
an expedition: where to fish.  They were accountable for assembling the crew, counting each 
cuttails’ catch of fish, in addition to the total fish count for the vessel, and setting watches at 
night.   
 These duties are reflected in the log books for fishing vessels.  Unfortunately, a log for 
one of the schooner Polly’s fishing expeditions has not survived.  John Lovett, commander of the 
schooner Volant, went on a typical fishing expedition from Beverly, Massachusetts to the fishing 
bank off Sable Island in late April, 1769, on what was a spring, or first, fare.  In the first log 
entry for Friday, April 24, the weather turned “cloudy…and foggy, with Souther[ly] Winds.”  It 
soon began to rain and Lovett ordered “our fore Sail” reefed in preparation for a hard blow.  
“The Wind veered to the Westward and Cleared of[f],” however, and Lovett “Saw the Sun.”  
                                                 
76 For evidence of fishing skippers’ knowledge and practice of navigation, see George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-
1774, MHS; log of the schooner John, 1762; schooner Ruby, 1788; schooner St. Peter, 1793; Microfilm #91, Reel 
68, JDPL; and the log of the schooner Nancy 1795-96, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL. 
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Early the following day, with wind beating from the “NW” and “Cloudy Weather most part of 
the time,” Lovett headed the schooner “EBS” in order to make “our Course due East.”  The 
skipper noted that “the Wind [beat] at NBE” until “6 of the Clock in the morning.”   At that 
point, “the wind veered to the Westward and She made her course EBN; and at 8 of the Clock in 
the morning [headed] ENE till 10 of the Clock; and then Came up to NE1/2E and Run so till 12 
of the Clock.”  After a sailing time of three days, Lovett recorded his position as latitude 43°N 
27’ and longitude 62°W 08’, on the southwest corner of Sable Island Bank.  With “Northerly 
winds and Cloudy Weather…We Laid too till 4 of the Clock and Caught about 130 fish and then 
bore away and we run under our [w]hol[e] Sails till 8 of the Clock in the morning and the wind 
veered out to the Eastward.”   
 On Monday, April 27, the crew of the Volant experienced “Westerly winds and rainy 
weather.”  Lovett ordered the crew to lower “our fore Sail,” and the schooner ran thus until “6 of 
the Clock in the morning.”  At this point, the skipper ordered “Soundings on the Western 
ground,” or the outer edge of Sable Bank.  He found they were “in about 50 fathoms of Water.”  
Lovett noted that the men “tried all day and caught but one fish and Spoke with a Cape Anne 
man.”  That night, the skipper “Laid her too under her fore Sail and Set the Watch and Went to 
Cabin.”  Before his head hit the pillow, Lovett recorded their position as latitude 43°N 32’ and 
longitude 59°W 42’.  The following day, he observed: “This 24 past Cloudy Weather and 
Westerly Winds and fish Very Scarce; and Spoke With a Cape Ann Man and at Night Laid her 
too under two Re[e]fs Fore Sail.”  The crew stayed on the Sable Bank for the next four weeks.  
On June 1 “We hove up on the Western ground and bore W to go home; all Well aboard; at 12 of 
the Clock the Western End of Newfoundland bore NNE, Distance 15 miles.”   With winds 
blowing “EBN” and the current running “WBN” the Volant headed toward Beverly and reached 
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the port after a quick, uneventful sailing time of six days.77  The very fact that skippers were 
literate and kept such log books separated them from the rest of the crew. 
 Skippers and sharesmen were further separated from the cuttails by age, experience, and 
earnings.  The skipper typically earned the same amount as the sharesmen on these fishing 
expeditions.  Both types of workers were in most cases above the age of twenty-one.  These men 
had prior experience on board a fishing vessel, were considered skilled laborers, and were 
guaranteed five-eights of the profits from the sale of the catch to the outfitting merchant.78   
 Younger, inexperienced, and therefore less productive, cuttails earnings were different.  
They were only guaranteed the promise of a flat rate for every fish they caught, plus a small 
annual wage that was referred to as “gratis money,” earnings that were separate, or free, from the 
count of their fish.  In addition, cuttails’ earnings were deposited in accounts controlled by older 
family members, usually a father or mother, but sometimes an older sibling.79  The cuttails were 
divided again by their age and ability, and their earnings usually reflected these characteristics.  
“Stumps” typically were at the bottom of the cuttails, and earned the least.  “Swallows” were 
next in line, then “doubles.”  At the top of the unskilled hierarchy, with earnings that typically 
outpaced the others, was the “single.”  Occasionally, one of the lower cuttails could outwork his 
unskilled shipmates and earn more as a result.  On William Knight’s Marblehead schooner Molly 
                                                 
77 Log of the schooner Volant, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
78 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 161, 173-174. 
79 Ibid.  Vickers does not discuss gratis money, but evidence that it was provided to younger workers can be 
found in William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL; and Thomas Pedrick Account Book, 1760-1790, 
MDHS.  For example, William Knight’s Marblehead schooner Molly left after September 22, 1767, on a fall fare.  
The vessel was manned by a seven-man crew, including four sharesmen and three cuttails.  Of the later, Samuel 
Andrews, the “single,” caught fish worth £12.2.8, plus £0.8.0 in gratis money (in inflated colonial Massachusetts’ 
currency).  Thomas Salter, the “double” caught fish worth £10.17.3, plus £0.8.0 in gratis money.  Christopher Oaks, 
the “swallow,” caught fish worth £6.7.10, plus £0.5.0 in gratis money.  Such a small annual wage had been provided 
to younger, less-skilled workers in the Newfoundland fisheries since at least the seventeenth century.  Pope, Fish 
Into Wine, 175, 186-187.  Pope suggests that the introduction of the wage in this manner eventually led to “the 
broader trend to a greater emphasis on wages in the remuneration of skilled workers.”  Ibid., 187.  Thus, the use of 
gratis money among eighteenth century New England merchants can be seen as an attempt to convert the industry to 
a wage system.   
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in 1768, the stump, Samuel White, earned more for the fall fare than the swallow, William 
Courtis; and the double, John Chin Knight, earned more than the single, Thomas Salter, Jr.  On 
the same schooner in 1775, the stump, Robert Courtis, earned more for the spring fare than the 
swallow, Elias Hammon.80  These were exceptional cases, however.   
 Occupational mobility within this eighteenth-century labor hierarchy is difficult to 
determine.  No record exists describing the precise way in which workers were promoted.  In 
merchant ledgers, the best surviving source, it is possible only to determine the rank of a 
crewmember in those rare instances when the trader took the time to list the rank after the man’s 
name, or when the crew went on the share system.  There is evidence to suggest that vessel-
owning merchants were involved in deciding who was promoted from sharesman to skipper.  
John Chin Knight, for example, worked for his relation William Knight of Marblehead on the 
schooner Molly as a double in 1768.  He then worked as a single on Knight’s schooner Barnett 
for five fares between 1769-70.  In the fall fare of 1770, John was promoted to sharesman.  He 
worked as sharesman for the next three years until he made skipper of the Barnett in the fall fare 
of 1773.  He remained skipper until the outbreak of the Revolutionary War.81  Thus, promotion 
probably depended on the vessel owner’s will as much as the sharesman’s whim.  Almost 
universally, new skippers had worked as sharesmen for vessels with the same owner.  Phillip 
Babson worked as a sharesman on John Stevens’ Gloucester schooner Victory before being made 
skipper in 1770.  John Barker did likewise on Richard Pedrick’s Marblehead schooner Molly 
before being made skipper in 1769.  John Carwick worked as a sharesman on Timothy Orne’s 
Salem schooner Esther before being made skipper in 1766.  In general, such upward mobility did 
not occur frequently and was not widespread in the commercial cod fishing industry.  There were 
                                                 
80 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
81 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
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too many workers and too few skipper positions.  Moreover, the navigational skills and 
knowledge necessary for the skipper position had to be learned and paid for.  Adults could take 
classes with teachers such as Benjamin Bangs, and children could do formal apprenticeships with 
sea captains to learn the “Art, Trade & Mystery of Navigation.”82  Like the “lower sort” among 
Philadelphia’s eighteenth century laboring community, occupational mobility was possible to 
achieve but it was not common.83 
 The advancement of a cuttail was most likely decided on over hard cider or rum in a 
local tavern following an expedition.  The loyalty of fishing companies to particular outfitters 
had declined in the eighteenth century partly as a result of merchants’ unwillingness to extend 
credit on liberal terms to any employee, regardless of their tenure.84  This situation further 
weakened the vessel owner’s control over promotion within the ranks of a particular company.  
Given the general lack of vessel owners’ involvement in labor recruitment at the lower levels, it 
is certain that skippers enjoyed a great deal of authority in deciding which cuttails were 
promoted to the rank of sharesmen, and when.  It is also possible that the skipper relied on the 
collective agreement of the experienced hands when it came time to make such a decision.  
Every additional sharesmen decreased the size of individual shares, which meant these 
experienced hands would have had a vested interest in deciding who was added to their ranks.  
                                                 
82 For evidence that older men took classes from teachers, see Benjamin Bangs Diary, 1742-1765, MHS.  For an 
actual apprenticeship, see Aaron Parsons, Sr., Shipping Papers, Box 8, Folder 7, JDPL, esp. “Shipping records for 
Captain Paul Dolliver, 1750-1770.”  On October 10, 1759, Thomas Groves “a Minor aged fifteen years” and 
resident of Gloucester “bound himself” to Paul Dolliver “Gloucester Mariner, to learn his Art, Trade & Mystery of 
Navigation.”  Groves agreed to serve Dolliver, his wife Rachel, and his heirs, for the term of “six years.” 
83 Billy G. Smith, The “Lower Sort”: Philadelphia’s Laboring People, 1750-1800 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell 
University Press, 1990), 126-149.  According to Smith, “Occupational mobility among mariners was no better than 
it was among either laborers or journeymen cordwainers and tailors.  The promotion of a common sailor to ship’s 
officer was extremely rare.”  Ibid., 142.  Vickers maintains a more positive view of promotion rates with respect to 
Salem’s colonial merchant marine.  He calculates that between 1745 and 1759, 49% of all Salem-born seamen 
became mates and 27% became shipmasters.  Vickers, Young Men and the Sea, 112. 
84 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 162. 
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This decision was a complex one.  A skipper could recruit a larger crew for the next expedition 
by hiring a new cuttail to fill the void in the lower ranks.  Alternatively, the skipper could decide 
to use more sharesmen in the company.   However, given the fact that the ratio of sharesmen to 
cuttails remained fairly constant, thus ensuring a steady flow of coin and credit into sharesmen’s 
pockets, it is probable that one advanced into the sharesmen ranks only when an experienced 
hand left, died or was fired.85  In short, we can surmise from the surviving evidence that cuttails 
were hired young and seasoned over a period of years during which older sharesmen passed their 
prime and retired, willingly or no, got angry and left, or died.  After some experience, younger 
cuttails were promoted to fill any openings among the sharesmen.  Such an “informal 
apprenticeship mechanism” was also part-and-parcel to the Newfoundland fisheries.86  If, 
however, an ambitious cuttail came of age and there was no such opening on a particular vessel, 
then the young man might grow frustrated, leave the company and search for an opportunity on 
another schooner.   
 Once he had attained the rank of skipper and recruited a company, Burnham contracted 
with an outfitting merchant for employment.  In the summer of 1774, he made an agreement with 
Francis and John Choat in Ipswich.  This agreement may have been verbal or written.  In 1768, 
Marblehead’s selectmen maintained “that Fishermen ship themselves on board Fishing Vessels 
for such time & on such Terms as is verbally agreed on.”87  Yet, Gloucester merchant Ezekiel 
                                                 
85 On the Marblehead schooner Molly between 1767-69, there was an 8-man crew on six fares.  On all of the 
fares, the ratio of sharesmen to cuttails remained constant at 4:4.  Richard Pedrick Account book, 1767-1784, 
MDHS. 
86 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 173. 
87 “Petition of the Selectmen of Marblehead [To Governor Francis Bernard and the Massachusetts General 
Court] asking for the passage of an act relating to the Cod-fishery, with a copy of said act,” 1768, MSA Collections, 
Vol. 66, Maritime, 1759-1775, 406-409.  In place of this verbal agreement, which the selectmen believed led to 
“many Evils,” they proposed the following: “before they leave the Port or place to pursue such Voyage, the Owner, 
Skipper, & Crew shall sign a duplicate of an agreement in form following, viz. ‘These Present witness That [blank] 
being appointed Skipper of the Schooner called the [blank], [blank] owner, & [initials of the crew] crew on board 
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Woodward, Jr. agreed on paper on September 18, 1762 to “Engage to Give Joshua Burnham Six 
Pounds Thirteen Shillings and 4 [pence] for Each Thousand of Cod fish said Burnham Shall 
Catch on Board my Schooner [Abigail] this fall fare on the Banks & Bring home.”88  Also, in 
1758 the crew of the schooner Molly signed a written document with Salem merchant Timothy 
Orne agreeing to go “upon a Fishing Voyage in Said Schooner for the Next Season upon 
Common Share or upon Sell Fish.”89   
 While the agreement between Burnham and the Choats has not survived, perhaps 
because there was no written contract, most eighteenth century arrangements, verbal or 
otherwise, would have had the outfitting merchant agree to provide their vessel along with 
“great” and “small” general goods for an expedition.  Typically, the great general goods 
consisted of work-related necessaries for the trip: barrels of mackerel or clams for bait, barrels of 
water, hogsheads of salt, candles, hooks, lines, leads, extra sail cloth, powder, shot, gloves and 
mittens.  The small general goods were for the most part personal necessaries that made the trip 
less arduous: soap, brooms, brushes, cords of wood, paper, cider, rum, molasses, pepper, beans, 
                                                                                                                                                             
said Schooner for a Fishing voyage intended to be made in her from this day until the [blank] day of [blank] next, 
Do severally engage to perform their respective duties on board said Vessel during that Time, & the fish to be 
caught in her from time to time, to be brought home to [blank] & delivered to the said [blank] on order as Shoreman 
to cure & fill for market, which the said [blank] hereby engages to do & render to the said Skipper & Crew their 
respective shares or interest therein.  In witness whereof the said parties have herewith set their names this [blank] 
day of [blank] Anno Dom. [blank];’ and when any such crew shall be minors the said agreement shall be signed by 
their Parents or Guardians who shall have the care of such minors.”  The codification of labor agreements between 
merchant and laborer here are very similar to Parliament’s 1729 “Act for the Better Regulation and Government of 
the Merchants Service.”  For a discussion of the 1729 Act, see Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep 
Blue Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 121.  Throughout the seventeenth century in 
Newfoundland, labor contracts “were still normally oral, so that very few fishers’ contracts have survived.”  Pope, 
Fish Into Wine, 168. 
88 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Schooner Abigail, [c.1762], Box 1, Folder 1, JDPL.  The use of the 
collective plural “Banks” here, as opposed to a specific regional modifier, underscores the skipper’s role in choosing 
the location for fishing. 
89 Timothy Orne Shipping Papers, schooner Molly, 1758-60, Box 7, Folder 11, JDPL.  The share system and the 
count system, or “Sell Fish,” will be explained later in this chapter. 
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flour, beef, oil and lamps.90  In return, fishing companies consented to sell their catch exclusively 
to the outfitting merchant; return any unused great general goods; and pay for all small general 
goods that were used on the expedition.  Such an arrangement represented a considerable up-
front commitment and risk of capital on the part of the outfitting merchant.   
2.4 CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
In 1763, Robert “King” Hooper and Jeremiah Lee carefully calculated the costs involved in 
sending a fishing vessel and crew out to sea.  These men were eminently qualified to make such 
a calculation.  They were two of the foremost merchants involved in the fishing industry in 
Marblehead, Massachusetts, which at that time was the largest fishing port in colonial New 
England with regard to number of workers, fleet size, and capital outlay.91   
 The costs associated with commercial fishing were considerable.  Hooper and Lee 
reckoned “the first Cost of a Banker,” a vessel capable of working off-shore fishing banks, was 
£500.  In addition, the total capital outlay for outfitting a crew of 8 for one year was £635.  This 
figure included £160 for “Vessels ware & tare;” £195 for provisions used at sea; £40 for 
“Fishermen’s Clothing;” and £48 for “Fishermen’s provisions on shore at £6 per head.”  Also, in 
                                                 
90 The most detailed accounts for these items include: Thomas Davis Account Book, 1771-78, JDPL; William 
Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL; and Miles Ward Ledgers, 1765-1772, JDPL. 
91 As a demonstration of his wealth and power, Lee built an enormous mansion house in Marblehead in 1768.  
At a cost of £10,000, it was considered one of the most expensive homes in all of the colonies.  Hornsby, British 
Atlantic, American Frontier, 86-87; and Thomas Amory Lee, “The Lee Family of Marblehead,” Essex Institute 
Historical Collections, Vol. LII, (1916), 331.  Also, see figure 4 in chapter five.  Lee owned, at one time or another, 
45 ships, brigs, snows, sloops, and schooners.  At his death, he left an estate valued at £24,583.18.10.  Smith, ed., 
The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol.2, 665.  For his part, Hooper owned a mansion house, ropewalk, 
warehouse and wharf, in addition to many vessels.  Upon his death in 1790, Hooper’s estate, valued at £5,486.6.4 
was declared insolvent due to debt owed to London financiers Champion & Dickason amounting to £39,650.6.2.  
Ibid., 661.  For more on Marblehead’s size and importance, see chapter three. 
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recognition of the extent to which fishermen were involved in a debt peonage relationship with 
merchants, Hooper and Lee factored into the costs of sending a fishing crew to sea the sum of 
£192 for selling provisions and clothing to the fishermen’s family while they were employed.  
This last figure was based on the assumption that at least half of the 8-man off-shore fishing 
crew, most likely the older sharesmen, had “4 in his Family besides himself.”  In short, wealthy 
fish merchants viewed fishermen’s families as sunk costs that needed to be factored into the total 
capital outlay necessary for retrieving cod from off-shore banks.  These families bought goods 
on credit against their male relation’s future earnings.  Thus, a merchant had to be prepared and 
able to supply these items for one year without receiving payment.  In total, Hooper and Lee 
calculated the cost for purchasing a single banker and outfitting a crew and their family for one 
year to be £1,135.  In the year that Hooper and Lee made these calculations, Marblehead 
maintained “72 Bankers.”92  At the same time, Benjamin Pickman and Samuel Gardner, fish 
merchants from Salem, counted 301 “Vessels Employed in the Fishery in the Province [i.e. 
Massachusetts], Cod Fishing on the Banks.”93  Assuming that purchasing and manning these 
vessels cost their owners £1,135 per “banker,” the Massachusetts deep sea fishing fleet in 1763 
represented a total capital investment of £341,635.   
                                                 
92 “Calculations respecting outfits of a Fishing vessel,” December 1763, Ezekiel Price Papers, 1754-1785, 
MHS.  In 1755, £1,135 sterling was equivalent to $131,528.34 in year 2000 U.S. dollars.  John J. McCusker, How 
Much Is That In Real Money?  A Historical Commodity Price Index for Use as a Deflator of Money Values in the 
Economy of the United States, 2nd ed., (Worcester, Massachusetts: American Antiquarian Society, 2001), 35-36.  
Vickers writes that fishermen’s clothing typically included “heavy boots, woolen outerclothing, and thick canvas or 
leather aprons called barvels.”  Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 122.  Pope adds that their clothing was usually 
made from “kersey,” a “coarse, narrow, woven wool cloth, usually ribbed.”  In addition, fishermen typically wore “a 
hauling hand,” which was “a glove covering the palm, with the fingers protruding, used in handling fishing lines.”  
Pope, Fish Into Wine, 363, Table 25. 
93 Benjamin Pickman and Samuel Gardner of Salem, to John Rowe, Esq., and others Committee of the Society 
for Encouraging Trade & Commerce located in Boston, letter dated Salem, December 24, 1763, Ezekiel Price 
Papers, 1754-1785, MHS. 
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 Despite these expenses, fish merchants still turned profits.  In 1776, Massachusetts 
merchants calculated the “Loss On Income” that resulted from the first year of the Revolutionary 
War.  Business leaders factored into their calculations the profits they lost on each fishing vessel.  
In Cape Ann, for example, which included three deep-sea ports: Gloucester, Manchester, and 
Beverly, and four smaller ports: Chebacco, Annisquam, Sandy Bay, and Pigeon Cove, merchants 
figured that each of their “80 Sail fishing Vessels” brought in an annual net profit of “£100 
Each.”  Thus, the fishing fleet earned Cape Ann “£8,000” each year.94  At the same time, fish 
merchants in nearby Salem calculated an equivalent profit of “£100 Each” on their fishing 
schooners.  With “50 Sail,” these merchants figured the fleet brought into Salem “£5,000” each 
year.95  Assuming the same profits for the Marblehead fish merchants, and taking into account 
their “72 Bankers,” commercial fishing brought £7,200 net profit into port on an annual basis.  In 
other words, the fishing fleet cost Marblehead fish merchants £81,720 annually, and they earned 
£88,920 at the same time.  Thus, entrepreneurs in New England’s largest fishing port earned a 
net profit margin of 8% from fishing alone 
2.5 DEEP SEA COD FISHING 
Once the Choats had fully provisioned the Polly, Burnham and his crew set sail in June for the 
Grand Bank off Newfoundland.  The timing of their trip in the summer underscores the seasonal 
nature of life and work in the cod fisheries.  Eighteenth-century fishermen typically did not work 
                                                 
94 “Estimate of the Loss on Income & the Trade of Cape Ann from April 1775 to April 1776,” NDAR, Vol. 4, 
1323-24.  The Cape Ann merchants further factored into their financial loss “11,600 of superfine feet Wharf 
Useless” and “48 Warehouses Useless.” 
95 “Estimate of the Loss on Income and Trade for the Town of Salem,” April 30, 1776, NDAR, Vol. 4, 1324-
1325. 
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the Bank during the fall, winter, or spring months, because of dangerous temperatures, winds, 
and seas, combined with the prevalence of fog and icebergs in the region.96  At bottom, labor in 
the fishing industry involved man’s struggle and symbiotic relationship with nature.  On the one 
hand, fishermen fought to balance themselves on board wooden vessels caught in rolling seas.  
They tacked one way and another in order to make headway in the face of contrary winds.  The 
same workers also attempted to stave off cold, damp weather with thick clothing.  And a sudden 
storm could render meaningless anyone’s attempts to save the vessel from wrecking.  Yet, at the 
same time fishermen moved with the rhythms of nature.  As seasons changed, work patterns 
were altered.  As water temperatures altered, and cod stocks shifted, fishermen moved to 
different zones.  In these ways, Burnham and his crew would have fought with and learned from 
nature on their sea voyage. 
 Cod fishermen in eighteenth-century Massachusetts could have worked nearby waters on 
a year-round basis.  The fish do not leave the northwest Atlantic and migrate further to the south 
in the winter like certain fowl.  However, there is no evidence of an extensive winter fishery 
being prosecuted prior to the American Revolution.  The evidence that does exist suggests that 
winter fares could be difficult and dangerous, and they were rarely successful.  Benjamin Bangs 
worked on cod fishing expeditions out of Eastham, Massachusetts, and he did attempt to work 
inshore waters off Cape Cod in February 1743.  On this expedition, he encountered “a hard NE 
snow storm,” and a “Cold NW wind.”   Bangs observed that it was a “tuff time,” and that he and 
the other fishermen could “Catch but 3 Codfish.”  On the return trip, he encountered a “NE storm 
                                                 
96 According to Pope, the bulk of fishing activities were conducted off Newfoundland between May and July.  
Pope, Fish Into Wine, 21-29.  Also, see Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 104, 116.  One observer recorded “Lands 
of Ice” floating around Newfoundland between March-April, 1726, and further noted that this made it “very 
dangerous for those that are unacquainted.”  Quoted in Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, 73.  Head notes 
that a majority of the region’s gale-force winds come between December-March.  At the same time, the region 
experiences its highest number of days with precipitation and its lowest temperatures.  By contrast, June, July, and 
August typically maintain low precipitation, slight winds, and warm temperatures.  Ibid., 43. 
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of Rain and snow” and referred to the entire expedition as “a broken voyage.”97  In 1760, Robert 
Hooper, Jr., a fish merchant from Marblehead, petitioned the Massachusetts General Court in 
order to be reimbursed for a rescue mission.  A “Number of People” were working the waters 
around Sable Island when they were “cast on Shore on said Island and in Danger of perishing by 
the Severity of the Winter, unless relieved.”98 
 The majority of eighteenth-century Massachusetts fishermen, including the crew of the 
Polly, went to sea in the spring, summer, and fall.  Fishing schooners were generally taken out of 
home ports in March and April to catch spring fare on the first expedition of the year.99  In 1753, 
Timothy Orne gave orders for John Felt, a skipper who was working as captain of a merchant 
vessel, to “Be sure to get Ready to Come away by the Last of January if Possible that so you may 
be at home timely for The Spring Sable [Banks] Fare, which is of more Consequence than the 
Maryland Voyage.”100  Leaving the Southern colony for home between January and February 
would have allowed Felt and his crew enough time to catch the first fare off Sable Island. 
 
                                                 
97 Benjamin Bangs Diary, 1742-1765, MHS.  Bangs had better luck working these inshore waters between 
March 23 and April 23 in 1743. 
98 JHRM, Vol. 38, Part II, 278. 
99 Trefts asserts “the cod season began in mid-winter (February) and continued virtually year-round.”  Trefts, 
“Canadian and American Policy Making in Response to the First Multi-species Fisheries Crisis in the Greater Gulf 
of Maine Region,” 209.  I have seen no evidence of fishermen leaving in February to go to the banks. 




Figure 2:  Northwest Atlantic Fishing Grounds A. 101 
 
During the eighteenth century, fishermen often frequented the waters between Canso Bay 
in Maine and Sable Island, located southeast of Nova Scotia, 300 miles east of Maine’s coast, or 
around four days sailing time (Compare Figure 2 and Figure 3).102  Raymond McFarland 
describes the Sable Island Bank as “elliptical in form with a length of 156 miles and a width of 
                                                 
101 McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries, 11. 
102 Trefts, “Canadian and American Policy Making in Response to the First Multi-species Fisheries Crisis in the 
Greater Gulf of Maine Region,” 206-211; Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 148-149.  Indeed, one of the fishing 
grounds off the coast of Maine was named “Marblehead Bank.”  McFarland, A History of the New England 
Fisheries, 12.  According to Rawlyk, the number of Massachusetts’ schooners operating at Canso Bay declined from 
its height of 223 in 1729 to “only a handful” in 1744.  Rawlyk, Nova Scotia’s Massachusetts, 130-131. 
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56.”103  Workers traveled here whether it was the spring fare, the summer fare, or the fall fare 
that ended in October or November.  If they did not have good luck, then, like the Polly in 1774, 
Massachusetts men headed to the “eastward” toward the largest known feeding and spawning 
ground of Atlantic cod, the Grand Bank (See Figure 3).104  McFarland notes that the Bank “is 
roughly triangular in shape, one side facing N.N.E., another S.W., and the third about E. by S.  
North and south it extends from below the parallel of 43° to beyond that of 47°; its width is 
between the meridians of 48° and 54°, giving it an area of 37,000 square miles, or more than that 
of the state of Indiana.”105  At this point in time, no other part of the Atlantic Ocean teemed with 
cod like the Grand Bank. 
                                                 
103 McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries, 14. 
104 For other examples of eighteenth century Massachusetts’ schooners traveling to the Grand Bank in the 
summer months, see George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS; schooner Ruby, 1788; schooner St. Peter, 1793; 
Microfilm #91, Reel 68, JDPL; and the log of the schooner Nancy 1795-96, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL.  
Alexander Coffin, a Massachusetts fish merchant, wrote in 1782: “From Cape Sable to the Isle of Sable and so on to 
the Banks of Newfoundland, are a Chain of Banks, extending all along the Coast, and almost adjoining each other, 
and are those Banks where our Fishermen go for the first Fare, in the early Part of the Season.  Their second Fare is 
on the Banks of Newfoundland, where they continue to Fish till prevented by the tempestuous and boisterous Winds, 
which prevail in the Fall of the Year on that Coast.  Their third and last Fare is generally made near the Coast of 
Cape Sables or Banks adjoining thereto, where they are not only relieved from those boisterous Gales, but have an 
Asylum to fly to in Case of Emergency, as that Coast is lined, from the head of Cape Sable to Halifax, with most 
excellent Harbors.”  L.H. Butterfield, ed., The Adams Papers: Diary & Autobiography of John Adams, Volume III, 
Diary 1782-1804 and Autobiography through 1776 (New York: Atheneum, 1964), 74.  According to Pope, “Gadus 
morhua [cod] occupies an ecological niche near the top of the marine food chain, preying on crustaceans and capelin 
or other small fish, which graze in turn on plankton.  Plankton boom around upwellings of cold, nutrient-rich waters.  
Hence, summer concentrations of cod occur where the southward-trending Labrador Current encounters 
Newfoundland’s promontories, shoals, and islands and exactly where the fishing stations and settlements of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were located.”  Pope, Fish Into Wine, 24. 




Figure 3: Northwest Atlantic Fishing Grounds B. 106 
 
 After a passage of ten days sailing time, during which the younger cuttails probably cut 
mackerel and clams into bait while the experienced sharesmen swapped stories, Burnham and the 
crew of the Polly reached this magisterial stretch of the ocean and dropped anchor.107  They 
would have taken soundings before breaking the water with hand-lines, lead weights, bait, and 
                                                 
106 McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries, 14. 
107 Burnham did not record his particular sailing time on this fare.  The average sailing time from Beverly, 
Massachusetts to the Grand Bank in the late eighteenth century was taken from the log of the schooner St. Peter, 
1793, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 68, JDPL; the log of the schooner Nancy, 1795-1796, Ship’s Log 
Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL; and the log of the schooner Lark, 1771, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-
1774, MHS.  By comparison, it took migratory fishing fleets an average of five weeks to travel from their ports in 
England’s West Country to Newfoundland in the eighteenth century.  Ian K. Steele, The English Atlantic 1675-
1740: An Exploration of Communication and Community (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 82. 
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hooks.  John Thistle, skipper of the Beverly schooner St. Peter, had the crew take a sounding on 
September 16, 1793.  They reported they were in 75 fathoms “on the grand Bank.”  Later that 
day, the St. Peter’s crew reported a dept of “60 fathoms of warter.”108  Skipper John Groves of 
the Danvers schooner Nancy and his crew came to anchor on the Grand Bank at latitude 45°N 7’ 
and longitude 52°W 7’ in July, 1795.  They sounded a depth of 36 fathoms.109  George Stevens 
simply noted that on “Thursday the 28 day of April 1774,” his crew “got Soundings on the Grand 
Bank.”110  By recording ocean depths, fare after fare, year after year, skippers were able to 
accumulate knowledge about where fish could be caught.  Such maritime knowledge could 
separate the successful fares from the broken voyages. 
 Burnham and company worked the Grand Bank from Sunday June 26, 1774 to Friday 
July 15, 1774.  Joshua Burnham took 927 cod; Samuel Burnham, 2,000; Peter Edwards 1,913; 
George Pierce, 1,797; Stephen Low, 1,668; James Andrews, 1,573; Daniel Andrews, 1,384.  In 
all, the 7-man crew took in a catch of 11,262 cod.111  Between 1675 and 1775 there was a 75% 
increase in the average catch-rate-per-man in the New England cod fishing industry, from 45 to 
79 quintals, as a result of the transition to schooners and larger crews.112   
 Deep sea fishing had a reputation as being very physically demanding.  A Boston writer 
referred to it as “one of the most laborious employments.”113  Christopher Prince described the 
work as “the most trying of any employment.”114  Fishermen worked a grueling, near continuous 
                                                 
108 Log of the schooner St. Peter, 1793, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 68, JDPL. 
109 Log of the schooner Nancy, 1795-1796, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL. 
110 Log of an unnamed schooner, 1774, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
111 Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Box 1 Shipping Papers, 
JDPL.  By comparison, the earlier English migratory fishery at Newfoundland averaged over 20,000 fish on 
expeditions lasting 56-70 days.  Pope, Fish Into Wine, 23. 
112 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 100, 154, esp. Table 4. 
113 Boston Evening Post, November 28, 1763. 
114 Crawford, ed., The Autobiography of A Yankee Mariner, 16. 
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schedule for as long as they stayed on the banks.115  Vickers estimates men worked 18-20 hours 
per day in the inshore fisheries, and “most of the day and frequently in turns throughout the 
night” in the offshore fisheries.116     
 Entire crews hand-lined for cod while working off shore.  According to Prince, “when 
we come across a school of fish, every one is anxious to get as many as any of his shipmates.”  
Each man dropped two lines, usually thirty to fifty fathoms in length, over the vessel’s bulwark 
and waited for the lead weights to carry the hooks and bait close to the ocean bottom where cod 
feed.  They then anxiously lingered for a bite, and their patience was not always rewarded.  The 
frustration of fishing unsuccessfully can be felt in Prince’s words on the subject.  He worked the 
Banquereau, or “Quero,” Bank off the east coast of Nova Scotia for two years, and later wrote: 
At one time we came among a large quantity of fish, and they were hauling of 
them in, almost every one but myself, without any intermission, and I could not 
get one.  If I felt a bite, it was only to rob my hooks of their bait, and sometimes I 
would hook one and get it near the top of the water and then it would break off.  
After experiencing many of these trials, which I bore for some time with Christian 
patience, I at last gave way and for the first time in all my life I uttered a profane 
word.117   
A more fortunate fisherman hauled up his catch using wooden hand-frames and the bulwark for 
leverage.  A single cod could weigh from five to a hundred pounds, and, in rare instances, could 
                                                 
115 John Groves and the crew of the schooner Nancy worked on the Grand Bank for 46 days between July-
August, 1795.  Log of the schooner Nancy, 1795-1796, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL.  Skippers 
George Stevens and Thomas Woodberry, together with their respective crews worked on the Grand Bank for 52 
days between June-August, 1770.  Log of an unnamed schooner, 1774, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, 
MHS.   
116 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 122, 150. 
117 Crawford, ed., The Autobiography of A Yankee Mariner, 16, 18.  McFarland describes Banquereau as 
“another important fishing bank with an area of about 2,800 square miles.”  McFarland, A History of the New 
England Fisheries, 14.  Prince further noted that “For many days I wept in private for what I had said.  But not long 
after that I was several times placed in the same situation and repeated the same words without any remorse of 
conscience; and thus I continued again and again until it was done without a thought I had done wrong.  I soon 
neglected prayer entirely and reading the Bible.”  Ibid., 16-18.  Thus, Prince blamed the nature of work in the 
commercial fishing industry for his impiety. 
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exceed two hundred pounds.  Cod tongues were taken out and separated for each of the more 
experienced men.  Younger crew members cut the tails of fish with different marks, such as 
stumps, swallows, doubles, or singles, to indicate their catches.  The marked and de-tongued cod 
was then tossed into a container nearby.   
 When the container began overflowing men stopped hauling cod out of the ocean and 
began processing the catch.  Seventeenth-century cod fishermen did not have room in their 
smaller shallops to process the catch at sea.  Instead, they were forced to take each haul to shore 
to be processed on stages, or short wharves located near chosen fishing grounds.  Men such as 
Burnham and his crew, on the other hand, utilized the larger schooner as a floating stage.  Part of 
the crew stood on the schooner’s deck splitting cod bellies open, ripping out guts, cutting-off 
heads and tails, and then removing spines.  The marked tails were presumably returned to their 
owner for the purposes of counting.  Fishermen carefully removed the cod’s liver to be converted 
into a lubricating oil for various machines, or “trains.”  Hence, the name “train oil.”  Other parts 
of the entrails were converted into bait.  Workers, most probably the younger cuttails, also had 
the unsavory job of going down into the schooner’s dank bowels to receive the filets.  They 
lightly salted the filets and stacked them in the hold.  This light salting was part one of a two-
stage curing process.  The entire crew then repeated the process for as long as they were 
physically able, or until the schooner’s hold had been filled.118   
                                                 
118 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 150-151, 173-174; quote taken from 150.  The practice of sounding before 
fishing was routinely noted in the log books mentioned above in footnote #104.  For more on seventeenth-century 
fishing techniques in Massachusetts, including shore work on stages and the lower-limit for cod weight, see Ibid., 
123-126.  For the middling weight, see Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, 5.  For the upper limit of cod 
weight, see Innis, The Codfisheries, 4.  According to Innis, cod “weight tends to grow less as one goes north” in the 
Atlantic Ocean.  Ibid., 5.  For more on seventeenth-century techniques in the English fishery at Newfoundland, see 
Pope, Fish Into Wine, 22-29, esp. Plate 2.  Pope notes that the technology used in hand-lining for cod was medieval 
with the exception of the wooden hand-frames for winding the line.  For the eighteenth century, see Head, 
Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, 72-74.  For more on sixteenth and seventeenth century off-shore French 
techniques on the Grand Bank, see Innis, The Codfisheries, 48.  Dories were not widely used in the cod fishing 
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 In essence, the eighteenth century schooner functioned as a floating factory.119  These 
hardy vessels were not merely used to transport workers to and from off-shore banks.  Nor were 
they used exclusively to freight fish to markets.  Schooners were utilized in these ways and more 
as workers began using the combination cure.  The first component in the two-part curing 
technique involved beheading, gutting, boning, and lightly salting filets at sea on board the 
schooners.120  In this way, schooners represented work-spaces in a double sense.  They aided in 
catching fish, which was part of the commercial process.  In addition, schooners played an 
important role in the conversion of fresh fish into a saleable commodity, which was part of the 
manufacturing process that took place on the banks themselves.  
 Cod fishermen ran many physical risks working these off-shore banks to secure a 
commodity for their outfitting merchants.  Even those born near the sea, such as Christopher 
Prince, needed time to season themselves to life and work on rolling waves and pitching 
decks.121  Prince, who sailed out of Kingston, Massachusetts, recorded on his first fishing fare to 
unspecified “banks” off Nova Scotia that “after we passed the point [“the race point of Cape 
Cod”], I became so seasick I could not go off the deck, and I should not [have] struggled any if 
they hove me overboard!”  He lay prostrate and ill on the schooner’s deck “for three days.”122  
                                                                                                                                                             
industry until the nineteenth century.  See, Andrew A. Rosenberg, W. Jeffrey Bolster, Karen E. Alexander, William 
B. Leavenworth, Andrew B. Cooper, and Matthew G. McKenzie, “The history of ocean resources: modeling cod 
biomass using historical records,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, Vol.3, No.2, (2005), 85, Figure 1.  
The cod trap displaced hand-lining in the late nineteenth century.  I am grateful to Daniel Finamore, Russell W. 
Knight Curator of Maritime Art and History at the Peabody Essex Museum, for providing me with a copy of this 
article.  Pope, Fish Into Wine, 25n. 
119 Rediker has seen the merchant ship as a floating factory.  Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea, 
83-87, 111-113.    
120 The second part, the drying, is described in a subsequent section here, and the combination cure is discussed 
further in chapter three. 
121 Vickers has argued that the reason fishermen and merchant mariners went to sea in the first place was that 
they had grown up near the ocean and work on the water was simply a natural part of life.  Vickers, Young Men and 
the Sea.  This might be the case.  However, it still took time for young men such as Prince to get used to the ocean’s 
nature and acclimatize himself to work upon the waves. 
122 Crawford, ed., The Autobiography of A Yankee Mariner, 14. 
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The repetitive, laborious exertions needed to continuously pull heavy cod out of the depths more 
seriously wore on mortal bodies.  Vickers has quantified the extent to which an individual cod 
fisherman’s productivity declined at age thirty, following years of rigorous work.123  Work-
related accidents further took their toll on fishermen’s bodies.  Lovett recorded that while the 
crew of the schooner Volant was off the coast of Newfoundland on “Wednesday the 18th Day of 
October 1769,” fisherman “Paul Haskell Spl[it] the pan bone of his knee by falling with his 
[illegible] on fore Scuttle by a Sudden pitch of the Vessel.”  The following day they “hove up 
and bore away to carry Paul Haskel home; and William Herrick is Lame, by putting his knee out 
of joint.”  The constant and “sudden” movements of a wooden vessel on the ocean were enough 
to displace and even break a man’s bones.124  Such physical dangers explain why many fishing 
ports in Newfoundland maintained at least one surgeon in the eighteenth century, following the 
development of an off shore fishery there.125   
Fishermen encountered all sorts of foul weather while working on the offshore banks of 
the Northwest Atlantic littoral that made their work that much more dangerous.  Joshua 
Burnham, now working out of Gloucester for Daniel Rogers on the schooner Ruby, was fishing 
“on the Grand Bank” on Friday, September 19, 1788.  Two days later, the Gloucester crew “hove 
up our anchor” and headed for Cape Anne.  At 2 a.m. Tuesday, September 23, 91 leagues west of 
the Grand Bank, the Ruby was hit by “a hard Galle of wind at S.S.E” that forced the crew to reef 
sails.  By 10 a.m. there was “wind at S. By W. hard Gale.”  Twenty-four hours later, “the wind 
abated” and they headed “S.B.W. under 4 Reefed fore Sail.”  According to the next observation 
                                                 
123 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 178-180, esp. Figure 2. 
124 For more on the separate but related dangers associated with inshore fishing, in which two or three men went 
out in a small vessel to catch fish on a short time schedule, see Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 124.  Vickers notes 
that over 50% of inshore fishermen that went to sea between 1645-1675 died in work-related accidents on the deep 
125 Trinity had five surgeons in the late eighteenth century.  Jerry Bannister, The Rule of the Admirals: Law, 
Custom, and Naval Government in Newfoundland, 1699–1832 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 147. 
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in Burnham’s log, they were only 82 leagues west of the Grand Bank following the gale-force 
winds.126  John Thistle observed “thick weather” when he and his Beverly crew were “on the 
grand Bank” in mid-September, 1793.  On the return to Massachusetts that same fare, Thistle 
“spoke with a Cape Ann man from the grand Bank.  He had lost all of his cables and anchors” in 
a sudden storm, presumably related to the “thick weather” noted earlier.127  In 1769 George 
Stevens left Beverly on a spring fare to the Sable Island Bank.  Near latitude 42°N 51’ and 
longitude 59°W 40’, southeast of Sable Island, on Wednesday March 4, Stevens observed “this 
24 [hours] past fine winds and Cloudy weather with Some Squalls of Snow.”  On Thursday, 
March 5: “This 24 past moderate breeze of wind and Clear weather.”  Then, near latitude 43°N 
21’ and longitude 59°W 10’, he encountered “rainy weather.”  Later, on the return trip back to 
Beverly, at latitude 39°N 23’ and longitude 68°W 47’, he observed “these 24 [hours] past hard 
winds so that we was obliged to Scud.”128  Afterward, Stevens and his company set sail from 
Beverly to Banquereau Bank on a first fare in April 1774.  The men only caught “some” cod 
there, however, and they put-off for the Grand Bank at the end of the month.  En route, Stevens 
observed “fresh gales with plenty of rain and Cold Weather.”  At another time, on a fall fare to 
Banquereau Bank in mid-August, he observed “foggy, misty weather.”129  According to Vickers, 
adverse climactic conditions cost colonial fishermen “one to three full days” of work each week 
during the eighteenth century.130  One horrified English migratory fisherman attempting an early 
trip to the Grand Bank in March, 1670 observed artic winds and waters that turned his vessel into 
“a lump of ice.…the water freezes as soon as it comes on decks, not for our lives able to loose a 
                                                 
126 Log of the schooner Ruby, 1788, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 68, JDPL. 
127 Log of the schooner St. Peter, 1793, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 68, JDPL. 
128 Log of an unnamed schooner, 1769, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
129 Log of an unnamed schooner, 1774, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
130 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 122.   
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knot of sail, all things are so frozen….God help us, we are very fearful.”131  As late as May, 
Newfoundland merchant Samuel Prince encountered “nothing but hard gales & contrary winds & 
snow storms the chief of our passage” from Boston to St. Johns.  “For my part,” he wrote to 
Boston merchant Isaac Clarke, “I began to think we had mistaken the season of the year & left 
Boston in January instead of May, so much for our passage.”132 
 Such bad weather contributed in different ways to the work-related dangers fishermen 
faced.  Several newspapers in New England reported in 1766 the effects of storms at sea on 
various sailors and fishermen.  Included in these accounts was the description of “the Bodies of 
two Men” that had washed up on the shore off Sable Island near the wreck of a schooner, “which 
by their Dress appeared to be Fishermen.”133  A Worcester, Massachusetts newspaper reported 
hearing from Boston of a “violent storm of the 19th” of November, 1783.  “Since which several 
other dead bodies have been taken up, which appear to be fishermen.”134  Shipwreck could also 
occur as a result of collision, usually when larger vessels failed to spot fishing vessels moored on 
the banks at night.135  Accounts of drowned fishermen were never big news, meriting only a few 
sentences in the back pages of newspapers.  Yet, such accounts were not uncommon.136  Men 
were also reported “lost” or “drowned” while working on the offshore banks in vital records 
pertaining to deaths.137  Between January, 1768 and June, 1770, “Twenty-four” fishing vessels 
                                                 
131 Quote taken from Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, 2.  For a later first-hand account of fishermen 
encountering ice-flows on the Grand Bank in 1726, see Ibid., 73. 
132 Letter from Samuel Prince to Isaac Clarke, dated Trinity, Newfoundland, June 21, 1766, MHS. 
133 Boston Evening Post, June 23, 1766; The Boston News-Letter and New-England Chronicle, June 26, 1766; 
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Marblehead fisherman.  Chin was “washed over[board] in [a] spring fare,” in 1745.  EVREC, Vol. 2, 515.  Similar 
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from Marblehead alone, along with “One hundred and seventy Men and Boys,” were “lost at 
Sea.”138  Outfitting merchants may have risked a large amount of capital in fishing expeditions.  
However, workers risked life and limb - especially in bad conditions. 
 The work of deep-sea fishing impacted laborers not only physically, but psychologically 
as well.  Vickers has emphasized the ways in which gloomy weather and physical separation 
from family members generated a sense of isolation and melancholy loneliness among colonial 
fishermen.139  To be sure, most skippers were separated from their family members, and 
fishermen in general probably felt the dreary effects of inclement weather more than others.  Yet, 
there were strong kinship ties among crewmembers that may have mitigated separation anxieties. 
 In addition, there are other reasons to believe the psychological effects of deep-sea 
fishing, particularly with regard to loneliness, have been overestimated.  For example, there was 
a fairly constant circulation of knowledge among eighteenth-century fishing fleets regarding how 
long a crew had been at sea, where they had worked, and how much fish they had caught.140  
When John Groves and the crew of the Danvers schooner Nancy were not taking soundings on 
the Grand Bank in 1795, they “Saw and spoke” with “several” other fishing vessels.  “No fish on 
the Bank was all the News then Extant,” Groves reported.141  On a fall fare to Canso Bay off the 
                                                                                                                                                             
in a Schooner belonging to Mr. Samuel Knight for the Grand Bank and never been heard of Since,” in 1815.  John 
Courtis was also on Knight’s schooner.  Ibid., 524.  One of Chadwick’s relations, another Charles, “Drowned on 
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the Crew of the Schooner Ocean lost on the passage from the Grand Bank” in 1840.  Ibid., 511.  One of his 
relations, Thomas P. Caswell, “drowned on Grand Bank, Schooner Zela,” in 1846.  Ibid., 512.  
138 By the Honorable Thomas Hutchinson… (Boston: Richard Draper, 1770), Early American Imprints, Series I: 
Evans #42125. 
139 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 181-182. 
140 For evidence of this circulation of knowledge in the nineteenth-century fishing industry, see Rosenberg, 
Bolster, Alexander, Leavenworth, Cooper, and McKenzie, “The history of ocean resources: modeling cod biomass 
using historical records,” Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment, 84-90. 
141 Log of the schooner Nancy, 1795-1796, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL. 
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coast of Maine, on Oct. 27, 1796, Groves “spoke Joseph Woodbury [in the] schooner Rachel.”  
Woodbury, who was returning from Canso, reported having 23,000 fish on board.  Three days 
later, the Nancy’s skipper “spoke Nathaniel Black, Bound home” with 32,000 fish.142  While on 
the Grand Bank in late April, 1774, George Stevens observed “Saw a Ship to the Southward; 
Saw two Marblehead men; Spoke with one of them; He told us he had been from home Six 
weeks and had a hundred quintals of fish.”143 
 In addition, colonial Massachusetts skippers frequently “saw” and “spoke” with other 
vessels on their journeys across well-traveled Atlantic shipping lanes.  In a particularly detailed 
log, John Lovett, skipper of the schooner Volant, sailed from Cape Ann to Sable Island and then 
on to Banquereau Bank between April 23-28, 1769.  On four of the six sailing days to the Bank 
the skipper spoke with other vessels.  For three of the six days they sailed in company with 
another schooner.  He observed “at 9 of the Clock Saw S[to the south?] Sail of Schooners bound 
to the eastward.”  They then “veered out to the Eastward and Joseph Lovett and [?] Cox in 
Company with us.”  When he and his crew reached the Banquereau Bank, which lay “to the 
eastward” of the Sable Island Bank, Lovett observed “Spoke with a Cape Anne man.”  One day 
later, he “Spoke With a Cape Ann Man” a second time in as many days.  They then fished for 
one month.  Between June 1-7, Lovett and his crew sailed home from Banquereau Bank.  On 6 
of the 7 days the skipper spoke with other vessels.  On his way home to Cape Ann, he observed 
“spoke with small schooner belonged to Cape Anne and bound to the [Sable] island.”  Later, he 
observed “saw a Marblehead fisherman and Spoke with him and he told us that there Was 
thirteen or fourteen Sail of their fishermen Lost [as a result of a storm] as they thought.”  On the 
following day, “Saw Several Sails of Schooners Laying away a-fishing, and Spoke with one 
                                                 
142 Log of the schooner Nancy, 1795-1796, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL. 
143 Log of an unnamed schooner, 1774, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
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Marblehead man.”  The next day, located in Longitude 65:56, Latitude 43:05, Lovett even 
stopped to give a “Cutthroat,” a knife used by fishermen to filet cod, to “John Bridgum of 
Marblehead.”  The day after, he “Saw two sails of Vessels.”   Then, Lovett “Spoke With Samuel 
Woodbury.”144  Thus, 10 of the 13 days sailing time involved in this fishing fare involved 
contact with men beyond the crew of the Volant.  Massachusetts fishermen even met maritime 
laborers on the banks who were en route from other countries, even as far as Russia.145  Of 
course, it is possible that the majority of crews were busy about their work and they did not 
fraternize during these encounters.  Yet, even if crewmembers kept their mouths closed and 
never socialized with fellow seafarers while their skippers exchanged information, the sight of 
other mortals navigating the deep combined with the proximity of other vessels and people from 
Massachusetts surely provided some emotional comfort. 
 Fishermen frequently left ports to go out on fares “in company” with other vessels.  In 
1770, George Stevens left Beverly on a spring fare to an unspecified “Bank” with “Iccabod 
Groves in Company with us.”  Stevens then went on a summer fare “Thomas Woodberry in 
Company with us.”  Together, Woodberry’s vessel and Stevens’ vessel worked waters around 
Maine’s Canso Bay and then off “the North Side” of St. John’s, Newfoundland.  Combined, the 
two fishing crews caught 55,903 fish.  For the final fall fare in September, the Beverly skipper 
went to Banquereau Bank, “Joseph Lovett in Company With us.”146  Later, on a 1774 spring 
fare, Stevens sailed from Beverly to Banquereau Bank, “with Jonathan Larkum, Commander of 
                                                 
144 Log of the schooner Volant, 1769, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
145 Log of the schooner Nancy, 1795-1796, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL.  On the way home 
from the Grand Bank, John Groves observed: “spoke the William of Salem, Captain Benjamin Bickford from Russia 
76 days out.”  While returning from the Grand Bank, John Thistle observed on Friday, November 2, 1793: “spoke 
with a brig from Malaga, [Spain] bound to Boston.”  Then, on their way from Beverly to the Grand Bank on 
Saturday, September 7, 1793, Thistle made contact with “two Manchester [England] schooners.”  Log of the 
schooner St. Peter, 1793, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 68, JDPL. 
146 Log of an unnamed schooner, 1770, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
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Schooner Benjamin.”  Stevens must not have had much luck in the area, for the Beverly skipper 
soon left the Banquereau Bank for the Grand Bank.  This time, Stevens recorded, “Samuel 
Masury in Company.”147  Apparently, Stevens and Masury commiserated on Banquereau and 
decided to try their luck at the Grand Bank.  For his part, Larkum and his crew did not join the 
two vessels as they headed eastward.  Asa Woodbury, skipper of the schooner Lark, left Beverly 
on a spring fare to “the Western Ground” of an undisclosed off-shore bank, “Jonathan Larkum in 
Company With us.”  One “evening,” Woodbury “Spoke with John Wallis,” who was on another 
fishing vessel.  The following summer fare, Woodbury left Beverly in late June and “got up to 
St. John’s Newfoundland; John Wallis in Company.”  Clearly, Woodbury and Wallis were on 
close enough terms to speak and work together.  Off the coast of Newfoundland, near “Matleen 
Island,” the two skippers “Saw several other Vessels a fishing.”148   
 In sum, commercial cod fishing does not seem to have been a very lonely occupation in 
the eighteenth century.  Sharesmen and cuttails would have had family members on board with 
them, and these kinship ties would have helped ameliorate home sickness.  The documented 
conversations between skippers provided them with some fraternization at sea.  Within well-
traveled shipping lanes, and on common fishing grounds, the near constant proximity of other 
crews and familiar vessel names would have served as physical reminders of home.  In addition, 
colonial crews occasionally went to sea in fleets, literally in company with their fellow town 
members.  These factors certainly mitigated the isolation of work at sea. 
                                                 
147 Log of an unnamed schooner, 1774, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
148 Log of the schooner Lark, 1771, George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS. 
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 On Saturday July 16, the crew of the Polly weighed anchor and “sailed from the Grand 
Banks for home.”149  Assuming they encountered good weather, their return trip would have 
been one week longer than their voyage out, seventeen days on average, due to contrary westerly 
winds.150  In total, then, fishermen traveling to and from the Grand Banks in the late eighteenth 
century could expect almost a month of sailing time. 
 Time was a crucial element in processing raw fish and getting it to market.  Early 
modern fishermen were governed by the pressures of the marketplace every bit as much as urban 
industrial workers, if not more so due to the perishable nature of their particular commodity.151  
In an age lacking refrigerated holds, cod flesh taken out of the ocean began to decompose almost 
as soon as it was removed from the ocean.  Fishermen salted cod filets at sea in order to delay 
this natural process.  They then waited for a full hold before leaving the offshore banks and 
heading home to finish the curing process.  This delay, coupled with carrying times, placed great 
pressure on fishermen to catch, process, pack, and transport cod to home ports as quickly as 
possible.  Fishermen’s earnings were directly tied to the price their catch could command in the 
marketplace.  More will be said about these earnings shortly, but spring fare merchantable grade 
                                                 
149 Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Box 1 Shipping Papers, 
JDPL.   
150 The average sailing time from the Grand Bank to Beverly, Massachusetts in the late eighteenth century was 
taken from the log of the schooner St. Peter, 1793, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 68, JDPL; the log of the 
schooner Nancy, 1795-1796, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL; the log of the schooner Lark, 1771, 
George Stevens Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS; and the log of an unnamed schooner, 1774, George Stevens 
Logbooks, 1768-1774, MHS.  Again, by way of comparison, the West Country migratory fishing fleets routinely 
faced homeward bound travel times of three weeks.  Steele, The English Atlantic, 82.  In sum, it took the fleets that 
sailed out of England longer to reach Newfoundland than it did to sail home.  The opposite was the case for New 
England fishermen, due primarily to wind speeds and ocean current direction. 
151 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 117, 119-123, 127; Pope, Fish Into Wine, 171-172; and Fernand Braudel, 
The Structures of Everyday Life: Civilization & Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, Volume 1, translated by Siân 
Reynolds, (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1979), 217.  According to Braudel, as early as the sixteenth 
century French cod fishermen in Olonne, near La Rochelle, engaged in a “race” every year to see which crew could 
make a fare to the Grand Bank and return the quickest.  “The winning captain,” Braudel writes, could earn “as much 
as 60 livres” for every quintal, while those selling their fish thereafter stood to make only “30 livres.” 
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dried cod typically commanded the best prices on an annual basis.152  Fish caught in colder 
weather tended to stay fresh for longer periods of time.  Those who could not get to the banks 
early could make up for this with additional trips.  As a result, fishermen raced to get to off-shore 
grounds first, and most often, each year.  Moreover, such time-related pressure did not abate as 
the year progressed.  For, if markets became glutted, then prices could decline rapidly.  Thus, 
there could be a near constant demand to get as much fish as possible to market as quickly as 
possible.  On November 14, 1795, the schooner Nancy weighed anchor and “sailed from Grand 
Bank Bound for Beverly.”  Skipper John Groves prayed “God send us a fast passage to our 
Destined port.”  Despite the weather and work-related accidents that could hinder his passage, he 
did not pray for safe passage home.  Even late in the year, speed mattered most to those 
fishermen seeking the best prices, and thereby the best earnings with which to feed families.153  
If there was any negative psychological effect linked specifically to commercial fishing in the 
Age of Sail, then it was surely the stress associated with the time discipline that was part-and-
parcel of even this early modern industry.154 
                                                 
152 Daniel Vickers, "The Price of Fish: A Price Index for Cod, 1505-1892," Acadiensis, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring, 
1996), 62-81. 
153 Schooner Nancy, 1795-1796, Ship’s Log Books, Microfilm #91, Reel 3, JDPL.  Emphasis my own. 
154 For more on the relationship between time management and modern, capitalistic, commercial enterprise, see 
E.P. Thompson, Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New York: The New Press, 1992), 
esp. ch. 6, “Time, Work-Discipline and Industrial Capitalism,” 352-403.  Thompson argued that “fishing and 
seafaring peoples” maintained “a disregard for clock time,” as opposed to urban industrial laborers.  Ibid., 357.  His 
interpretation on this score may reflect a broader view of English working peoples as politically backward-thinking, 
or “inarticulate,” prior to the turn of the nineteenth century.  For more on this view, see his seminal work, The 
Making of the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1963), quote taken from 85.   
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2.6 BACK IN PORT 
Once Burnham and his company returned to Ipswich from their summer fare, the 11,262 cod 
they took would have been unloaded in order to complete the drying process.  In the seventeenth 
century, fishermen would have built flakes, open-air wooden platforms, for air-drying the fish on 
some shoreline near their preferred fishing waters.155  In the eighteenth century, by contrast, 
workers using the combination cure air dried the cod filets that had been processed at sea back at 
their home port.  On the docks, carters and day laborers in the outfitting merchant’s employ 
carried the wet-salted fish filets and cod livers that had been packed in hogsheads to the 
merchant’s flakeyard.  These yards typically included all the elements necessary for dry-curing 
cod: flakes or fences, train vats, fish houses and nearby warehouses.  Train vats were large 
containers in which shoremen rendered cod livers into oil, which then spilled through spouts into 
barrels.156  Fishermen used a fish house to pile dried cod in stacks.  Weighted down, any 
additional moisture was squeezed from the fish.157  After the filets had dried properly, they were 
packed and salted in hogsheads and stored in warehouses until they were loaded onto vessels for 
overseas transport.   
 Merchants could own and maintain all of these means of production – ships, flakes, 
warehouses, or they could rely on independent contractors.  In 1773, Marblehead merchant 
William Knight paid a fee to Archibald Selman to use his fish house “for drying.”  At various 
other times, Knight rented fences “for drying” from neighbors Abigail Orne, Jane Bray, and 
                                                 
155 Vickers only describes the labor involved in drying cod during the seventeenth century.  Vickers, Farmers 
and Fishermen, 124-126.  He does not discuss the ways in which the drying process changed as a result of the shift 
toward schooners and the combination cure beyond noting that schooners “functioned as a floating stage.”  Ibid., 
150. 
156 Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, 3-4, esp. Figure 1.1. 
157 A picture of an early-twentieth century fish house filled with cod stacks can be found in Albert Cook 
Church, American Fishermen (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1940), picture 210. 
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Captain William Courtis.  On additional occasions, Knight charged “drying” fees for use of his 
flakeyard and rental fees for “hiring” his fish flakes.158  Idle means of production meant reduced 
profits. 
 At the flakeyard, shoremen, who could be the merchants themselves or paid employees, 
were in charge of processing cod livers in vats and properly drying the filets on fish flakes.  The 
cod was to be turned flesh side up during the day in sunshine and skin side up at night or during 
rain, as too much moisture could ruin the curing process.159  The method had its imperfections.  
Too-lightly salted portions of the catch habitually rotted on the return voyage and filets 
improperly dried spoiled.  The process therefore yielded filets that had to be sorted according to 
their saleable quality.   
 Once the filets had been completely cured, the outfitting merchant employed a culler to 
separate the dried cod into the merchantable grade, or the freshest, most properly dried fish; the 
refuse, or Jamaica, grade, the most rotten fish still deemed eatable; and a middling grade in 
between the two extremes.  Francis Felton culled fish for Marblehead merchant William Knight 
between 1769-1774.  Felton charged Knight three shillings five pence to cull 82.5 quintals of fish 
in November 1771; three shillings nine pence to cull 90 quintals of fish on June 30, 1772; three 
shillings eleven pence to cull 94.75 quintals of fish on December 8, 1773; and five pence to cull 
10.5 quintals of fish on July 20, 1774.  Given that a quintal equaled 112 lbs. dry weight, Felton 
earned one pence to separate two quintals, or 224 lbs. of dried cod, between 1771 and 1774.160  
John Bickford culled fish for Salem merchant Timothy Orne between 1764 and 1767.  In 1767, 
                                                 
158 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
159 The duties of shoremen in this regard did not change between the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries.  
For the seventeenth century practice, see Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 125.  For the early twentieth century, see 
Church, American Fishermen, pictures 211 and 212. 
160 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
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Bickford earned £0.10.5 for culling 250 quintals of fish, which amounted to the same earnings as 
Felton in Marblehead some years later.161      
 On occasion culling was not contracted out.  Independent fishermen (men who owned 
their own small boats, worked alone, and sold fish to merchants in exchange for goods and lines 
of credit) typically culled their own fish.  John Standly culled his own fish before selling it to 
William Knight in 1771.  Standly then charged Knight for culling services in addition to the fee 
for the fish.  Benjamin Darling did likewise in 1772, as did Phillip Goudy and Benjamin Ashton 
one year later.162  Thomas Rand culled and sold fish to Gloucester merchant Daniel Rogers in 
1771.163 
 At other times, outfitting merchants culled fish themselves.  Knight sold merchantable 
and Jamaica grades to Thomas Gerry, Jr., between 1772 and 1774.  Knight, like Standly, charged 
for culling fees in addition to the fish fee.   He also culled and sold fish to Robert Hooper in 
1772.  One year later, he culled and sold merchantable and Jamaica grades to Captain John 
Prince.164  In this manner, Knight lowered his operating costs and thereby raised his profit 
margin. 
 Separated grades of fish were then weighed before being sold.  Some outfitters did their 
own weighing.  John Standly sold Jamaica and merchantable fall fare to William Knight in 1770, 
and Knight charged him £0.1.6 per quintal to "weigh & Labor" 144.75 quintals.  Joseph Abbot, 
another independent Marblehead fisherman, sold his catches to Knight between 1770 and 1773, 
                                                 
161 Timothy Orne Ledgers, 1762-1767, JDPL.  According to Vickers, refuse grade cod included “cod that was 
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and Knight charged him similar fees to weigh the fish.165  Captain John Reed bought 36 quintals 
from Marblehead merchant Richard Pedrick in July and November, 1771, and paid Pedrick a fee 
for weighing each time.  Joel Smith, John Carder and Captain Thomas Proctor did likewise in 
1774.166   
 Fish merchants could also contract out their weighing services.  In addition to culling 
fish, Felton weighed fish for Knight during the late 1760s and early 1770s.  John Bray, an 
independent Marblehead fisherman, sold his catches to Knight between 1771 and 1772.  Unlike 
Joseph Abbot, Bray weighed the fish himself and charged Knight £0.2.1 for 16 quintals.167  John 
Brown sold Marblehead merchant Thomas Pedrick thirty-four quintals of merchantable fall fare 
and thirty-five quintals of Jamaica grade in 1774, and he charged Pedrick for weighing services 
rendered.  John Cauley, John Bray, Samuel Chin and Philip and William Ashton did likewise.168 
Once the outfitting merchant knew how much and what type of fish he had to sell, as well 
as the current market price of each grade, a total value was placed on the catch.  At that point, the 
crew and the merchant sat down to reach a financial settlement.  If dried cod was in great 
demand in overseas markets (which was known principally through correspondence between 
merchants and through the reports of returning ship captains) and it could fetch a high price, the 
value of catches and worker’s earnings were adjusted accordingly.169  That is to say, these 
earnings would only be adjusted if workers operated on a share system.  Any left-over great 
general goods would be returned to the merchant.  The total cost of the small general goods for 
each fare would be divided among the crew and charged to their accounts.  If barrels of oil had 
                                                 
165 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
166 Richard Pedrick Account book, 1767-1784, MDHS. 
167 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
168 Thomas Pedrick Account Book, 1760-1790, MDHS. 
169 Vickers, "The Price of Fish: A Price Index for Cod, 1505-1892," 196. 
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been processed, each man would receive a share of the overall value of the oil.  In each annual 
settlement involving a share system, the fishing company’s portion of the value of the fish caught 
on each fare typically amounted to five-eighths.170  This five-eighths was then divided equally 
among the sharesmen in the fishing company, regardless of how many fish each man actually 
caught.  Their equivalent fish counts represented the vernacular calibration of rank, age, and 
experience.171 
At times, fishing crews went to sea on the count system.172  In this less customary, more 
capitalistic mode of labor discipline workers were given pre-arranged pay rates based on the 
number of fish caught.  Usually, men agreed on a rate per every thousand fish caught.  For 
example, Gloucester merchant John Stevens paid John Perry £19.12.10 for 3,272 fish caught on a 
single fare at £6 per thousand fish in 1771.173  In a rare instance in which the count system terms 
were contractually recorded, Gloucester merchant Ezekiel Woodward, Jr. agreed in 1762 to 
“Engage to Give Joshua Burnham Six Pounds Thirteen Shillings and 4 [pence] for Each 
Thousand of Cod fish said Burnham Shall Catch on Board my Schooner [Abigail] this fall fare 
on the Banks & Bring home.”174  Burnham and the crew of the Polly operated on a count system 
when they went to the Grand Bank in 1774.175  Such a system encouraged an ethic of aggressive 
competition among fishermen and can be seen as a form of piece-work waged labor, as workers 
effectively engaged in a wage agreement with merchants.  Moreover, customary distinctions with 
respect to earnings between skilled and unskilled labor virtually evaporated on the count system.  
                                                 
170 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 161. 
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If one man worked hard and got lucky he could catch a lot of fish and make more than another 
laborer, regardless of age or experience.  The only difference among the men at the start of the 
expedition was the fact that the skipper maintained the aforementioned additional 
responsibilities.   
 Neither system benefited all workers equally.  The share system privileged age over 
competency, while the count system ignored more customary benefits associated with seniority 
and tenure.  However, workers in the eighteenth century Massachusetts cod fishing industry 
preferred these two systems to “straight” wage labor.176 
 Workers in the cod fisheries did not typically earn straight wages during the eighteenth 
century.  There is modest evidence that such wages were introduced at Robert Trelawny’s failed 
attempt to establish a permanent resident fishing station at Richmond Island off the coast of 
Maine in the mid-seventeenth century.177  There is also evidence that John Stevens attempted to 
introduce straight wage labor among his Gloucester workers in the second half of the eighteenth 
century.178  Yet, for the most part cod fishermen had an aversion to straight wage labor.179  Such 
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antipathy was common among workers in other early modern industries.180  In order of usage, 
then, workers in the eighteenth century cod fishing industry went on the share system, the count 
system, and straight wages.181   
 Each form of payment represented a verbal or written contractual means by which 
merchants could discipline workers in the fishing industry.  The share and count systems, for 
example, gave workers a financial incentive to work hard and bring the fish into port as fast as 
possible.  More fish caught quickly meant higher prices and better profits for sharesmen, and 
those who went to sea “on the count” earned just as much money as they could catch fish.  The 
straight wage, on the other hand, stripped workers of any incentive to work hard or quickly.  
Whether they turned in a hundred cod or a thousand, fishermen received the same fixed wages.  
Straight wages did offer workers some protection from broken voyages and more predictable 
income, however, and straight wages appealed to those merchants in populous areas who were 
able to hire workers cheaply and thereby increase their profit margins.   
 The actual earnings fishermen made varied depending on which pay system was 
employed, the number of fish caught (which depended on a host of variables), and the price of 
cod.  However, on average, between 1750 and 1775, older, experienced hands typically earned 
£10-£20 per fare, three fares a year, while younger lads averaged £5-£10 per fare.182  Put another 
way, commercial cod fishermen could earn between £15-£60 for work in the spring, summer, 
and fall.  By comparison, men who worked as merchant mariners on trade ships typically earned 
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between £1.14.0-£2.18.0 per month.183  In Salem, Massachusetts in 1753, just before the Seven 
Years’ War, masters of schooners on trading missions earned £1.17.4 per month; mates £1.12.0; 
and mariners £1.6.8.184  In Ipswich, Massachusetts in 1774, on the eve of the Revolutionary War, 
similar masters earned £2.8.0 per month; mates £1.12.0; and mariners £1.6.8.185  For their part, 
waterfront workers such as carpenters earned around £1 per month.186  In general, between 1750-
1775, workers in colonial America earned £8-£40 annually, or £0.13.4-£3.6.8 per month.187  
Fishermen, then, earned slightly more on a yearly basis for catching cod than other laborers.  A 
small comfort when the labors and dangers affiliated with off-shore banks fishing are taken into 
account.     
 Burnham and the crew of the Polly did not reach a financial settlement with the Choats 
immediately after the summer fare in 1774.  The drying, culling, weighing and pricing took time, 
typically five to six weeks to properly cure the catch.188  Such a processing time effectively 
prevented fishermen from collecting earnings after each fare.  For, if they waited on shore during 
this time, then they could not go to sea to catch more fish.  Only during the winter months, when 
fishing fares were far less likely, could labor and capital take stock and come to a settlement.  As 
a result, fishermen were usually paid for their labors on an annual basis, typically in the first part 
of the year.  Marblehead outfitter William Knight routinely settled accounts in January and 
February.189  Gloucester outfitter John Stevens settled accounts with his fishermen in February 
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and March of every year.190  Gloucester outfitter Ezekiel Woodward, Jr. did contract with Joshua 
Burnham “to Pay him in Cash in Twenty Days after he Comes home” following the “fall fare on 
the Banks” onboard the schooner Abigail in 1762.191  But such an arrangement was outside the 
norm.   
 In the intervening months between financial settlements, merchants allowed laborers to 
buy goods on credit against their future earnings.  Workers in the commercial cod fishing 
industry typically bought goods for themselves such as rum, cider, spending cash, and various 
types of food, including molasses, bread, pork, sugar and tea.  They also purchased items for 
their wives or mothers, including silk handkerchiefs, chocolate, coffee, flour and additional 
spending cash.192  In the seventeenth century, credit was offered on easy terms and rarely sought 
after.  Yet, as the industry became increasingly capitalistic in the eighteenth century merchants 
became less willing to extend long-term and interest-free credit.  They also began suing debtors 
on a much more frequent basis.193  
The commercial cod fishing industry became increasingly capitalistic in the eighteenth 
century due principally to the fact that ownership of the means of production had shifted 
decisively into the hands of a few merchants.  For the most part, there were two essential 
productive means in the commercial cod fisheries: vessels, primarily schooners in the eighteenth 
century, and flakeyards.  The schooner was necessary for mining oceanic depths and beginning 
the process of converting raw catches into saleable commodities.  In the seventeenth century, 
40% of cod fishermen owned at least a share in fishing vessels.  In the years before the American 
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Revolution, that same figure had fallen to 2%.194  The declension in vessel ownership among 
workers underscores the general concentration of economic power in the hands of a relatively 
small percentage of the population that occurred throughout the colonies during the eighteenth 
century.195    
 Typically, vessels were not owned by a single individual.  Salem merchant Timothy 
Orne is a case in point.  He owned 5/8 of the schooner Sally, while Benjamin Osgood, who 
owned a flakeyard and dried fish for Orne, owned 2/8 and John Cloutman, the skipper, owned 
1/8.  Orne owned 1/2 of the schooner Louisa, while John and David Felt, who also owned a 
flakeyard and dried fish for Orne, owned 3/8 and Thomas Stevens, the skipper, owned 1/8.  Orne 
owned 1/2 of the schooner Esther and Benjamin Osgood owned the other 1/2  In fact, of all the 
vessels listed in his ship book for 1760, Orne only owned one vessel outright, the schooner 
Eunice.196  Ownership was divided among two or more investors in order to limit an individual’s 
capital investment, and thereby reduce risk.   Yet, despite this fact, overall vessel ownership and 
control over this means of production had constricted in the eighteenth century as economic 
power concentrated.    
 Flakeyards were also necessary for finishing the processing of raw fish into a product 
that could withstand long-distance transport.  These productive means had developed in port 
towns as a result of the shift toward an offshore fishery.  As mentioned above, they were large 
plots of land with different types of infrastructure.  The cost of the land, along with the 
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construction and maintenance of this infrastructure, effectively prohibited a majority of the 
working population from controlling any productive means.197 
 Some upward social mobility was possible in the commercial fishing industry given the 
right circumstances.  There were those who worked as fishermen and were eventually able to 
purchase flakeyards or shares in vessels.  Of the few fishermen who were able to reach the rank 
of skipper in the eighteenth century, roughly 17% then went on to purchase part of a vessel.198  
Family status and the earning potential that accompanied the role of skipper helped men achieve 
some measure of control over their lives and fortunes.  Benjamin Punchard, the son of a skipper, 
worked on board Salem merchant Timothy Orne’s schooners Molly and Esther as a cuttail and 
sharesman between 1753 and 1760 before he was able, possibly through an inheritance, to 
purchase a flakeyard.199  David and John Felt labored as sharesmen and skippers on Orne’s 
schooners Molly and Eunice between 1753 and 1767 before they were able to purchase a 
flakeyard.200  These men were the exceptions to the rule, however.  Most fishermen in the 
eighteenth century remained poor and productive means stayed beyond their meager purchasing 
power. 
The capitalist nature of the eighteenth century commercial fishing industry most 
benefited those who owned the means of production.  Vessel-owning merchants with their own 
flakeyards routinely earned a greater percentage from each fishing expedition than the workers 
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themselves.  They typically received 3/8 of the net proceeds from each catch.  The crew received 
5/8, but this was divided among, on average, seven men.  Thus, each fisherman usually received 
only 9% of the net profits after risking his life in dangerous working conditions on the offshore 
banks.  A Boston political writer who used the alias “Montesquieu” underscored this 
fundamental fact of the cod fishing industry when he noted in 1763 “that those who carry it on 
get to themselves but a bare subsistence.”201   
Vessel owners were not guaranteed financial success, to be sure.  They ran the risk of 
losing their capital investments in storms at sea.  In addition, they were responsible for any and 
all repair costs following each and every voyage.  Indeed, 2/8 of the vessel owner’s profits from 
each catch were specifically allocated to cover the wear and tear on the vessel.  Salem merchant 
Timothy Orne paid local sail maker Eleazar Moses £33 for the “making & mending” of the 
Esther’s sails on April 15, 1763.  On another occasion, August 12, 1765, Orne paid Moses £30 
for “making a New Suit of Sails.”  One year later, the Salem merchant paid local carpenter 
Josiah Cabot £3 for work on his schooner.  He also paid a Salem blockmaker named King £2 for 
materials; Samuel Lascombe, a Salem joiner, £7 for his “part of Joyner’s work of the Schooner 
Esther;” and Jonathan Mansfield, a Salem iron worker, the sum of £41 for work on the 
schooner.202  There is no doubt that entrepreneurs ventured and risked much in the fishing 
industry. 
 Yet, there was a difference between the contributions of workers and merchants to the 
fishing industry.  Maritime insurance could be purchased and vessel ownership could be divided 
in order to mitigate the risk involved with capital investment in the cod fisheries.  Moreover, 
repairs could be made and new vessels could be built.  Worker’s lives, by contrast, could not be 
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repaired or replaced.  As the 1763 journalist astutely noted, those who experienced the greatest 
risk benefited the least in the production of the single most valuable export commodity in all of 
colonial New England.   
2.7 SHIPPING COD 
Once a catch had been dried, culled and weighed, and the value of the catch had been factored 
into a ledger, cod was then packed in hogsheads for overseas shipping.  As with drying and 
culling, merchants could pay others for packing services or charge for these services.  On several 
occasions, William Knight paid Archibald Selman for “packing” cod from Selman’s “fish 
house.”  On August 16, 1773, he charged Knight £0.1.4 for packing 2 hogsheads of fish, or eight 
pence per hogshead.  Knight paid Joseph Homan for packing cod from Homan’s fish house into 
hogsheads in 1770.203  Isaac Smith, Esquire, sold Gloucester merchant Daniel Rogers 240.25 
quintals in 1772, and he charged Rogers eight pence per hogshead for packing thirty-one 
hogsheads.  In 1774, Rogers paid the Gorham brothers for “making” a fare and “packing” fish.204  
Yet there were occasions when merchants charged for packing services.  Captain Samuel Gale 
purchased primarily Jamaica grades of dried cod from Richard Pedrick between 1771-1775, and 
he paid Pedrick packing fees.  Captain John Nut, Captain William LeCraw and Captain William 
Blackler did likewise.205 
Carters then hauled the packed fish to the docks and loaded it onto waiting ships.  Dixey 
Morgan of Salem carted 100 quintals of fish for Marblehead merchant Richard Stacey at some 
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point in the late 1760s or early 1770s, and he deposited his earnings with Salem merchant Miles 
Ward.  At the same time, Nathaniel Peas of Salem carted fish for local merchant John Field, then 
deposited his earnings just as Morgan had done.206   
If vessel-owning merchants were short on ship space, then they could rely on others to 
transport their dried cod overseas.  Marblehead merchant Richard Pedrick paid freight charges to 
Captain Samuel Gale between 1771 and 1775 for shipping Jamaica grade dried cod to the West 
Indies.207  Similarly, Marblehead merchant William Knight paid Thomas Gerry, Jr., owner of the 
schooner Fox, to ship merchantable grade dried cod to southern Europe and refuse grades to 
South Carolina from 1772 to 1774.208  Gloucester merchant Daniel Rogers paid Newbury ship 
captain Ebenezer Parsons freight charges for transporting 400 quintals of undesignated “fish” in 
1786.209  Salem merchant Miles Ward utilized the talents of coasters Edward Smith and Samuel 
West, Jr. to freight various goods to Boston between 1765 and 1769.210  Dividing shipments of 
cod between their own vessels and those belonging to others also mitigated risks associated with 
transoceanic shipping. 
 Some merchants acted solely in the capacity of fish exporter, not bothering to venture 
capital in outfitting risky deep-sea fishing ventures that constantly wore and tore on men and 
vessel.  Wealthy vessel-owning fish exporters such as Jeremiah Lee of Marblehead purchased 
large quantities of dried cod, between 100-600 quintals at a time, from local suppliers, which 
could include other merchants, independent fishing companies and individual fishermen.  On 
April 28, 1771, Lee, who at this point was listed as “Colonel Jeremiah Lee, Esquire,” purchased 
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544 quintals of merchantable grade dried cod from Beverly merchant Thomas Davis.  Lee then 
compensated Davis for weighing services, and he even paid to have Davis hire men to cart the 
fish to his trade vessel.  What is more, in a currency-starved economy Lee paid for all of these 
things in cash that amounted to over £434.  This was a single payment made immediately on the 
day of sale.  Less impressive, Beverly exporter John Cabot purchased 216.5 quintals of 
merchantable fish from Davis on July 12, 1771.  Like Lee, Cabot paid Davis for weighing 
services, and he paid in cash.  Unlike Lee, Cabot paid Davis the £173 he owed later in August 
that year.  Marblehead exporter Jacob Fowles bought between 120 and 267 quintals of 
merchantable grade dried cod from Davis from 1771-1773.211  Fowles paid in cash for the fish 
and weighing services.  Michael Coombs, another Marblehead exporter, purchased 400 quintals 
of merchantable grade dried cod from Gloucester merchant Daniel Rogers in August, 1772.  Like 
the other wealthy exporters, Coombs was able to pay cash in the sum of £360.212  The largest 
shippers sent loads amounting to more than 2,000 quintals overseas.213  Such New England fish 
specialists could, at times, even import fish from Newfoundland for re-export in order to fill an 
overseas order.214   
 Other merchants who wore various hats and acted as outfitter, shoreman, and exporter 
only had to buy fish from other providers during a poor season.  Men such as William Knight of 
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Marblehead and Richard Derby of Salem owned their own vessels, which they used for fishing 
and trade, and their own flakeyards.  These men successfully integrated the various components 
of the commercial fishing industry.  They could mine the seas, dry the catches, and ship the end 
product overseas themselves.   
 Different types of dried cod traveled to different destinations around the Atlantic.  
Merchantable grades of fish were typically shipped to Iberian and Mediterranean ports in April 
and November to be exchanged for fish, wine, salt, and fruit.215  Refuse grades of fish were 
shipped in the winter months to fuel slave laborers on plantations in the Southern and West 
Indian colonies.  The southern colonies traded pork, tobacco, and naval stores, while the West 
Indian colonies exchanged sugar, molasses, and rum.  By the eighteenth century, the spring and 
fall shipments to Iberian and Mediterranean ports represented a minority of the fish trade.216  
Work patterns adjusted accordingly, and most shipments were made during the winter months to 
the slave plantations.  Merchants could then use trade goods received in exchange in their shops 
to sell to fishermen and other locals.  With the profits, they could purchase manufactured goods 
from Europe.  If a merchant acted in the capacity of outfitter, shoreman, exporter and shop 
owner, he turned profits at every stage of the fishing industry. 
2.8 EXPLOITATION 
For their part, workers in the cod fisheries experienced varying degrees of exploitation.  It has 
already been established here that no worker in the industry profited from his labors as much as 
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the merchants.  Indeed, most laborers remained in debt to these merchants.217  Having said this, it 
was generally the case that free laborers were less exploited than their un-free counterparts.  
Within the free labor group, skippers were the least exploited.  They generally earned more on an 
annual basis than other workers and a greater percentage were able to gain partial control over 
some of the means of production in the industry, as we shall see below.  Sharesmen were more 
exploited, earning less and having almost no financial wherewithal to control even the slightest 
part of any productive means. 
 Of all the free laborers in the commercial fisheries, cuttails were the most exploited 
workers.  The meager earnings of these child laborers were deposited in someone else’s account, 
one that usually belonged to a parent or an older sibling.  After applying to Governor Thomas 
Hutchinson in 1770 for relief following the deep sea deaths of 170 “Men and Boys,” Marblehead 
fish merchants observed “many Parents” in town were “deprived of the Earnings of their Sons, 
which was their chief Support.”218  Such parents typically purchased goods from nearby 
merchants against these earnings.  Take, for example, the Salter family in Marblehead.  Elizabeth 
Salter may have been a widow through most of the 1760s and early 1770s as she maintained her 
own account with merchant William Knight.  Given the patriarchy of the time and place, 
Elizabeth needed a man, Francis Felton, to witness her financial dealings with Knight.  Her sons, 
Thomas and Benjamin Salter, worked as cuttails on board Knight’s schooners Molly and Barnett.  
Elizabeth routinely deposited her two sons’ earnings in her own account and purchased 
provisions for the family, along with silk handkerchiefs, fabrics, and spending cash for herself, 
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against the product of Thomas and Benjamin’s labors.219  Widow Mary Foster deposited her son 
Jonathan’s earnings in her account with Beverly merchant Thomas Davis in 1771.220  Lucy 
Yonger likewise deposited her sons Levy and Willard’s earnings in her account with Gloucester 
merchant John Stevens between 1771-75.221  The widow Mary Glover had her own account with 
Salem merchant Timothy Orne from 1762 to 1766.  She bought goods against the earnings of her 
son Samuel.222  Benjamin Webber had an account with Gloucester merchant Daniel Rogers.  His 
son, Benjamin, Jr., worked on various schooners for Rogers between 1770-74.  The father 
deposited the son’s earnings and bought goods against those earnings until 1773, when 
Benjamin, Jr. became twenty-one and was old enough to open his own account with the 
merchant.  Fortunately for Benjamin, Sr., his younger son, Joseph, came of age about this time 
and provided purchasing power for the father.223  In short, younger workers in the fishing 
industry typically earned less than their adult counterparts and did not have control over their 
earnings.224   
 Unfree laborers similarly lacked control over their earnings, but they had even less 
power over their lives.  Servant labor was not as large a component of the New England 
commercial cod fisheries as it was in Newfoundland in the eighteenth century.225  On the eve of 
the American Revolution, however, there were still men who bound themselves to another 
human being for a specified amount of time.  Little is known about why these men did this and 
what they gained from the experience.  Most likely they were working off debts.  It is clear that 
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during this period of servitude workers’ earnings were deposited in their master’s accounts.  
Between 1770-72, two servants belonging to Captain Edward Hales worked on schooners 
belonging to Richard and Thomas Pedrick of Marblehead.  Hales’ account was credited for their 
labors.226  Other sea captains maintained servants and exploited their labor capacity in the fishing 
industry.  Captains John Reed, David Ross and John Lewis each had a servant employed with 
Richard Pedrick on fishing schooners in the early 1770s, and each received the earnings of these 
men.227  At the same time, Captain Nicholas Thorndike had a servant employed on one of 
Beverly merchant Thomas Davis’ schooners.228  Most of these servants worked as cuttails, and 
were probably young men who could not choose their employers or the type of work that they 
performed.  In rare instances, fishermen had servants of their own.  Robert Fry went on three 
fares for Salem merchant Richard Derby in 1756.  Fry’s servant worked shoulder-to-shoulder 
with him on the schooner Three Sisters.  Fry then deposited his own earnings, and those of his 
servant, into his own account.  After the fishing fares, Fry put his servant on a trade voyage for 
Derby and collected earnings from that work as well.229  The exploited could thus exploit others 
in a system that rewarded such behavior. 
 Slave labor was never an integral part of the New England cod fishing industry, largely 
because the region did not maintain a large slave population.  Yet by the 1760s and early 1770s, 
a few Massachusetts slaves contributed to the daily operations of this enterprise.  David 
Montgomery’s slave “Cato” worked on Beverly merchant Thomas Davis’ schooner Swan in the 
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early 1770s.230  In nearby Salem during the mid-1760s, Peter Frye forced “his Negro” to carry 
salt for local fish merchant Richard Derby, undoubtedly for use in curing fish taken on Derby’s 
schooners.  Frye charged Derby two shillings ten pence for the day’s labor, almost exactly what 
white day laborers earned in the area.231  In 1768 Captain Thomas Peach rented “his Negro 
Charles” to Marblehead merchant William Knight.  Charles “Carried [wheel]Barrows” for 
Knight in May and November, most likely transporting spring and summer fare cod to and from 
the merchant’s flakeyard.232  Similarly, Marblehead merchant Richard Pedrick rented his 
“Negro” to Joshua Orne “for house” work one day in December, 1776, just after Thomas 
Jefferson declared that all men had the right to liberty.233  These men were surely the most 
exploited laborers in the commercial fishing industry.  Slaves would have endured the loss of 
their liberty in addition to their earnings, and they would have experienced any racial antipathy 
that existed in an industry that was mostly white.  Regardless of their race or age, however, most 
of the workers in the cod fisheries experienced some degree of exploitation. 
2.9 MULTI-FUNCTIONAL OCCUPATIONAL IDENTITY 
Through their struggle to earn a living and feed their families, workers in the commercial fishing 
industry became jacks-of-all-trades.234  In addition to fishing on the Grand Bank, Burnham and 
                                                 
230 Thomas Davis Account Book, 1771-78, JDPL. 
231 Richard Derby Ledger, 1757-1776, JDPL. 
232 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
233 Richard Pedrick Account Book, 1767-1784, MDHS.  There were four references to free persons of color in 
Daniel Rogers Account Book, 1770-1790, JDPL.  Two of these men were sailors and the others were day laborers.  
They each had their own accounts with Rogers. 
234 Pope maintains that most workers in the seventeenth-century English migratory fishing industry were not 
full-time fishermen.  “The fisheries were an opportunity for dual employment no less than other rural industries like 
the production of cloth or the mining of tin,” he writes.  Pope, Fish Into Wine, 169.  For his part, Vickers believes 
  84
his crew took on merchant mariner positions for the Choats at the tail end of 1774, when cold 
December winds and waters made working the North Atlantic more perilous and less productive.  
The same vessel that had taken them from Ipswich to the Grand Bank fishing would now take 
them south on a trading voyage to warmer climes and slave plantations in Virginia.  The 
schooner Polly’s articles list Burnham, formerly the skipper of the same vessel, as master.  John 
Andrews signed-on as mate, while Stephen Low, Joseph Burnham and Daniel Andrews shipped 
as seamen.  Aside from the fact that George Pierce and Thomas Yates did not sign the ship’s 
articles for this voyage, the entire crew had previously gone deep-sea fishing.  Each man was 
entered on December 15, 1774.  There were three witnesses to “each Man’s Signing” the ship’s 
articles.  Their monthly wages were as follows: Joshua Burnham earned £2.8.0; John Andrews 
earned £1.12.0; and the others each earned £1.6.8.235  In this manner, the same vessel and 
roughly the same men continued working and earning for the same employer, and all of their 
labor activities helped prosecute the commercial cod fishing industry.  The Polly and her crew 
were not exceptional in this regard. 
 Eighteenth-century schooners typically served this dual purpose of fishing and 
trading.236  In Ipswich, the Polly itself was taken out on six fishing fares from 1772 to 1774.  
Over the same period, the schooner re-exported West Indian trade goods and freighted refuse 
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grades of dried cod to various ports in Virginia, Maryland, and the Carolinas.237  In December 
1761 the schooner Abigail was used to transport dried cod and other cargo from Ipswich to 
Virginia and Maryland.  The following September she headed out on a fall fare to unspecified 
“Banks.”238  Between 1768 and 1770 the schooner Neptune went out on at least five fishing fares 
in the spring, summer and fall seasons.  During the winter months, the same vessel left Ipswich 
and took dried cod to Dominica in the West Indies, and various ports in Virginia and 
Maryland.239   
 In Gloucester, between 1762 and the beginning of 1764, the schooner Endeavor went on 
at least four fishing fares.  Then, at the end of 1762 and 1763, the same vessel transported goods 
to ports in Virginia and Maryland.240  The schooner Hannah, belonging to Daniel Rogers, 
worked on fifteen fares from 1770 to 1774.  Every winter during this period, she traveled to 
Virginia on trade missions.  Rogers’ schooner George went on sixteen fares between 1770 and 
1775.  In December, 1771, she was used on a trade mission to Virginia.  The following winter, 
she transported trade goods to South Carolina.  The schooner Lucky went on a least five fares 
from 1770 to 1772.  At the end of 1772, she was used to transport trade goods to North Carolina.  
The schooner Liberty went on twelve fishing fares between 1770-73.  During the winter months 
of 1772 and 1773, she was used on trade missions to South Carolina and then the West Indies.  
The schooners Rachel, Fame and Two Brothers served similar duties during the early 1770s.241 
 In Beverly, schooners belonging to Thomas Davis were utilized in this dual capacity.  
Between 1771-73, the schooner Volant was taken out on nine fishing fares and three trade 
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240 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Schooner Dolphin, [c.1762-64], Box 1, Folder 1, JDPL. 
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voyages to Virginia each December.  The schooner Swallow did the same.  The Swan was taken 
on six fares between 1771-72, and made at least one trade voyage to Virginia at the end of 
1771.242   
 In Salem, Timothy Orne’s schooner Esther left in December, 1759 for a trade voyage to 
South Carolina and back.  For the next two Decembers, the same schooner was taken to 
Maryland on similar voyages.  In the winter of 1762, she was taken back to South Carolina.  The 
Esther was also taken on at least eight fares between 1760-63.243  Orne’s schooner Molly did 
double-duty over an extended period.  She worked twenty-five fares between 1752-56, six fares 
between 1758-59, and she was taken on a fall fare to the Grand Bank in 1767.  From 1753-58 she 
made trade voyages to North Carolina and Maryland.  Then, in 1760 and 1761, she was taken to 
Monte Christo in the West Indies.244  Richard Derby’s schooner Three Sisters went on four 
fishing fares in 1756 before departing on a trade voyage to South Carolina in the winter.  At the 
same time, Derby’s schooner Three Brothers went on three fares before traveling to Virginia.245  
In nearby Marblehead, Richard Pedrick’s schooner Molly left in the winter of 1768-69 with a 
load of refuse grade dried cod bound for Barbados.  The vessel also went on at least eleven 
fishing fares between 1766 and 1771.246 
Like the schooners, many men who went on fishing fares in the spring, summer and fall 
went on trade voyages during the winter months each year.  Joshua Burnham went as 
skipper/master of various Gloucester and Ipswich schooners to off shore banks and then to ports 
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in the Southern and West Indian colonies throughout the 1760s and early 1770s.  For a period of 
nine years between 1766-1774, John Andrews worked as sharesman/mate alongside Burnham on 
these expeditions/voyages.247   
 In Gloucester, the crews of schooners belonging to Daniel Rogers worked in this dual 
capacity as fishermen and merchant mariners.  Elisha Bray worked on board the Rachel for three 
fares in 1770 before laboring on the Hannah transporting trade goods to Virginia in December.  
Alford Davis worked on board the Robinhood for three fares in 1770 and the Liberty for just as 
many fares one year later.  At the end of 1771, he worked on the Hannah on a trade mission to 
Virginia.  Benjamin Webber, Jr., worked on three fares a year from 1770 to 1774 on board the 
Robinhood, Liberty, George and Hannah.  Each winter he helped transport trade goods to 
Virginia on the Hannah.248    
 In Beverly, John Lovett skippered the schooner Volant for merchant Thomas Davis 
between 1771-73.  Over the same period, he also worked as master on the same vessel on trade 
voyages to Virginia.  Joseph Thorndeck was one of Lovett’s crewmen for these journeys in 1771.  
Joseph Lovett skippered the schooner Swallow for Davis at the same time, and to the same 
places, his brother commanded the Volant.  Thomas Simonds worked as a crewmember on the 
fishing fares and the trade voyage on the Swallow in 1771.  Jonathan Harry and William Ober 
worked on board the schooner Swan for Davis on fishing fares and a trade voyage to Virginia in 
1771.249  
 In Salem, Benjamin Henderson worked as mate on board Timothy Orne’s schooner 
Esther, Tobias Davis, Jr., master on a trade mission to South Carolina at the end of 1759.  
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Having been promoted, Henderson went as master to Maryland the following two Decembers.  
He also went on at least eighteen fares as the Esther’s skipper between 1760-64.  He and 
Benjamin Punchard, who went as mate, were the only two of the five-man crew on board the 
Esther on its voyage to Maryland at the end of 1760 that had gone fishing throughout that year.  
However, the following December the entire five-man crew, including Benjamin Henderson, 
master; Benjamin Punchard, mate; Samuel Whitford, Jr., mariner; George Cook, mariner; and 
James Bickford, mariner, had all been on fishing prior fares on the Esther.250  William Cumins 
was one of the crewmembers on board Richard Derby’s schooner Three Sisters for its four fares 
in 1756.  He then went on the winter trade mission to South Carolina.  At this time, Richard 
Masury worked on Derby’s schooner Three Brothers for its three fares.  He then went on the 
winter trade mission to Virginia.251   
 In Marblehead, Jonas Dinnis worked as a skipper for merchant Thomas Pedrick for at 
least three fishing fares from 1761 to 1762.  In 1761, Dinnis also worked as a mariner on 
Pedrick’s schooner Salisbury, Thomas Dixey, master, on a trade voyage to Cadiz, Spain.  Joseph 
Pribble also signed on as a mariner on this transatlantic trip in 1761, after he had worked as a 
sharesman for Pedrick on a fare earlier that year.  William Pedrick worked as a ship’s boy on this 
trade mission, after he worked as a cuttail on a fishing fare for Thomas Pedrick.  Nicholas 
Girdler, Jr., also worked for Pedrick in a dual capacity.  Girdler went as a sharesmen on four 
fares between 1774 and 1775 before he signed on Pedrick’s schooner Content, Andrew Martin, 
master, in 1775.252  John Chin Knight, who worked his way up from cuttail to sharesman to 
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skipper between 1768-1775, was also master of William Knight’s schooner Fox in 1778.253  All 
of these maritime laborers earned wages for their work on trade missions in addition to their pay 
for the fishing fares. 
 Moreover, workers in the commercial fishing industry supplemented their wages on 
these trade voyages.  The foremost means by which they could pad their earnings involved 
certain trade “privileges.”  In a typical voyage from Massachusetts to the Southern slave 
plantations, Burnham mastered the schooner Neptune on a voyage to Virginia and Maryland in 
the winter of 1768-69.  Most of the crew was “shipped” on November 22.  The final seaman was 
added on December 5.  Their wages per month were as follows: the master earned £2.8.0; the 
mate £1.12.0; and each seamen earned £1.6.8.  Their “time on board” was listed as 4 months and 
12 days for everyone except the delinquent seaman, who was on board for 3 months and 20 days.  
The crew’s “wages due,” which included deductions for the Greenwich Hospital tax and any 
advance wages, were as follows: the master earned £8.3.3; the mate earned £4.16.5; the three 
seamen who shipped on November 22 earned £3.19.4 each; and the final seamen earned £3.8.8.  
However, the Choats also allowed Burnham “100 bushels” of space in the schooner’s hold to 
transport his own trade goods.  The mate was permitted “50 bushels,” and each of the four 
seamen were allowed “35 bushels.”254  Unfortunately, there is no record of what type of trade 
good the men used, or how much they earned in trade from their items.  But, it is safe to assume 
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that Burnham, as master, made more money than the rest of the crew as a result of having greater 
space in the hold for trade goods.255 
 If maritime laborers needed ready money in a hurry, they could negotiate for an advance 
on their wages for the trade mission.  The crew of the Polly in 1774 were each given one month’s 
advance wages amounting to £2.8.0 for the master; £1.12.0 for the mate; and £1.6.8 for each of 
the three seamen.256  Burnham, his mate and three seamen all received similar advance wages for 
a voyage from Ipswich to Dominica in the West Indies in December, 1766.257  Through such 
advance wages, monthly wages and trading privileges, workers in the commercial fishing 
industry could extend their seasonal earnings from fishing fares.   
Skippers also acted as agents, or supercargoes, for their vessel-owning merchants on 
trade voyages.  On December 13, 1760, Salem merchant Timothy Orne ordered Benjamin 
Henderson, skipper and master of the schooner Esther, to travel to Maryland and “find the Sloop 
Dolphin, Jonathan Gardner, Jr., Master.”  Once he found the sloop, Henderson was to “afford her 
all the Assistance in your power that she wants & put aboard her the Two Men that I send to 
her.”  If the Dolphin “would Require another hand,” then Henderson was to “put aboard your 
own Mate, Mr. Punchard.”  Henderson was further ordered to sell the cargo on board and buy 
wheat, corn, pork, beans, skins, or “Bar Iron,” and to “leave no Outstanding Debts in the 
Country,” and “Neither suffer any Tobacco to be brought home.”258   
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 In addition, Joshua Burnham took the schooner Dolphin to Virginia and Maryland in 
December, 1764.  Before he left, Gloucester merchant Ezekiel Woodward, Jr., in typical fashion, 
issued specific orders to his trusted man.  Woodward’s orders were as follows: “As to Selling 
your Cargo, you must, in order to Make all Possible Dispatch, Sell the Bigger Part of it by Whole 
Sale – Unless you Sell of[f] Very fast Indeed by Retail.  Towards the Last of your Cargo you had 
Better Sell some of your things for Something Less than the first cost than to Bring them Home 
again - if you’re not Like to get a full Load.  Don’t Stay to Retail out your Cargo so as to make it 
Late home Because of Spoiling the fishing Voyage.  Make as much possible Dispatch Back 
again to Gloucester.”  Speed, again, mattered in the commercial fishing industry in an age 
without refrigerated holds.  Not only was there the danger that the dried cod would spoil as it sat 
in the ship’s hold traveling around warm water ports waiting to be sold, but there was also the 
risk that the fishing vessel, its skipper and the crew would not return in time to catch the first fish 
of the year, which was the most valuable.  In closing, the Woodward wrote: “Brake No acts of 
Trade.  Leave no Debts Behind you in the Country.”259   
 In short, skippers/masters had more responsibilities than other mariners.  They were 
entrusted with their merchant employer’s reputation, along with his vessel and commodities, on 
trade missions.  On fishing expeditions, the same skippers/masters were responsible for 
recruiting a company, choosing a location to fish, navigating and keeping count of the fish taken.  
These men wore many hats, and the overall success of the industry depended in no small part on 
                                                                                                                                                             
Chapman, dated December 9, 1771, Timothy Orne Shipping Papers, schooner Molly, 1771-72, Box 7, Folder 13.  
Here, Chapman is explicitly told: “Be very careful that you break no Acts of Trade, neither must you Suffer any 
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259 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Schooner Dolphin, [c.1762-64], Box 1, Folder 1, JDPL.  On November 
20, 1753, Salem merchant Timothy Orne ordered John Felt, skipper and master of the schooner Molly, “to get Ready 
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  92
their endeavors.  These responsibilities explain why skippers/masters earned more in annual 
wages than sharesmen/mariners in annual wages, including earnings from trade voyages and 
fishing fares.  The earnings of the entire crew came with certain risks while trading in the 
warmer southern climes, however. 
 In addition to shipwreck, drowning, and other work-related accidents, workers in 
eighteenth century Massachusetts’ merchant marine ran the risk of contracting diseases while on 
trade missions to tropical ports in the West Indies.  One recent study estimates that while 39% of 
the deaths of merchant mariners can be attributed to work-related accidents, 54% of those deaths 
were caused by malaria and yellow fever contracted in the West Indies.  As a result, 30% of 
colonists who went on trade voyages never reached the age of thirty.260  As will be shown in the 
second chapter, West Indian slave plantations represented the principal overseas markets for 
dried cod in the eighteenth century.  The skipper of the Polly, who died from a fever contracted 
in the West Indies, was therefore representative of an important pattern.   
 Workers on trade voyages also ran the risk of corporal punishment.261  Captains of 
vessels on trade missions were legally allowed to beat their crewmembers.  Even though legal 
authority might be restrained by custom and ship-borne camaraderie, it was a reality faced by 
some and a constant threat to all.262  Ashley Bowen, who worked on off-shore cod fishing fares 
and traveled to the West Indies on trade missions for Marblehead merchants, underscored the 
tangible effects of this threat.  After traveling to the West Indies the previous winter, Bowen was 
engaged on the same vessel as a young ship’s boy for a transatlantic trip to Spain in 1743.  His 
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captain, Peter Hall, had the boy “pickled” for accidentally dropping dinner fowl overboard.  
Bowen wrote of this experience: 
My master stepped down to me and took me by the hand and said now you should 
not run away from him and brings me up on deck and orders the Boatswain to get 
two seizings of spun yarn, and I was tied to the rail by each wrist and my trousers 
let [down] about my heels and my frock tucked into my collar.  The Cook was 
ordered to get a bowl of pickle from the beef cask; my feet [were] tied to the fife 
rail and master would take his cat with 9 parts of log line and give me a dozen 
strokes on my back; then take his hand full of pickle and pat it on my back; then 
take his quadrant and look for the sun; then took a tiff of toddy, and so regularly 
he would do that office, one after another.263 
Eventually, one of the mates felt compelled to stay the captain’s hand by threatening to testify 
against Hall in an admiralty court.  Other workers on eighteenth-century trade missions were not 
so lucky, and no one halted the punishment.264  The merchant vessel could be a brutal work 
environment.  Still, not getting a berth at sea and being forced to work at day labor could be a 
worse fate. 
 Fishermen who could not gain berths on trade voyages to warmer climes did day labor 
for wages in the cold winter months.  Edward Woodbury worked as a cuttail for Beverly 
merchant Thomas Davis in the early 1770s.  As a younger worker, he may have been denied a 
winter berth because of his youth.  In December, 1772, he was doing day labor for Davis at the 
rate of two shillings eight pence per day.  Other factors may have kept workers from seeking 
berths.  John Lovett was a skipper for Davis around the time Woodbury was working as a cuttail 
and day laborer for the Beverly merchant.  Lovett had a younger son, John, Jr., who also worked 
on fishing fares, and he may not have wanted to leave his family for three to four months on a 
trade voyage.  At the end of 1772, he and his son were doing day labor for Davis at the same rate 
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given to Woodbury.  Similarly, Benjamin Beckford, who worked as an independent off-shore 
fisherman, did day labor along with his two sons, Benjamin, Jr., and John, for Davis in January, 
1774.265   
 At the typical pay rate of two shillings eight pence per day, assuming they worked every 
day for thirty days, day laborers would have earned £4 per month in the early 1770s.  This would 
have been more money than any crewmember on trade voyages at that time would have seen, 
including the vessel’s master himself.  However, unlike work on a trade voyage in which 
laborers could expect several months pay, day labor was never guaranteed and rarely lasted for 
extended periods.  Merchants typically hired day laborers for short-term projects, such as 
cleaning vessels, carting goods from one place to another and carrying fire wood.266  During the 
frigid winter months in Newfoundland, carrying fire wood became second nature for fishermen, 
and may have represented something like regular employment.267  Nevertheless, the work was 
usually physically demanding and hardly represented a promising career.  If employers had no 
additional projects for the laborer once the initial job was done, then another employer with work 
would have to be found.  Day labor was thus unreliable and hard. 
 Despite these drawbacks, day labor represented another means by which workers in the 
cod fisheries could extend their annual incomes and feed their families.  During the second half 
of the eighteenth century, the increasingly exploitative nature of the industry motivated workers 
to develop a multi-functional occupational identity in order to increase their earning potential.  
Jacks-of-all-trades were commonplace in the commercial fisheries at this time. 
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This occupational diversity has several implications.  It has been asserted that cod 
fishermen’s earnings “would cease” at the end of fishing seasons.268  Yet this conclusion is 
accurate only if we limit our definition of a worker in the fishing industry to a deep-sea handliner 
of cod.  In truth, worker’s annual earnings did not stop at the end of fishing seasons.  Their 
employers in the fishing industry paid them for fishing fares, day labor, and trade voyages, all of 
which helped prosecute the Atlantic trade in dried cod.  Moreover, workers could supplement 
their wages on trade voyages with private trade privileges.  These were the same workers, 
working for the same employers in the same industry. 
 It is also clear that the labor hierarchy on board trade voyages and fishing expeditions 
were not polar opposites.  The foremost authority on the colonial fishing industry has 
emphasized the egalitarian nature of ship life on fishing vessels.  “The discipline that governed 
this more demanding workplace was essentially collective….the skipper was merely the first 
among equals,” we are told.269  Yet, ship life in the fishing industry was not democratic.  The 
sliding wage scale on board the Polly during its trade voyage in 1774 clearly delineated a labor 
hierarchy.  Such stratification also existed on the same schooner during fishing expeditions in the 
form of the aforementioned divisions between the skipper and the rest of the crew and between 
the sharesmen and the cuttails.  It is true that Burnham and his crew operated on a count system 
prior to their trade voyage to Virginia in 1774 and that such a system did obscure divisions 
between the men.  However, whether they were fishing or trading, Burnham controlled the 
schooner and maintained his authority as head of the company of men.  The divisions between 
skipper and crew, and between sharesmen and cuttails, were further exacerbated every time the 
men went on the share system. 
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If we incorporate into our understanding of the nature of work in the commercial cod 
fisheries the sense that in many instances the same crews on the same vessels worked in various 
capacities for the same merchant employers, then it becomes clear why men would want to take 
on the additional responsibilities associated with being a skipper.  In almost every case, merchant 
captains earned more, both in real wages and from the amount of privilege allowed, for trade 
voyages than their mates or common seamen.  Merchants commonly trusted the same men who 
worked for them in the capacity of skipper to work for them as masters on trade missions.  As a 
result, the role of skipper represented increased earnings potential for workers in the commercial 
fisheries.  There was also an unquantifiable measure of prestige that went along with the 
responsibility of recruiting and commanding men on fishing expeditions and trade voyages.    
In the final analysis, the eighteenth-century commercial fishing industry operated within 
an increasingly capitalist world system in which the means of production had shifted to the hands 
of the few, social relations were defined through waged labor, private property rights were 
clearly defined and rigidly enforced through the law, and surplus value was generated for sale in 
the marketplace.270  Yet, the transition to capitalism did not occur at the same pace in every 
economic sector.  Development occurred unevenly within different industries at different times 
in different places.  The coal mining industry and textile industry in England seem to have 
developed rapidly to become full-fledged capitalist enterprises by the end of the eighteenth 
century despite stiff resistance from workers.271  The commercial fishing industry in New 
England, by contrast, had not fully integrated into the new world system in the eighteenth 
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century.  Ownership of the means of production had shifted away from the many workers to the 
few merchants and time-oriented work patterns were market-driven.  Yet, wage labor did not 
completely define social relations and occupational identity had not been fully standardized in 
the cod fisheries.  Instead, workers preferred the share and count system to wage labor in the 
fishing industry, and many men were jacks-of-all trades.  Moreover, in terms of structural 
organization, vertical integration was rarely achieved and was almost never complete.  
Merchants in different ports at different times relied upon others for various catching, drying, 
and shipping services.  Until we develop a definition of a fisherman that encapsulates the diverse 
experiences many men went through, we will never truly understand what it meant to work in the 
commercial fishing industry.   
Based on the foregoing look at the fishing industry, it seems clear that a commercial 
fisherman during the second half of the eighteenth-century in Massachusetts operated in a 
vernacular capitalist industry in which the means of production were controlled by relatively few 
individuals, and in which there were few standardized occupational identities.  He experienced 
labor at sea on fishing expeditions and trade voyages, and labor on land at a variety of short-term 
tasks.  Throughout the labor process involved in catching, processing, and shipping cod, he faced 
a variety of risks and physical demands.  He also experienced varying degrees of exploitation, 
and he earned compensation of several types and degrees.   
 As will be shown in later chapters, the occupational diversity that was part-and-parcel of 
the eighteenth century commercial fishing industry in Massachusetts proved of great 
consequence for the American Revolutionary War.  Indeed, the same schooner Polly that opened 
this chapter was used as a U.S. Naval vessel during the Revolution, and Burnham, its skipper, 
became a revolutionary official.  On December 7, 1776, he shipped as master and agreed “to 
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Follow all the regulations of the American Congress & be under such regulations as is 
Customary for Seamen & Mariners.”272  The switch from one maritime pursuit to another would 
not have been unusual for a worker who had made his living from the sea as a jack-of-all trade.  
Indeed, many men such as Burnham were employed in revolutionary activities because of their 
wide-based skill set.  In order to explain why such men decided to put their diverse skills to use 
in resisting British authority during the imperial crisis we must first step back and analyze the 
rise of the New England cod fisheries in the Atlantic economy.  
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3.0  THE RISE OF THE NEW ENGLAND COD FISHERIES IN THE ATLANTIC 
ECONOMY 
“The lumber and provisions of the American colonies were more necessary to the 
West India islands than the rum and sugar of the latter were to the former.”           
- Adam Smith to William Eden, December 15, 1783.1 
There is a scholarly consensus that an integrated Atlantic economy emerged between 1650 and 
1750.2  Trade routes were organized and consolidated during this period, connecting diverse 
markets and peoples.  Timetables were defined in such a way as to minimize extraneous costs 
that came with overseas transport and quicken the circulation of information and commodities.  
The proliferation of maps, globes, and marine atlases at this time also helped overcome 
difficulties associated with transoceanic shipping.3   
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Certain commodities have been privileged in economic histories of the Atlantic world.  
Sugar, especially, has been viewed as a catalyst for global economic expansion.4  As European 
entrepreneurs sought new and more fertile lands to produce this sweet confection and its by-
products, western territories off the coast of Africa and across the Atlantic Ocean into the 
Western Hemisphere were conquered.  Native peoples were either killed or enslaved, and sugar 
plantations sent out shipments bound for European markets.  Other consumer goods such as wine 
and tobacco have also been revealed as playing a role in connecting diverse regions and peoples 
around the Atlantic world in an ever-tighter global web.5  The role that the commercial cod 
fishing industry played in this process has been understudied.6   
 Only two works have systematically treated the connections between commercial cod 
fishing and the Atlantic economy.  In 1940, Harold Adams Innis published his broad-sweeping 
classic overview, The Codfisheries: The History of an International Economy.7  Innis examined 
the historically competitive nature of the fishing industry and argued that the production of dried 
cod benefited the economies of different regions.  Through extensive research in Spanish, 
                                                 
4 Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Tropical Babylons: Sugar and the Making of the Atlantic World before the ‘Sugar 
Revolution’ (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2004); Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in 
the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-1835 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Sidney W. 
Mintz, Sweetness and Power: The Place of Sugar In Modern History (New York: Viking Press, 1985); Richard S. 
Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713, 2nd ed., (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973); and Richard B. Sheridan, Sugar and Slavery: An Economic History of the 
British West Indies, 1623-1775 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973).   
5 For wine, see David Hancock, “‘A Revolution in the Trade’: Wine Distribution and the Development of the 
Infrastructure of the Atlantic Market Economy, 1703-1807,” in McCusker and Morgan, eds., The Early Modern 
Atlantic Economy.  For tobacco, see Jacob M. Price, Tobacco in Atlantic Trade: The Chesapeake, London and 
Glasgow, 1675-1775 (Brookfield, VT: Variorum, 1995); and Paul G. E. Clemens, The Atlantic Economy and 
Colonial Maryland’s Eastern Shore: From Tobacco to Grain (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980). 
6 Coclanis edited chapters on wine, cloth, tobacco, rice, and indigo, but not cod.  Similarly, McCusker and 
Morgan brought together historians who focused on wine, sugar, rum, and tobacco, but not cod.  Socolow edited 
chapters focusing on all of these staples, in addition to chocolate, spermaceti, and cochineal, but not cod.  David 
Hancock does not even mention the fisheries.  Price admits “I have had to neglect some important subjects, 
including fishing and fish exports.”  Price, “The Transatlantic Economy,” 39.  Immanuel Wallerstein only mentions 
the industry once.  Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I, 281.  Ralph Davis does not discuss the commercial 
fishing industry in any systematic way.          
7 Harold Adams Innis, The Codfisheries: The History of an International Economy (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1940).   
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French, and English archives, he demonstrated that from the sixteenth century to the twentieth 
century various European powers fought for access to the same fishing grounds.  Much more 
recently, Peter Pope has argued that the trade in cod for Madeira wine effectively established a 
North Atlantic triangular trade as early as the seventeenth century.8  The focus of both these 
excellent works, however, is on Newfoundland. 
 This chapter will situate the colonial New England fishing industry within the broader 
framework of an Atlantic economy.  First, the role that cod played in the rise of an integrated, 
multi-regional economic system will be examined.  Then, the chapter will investigate the 
expansion of the New England fisheries within this system and discuss change and continuity in 
the Atlantic cod trade.  It will be demonstrated that cod was the basis of an organized Atlantic 
economy from at least as early as 1600.  The primary function of this valuable commodity in a 
supra-imperial system of supply and demand shifted between the seventeenth and the eighteenth 
centuries as a result of a variety of factors that will be examined in detail.  Such a shift weakened 
English capital’s financial control over its periphery in New England and expanded colonial 
maritime commerce.  To be sure, cod was never the most lucrative of Atlantic commodities.9   
However, its importance as a source of food for slave labor and as New England’s primary 
means of exchange in the Atlantic marketplace cannot be ignored.     
 
                                                 
8 Peter E. Pope, Fish Into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004).  In his early discussion of “the Atlantic basin” Charles McLean Andrews 
noted that “fish” was one of five major “groups of economic commodities.”  Charles M. Andrews, “Anglo-French 
Commercial Rivalry, 1700-1750: The Western Phase, I,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 3 (April, 
1915), 546.  The other four commodity “groups” he mentioned were slaves, tropical and semi-tropical products 
(including sugar, tobacco, and indigo), furs, and naval stores. 
9 New England fish ranked sixth in terms of the value of British North American and Caribbean exports, 1764-
1775, behind sugar products, tobacco, Newfoundland fish, bread and flour, and rice, in that order.  See, Stephen J. 
Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier: Spaces of Power In Early Modern British America (Hanover: 
University Press of New England, 2005), 26-28, esp. Figure 2.1. 
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3.1 WESTWARD EXPANSION AND THE RISE OF THE ATLANTIC 
COMMERCIAL COD FISHING INDUSTRY 
Cod used to flourish in the North Sea and Atlantic waters between Norway and Massachusetts.  
Gadus morhua are characterized by five fins, a protruding upper jaw on a head that takes up one 
fourth of its body length, a heavy body and a square tail.  They are demersal fish that feed on 
crustaceans and other smaller forms of sea-life that eat plankton on the bottom of the ocean, 
usually along continental shelves near upwellings of cold water.  Cod migrate to inshore waters 
to spawn, as the food is more abundant there and they generally reproduce more efficiently in 
warmer waters than cold.  They can grow to weigh over 200 pounds, but are usually found less 
than 50 pounds.  Their flesh is almost purely white, and it is an unusually rich protein source.  
Taken wet, right out of the ocean, cod contain 18% protein.  Dried cod filets with the water 
weight evaporated can contain 80% protein.10  Such protein has made dried cod highly desirable 
in the marketplace.    
 Early modern commercial fishing operations took in cod and, after processing, 
transported the catch to markets around the Atlantic world.  The earliest recorded commercial 
cod fishing ventures in the Atlantic Ocean were conducted off the coast of Ireland around 1200 
AD.11  To be sure, ancient European peoples had been fishing in the Atlantic Ocean for 
                                                 
10 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 24; Mark Kurlansky, Cod: A Biography of the Fish that Changed the World (Canada: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1997), 32-45; Innis, The Codfisheries, 1-6; and Raymond McFarland, A History of the New 
England Fisheries (New York: D. Appleton & Company, publishers for the University of Pennsylvania, 1911), 4. 
11 Todd Gray, “Fisheries to the East and West,” in “The Distant-Water Fisheries of South West England in the 
Early Modern Period,” in David J. Starkey, Chris Reid, and Neil Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries: The 
Commercial Sea Fisheries of England and Wales since 1300 (London: Chatham Publishing, 2000), 97; and Robb 
Robinson and David J. Starkey, "The Sea Fisheries of the British Isles, 1376-1976," in Poul Holm, David J. Starkey 
and Jón Thór, eds., The North Atlantic Fisheries, 1100-1976 (Esbjerg: Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseets, 1996), 121-143.  
It is important to note that Gray sees the origins of the medieval commercial English fishing operations to the west, 
in the Atlantic Ocean, in earlier ventures in the eastern Channel and the North Sea.  Commercial cod fishing was 
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subsistence for thousands of years.12  Yet, sustained efforts to harvest the fruits of the Atlantic 
and convert surplus cod into a saleable commodity for consumption in the marketplace began 
only in the medieval period.13  It is probably no coincidence that Venetian merchants were 
establishing slave-run sugar plantations in the Mediterranean just prior to the initial westward 
expansion of European commercial fishing activities in the Atlantic.  The addition of slave 
plantations may have established markets for lesser grades of cod fish.14 
 Irish fish merchants traded directly with France, Spain and Portugal as early as the 
thirteenth century.  Warmer waters provided a comparative advantage here, as opposed to the 
colder North Sea, enabling longer fishing seasons and the catch of additional species.  Once the 
season had ended, Irish fishermen and fishing vessels transported catches and hides to ports in 
these regions to exchange for salt, iron, and wine.15  Commercial cod fishing around Ireland 
developed slowly until the turn of the fifteenth century.16  Ireland’s maritime resources were 
increasingly exploited from abroad, and in 1430 Irish chieftains complained about the expanded 
activities of fishermen from England, Wales, Scotland, Brittany, Gascony, the Netherlands, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
active in the North Sea from the fourteenth century.  See, Wendy R. Childs, “The Eastern Fisheries,” in “Fishing and 
Fisheries in the Middle Ages,” in Starkey, Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries, 22. 
12 According to Barry Cunliffe, Mesolithic period settlers along the south-west coast of Scotland hand-lined for 
fish in the Atlantic Ocean between 7,000 and 5,000 B.C.  Barry Cunliffe, Facing the Ocean: The Atlantic and its 
Peoples, 8000BC-AD1500 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 124-127, 156-158. 
13 Mark Kurlansky believes Vikings were taking Atlantic cod, processing catches, and selling surplus in 
European markets as early as the ninth century.  Kurlansky, Cod, 21.  There is, however, no evidence for these early 
commercial ventures. 
14 Cunliffe, Facing the Ocean, 529-530; Philip D. Curtin, The rise and fall of the plantation complex, 2nd ed., 
(Cambridge University Press, 1998), 4-5.  Venice and Genoa, major financial centers for Mediterranean sugar 
production, were trading with English ports from the thirteenth century, and cod may have been involved.  The 
historical relationship between commercial fishing and slavery needs more scholarly attention. 
15 Cunliffe, Facing the Ocean, 537. 
16 Maryanne Kowaleski, “The Western Fisheries,” in “Fishing and Fisheries in the Middle Ages,” in Starkey, 
Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries, 23.  Kowaleski attributes this initial slow growth “to the later 
settlement of much of western Britain which, in turn, led to lower population, income and wealth levels.  Such 
factors, together with the distance of the west from continental markets, and the volatile political scene (notably in 
Wales), conjoined to stymie investment.”  Ibid. 
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Iberia.17  Maryanne Kowaleski  notes that “by the second half of the sixteenth century, some 600 
Spanish ships were reputedly sailing to Ireland to fish each year.18  Herring, hake, cod, ling, and 
salmon were all taken around Ireland and sold commercially throughout Europe and the 
Mediterranean.  As early as the fifteenth century, English fishermen operated on a share system 
in which they received an agreed upon portion of the profits from the sale of the catch.19  The 
share system would dominate England’s fishing industry until well into the eighteenth century.   
 The principal demand for fish in Europe during the medieval period stemmed from those 
unable to afford meat, and from pious Catholics unwilling to violate feast day and Lenten 
prohibitions.20  These markets were supplied with small amounts of fresh fish.  According to 
Wendy R. Childs, in the fourteenth century “the bulk of the international market was in the 
preserved variety, whether salted, dried, or smoked.  Herring and cod were the most commonly 
preserved species, though others such as hake were also dried and salted.”21   
 Some of this dried fish was processed using an innovative cure developed in the 
Netherlands during the late fourteenth century.  This practice involved partially gutting, salting, 
and packing the catch in barrels at sea, then repacking the fish on shore to adjust for moisture 
loss.  The entire process enabled fishermen to work at sea for longer periods and haul in more 
                                                 
17 While some Basque, Portuguese, and Spanish fishermen were able to reach these waters, contrary trade winds 
and ocean currents prevented Iberians from penetrating the Atlantic in any substantive way until well into the 
fifteenth century.  John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, 2nd ed., (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 13-17, 21-24; and Ralph Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies 
(Cornell University Press, 1973), 5-7.  Moreover, as Barry Cunliffe has noted, until the Muslim control of the Straits 
of Gibraltar was broken in the thirteenth century, Spain “turned its back firmly on the opportunities offered by the 
Atlantic.”  Cunliffe, Facing the Ocean, 527. 
18 Ibid., 27. 
19 See, Kowaleski, “The Western Fisheries,” 28. 
20 Maryanne Kowaleski, “The Internal Fish Trade,” in “The Internal and International Fish Trades of Medieval 
England and Wales,” in Starkey, Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries, 29.   For more on the important 
role fish played in the diet of many medieval Europeans, see C.M. Woolgar, “‘Take This Penance Now, and 
Afterwards the Fare will Improve’: Seafood and Late Medieval Diet,” in Starkey, Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., 
England’s Sea Fisheries, 36-44. 
21 Wendy R. Childs, “Control, Conflict and International Trade,” in “The Internal and International Fish Trades 
of Medieval England and Wales,” in Starkey, Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries, 33. 
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fish.  Overall, the Dutch cure provided a durable commodity for overseas transport.22  At this 
time, salt for the cure was purchased from Germanic, English, Dutch, French, and Italian 
suppliers.23  New vessel designs, such as the fifteenth century development of the Dutch buss 
and the lateen-rigged caravel, together with new navigational equipment such as the quadrant for 
determining latitude, further encouraged the prosecution of the Atlantic fishing industry.24     
 Commercial cod fishing expanded westward to the shores of Iceland as maritime 
technology was being revolutionized.  By the fifteenth century, Scandinavian, English, and 
perhaps some Portuguese were working the artic waters off Iceland.25  From the late fourteenth 
and early fifteenth centuries the united kingdoms of Denmark and Norway controlled the region 
first explored by Thorwald and his unruly son Eirik the Red.  The Norwegian monarchical state 
attempted to regulate the Icelandic cod fish trade, making Bergen a port through which all such 
fish had to pass and be taxed.  The Danes were particularly unwilling to abide foreign 
                                                 
22 For more on the Dutch cure, see R.W. Unger, “The Netherlands Herring Fishery in the late Middle Ages: the 
False Legend of Willem Beukels of Biervliet,” Viator, Vol. 9, (1978), 335-356.  Although the cure was developed 
for use in Dutch North Sea herring fisheries, it was extended to other types of fish and used in the taking of cod in 
Atlantic waters around medieval Ireland.  See, Kowaleski, “The Western Fisheries,” 27. 
23 Robert P. Multhauf writes that in the fourteenth century, “in the Low Countries salt was extracted from salt-
rich coastal peat, and in England by boiling down sea water all along the coast.  Both of these sources declined in 
the fifteenth century: the Low Countries because of the exhaustion of peat and England because of the loss of labor 
to the growing textile industries.  These sources were succeeded by ‘bay salt,’ a product of solar evaporation of sea 
water along the French Atlantic coast…where salt production began to flourish about 1370.”  Robert P. Multhauf, 
Neptune’s Gift: A History of Common Salt (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 9.  
24 According to Jan De Vries and Ad Van Der Woude, "the development of the herring buss, a veritable factory 
ship on which the herring were not only caught but processed on board, is undoubtedly one of the seminal 
innovations of the fifteenth century, and it played a leading role in the economic rise of the new [Dutch] Republic at 
the end of the sixteenth century.”  Jan De Vries and Ad Van Der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, 
Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge University Press, 1997), 243.  For an 
exact description of a buss, see Simon Smith, Agent for the English Royal Fishing Company, The Herring Busse 
Trade, expressed in Sundry particulars (London, 1641).   For more on the importance of the quadrant and lateen 
rigged caravel, which was also used for exploration and transporting slaves, see Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic 
Economies, 6, 12; A. J. R. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415-1808: A World On The Move, 2nd ed., 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 28-29; and C.R. Boxer, The Portuguese Seaborne Empire: 
1415-1825 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969), 21, 27-28. 
25 For evidence that Christopher Columbus, sailing a Portuguese-owned vessel, ventured to Iceland in 1477, see 
Samuel Eliot Morison, Admiral of the Ocean Sea: A Life of Christopher Columbus, 2nd ed., (New York: Time 
Incorporated, 1962), 21-23.  It is not known what type of vessel this was, or why the Portuguese were there. 
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encroachments.  They initially forbid foreigners to over-winter on the Island, and in 1426 
attempted to ban foreign fishing vessels from working Icelandic waters.  The Danes were hoping 
to promote their own trade in stockfish, cod that was wind-dried on Icelandic shores.  When their 
prohibitions failed, the Danes tried to sell and enforce fishing licenses.  Denmark and Norway 
were also members of the Hanseatic League, a mercantile confederacy uniting more than two 
hundred towns from the Rhine to the Gulf of Finland that dominated the North Sea and Baltic 
trades.  The League reduced Bergen’s access to foreign shipping, further restricting Icelandic 
cod.  Despite these attempts to keep Iceland as a Hanseatic preserve, fifteenth century English 
fishermen continued to take in cod all around the island, and even erected temporary fishing 
stations on its shores to salt and barrel catches.26   
 The influx of Icelandic cod transformed England’s economy.27  According to Kowaleski, 
cod increased English foreign trade with Catholic regions in France and the Mediterranean, and 
turned the ports of Devon and Cornwall into “the biggest fish exporters in fifteenth-century 
England.”28  Icelandic cod may have been responsible for opening up trade networks in Spain, as 
well, for it was around the turn of the fifteenth century that English merchants became active in 
Seville and Bilbao, where the demand for fish would have given the English cod merchants 
                                                 
26 Wendy Childs, “England’s Icelandic Trade in the Fifteenth Century: The Role of Hull,” in Poul Holm, Olaf 
Janzen, and Jón Thór, eds., Northern Seas Yearbook 1995, Association for the History of the Northern Seas, 
(Esbjerg, Denmark: Fiskeri- og Søfartsmuseet, 1995), 11-31; Cunliffe, Facing the Ocean, 539-541. 
27 There is a debate among English scholars as to which part of England was most responsible for conducting 
fishing operations off Iceland in the fifteenth century.  James A. Williamson maintains Bristol merchants were the 
driving force behind these north Atlantic fisheries.  James A. Williamson, A Short History of British Expansion: The 
Old Colonial Empire, 3rd ed., (London: MacMillan and Co., limited, 1945), 68.  More recently, Wendy Childs has 
promoted Hull as the commercial leader in these artic enterprises.  Childs, “England’s Icelandic Trade in the 
Fifteenth Century: The Role of Hull.”  For his part, Evan Jones has shown a shift in the center of this commerce 
from the West Country to East Anglia in the sixteenth century.  Evan Jones, “England’s Icelandic Fishery in the 
Early Modern Period,” in Starkey, Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries, 106. 
28 Kowaleski, “The Western Fisheries,” 28. 
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leverage.29  The economic costs of fishing around Iceland remained, however, and merchants 
began seeking waters further west beyond the reach of the Hanseatic League.30 
 Merchants in Bristol, England took the lead in this search and financed at least one major 
expedition to explore the seas west of Iceland in 1497.31  They sponsored Venetian explorer John 
Cabot’s discovery of Newfoundland, “the new found land,” “terre neuve,” or “terra do 
bacalhau,” Portuguese for the land of cod.32  Bristol is located in South-Western England in a 
region known as the West Country. 
 The West Country has had a long and well-documented relationship with the Atlantic 
cod fishing industry.33  Ports such as Bristol, Plymouth, Barnstaple, Dartmouth, Poole, and 
Teignmouth were ideally located to prosecute the fisheries to the westward.  On a small scale, 
fishermen from these ports had previously worked waters off Ireland and Iceland.  It was not 
until the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries that West Country ports came to dominate 
                                                 
29 Cunliffe, Facing the Ocean, 533-534. 
30 Stephen J. Hornsby argues that “the stimulus” behind England’s westward Atlantic expansion was the search 
for additional trade goods for use in Spanish markets in exchange for East Asian spices.  Hornsby, British Atlantic, 
American Frontier, 13-14.   Hornsby largely ignores other factors, such as Hanseatic pressures. 
31 David Harris Sacks, The Widening Gate: Bristol and the Atlantic Economy, 1450-1700 (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1991), 34-36.  For more on speculations about pre-Cabotian Bristol voyages to Newfoundland, 
see K. R. Andrews, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 
1480-1630 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 44-47.  Kurlansky feels very strongly that the Basques 
were working Newfoundland waters long before Cabot’s voyage.  Kurlansky, Cod, 17-29.  Yet, in the most recent 
scholarly work on early Newfoundland, Peter Pope dismisses these early voyages, particularly the Basque ventures: 
“The notion of pre-Columbian Basque fishers in Newfoundland waters is a recurring fantasy of writers with more 
interest in a good story than in the evidence.”  Pope, Fish Into Wine, 17, fn. 7. 
32 For the various sixteenth century names for Newfoundland, see Pope, Fish Into Wine, 15. 
33 For a concise overview of the role West Country ports played in the medieval and early modern cod fishing 
industry, see Todd Gray and David J. Starkey, “The Distant-Water Fisheries of South West England in the Early 
Modern Period,” in Starkey, Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries, 96-104.  There is a vast literature on 
the role West Country merchants played in the cod fisheries around Newfoundland.  For a concise overview, see 
Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier, ch. 2.  For the seventeenth century in particular, see Pope, Fish Into 
Wine, esp., 144-149.  For the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see W. Gordon Handcock, Soe longe as there 
comes noe women: Origins of English Settlement in Newfoundland (St. Johns, Newfoundland: Breakwater Books, 
1989), esp. 53-69, and Table 3.1.  For more on the role West Country fish merchants played in the settlement of 
New England, see Phyllis Whitman Hunter, Purchasing Identity in the Atlantic World: Massachusetts Merchants, 
1670-1780 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), 33-70; Sacks, The Widening Gate, 50, 101-103; and 
Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, 3rd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard 
University Press, 1982).  
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the English industry.34  Once Cabot’s discoveries were made known throughout Europe an 
international race for waters teeming with cod began.35  Dried cod was the first staple the 
English developed in North America.  Yet, the West Country merchants initially could not 
compete with the French in the Northwest Atlantic. 
 French fishermen were fastest out of the gate, and they took the lead in catching cod off 
Newfoundland.  French fish merchants’ sophisticated financial organization and local supplies of 
salt may have given them an edge over the competition in terms of prosecuting the 
Newfoundland fishing waters.  Indeed, in 1545 France was even exporting a portion of their 
annual catch to England.36  The French would not relinquish this commanding position until the 
end of the Seven Years’ War.37   
 Despite the discovery of Newfoundland and Hanseatic claims to Icelandic waters the 
majority of English cod fishing operations remained off Iceland throughout the sixteenth 
century.38  England and Portugal sent joint fishing ventures to the land of cod early in the 1500s, 
and a syndicate, “The Company Adventurers to the New Found Lands,” formed in Bristol in 
                                                 
34 Throughout the medieval period England’s eastern fisheries in the North Sea represented the primary sector 
of economic activity.  The western fisheries did not expand significantly until the fifteenth century.  Wendy R. 
Childs and Maryanne Kowalski, “Fishing and Fisheries in the Middle Ages,” in Starkey, Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., 
England’s Sea Fisheries, 19-28.     
35 Raimondo de Soncino reported to the duke of Milan in a letter dated December 18, 1497 that he overheard 
Cabot state with regard to Newfoundland, “The sea there is swarming with fish.”  Cited in Innis, The Codfisheries, 
11.  Also, see Sacks, The Widening Gate, 36.  In this often cited letter, Cabot was reported to have found cod so 
plentiful he could take them by lowering a basket into the sea. 
36 Innis, The Codfisheries, 13, fn.13, and 40-41. 
37 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 19-20; Innis, The Codfisheries, 15-23, 49.  According to Innis, 93 of the 128 recorded 
expeditions to Newfoundland prior to 1550 were French-owned vessels.  Ibid., 19, fn. 35. 
38 Jones, “England’s Icelandic Fishery in the Early Modern Period,” 105-110.  It is Jones’ primary contention 
that “although England’s Icelandic fishery did disappear in the end, this did not happen until the late seventeenth 
century.”  Ibid., 105.  For more on England’s lethargic involvement in the Newfoundland fisheries, see Pope, Fish 
Into Wine, 15-16; and Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women, 24. 
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1501.39  Yet, the English struggled for market share in the international economy that formed 
around commercial cod fishing. 
 Cod caught off Newfoundland connected peoples and markets around the Atlantic world 
as early as the sixteenth century.  According to Peter Pope:  
By the later sixteenth century, European commercial activity in Atlantic Canada 
exceeded, in volume and value, European trade with the Gulf of Mexico, which is 
usually treated as the American center of gravity of early transatlantic commerce.  
The cod fishery was by far the most important component of European 
commercial activity in northern North America, and it would remain for centuries 
much more important than the trade in furs.40   
Following their victory over Spain’s armada, the English increased their attention on 
Newfoundland.  Sixteenth-century English fishermen obtained salt from France or Portugal, 
caught cod off Ireland, Iceland, and Newfoundland, dry cured the catches, then sold the dried 
salted cod along Iberian and Mediterranean coasts in exchange for wine, oil, salt, and fruit.41  
The Price Revolution and increased Catholic population levels helped lure merchantable grades 
of cod to Iberian ports.42  In 1578 there were an estimated 50 English fishing vessels working off 
the land of cod.  By 1592 this figure had doubled.43   
 People from different nations met in the shipping lanes and fishing waters off the coast 
of Newfoundland.  For their part, the French maintained a fishing fleet at Newfoundland that was 
                                                 
39 Sacks, The Widening Gate, 49-50; Innis, The Codfisheries, 12. 
40 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 13-14.  Also, see Sacks, The Widening Gate, 34-36, 48-50. 
41 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 14-15, 91.  At the turn of the seventeenth century only ten percent of the fish taken by 
English hooks on an annual basis was consumed in England.  See, Gray, “Fisheries to the East and West,” 97. 
42 Andalusia remained one of the major markets for dried Atlantic cod, and between 1500-1520 and 1595-1605 
the price of cod rose 929%.  During the same time periods, the general price index rose by 713%.  See, Earl J. 
Hamilton, “American Treasure and Andalusian Prices, 1503-1660: A Study in the Spanish Price Revolution,” 
Journal of Economic and Business History, I (1928), 1-35, esp. 20-26; Innis, The Codfisheries, 51; and Davis, The 
Rise of the Atlantic Economies, 98-107.  According to Davis, following the fourteenth century Black Plague that 
reduced the population of Western Europe by one third, the population of Europe doubled between 1460 and 1620.  
Ibid., 16-17.  The influx of New World gold and silver helped consumers meet these inflated prices. 
43 Gray, “Fisheries to the East and West,” 97. 
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at least twice the size of the English fleet at the end of the sixteenth century.44  Breton, Brittany, 
and Norman fishermen relied on their own salt supplies, and either lightly salted the 
Newfoundland catches, leaving them mostly wet, or “green,” or they slightly air dried the cod 
before returning the fish to French fishmongers.  The Basques also utilized the lightly salted air-
dried cure to process cod caught off Newfoundland, which they in turn sold to French and 
Iberian markets.45  Portugal and Spain were primarily focused on exploiting the resources of 
Africa, the East Indies, the West Indies, and South America.  Yet, these imperial powers did send 
fishing vessels to Newfoundland during the first half of the sixteenth century, possibly 
attempting to provision their expanding Atlantic empires in addition to meeting domestic 
consumption.  The Iberian fishing fleets waned following political unification and the destruction 
of the Spanish armada.46  For their part, the Dutch consolidated their control over North Sea 
herring and the Atlantic carrying trade during the sixteenth century.47  They would invest capital 
and join in exploiting the waters around Newfoundland, but only later.48     
                                                 
44 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 19-20.  The French caught four times as much fish as the English off Newfoundland in 
1664.  See, David J. Starkey, “The Newfoundland Trade,” in “The Distant-Water Fisheries of South West England 
in the Early Modern Period,” in Starkey, Reid, and Ashcroft, eds., England’s Sea Fisheries, 101, esp. Table 10.1. 
45 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 14. 
46 Innis, The Codfisheries, 19, fn. 35, and 38-39.  It is Darlene Abreu-Ferreira’s contention that the Portuguese 
presence was minimal throughout the sixteenth century.  Abreu-Ferreira, “Notes and Comments: Terra Nova 
through the Iberian Looking Glass: The Portuguese-Newfoundland Cod Fishery in the Sixteenth Century,” 
Canadian Historical Review 79, no.1 (1998): 100-115. 
47 Jonathan I. Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806, 4th ed., (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), 117, 325.  By the 1620s, however, sizeable numbers of Dutch sack ships, freighters of 150-
300 tons that purchased direct from the fishermen on the open sea, were transporting cod caught and dried at 
Newfoundland to European and Mediterranean markets.  See, Pope, Fish Into Wine, 96-97, 99. 
48 The Dutch expanded their maritime empire during first half of the seventeenth century.  They carried 
European goods to East Asia, the Indian Ocean, Africa, South America, the West Indies, North America, and 
Newfoundland.  Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806, esp. ch. 14.  According to 
Russell-Wood, the Dutch were primarily responsible for displacing the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean and East 
Asia in the seventeenth century.  Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415-1808, 128.  Dunn maintains, “the 
Hollanders turned the Caribbean almost into a Dutch lake.”  Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 16.  Large numbers of Dutch 
vessels frequented Newfoundland waters by the 1620s, not to fish for cod, but to trade.  Their sack ships - large, 
armed vessels devoted solely to purchasing and freighting cargo - exchanged cash and credit for Newfoundland cod, 
which they then transported to Mediterranean, Iberian, and even French ports.  For the derivation of the term “sack 
ship,” see Pope, Fish Into Wine, 95.  For more on the Dutch sack trade at Newfoundland, see Ibid., 98-103.  Three 
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 The establishment of slave labor systems in the New World opened additional markets 
for dried cod.  In England, plans had been made to ship North Atlantic dried cod to the slave 
plantations located on the Portuguese Atlantic islands (Madeira, the Canaries, and the Azores) in 
the sixteenth century, and the Portuguese may have conducted similar ventures at the end of the 
previous century.49  Yet, it was the emergence of large-scale plantations in the New World 
between the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries that generated more extensive markets for refuse 
grades of dried Atlantic cod fish.50  In their quest for the Spice Islands, Portugal, the Atlantic 
leader in producing slave labor and goods produced by slaves, turned increasingly away from 
fishing Northern waters themselves.  By the end of the sixteenth century, Portugal and the Wine 
Islands were primarily importing dried cod from Newfoundland for domestic consumption and 
for re-export to the Brazilian plantations.51  In fact, this transatlantic re-export trade had become 
so lucrative that the Brazil Company was established in Lisbon in 1649 and awarded a monopoly 
                                                                                                                                                             
Anglo-Dutch wars in the second half of the seventeenth century eventually weakened Hollanders’ maritime presence 
in western waters considerably. 
49 For sixteenth-century English plans, see Pope, Fish Into Wine, 91-92.  It is not known precisely when lesser 
grades of dried cod began to be shipped to slave plantations, located in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean.  However, 
there were sizeable slave populations on the Portuguese Atlantic islands during the 1500s.  For the slave populations 
at sixteenth century Madeira and Grand Canary Island, see William D. Phillips, Jr., “The Old World background of 
slavery in the Americas,” in Barbara L. Solow, ed., Slavery and the Rise of the Atlantic System (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 50, 55.  Europeans were certainly aware that these slaves generated demand for 
provisions.  In the first half of the sixteenth century, João Lobato reported to the king of Portugal that slaves in São 
Tomé were running away due to food shortages on the island.  See, John Thornton, Africa and Africans in the 
Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1800, 2nd ed., (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 169.  Moreover, 
Europeans were dry curing cod in the sixteenth century, and this process habitually yielded lesser grades of dried 
cod that could not be sold to free white Europeans.     
50 By all accounts, at the turn of the sixteenth century São Tomé contained the first modern, large-scale slave 
plantations.  Even Robin Blackburn, who is at pains to link capitalism and modernity and stress the discontinuities 
between “Baroque” and “Modern” slave systems, acknowledges the early sugar plantations at São Tomé combined 
extensive capital investment with large-scale African gang slave labor.  Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World 
Slavery (London: Verso Press, 1997), 111, 114.  It is not known whether shipments of dried North Atlantic cod 
made it as far south as São Tomé.  If they did, the cod would have found a ready market among the thousands of 
slaves there.  In 1554, there were 2,000 slaves living and working on sugar plantations in São Tomé, in addition to 
5-6,000 slaves awaiting the Middle Passage in baracoons.  See, Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of 
Brazilian Society, 13-14.   
51 Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, 1415-1808, 125-126, 132; and T. Bentley Duncan, Atlantic Islands: 
Madeira, the Azores, and the Cape Verdes in Seventeenth-Century Commerce and Navigation (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1972), 127, 136, 154-155. 
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on codfish imported into the colony.52  For their part, in 1636 the Dutch vessel de Cooninck 
freighted a load of dried cod from Newfoundland to Pernambuco, Brazil.53  The French, who 
dominated the sixteenth century Newfoundland cod fisheries, were routinely trading with 
Brazilian ports at this time.54  Moreover, from their initial English settlement, plantations at 
Jamaica and Barbados were provisioned with salt cod from the New England colonies.55  
Toward the north, as early as the 1610s, hungry Virginian planters relied on shipments of dried 
North Atlantic cod.56  Prior to 1650, then, and before permanent New England settlement, 
international cod fishing operations had integrated various Atlantic regions into a single 
economy fluctuating in rhythm with the sea.57   
 
                                                 
52 Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society, 181.  In 1600 there were between 12-
15,000 African slaves in Brazil, and many more native American slaves.  Between 1600 and 1650, 200,000 African 
slaves were forcibly removed to Brazil.  Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 168. 
53 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 96.  More will be said about the Dutch sack trade in the following sections. 
54 W.J. Eccles, The French in North America, 1500-1783, rev. ed., (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State 
University Press, 1998), 2-3, 8-9.  According to Eccles, “the ports of northwest France were as much concerned with 
the Brazil trade as with the fishery of the Grand Banks.”  Ibid., 2-3. 
55 Dunn, Sugar and Slaves, 276.  Subsequent sections will cover this West Indian trade in more detail. 
56 James Wharton, The Bounty of the Chesapeake: Fishing in Colonial Virginia, 2nd ed., (Charlottesville: The 
University Press of Virginia, 1973), 14, 22, 27-28; John Scribner Jenness, The Isles of Shoals: An Historical Sketch, 
3rd ed., (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1884), 20-22. 
57 Pushing the origins of the Atlantic economy back to the turn of the seventeenth century forces us to re-
evaluate the role the English Civil War played in bringing about this world system.  It has been theorized that the 
rise of a “modern” fiscal-military state in England was fundamentally necessary for the integration of the Atlantic 
economy.  See, Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I, 232, 256-257.  According to Wallerstein, England took a 
leading role in this world systems shift, becoming a core with its own periphery, because bourgeois yeomen were 
able to seize political authority in the 1640s and set the nation on a decidedly commercial course in which state 
power was used to enforce private property rights.  More recent scholarship has focused attention on earlier Tudor-
Stuart centralizing, “modernizing” tendencies, further complicating Wallerstein’s paradigm.  See, for example, Steve 
Hindle, The State and Social Change in Early Modern England, c.1550-1640 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000); 
and Michael J. Braddick, State Formation in Early Modern England, 1550-1700 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2000). 
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3.2 NEW ENGLAND’S BIOGEOGRAPHIC COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGES 
Resident New England commercial cod fisheries were born into this Atlantic world during the 
first half of the seventeenth century.  The New England region enjoyed certain biogeographic 
comparative advantages over other sections of the New World with access to cod.  Its temperate 
climate and proximity to fertile lands stimulated the formation of a mixed agricultural/maritime 
economy.  Warmer water temperatures yielded larger species and longer fishing seasons off the 
north eastern seaboard of North America as compared to the North Atlantic waters surrounding 
Newfoundland.58  Bartholomew Gosnold, who voyaged in search of sassafras to the coast of 
what would become New England in 1602, sighted numerous fish close to shore.  Gosnold noted 
that “in the months of March, April, and May, there is upon this coast, better fishing, and in as 
great plenty, as in Newfoundland….And, besides, the places…were but in seven fathoms [of] 
water and within less than a league of the shore; where, in Newfoundland they fish in forty or 
fifty fathoms [of] water and far off.”59  The following year Martin Ping, an agent of West 
Country merchants in Bristol sent to investigate the possibilities of establishing a fishery in New 
England, provided his expert opinion that the region was ripe for such development.  Ping 
reported: “We found an excellent fishing for cod which are better than those of Newfoundland 
and withal we saw good and rocky ground fit to dry them upon.”60  Even the adventurous 
                                                 
58 Commercial fishing around Newfoundland was restricted to a short summer season.  Gray, “Fisheries to the 
East and West,” 98.  For more on the longer fishing seasons off the New England coast, see Daniel Vickers, 
Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1830 (Chapel Hill: The 
University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 116; and Innis, The Codfisheries, 80.  Peter Pope, a scholar currently 
living and working in Newfoundland, whose historical subject is Newfoundland, writes: “New England was, from 
the beginning, far wealthier and far more populous than Newfoundland and enjoyed key resource advantages, not 
the least of which were the lumber and naval stores that permitted the rapid development of an efficient shipbuilding 
industry.”  Pope, Fish Into Wine, 159.   
59 H.S. Burrage, ed., Early English and French Voyages, Chiefly from Hakluyt, 1534 – 1658 (New York: C. 
Scribner’s Sons, 1906), 331-332. 
60 Ibid., 345. 
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Captain John Smith noted the particular suitability of the New England area for the fishing 
industry.  “New England’s fishings,” he wrote, “are near land where is help of wood, water, 
fruits, fowls, corn, or other refreshments needful.”61  William Wood, an English traveler who 
visited New England in 1634 wrote:  
There is no country known that yields more variety of fish winter and summer, 
and that not only for the present spending and sustenation of the plantations, but 
likewise for trade into other countries, so that those which have had stages and 
make fishing voyages into those parts have gained (it is thought) more than the 
Newfoundland fishermen.  Codfish in these seas are larger than in Newfoundland, 
six or seven making a quintal [112 lbs. dry weight], whereas there they have 
fifteen to the same weight.62   
More northern regions proved less conducive to permanent fishing settlements. 
 The land of cod, in particular, was a harsh environment.  Peter Pope, the leading 
authority on early Newfoundland fishing, describes the island’s seventeenth-century climate as 
“subarctic;” its soil as “glaciated…youthful and shallow;” and its ecosystem as “restricted” and 
“simple.”  He further notes that such “biogeographic instability” was responsible for the 
disappearance of two native populations prior to the 1600s.63  Living conditions in 
Newfoundland were so challenging, in fact, that migratory English fishermen sent to live and 
work temporarily there often escaped to New England aboard trade ships.  New England was a 
constant drain on Newfoundland’s labor supply throughout the colonial period.64   
                                                 
61 Edward Arber, ed., Travels and Works of Captain John Smith, President of Virginia, and Admiral of New 
England, 1580-1631, Vol. II, (New York: Burt Franklin, 1910), 712. 
62 William Wood, New England’s Prospect, edited by Alden T. Vaughan, (Amherst, Mass.: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 1977; orig. pub. London, 1634), 53.   
63 Pope, Fish Into Wine, 45-46.  For more on the “Inhospitable Environment” in Newfoundland, written by a 
Newfoundland scholar, see C. Grant Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart 
Limited, 1976), 41-48; quote taken from the section’s sub-title on 41.  Innis, another Canadian scholar, reminds us 
that because New England maintained “a more favorable climate and an extensive hinterland” people there grew 
less dependent on the sea in the long run, while Newfoundland grew increasingly dependent on the fishing industry 
between the colonial and modern periods.  Innis, The Codfisheries, 2. 
64 Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women, 29-30. 
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 For their part, early English settlers in colonial Virginia made attempts to overcome their 
chronic food shortages through subsistence and commercial fishing in the Chesapeake Bay.  
However, fish seemed to be most prevalent during hurricane seasons.  The warm climate also 
made spoilage an endemic problem and stymied the industry’s development there.65  New 
England’s biogeographic comparative advantages help explain why the first permanent resident 
fishing station was established in this region. 
3.3 WHY ENGLAND WAS THE FIRST TO ESTABLISH A RESIDENT FISHING 
STATION 
England was first to settle permanent resident fishing stations on the New England coast for a 
variety of reasons.  The French, who had now become England’s chief rival in catching cod, 
focused commercial activity around Newfoundland, the St. Lawrence Bay, and the St. Lawrence 
River.  The furs in this region occupied their settlement plans and capital investment, and they 
seem to have been satisfied with the production of temporary, migratory fishing activities.66  
Moreover, most major European powers were deeply embroiled in the Thirty Years War at this 
time.  The fact that the English remained largely aloof from continental conflict may have 
contributed to their ability to finance and conduct settlement plans in the first half of the 
                                                 
65 Wharton, The Bounty of the Chesapeake, 3, 6-13, 27.  Virginians continued to supplement their diet with river 
fish throughout the colonial period.  In the 1620s colonists in Virginia even attempted to send vessels to 
Newfoundland to trade tobacco for dried cod.  By the mid-1600s, when Virginian planters made the decisive 
transition to slave labor, New Englanders were providing a steady stream of dried refuse grades of cod to Virginia.  
At this point, planters focused on tobacco production and abandoned ventures to the north for their own shipments 
of dried cod.  It was more efficient for planters to purchase cod from New England suppliers as opposed to outfitting 
a vessel, purchasing marine insurance, buying and transporting the fish themselves, in addition to cultivating 
tobacco.  
66 Eccles, The French in North America, 1500-1783. 
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seventeenth century.  It is also important the early Stuart period witnessed increasing levels of 
state involvement in the English fishing industry.67  Due in part to their Scottish heritage, James I 
and his son were particularly keen on promoting the English fisheries at home and to the 
westward.68  Mounting population pressures further encouraged the Stuarts to authorize, and in 
some cases fund, plans to settle resident fishing stations in various parts of the New World.  This 
was urgent because 1.5 million hungry mouths had been added to England’s population between 
1500 and 1620, crowding the island with “idle hands” in need of employment.69   
 The expansion of West Country ports also stimulated the development of England’s 
fishing industry.  Although these ports maintained extensive commercial dealings only from the 
sixteenth century, merchants and fishermen from the West Country had been working the waters 
around Ireland and Iceland for hundreds of years.  The accumulation of knowledge regarding 
where and when to fish, the organization of trade networks, and the concentration of capital 
contributed to the West Country’s rise as a core in a world system formed in no small part 
                                                 
67 During his reign, James I banned foreign fishing operations off English shorelines, and, when the ban failed, 
he decreed that foreign fishermen had to pay for licenses to fish in English waters and he levied a tax on all foreign 
fishermen.  His son, Charles I formed his own royal fishing company in 1632 and built-up the navy to preserve his 
maritime sovereignty.  John R. Elder, The Royal Fishery Companies of the Seventeenth Century (Glasgow: Glasgow 
University Press, 1912), 7, 8, 9, 11, 33; and Charles Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the Dutch 
Wars (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), 37. 
68 For Scotland’s historic relationship with commercial fishing in general, and the impact this history had on 
James I in particular, see James R. Coull, The Sea Fisheries of Scotland: A Historical Geography (Edinburgh: John 
Donald Publishers Ltd., 1996).  For the Stuarts’ roles in providing royal charters and granting exclusive fishing 
rights to various groups of early seventeenth century settlers, see Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the 
Seventeenth Century, 2-15. 
69 Population in France, Spain, and the Netherlands, by contrast, had peaked in the sixteenth century and was 
declining by 1600.  Davis, The Rise of the Atlantic Economies, 91.  Also, see John Brooke, “Ecology,” in Daniel 
Vickers, ed., Companion to Colonial America (Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 2003), 53.  Brooke writes: 
“Of any colonizing country, England exported far and away the greatest share of its population: half a million people 
in the seventeenth century.”  According to Wilson, early seventeenth century English pamphleteers proposed 
commercial fishing would “give employment to the multitudes of Englishmen who (‘through lewd idleness’) were 
reduced to ‘cheat, rob, roar, hang, beg, cart, pine and perish.’”  Wilson, Profit and Power, 35.  For evidence of this, 
see Tobias Gentleman, England’s Way to Win Wealth, and to Employ Ships and Mariners (London, 1614). 
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through cod.70  In addition to pre-existing pressures from the Hanseatic League at Iceland and 
Newfoundland’s harsh climate, demographic concerns, Continental warfare and state 
sponsorship, the rise of West Country ports enabled early seventeenth century English merchants 
to attempt plans for settling fishing stations in New England.   
3.4 THE BIRTH OF RESIDENT NEW ENGLAND FISHING STATIONS 
Initially, these plans for settlement either failed utterly, or succeeded only in maintaining 
temporary, migratory commercial fishing operations.71  It was not until 1631 that the first 
                                                 
70 According to Immanuel Wallerstein, “three things were essential to the establishment of such a capitalist 
world-economy: an expansion of the geographical size of the world in question, the development of variegated 
methods of labor control for different products and different zones of the world-economy, and the creation of 
relatively strong state machineries in what would become the core-states of this capitalist world-economy.”  
Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I, 38.  All of these qualifications had been met prior to the successful 
establishment of a permanent resident fishing station in New England. 
71 According to Vickers, earlier attempts, including “Sagadahoc at the mouth of the Kennebec River (1607-
1608), Wessagusset on the Massachusetts Bay (1622-1624), the Dorchester Company plantation on Cape Ann 
(1623-1624), and Mount Wollaston to the north of Plymouth (1623),” had all failed.  Vickers, Farmers and 
Fishermen, 90.  For more on these unsuccessful attempts at settlement, and the West Country capital backing them, 
see Gray, “Fisheries to the East and to the West,” 98-100; Faith Harrington, “‘Wee Tooke Great Store of Cod-fish’: 
Fishing Ships and First Settlements on the Coast of New England, 1600-1630,” in Emerson W. Baker, et al., eds., 
American Beginnings: Exploration, Culture, and Cartography in the Land of Norumbega (Lincoln: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1994), 191-216; Sacks, The Widening Gate, 101-103; John Frederick Martin, Profits in the 
Wilderness: Entrepreneurship and the Founding of New England Towns in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1991); Alaric Faulkner, “Archeology of the Cod Fishery: Damariscove Island,” 
Historical Archeology, Vol. 19, No. 2 (1985), 57-86; Edwin A. Churchill, “Too Great the Challenge: The Birth and 
Death of Falmouth, Maine, 1624-1676,” (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Maine, 1979); Charles E. Clark, The 
Eastern Frontier: The Settlement of Northern New England, 1610-1763 (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1970), 13-35; 
Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, 2-15; Richard A. Preston, “Fishing and Plantation: 
New England in the Parliament of 1621,” The American Historical Review, Vol. 45, No. 1 (October, 1939), 29-43; 
and McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries, 38-56.  There was some migratory fishing activity and 
attempts at settlement at the Isles of Shoals during the early 1620s.  Jenness, The Isles of Shoals, 46-57.  However, 
there is no evidence of successful permanent settlement there.  Indeed, Captain Christopher Levett, an early English 
traveler to New England, wrote of the Isle of Shoals in 1623: “Upon these islands I neither could see one good 
timber tree, nor so much ground as to make a garden.  The place is found to be a good fishing place for six ships, but 
more cannot well be there, for want of convenient stage room, as this year’s experience hath proved.  The harbor is 
but indifferent good.”  Ibid., 46-47.  According to Christine Leigh Heyrman, “the Shoals settlements simply broke 
up as the island camps declined in importance as suppliers of fish by the end of the seventeenth century.”  
Commerce and Culture: The Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachusetts, 1690-1750 (New York: W.W. 
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permanent commercial fishing station in the New World was established in Marblehead, 
Massachusetts.72  Soon, Marblehead had company. 
By the middle of the seventeenth century permanent resident fishing stations had been 
established all along the New England coastline.  There were stations at Pemaquid, Portland, and 
Falmouth in the Maine province; Richmond Island and Monhegan Island off the coast of Maine; 
at the Isles of Shoals off the coast of Maine and New Hampshire; at Portsmouth in New 
Hampshire; at Cape Anne, Salem, Marblehead, and Ipswich in Massachusetts; and at Nantasket 
(renamed Hull), Scituate, and Cape Cod in Plymouth.73   
 These colonial fishing ports were firmly embedded in a transatlantic economic system 
with West Country ports situated at the core.  West Country merchants responsible for moving 
                                                                                                                                                             
Norton & Company, 1984), 229-230.  Also, Port Royal, Acadia, has been called “France’s first permanent outpost in 
North America.”  Leslie Choquette, “Center and Periphery In French North America,” in Christine Daniels and 
Michael V. Kennedy, eds., Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500-1820 (New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 195.  However, Port Royal was abandoned between 1607 and 1610.  When it was resettled, the 
port functioned as much or more as a fur trading entrepot and agricultural settlement than as a fishing station. 
72 Christopher P. Magra, “‘Soldiers…Bred to the Sea’: Maritime Marblehead, Massachusetts and the Origins 
and Progress of the American Revolution,” New England Quarterly, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 4, (December 2004), 534; 
Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 90-92; Heyrman, Commerce and Culture, 207.  Bernard Bailyn restricts his 
discussion to Salem, of which Marblehead was politically subservient to until 1649.  Bailyn, The New England 
Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, 17-18.  Robert G. Albion, William A. Baker, and Benjamin W. Labaree 
mistakenly refer to Marblehead as a “new settlement” in 1640.  Robert G. Albion, William A. Baker and Benjamin 
W. Labaree, New England and the Sea (Mystic, Connecticut: Mystic Seaport Museum, Inc., 1972), 19.  Raymond 
McFarland wrongly attributes “the first permanent settlement” to “Pemaquid in 1625,” and mistakenly puts the date 
of “the first fishing station” in Marblehead at 1633.  McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries, 51, 52-53.  
Peter Pope makes a strong case that the Calvert experiment at Newfoundland between 1610 and 1629 did not fail 
utterly, as it left behind a certain amount of infrastructure for subsequent settlement.  Pope, Fish Into Wine, esp. 45-
78.  Yet, even Pope is forced to acknowledge the fact that Calvert and his servants decamped for warmer climes in 
Maryland.  The number of resident fishermen in Newfoundland did not outnumber the migratory fishermen until the 
1790s.  Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women, 74-85, esp. Figure 4.2.  In this chapter, a permanent 
resident fishing station is defined as an unbroken line of human settlement annually processing surplus cod for sale 
in markets. 
73 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 92-100; Heyrman, Commerce and Culture, 34, 209-210; Bailyn, The New 
England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, 78; Innis, The Codfisheries, 75, 116; McFarland, A History of the 
New England Fisheries, 38-64.  Gloucester turned toward farming after 1660, and did not come back to fishing in a 
systematic way until the first half of the eighteenth century.   Plymouth was united with Massachusetts in 1691.  The 
New England commercial fisheries were located primarily north of Cape Cod.  Time and energy necessary for travel 
around the Cape seems to have restricted commercial fishing in colonial Rhode Island. 
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the Atlantic cod fisheries westward provided the capital necessary for all of these stations.74  
Salem developed as an outfitter for fishermen while Boston acted as a central depot taking in 
catches from all the New England fishing stations.75  Bostonians and English agents living in 
Boston then negotiated the sale with ship captains, super cargoes, or the overseas merchants 
themselves.  Finally, hogsheads of dried, salted cod were loaded onto West Country-London-
and-Boston-owned vessels and shipped overseas to foreign markets.76   
 Colonists were initially totally dependent on the capital and vessels associated with West 
Country merchants.  A visitor to the province of Maine in the mid-seventeenth century recorded: 
“The fishermen take yearly on the coast many hundred quintals of cod, hake, haddock, pollock, 
etc., and dry them on their stages, making three voyages a year.  They make merchantable and 
refuse fish, which they sell to Massachusetts merchants,” who typically worked for West 
Country firms.77  The dependent status of colonial fishing stations lasted for some time.  When 
Reverend John Barnard first came to Marblehead in 1714, he observed “the people contented 
themselves to be the slaves that digged in the mines and left the merchants of Boston, Salem, and 
Europe to carry away the gains.”78  Merchants in outports commonly had coasters and fishermen 
transport the catches to Boston, where additional middlemen had merely been filling orders for, 
                                                 
74 Gray, “Fisheries to the East and to the West,” 98-100. 
75 Daniel Vickers, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers In the Age of Sail (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 
University Press, 2005), 34-35. 
76 Vickers, Young Men and the Sea, 34, 42-43; Heyrman, Commerce and Culture, 227, 330; Innis, The 
Codfisheries, 79.  By the end of the century, Boston was the third largest port in the British Empire.  Bernard and 
Lotte Bailyn, Massachusetts Shipping, 1697-1714: A Statistical Study (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), 
20-22. 
77 This quote can be found in McFarland, A History of the New England Fisheries, 58. 
78 Samuel Roads, Jr., The History and Traditions of Marblehead, Third ed. (Marblehead: N. Allen Lindsay & 
Co., 1897). 42. 
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and loading the ships of, West Country merchants.79  West Country control did not remain static 
or constant, however. 
The first crack in the core’s control over the New England periphery occurred during the 
English Civil War.  Crisis at home disrupted England’s maritime economy in general and its 
commercial fishing industry in particular, as fishing vessels were converted to warships and 
fishermen were pressed into naval service.  Bristol, the largest port in the West Country, became 
a battleground and changed hands twice, in 1642 and 1644, between Parliamentarians and 
Royalists.  The West Country fleets that traveled to Newfoundland grew smaller and smaller, and 
then stopped traveling to New England altogether.80  As a result, European markets became 
hungry for new suppliers and cod prices rose in several key European markets.81   
 New England merchants in the 1640s lacked the shipping, capital and overseas 
connections necessary to fill this vacuum on their own.  However, London merchants eager to 
break the West Country’s stranglehold on the fish trade had all of the commercial necessaries, 
and they began shipping manufactured goods, mostly textiles, to Boston on the first leg of what 
would become a regular triangular trade.  In Boston, manufactured goods were exchanged with 
wholesalers for pre-arranged loads of dried cod, which were then shipped to ports in Iberia or the 
Portuguese Atlantic islands.  The transatlantic shipments of cod primarily involved merchantable 
grades for domestic European consumption, but some refuse grade cod was also sold in Iberia, 
presumably for re-export to slave plantations given the small European slave populations.  Once 
                                                 
79 According to Vickers, “coasters were, by definition, professional seamen who had mastered the handling of 
smaller sailing vessels and now made their business freighting cargo up and down the coast where they lived.”  
Vickers, Young Men and the Sea, 18. 
80 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 98; and Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the Seventeenth Century, 
77-78.  According to Vickers, the West Country fleet working Newfoundland waters “fell from 340 vessels in 1634, 
to 270 in 1644, to fewer than 200 by 1652.”  Ibid.  For more on the Civil War’s impact on Newfoundland, see Pope, 
Fish Into Wine, 132-44. 
81 Cod prices climbed by 25% in Seville between 1637-1642 and 1644-1648, and rose 50% in Madeira over the 
same periods.  See, Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 98.   
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the cod had been exchanged for fruits, solid specie, or lines of credit, the final leg of the triangle 
traversed to London.  Fortunately for New Englanders, many London merchants were so eager to 
get in on this trade that they were willing to enter into partnerships with colonists, who 
increasingly built their own fishing vessels.  Londoners’ helped New Englanders gradually to 
gain control of the trade circuit. 82 
The bulk of New England exports of dried Atlantic cod in the seventeenth century were 
shipped to Spain, Portugal, and the Wine Islands, where this type of fish has always been highly 
valued for a variety of reasons: it could stay dried for extended periods; it proved exceptionally 
resilient to warm climates; it was extraordinarily durable during inland transport from coastal 
communities; and it was high in protein.  Iberian ports were also attractive markets for fish 
because of the amount of solid specie that fish merchants could get in return.  The principal 
economic function of the seventeenth-century colonial New England cod fisheries within the 
Atlantic economy was the transference of New World gold and silver into London coffers.83  In 
1641, John Winthrop reported that 300,000 dried cod filets, or 6,000 quintals, were exported 
from Boston, the primary distribution center for New England, and almost all of it went to 
Iberian ports.84  In 1699, 75% of the 50,000 quintals of dried cod exported from Boston went to 
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Bilboa, Spain alone.85  These regions commanded the best prices for dried cod, or bacalao in 
Spanish.   In 1642, bacalao fetched 14 shillings per quintal in Iberia and 8 shillings in the West 
Indies.  And for the period between 1662 and 1685, for which price records are particularly 
good, cod was worth 27-44% more in Iberian ports than in West Indian ports.86  At no point 
during the colonial period did Southwestern Europe lose this comparative price advantage.  The 
fact that New England cod could be winter-cured also gave it a small but important comparative 
advantage over Newfoundland cod, which was not typically dried during the winter months.87  
Iberian markets for Atlantic cod were not new to the seventeenth century.  This trade had been in 
existence since the Irish fisheries were established in the thirteenth century.  The principal 
development here was that New Englanders were beginning to emerge as Iberian suppliers in 
place of West Country merchants.   
 Furthermore, New Englanders started to seize some market share around Newfoundland 
at the expense of West Country fish interests.  As a result of Civil War in England, West Country 
migratory fishing fleets at Newfoundland witnessed a decrease in output from 250,000 quintals 
in 1615 to 170,000 quintals in 1675.88  This decrease in production can be attributed primarily to 
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the fact that English migratory fishing fleets were dwindling.  In 1605, the migratory fleet 
numbered some 250 vessels.  By 1670, there were only 80 vessels in the transient fleet.89  The 
number of English sack ships declined during this period as well.  Sacks had been responsible for 
supplying those hardy souls willing to overwinter on the island and the migratory fishing fleets 
that established temporary base camps in the region.  New Englanders were able to capitalize on 
this weakened position of the West Country merchants, and expanded trade with Newfoundland 
during the second-half of the seventeenth century.  They traveled in small but growing numbers 
to the northern island and exchanged provisions, lumber, rum, sugar, molasses, and tobacco for 
specie, lines of credit, fishing equipment, and various European goods.90     
European expansion in the West Indies during mid-seventeenth century further stimulated 
the maritime commercial expansion of the New England cod fisheries.  Europeans quickly 
conquered and divided the tropical islands.  Between 1625 and 1650, England had settled 
Providence Island, Barbados, Nevis, Antigua, Montserrat, and part of St. Christopher’s Island.  
The French inhabited Guadeloupe, Martinique, the Tortugas, St. Martin, St. Lucia, St. Croix, 
Grenada, and the rest of St. Christopher, while the Dutch planted colonies at Curaçao, St. 
Eustatius, and Tobago.  After destroying the ability of the native population to resist, or utterly 
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eliminating the natives altogether, Europeans began converting the land to the production of 
tradable commodities and bringing workers to the islands.   
These workers needed to be fed, and cheaply so as not to reduce profit margins.  After 
experimenting with various forms of white servitude, West Indian planters came to rely on a 
steady supply of black African slave laborers.  Slave importation into Barbados exploded during 
the 1640s as the island experienced what Richard Dunn has coined a “sugar revolution.”91  In 
1640 there were relatively few black African slaves on the island.  Within ten years, 30,000 
whites owned an estimated 12,800 such slaves and the island had become the leading sugar 
producer in the British Empire.  In another ten years the number of slaves had more than 
doubled, and they outnumbered whites on the island.  By 1690, there were nearly 48,000 slaves 
living and working on Barbadian sugar plantations, a figure representing 75% of the island’s 
total population.92  Although no island converted to sugar production and slave labor as quickly 
as Barbados, Dunn writes, “all of the English and French islands inexorably followed the 
Barbadian example.”93  In 1650 there were 15,000 black African slaves on all of the British West 
Indian islands, or 25% of the total population.  Ten years later, there were 34,000 slaves, or 42% 
of the total population.  By the end of the century 98,000 slaves lived and worked in the British 
West Indies.  This figure represented 73% of the total population.94  The French sugar 
plantations expanded at a slower pace, which was to be expected given their capital commitment 
to Newfoundland fishing operations and New France exploration, fur extraction, and settlement.  
Yet, in 1664 the French West India Company was formed and given a monopoly for forty years, 
and by 1683 there were 19,346 slaves living and working on the French islands, including 2,102 
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slaves on the newly planted St. Domingue.95  Domestic food production could not meet the 
needs of the increasing numbers of slaves on these West Indian plantations.     
As planters increasingly stopped developing land for domestic food production a sugar 
monoculture developed.  West Indian planters consequently relied more and more on New 
Englanders for lumber and provisions.  The protein found even in near-rotten refuse grades of 
dried cod, which could not be marketed in Europe, provided an inexpensive fuel source for 
growing numbers of slave laborers.96  West Indian masters could have mobilized slave labor for 
fishing in addition to field work, thereby reducing their dependency on imported provisions.  In 
at least one instance, slave fishermen did produce cheap food for local field hands.  However, the 
decision to move coerced laborers away from sugar cane was not a popular one, and planters 
remained content to bring in most of the food for the islands from abroad.97  New Englanders 
were keenly aware of this dependency.   
 Yankee merchants exploited the tropical markets from the beginning of settlement in the 
northern colonies.  In 1636, Marblehead, Massachusetts, the first resident fishing station in New 
England, built its first vessel, the Desire, a one hundred and twenty ton ship initially employed in 
the local fishing industry.  In 1637, she went on one of the earliest recorded New England 
trading voyage to the West Indies.  At Providence Island, dried cod and seventeen Native 
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American captives were exchanged for a cargo of cotton, tobacco and black African slaves.  The 
Desire returned to Boston, the commercial hub, on February 26, 1638.98  Over the next few 
years, Providence Island converted quickly to a slave labor system, making it one of the earliest 
West Indian islands to abandon servant labor.  Given the impact that this conversion had 
throughout the region, it is significant that just as the Puritan-controlled island shifted to slaves, 
dried cod was forthcoming from the Puritan Commonwealth to the north.  The supply of an 
inexpensive food source was probably critical for this labor conversion.  Providence Island was 
not alone in this regard.   
 Barbados, the greatest sugar producer and slave consumer in the seventeenth century, 
quickly developed commercial ties to New England.  Richard Vines, a Barbadian planter, wrote 
to John Winthrop in 1647 to inform the leader of the Puritan Commonwealth that West Indian 
planters were “so intent upon planting sugar that they had rather buy food at very dear rates than 
produce it by labor, so infinite is the profit of sugar works after once accomplished.”99  
Throughout the second half of the seventeenth century New Englanders built-up their own deep 
sea fleets to supply dried cod to these hungry West Indian markets.  By 1687, 76% of vessels 
clearing customs in Boston were locally registered.  Salem and Boston, in particular, became 
centers of transatlantic shipping.  Boston still took in most of the fish caught in New England 
shallops, and it still dominated the export trade through a mixture of its own shipping and 
London-owned vessels.  Salem at this point had its own fleet of fishing vessels, which it outfitted 
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along with fishing vessels from most of the New England outports, and it traded directly with the 
West Indies, primarily Barbados.100   
 The proliferation of African slave labor in the Chesapeake Bay region contributed to a 
lesser degree to the early expansion of the New England cod fisheries.  To be sure, as early as 
1619, Virginian planters were sending ships to Newfoundland to purchase dried cod, and similar 
ventures to New England were conducted on an irregular basis throughout the first half of the 
seventeenth century.101  Yet, these small scale efforts seem to have been conducted with the sole 
purpose of preventing English settlers from starving.  The trade between New England and the 
Southern colonies took on new importance as Southern planters converted from a servant to a 
slave labor system in the second half of the century.102  It was at this point that Northern 
shipments of dried cod to Southern plantations took place on a regular basis.  Cod was 
exchanged for tobacco, pork, and naval stores such as tar and turpentine.  Following its own 
curing process, tobacco was ready for oceanic shipment around November and December each 
year, just in time to be sold to New England trade vessels that habitually traveled south to 
warmer waters in the winter months.103  This branch of New England’s trade, however, was 
always subsidiary to the European and West Indian trades.  Having said this, the trade was 
important enough to Southern planters that during the 1740s William Byrd II, a Virginia tobacco 
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planter and slave owner, came to advocate using the British military to forcibly take control of 
French fishing stations in the North Atlantic.104 
 Mid-century New Englanders were not establishing entirely new markets for Atlantic 
cod among slave plantations.  Rather, they were following trade patterns that had been 
established in the Atlantic economy at least as early as the turn of the seventeenth century.  Thus, 
John Winthrop could write with confidence before departing England in 1629 that dried cod was 
“a known and staple Commodity.”105  Even the Puritan divine understood which markets 
demanded cod, and why.   
 Throughout the 1600s the economic ties between New England and the West Indies 
multiplied.  As demand for tobacco and sugar in the British Empire raised production levels in 
the South and in the West Indies, increased production levels stimulated slave importation.  More 
slaves meant more demand for cheaper grades of dried cod.  Heightened demand for this refuse 
cod generated higher production levels in New England.  In order to meet these elevated 
production levels, more workers, salt supplies, hooks, lines, vessels, and constant maintenance 
from numerous waterfront artisans were necessary.  In short, there was a symbiotic relationship 
between cod and consumer goods produced through slave labor throughout the seventeenth 
century and into the eighteenth century that directly influenced the expansion of New England’s 
maritime economy.106 
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The English Civil War and the weakening position of the West Country, combined with 
the sugar revolution in the West Indies, contributed to the expansion of the New England cod 
fishing industry in the seventeenth century.  Between 1641 and 1645 the annual export revenue 
cod brought into Massachusetts doubled from £5,000 to £10,000.  In 1646, Marblehead alone 
drew £4,000 from its cod exports.  Populations of colonial New England fishing ports grew, and 
between 1645 and 1675 the combined output of these fisheries expanded by 5-6% annually, from 
12,000 to 60,000 quintals per year.107   
Early New Englanders typically worked along the coast between Cape Cod and the 
province of Maine in three-man shallops, which were open-decked, double-ended, single or 
double-masted vessels averaging twenty-five feet in length and six tons burden.  Most of the 
labor force along the New England coast initially consisted of servants who were recruited in 
West Country ports to work for a specified amount of time under a master.108  These mobile 
workers were almost exclusively young men who typically left colonial fishing stations for home 
after their labor contract expired.109  While their British brethren were being disciplined through 
the use of the wage, seventeenth-century New England fishermen operated under a system of 
clientage, which can be understood as the maritime equivalent of the putting-out system.  Due to 
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chronic labor scarcity in the region, workers were extended ample credit and allowed access to 
some productive means.  Merchants contracted with vessel-owning companies of men for 
catches.  The merchants supplied provisions and equipment, and in return the fishermen agreed 
to turn-over the product of their labor.110  The system of clientage changed around the turn of the 
eighteenth century as the New England fishing industry matured. 
3.5 THE MATURATION OF RESIDENT NEW ENGLAND FISHING STATIONS 
 The second fissure in the core’s economic control over the New England colonists came with 
the weakening of Boston’s position at the turn of the eighteenth century.  Boston had acted as a 
focal point for West Country and London interests.  Capital and shipping were sent from the 
mother country to pick up pre-arranged loads of cod on a regular schedule.  But, during the first 
half of the eighteenth century smaller fishing outports began eliminating middlemen altogether 
and marketing their catches overseas themselves.111  In 1744 Boston selectmen bemoaned the 
fact in town meetings.  They complained that “both Fish and Supply is Confined to the Fishing 
towns who generally Send it abroad in their own Vessels, Especially Marblehead, Salem, and 
Plymouth, which has rendered them much Abler and Us much less to Support Our Usual 
proportion of the Province Tax.”  Ten years later, Bostonians further lamented the fact that “the 
very men in Boston who heretofore supply’d the Fishery and Traders at Marblehead and 
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elsewhere, now buy great part of their Supply of English goods from those, to whom, but a very 
few Years since they used to Furnish all the English or European Goods those persons had.”112  
Robert Hooper and Jeremiah Lee, two of the wealthiest fish exporters in Marblehead, informed 
Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson in 1764: “We are not only largely concerned in the 
owning of Vessels, & employing the People in the Fishery, but annually ship large Quantities 
both to Europe and the West Indies on our own Accounts.”113  The expansion of commercial 
fishing ports such as Marblehead adversely affected Salem, in addition to Boston.  Salem’s 
fishing fleet declined from 60 vessels in 1689 to 30 in 1765.114  The expansion of smaller fishing 
ports hurt Salem’s position as a market town and outfitter for colonial fishing operations.115   
 While economic control over the fisheries fanned out from Boston and Salem during the 
eighteenth century, it did not stray too far from these traditional commercial centers.    Much of 
the labor and capital involved in the New England fisheries was concentrated in the North Shore 
coastal communities of Essex County, Massachusetts, including Marblehead, Gloucester, 
Beverly and Ipswich.116  These ports became commercial centers for the production of dried cod 
for shipment to overseas markets. 
 Marblehead expanded at this time to become the foremost fishing port in colonial New 
England, and its own outfitter.  By 1750, it surpassed its neighbor Salem in terms of the size of 
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its fishing fleet, the number of its fishermen, and the amount of fish caught on an annual basis.117  
At this time, Marbleheaders maintained 150 fishing vessels amounting to 1/3 the total tonnage of 
the entire Massachusetts fleet, and caught 50% of the fish exported from Massachusetts to 
Spain.118  The same Reverend John Barnard who in 1714 had referred to Marbleheaders as 
“slaves” recorded in mid-century that his adopted hometown had its own fleet of “between thirty 
and forty ships, brigs, snows, and topsail schooners engaged in foreign trade.”119  Dr. Alexander 
Hamilton, a Scottish émigré who visited Marblehead in 1744, wrote “they deal for 34,000 
Pounds sterling prime cost value in fish yearly, bringing in 30,000 quintals, - a quintal being one 
hundred-weight dried fish, which is 3,000,000 pounds’ weight, a great quantity of that 
commodity.”120  During the 1720s, Gloucester returned to fishing after more than forty years of 
attention to farming, sending out from Cape Anne 49 vessels and 245 fishermen.  By 1741, the 
number of vessels had increased to 70, and by 1775 the port boasted 150 vessels and 900 
fishermen.  This sudden and extensive growth made Gloucester the fastest growing fishing port 
in New England.121  Ipswich, located northwest of Gloucester, also expanded quickly, but could 
not sustain the growth.  In the early 1720s the town had 29 vessels and 149 fishermen, but only 
14 vessels were added over the next fifty years.  Beverly, northeast of Salem, launched its fishing 
fleet around mid-century.  In 1762, there were only 9 fishing vessels in the port, but by 1775 
Beverly’s fleet numbered 35 and employed 300 fishermen.122   
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Commercial fishing expanded in these small-scale eighteenth century fishing stations for 
several reasons.  British victories in various colonial wars stimulated the New England fishing 
industry.  The Treaty of Utrecht ended eleven years of war between France and Great Britain that 
had stunted the growth of the New England fishing industry.  French warships and privateers had 
scoured the New England coast, slowing the traffic in cod considerably.  The treaty restricted 
French cod fisheries in the North Atlantic, thereby opening commercial possibilities to British 
interests, particularly in supplying the French West Indian islands with dried cod.  Likewise, 
English wars with France and Spain between 1743 and 1763 set back the colonial fishing 
industry.  Yet the treaty signed at the end of the Seven Years’ War, in 1763, transferred most of 
French Canada, including Newfoundland, into British hands.123  Taken as a whole, the 
eighteenth century colonial wars destroyed France’s position in the North Atlantic fishing 
industry and gave Great Britain a virtual monopoly over the cod trade.124  The exclusion of 
French warships and most of their fishermen expanded New England’s access to North Atlantic 
cod.  Brook Watson, an eyewitness called before the House of Commons in 1775 to testify on 
behalf of the North American merchants regarding Parliament’s recent passage of the Fisheries 
Bill that closed the New England cod fisheries, gave his opinion on the positive effect of the 
1763 treaty on the cod trade to the West Indies.  He testified: 
That the most inferior fish is exported to the neutral or French islands, and 
exchanged for molasses on VERY ADVANTAGEOUS TERMS, as the French 
are PROHIBITED from fishing.  These molasses are sent to New-England, and 
manufactured into rum, which is sold for about fourteen pence per gallon, and 
used in the fisheries of New England and Newfoundland, and also exported to 
                                                 
123 The French retained St. Pierre and Miquelon, and rights to fishing on Newfoundland’s western shore.  For 
copies of this peace treaty, see The Providence Gazette; And Country Journal, May 21, 1763; The Newport 
Mercury, May 23, 1763; and The New-Hampshire Gazette, May 27, 1763. 
124 Innis, The Codfisheries, 138, 160-161, 171, 179-180; and McFarland, A History of the New England 
Fisheries, 78-81, 94-101. 
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Guinea, and there exchanged for slaves, many of whom are sold to the French, 
and therefore eat the fish procured by the NEW ENGLANDERS.125   
To be sure, the French continued to work North Atlantic waters, as the exclusionary articles in 
the peace treaties proved difficult to enforce.  However, the British Navy forcibly removed 
French settlers and arrested French fishermen who violated these articles.  By the end of the 
Seven Years’ War, New Englanders enjoyed greater access to cod and additional markets for this 
commodity as a result of wars and peace terms. 
 Expansion of the fishing industry did not automatically occur as quickly as the ink dried 
on these treaties, however.  Merchants in provincial fishing stations had to be convinced doing 
more in the Atlantic trade themselves was worth the additional efforts and financial risk.  In the 
case of Marblehead, Reverend John Bernard, a fixture in the community from 1715 to 1770, 
became an outspoken advocate for locally-operated overseas trade.  Barnard utilized his 
ecclesiastical position as pastor of Marblehead’s First Congregational church to bring about 
economic changes in the fishing industry.  First, he traveled to Boston Harbor in order to meet 
with “English masters of vessels.”  Barnard educated himself on the finer points of transatlantic 
commerce - in his own words, “that I might by them be let into the mystery of the fish trade.”  
After a time, Barnard felt that he had gained “a pretty thorough understanding” of what it meant 
to establish European connections, broker deals, and transport goods directly to a buyer instead 
of relying on a colonial middleman.  “When I saw the advantages of it,” Barnard wrote of 
transatlantic trade, “I thought it my duty to stir up my people, such as I thought would hearken to 
me, and were capable of practicing upon the advice, to send the fish to market themselves, that 
they might reap the benefit of it, to the enriching themselves, and serving the town.”  Once 
                                                 
125 The Massachusetts Spy: Or, American Oracle of Liberty, May 3, 1775. 
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Barnard had acquired “a pretty thorough understanding of the business,” the parson began 
disseminating his ideas about local economic development, especially among the younger men 
of his congregation.126 
Joseph Swett, Jr., for example, had been a merchant and a member of First Church.  
Barnard described him as “a young man of strict justice, great industry, enterprising genius, 
quick apprehension and firm resolution, but of small fortune.”  The pastor of First Church took 
the young Swett under his wing and informed him of a plan to establish transatlantic business 
connections in order to send their own fish to market, eliminating the middlemen in Salem and 
Boston.  “To [Swett] I opened myself fully,” Barnard wrote, “laid the scheme clearly before him, 
and he hearkened unto me, and was wise enough to put it in practice.”  Soon, Swett fitted out a 
small schooner, hired a captain, and “sent a small cargo [of fish] to Barbados.”  The venture 
proved so successful that Swett was able to fit out several trading vessels for additional voyages 
to Spain.  In Barnard’s words, Swett “soon found he increased his stock, built vessels, and sent 
fish to Europe, and prospered in the trade, to the enriching of himself; and some of his family, by 
carrying on the trade, have arrived at large estates.”127  Eventually, Swett brokered several deals 
with ports in Spain, and a triangular trade was established in which fish from Marblehead was 
traded for lemons and raisins in Spain, which were traded for rum in the West Indies, which was 
then sold throughout Massachusetts.128  According to Barnard, “the more promising young men 
of the town soon followed [Swett’s] example.”  The result of the pastor’s effort was that in 1766, 
Marblehead had “between thirty and forty ships, brigs, snows, and topsail schooners engaged in 
                                                 
126 Barnard, “Autobiography of the Reverend John Barnard,” 239-40.   
127 Ibid. 
128 Roads, Jr., The History and Traditions of Marblehead, 46-47. 
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foreign trade.”129  In short, while tobacco planters in the Chesapeake region continued to rely on 
British bottoms to freight their staple to European markets, New England fish merchants were 
becoming self-sufficient.130 
 Local population booms in the eighteenth century also stimulated economic expansion in 
the fishing industry by contributing to increased productivity.  Between 1650 and 1725, fishing 
ports in Essex County, Massachusetts realized a ten-fold increase in population.131  By 
comparison, the total population in New England grew from 22,900 in 1650 to 170,900 in 1720, 
realizing a 7.7-fold increase.132  Salem, Beverly, Manchester, and Gloucester grew from a 
combined population of 3,500 in 1690 to 16,000 in 1765.133  Within this county-wide expansion, 
Marblehead grew fastest.  Some 1,200 people lived there in 1700, one-third the number in nearby 
Salem.  As early as 1720, the two ports housed 2,000 people apiece.134  By 1744, one observer 
estimated that 5,000 people lived and worked in Marblehead.135  By comparison, Boston’s 
population expanded from 6,000 in 1690 to 17,000 in 1740.136  Expanding employment 
opportunities in the fisheries may explain some of the faster rate of population increase in Essex 
County as compared to greater New England.  Fishing servants continued to abandon the 
migratory fisheries at Newfoundland, and through sundry means they filed into New England 
maritime communities.137  However, in 1715 two-thirds of Essex County’s labor force was 
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Atlantic Trade. 
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generated by local families and by 1750 that proportion reached three-quarters.138  Whereas 
Newfoundland did not realize a demographically self-sufficient labor force until the 1790s, 
Massachusetts did so in the first quarter of the century.139  Migration into Marblehead tapered off 
through the 1730s and 1740s, and by 1750, 80% of Marblehead’s adult males were born into 
families that had lived in the town for at least thirty years.140  Between 1760 and 1774, 89% of 
all fishermen sailing out of Marblehead were born in that port.  In Gloucester and Beverly, the 
corresponding percentages were 73% and 85%, respectively.141  Natural increase, then, more 
than employment-driven immigration, explains the demographic expansion in eighteenth century 
Essex County.   
 More workers, ready at hand, enabled New England fishing ports to send larger fleets to 
sea and to catch and process greater quantities of cod.  In 1675, 1,320 New Englanders in 440 
vessels of 2,640 tons caught 60,000 quintals of cod.  One hundred years later, an estimated 4,405 
New Englanders in 3,000 vessels of 25,630 tons caught 350,000 quintals.142  By 1768, dried cod 
                                                 
138 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 155-157. 
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was the most valuable export commodity in all of New England, bringing in £152,155 every 
year, or 35% of the total export revenue for the entire region.143     
New England merchants shipped cod all over the Atlantic world in the eighteenth 
century, but the greatest emphasis was placed on trade with the West Indies.  The amount of cod 
shipped overseas fluctuated in rhythm with cod stock levels and the effectiveness of the curing 
process each year, making it difficult to determine exactly what percentage of New England 
dried cod was shipped to certain destinations over an extended period of time.  At the end of the 
seventeenth century it was estimated that 75% of New England’s dried cod was exported to 
Portugal, Spain, and the Atlantic Wine Islands.144  Based on the 1752-53 customs records for 
Salem, only 26.4% of the 121 vessels from Salem, Gloucester and Marblehead cleared for 
Southern Europe and the Wine Islands in the year prior to the outbreak of the Seven Years’ War 
that disrupted trade in the region.  The remaining 73.6% cleared for the Southern Colonies and 
the West Indies.  An overwhelming majority of the vessels from Salem and Gloucester cleared 
for the West Indies, while Marblehead sent roughly the same number to both destinations.145  In 
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1763, as news of international peace spread around the Atlantic world, Edward Payne, a Boston 
merchant and member of the Society for the Encouragement of Trade and Commerce, estimated 
that 60% of New England’s annual catch was being shipped to sugar plantations in the 
Caribbean.146  One year later, Robert Hooper and Jeremiah Lee, two of the wealthiest fish 
exporters in Marblehead, informed Lieutenant Governor Thomas Hutchinson “the fish caught in 
the several fishing Towns in the Province of the Massachusetts Bay is annually from 220 to 240 
Thousand Quintals, about 2/5 whereof is made merchantable & shipped to Spain, Portugal, & 
Italy; the other 3/5 is shipped for the West Indies, not being fit for the European Markets.”147  
The figure of 3/5 was later corroborated by “Mr. Kelly,” who “lived in New York and was bred a 
merchant;” and two merchants whose “knowledge is principally confined to New England, Nova 
Scotia and Newfoundland: “Mr. Wentworth,” and “Brook Watson.”  Each of these men testified 
before Parliament in 1766 regarding the impact of Parliamentary acts on colonial trade.148  In his 
capacity as Secretary of State under President George Washington, Thomas Jefferson 
retrospectively calculated a rough balance of trade to the West Indies and Southern Europe 
between 1765-75.  In Jefferson’s report, 50.9% of New England’s dried cod was being exported 
to Europe, which in this case refers specifically the ports in Iberia and among the Wine Islands, 
while 49.1% of the cod was exported to the West Indies.149  However, there is reason to suspect 
that Jefferson may have overestimated the trade to Europe, given Salem’s customs records, 
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Hooper and Lee’s report, and the Parliamentary testimonies of three additional merchants.  
Taken together, the trade data indicates eighteenth century New Englander’s placed a greater 
emphasis on shipping dried cod to slave plantations in the West Indies than they did during the 
seventeenth century.150  On average, 60.7% of the cod processed on Yankee flakeyards was 
shipped to the West Indies between 1752-1775.  Between 1771-73, New England fish merchants 
controlled 81.7% of the West Indian market.151  Other New England commodities followed this 
trade pattern.  From 1768 to 1772, Yankee merchants shipped 79% of their grain and flour, 88% 
of their lumber, and 99% of their cattle and horses to the West Indies.  In all, 63.5% of New 
England’s exports went to the West Indies during this time period.152  Indeed, such was the 
commercial connection between Massachusetts and the West Indies that the region southwest of 
Boston became known as “Jamaica Plain,” and a body of water there was called “Jamaica 
Pond.”153 
 A substantial New England sack trade had even emerged by the mid-eighteenth century 
that further tied Yankee traders to West Indian markets.  Instead of taking the trouble and 
expense to fish and cure the catch themselves, an unspecified number of New England merchants 
sent trade ships with their own manufactured rum, together with West Indian sugar, molasses, 
and rum, to exchange with fishermen around Newfoundland for refuse grade dried cod.  These 
                                                 
150 The evidence in this paragraph largely contradicts modern scholarly interpretations.  James G. Lydon 
estimates “the West Indies and southern Europe were of nearly equal importance as market areas” in the eighteenth 
century.  James G. Lydon, “Fish for Gold: The Massachusetts Fish Trade with Iberia, 1700-1773,” The New 
England Quarterly, Vol.54, No.4 (December, 1981), 539.  Also, see Innis, The Codfisheries, 162. 
151 Selwyn H.H. Carrington, The British West Indies During the American Revolution (Providence, RI: Foris 
Publications, 1988), 44, Table 30.  I arrived at the figure of 81.7% by first adding the barrels, quintals, and kegs of 
fish imported into the West Indies between 1771-73 from America, Nova Scotia and Canada, and Newfoundland.  I 
then divided the sub-total for America by the total.  Here, I assume that “America” refers to the New England cod 
fisheries.  In 1771 alone, New England fish merchants shipped 91.9% of all fish exported from British North 
America to the “British & Foreign West Indies.”  “Exports to the British & Foreign West Indies between the 5th day 
of January 1771 & the 5th day of January 1772,” British North American Customs Papers, 1765-1774, MHS.  
152 Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier, 135-136, Figure 4.6. 
153 “Plan of Boston and vicinity, 1775,” NDAR, Vol. 1, 197. 
  141
New England merchants then traded the refuse for more sugar and molasses in the West 
Indies.154  The value of the “West-India Cod-Fish,” or the refuse grade dried cod, involved in 
this sack trade was estimated at £10,000 in 1764.155   
 The trend toward greater commercial ties between New England fish merchants and 
West Indian markets during the eighteenth-century was primarily the result of four factors: the 
nature of the curing technique used by New Englanders; the proliferation of distilleries in New 
England; increased West Indian slave populations; and Newfoundland’s domination of the 
Southern European markets.  Prior to the development of an off-shore banks fishery, New 
England fishermen caught fish and headed for land as fast as possible, where they dressed, 
salted, and spread cod on fish flakes for drying.156  This process usually resulted in high yields of 
merchantable grade dried cod capable of being marketed in Europe.  Because of the distance 
involved, banks fishing required a different curing process.  New Englanders began utilizing the 
combination cure first developed by the Dutch in the late fourteenth century.157  Schooners 
would travel several days to offshore banks, take in cod, and fishermen would salt the catch wet, 
right out of the ocean.  The lightly salted cod would then be stacked in the holds of the schooner 
for a prolonged time.  Later, the crew would return to their home port, where shoremen would 
air-dry the damp, salty catch.158  Invariably, the combination of a wet-salt cure and an air-dry 
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cure produced a greater percentage of refuse grade dried cod, defined by Edward Payne, a 
Boston fish merchant, as “that being only such as is over Salted, Sun Burned, and broken, & 
thereby rendered unfit for any Market in Europe.”159  One New England fish merchant testified 
before Parliament in 1766 that colonial fishermen worked “at a great distance from the shore” 
and their catch was “kept in ships where it grows soft and becomes therefore soft and refuse.”160  
In short, the use of the schooners to work off shore banks and the employment of the 
combination cure produced a grade of dried cod that could only be sold to slave plantations.  In 
Payne’s words, “as we can’t cure Fish for the European Market separate from the other sort sent 
to the W. Indies, & as we have no other Market for what is made by the Bankers [i.e. the refuse 
grade dried cod], it will be lost if not sent to the foreign Islands in the W. Indies.”  It was Payne’s 
considered opinion that without West Indian markets, and the slave populations therein, “the 
whole Bank Fishery” would have been “destroy[ed].”161  
The proliferation of New England distilleries in the eighteenth century provided 
additional stimulus for the eighteenth century shift in Atlantic trade patterns.  There were a 
handful of distilleries in operation throughout New England at the turn of the eighteenth century.  
By 1770 there were 140 rum distilleries in the thirteen North American colonies, 97 of which 
were located in New England.  At this time, colonists imported over 6.5 million gallons of 
molasses from the West Indies.  Lumber and dried cod were the two primary commodities New 
Englanders exchanged for the enormous quantity of molasses they needed to feed their 
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expanding distilleries, which could not be gotten from Iberia or the Wine Islands.162  Rum 
production in New England increased throughout the eighteenth century as supplies of West 
Indian molasses expanded.  Greater sugar production in the West Indies was made possible by 
the use of greater numbers of slave laborers.   
The plantation complexes in the West Indian islands imported huge numbers of black 
African slaves throughout the eighteenth-century, which generated greater demand in that region 
for shipments of dried cod from New England.  Jamaica became the largest slave society in the 
British West Indies, expanding its slave population twenty-five times over between 1673 and 
1774.163  In 1700, there were 115,000 slaves in the British West Indian islands, and 54,000 in the 
French islands.  Forty years later, these numbers expanded to 250,000 and 228,000, respectively.  
By 1770, there were 434,000 slaves living, working, and dying on the British islands, and 
393,000 in the French islands.164  In short, British planters had to feed 319,000 more mouths in 
1770 than they did at the beginning of the century, while French planters had 339,000 more.     
 Feeding these slaves well, and providing for their living conditions in general, were not 
issues plantation managers and owners spent a great deal of time worrying about in the West 
Indies.  To be sure, black slaves did not live or eat as well as their white masters.  Yet, slaves 
were consumers of food.  They produced some of the protein for their dietary needs.  In part, 
slaves planted and grew their own vegetables in gardens and on the edges of cultivated sugar 
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plantations.  A few raised poultry instead of planting food.  Slaves were also given fishing hooks 
to help supplement their diets, and they became proficient fishermen.  Yet, such cost-saving 
measures were not enough to make these coerced laborers self-sufficient.  Slave provision 
grounds tended to be small, most of the fresh fish that was caught supplied master’s tables, and 
hurricanes frequently devastated food crops on the islands.  As a result, the majority of West 
Indian slave diets comprised imported provisions.  Some salted beef was brought in from Ireland, 
although most of it went to fuel the remaining white indentured servant populations on the 
islands.  Fish merchants in England, Scotland, and in the Netherlands shipped dried and pickled 
herring to the West Indies, and a portion went to the slaves.  Flour, corn, and beans were 
imported from North America.  And dried, salted refuse grade cod from New England remained 
an inexpensive source of protein with which to fuel slave labor.165  On average, individual slaves 
on the British islands consumed thirty pounds of fish each on an annual basis during the second 
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half of the eighteenth century.  This figure varied depending on the availability of provisions and 
the plantation involved.  Slaves could each be given as little as twelve pounds of fish per year or 
as much as seventy pounds.  The most common daily allowance for a slave at this time was one 
pint of corn and one-seventh of a pound of fish.166   
 New England maritime commercial expansions was further stimulated by the fact that 
warfare and peace negotiations had gone a long way toward establishing Great Britain’s 
hegemony around Newfoundland.  British cod production increased exponentially throughout the 
eighteenth century as a result, which motivated New Englanders to concentrate their efforts on 
the West Indies.  In 1710, the British cod fishing interests at Newfoundland, understood as both 
the resident fishery and the West Country migratory fisheries, produced 100,000 quintals.  
Production then increased to over 300,000 quintals in 1730; over 400,000 quintals in 1750; over 
600,000 quintals in 1770; and over 700,000 quintals in 1790.167  Much of this Newfoundland cod 
went to ports in Iberia and the Wine Islands.  During the eighteenth century, the English West 
Country migratory fishermen and Newfoundland planters consistently produced a majority of the 
British cod exported to Spain, Portugal, the Madeiras, Azores, and Canaries.  Assuming the 
Newfoundland interests and the New England fisheries accounted for the total annual British cod 
production, the Newfoundland interests controlled an average of 78.6% of all Southern European 
markets throughout the entire eighteenth century.168  By contrast, these same Newfoundland 
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interests controlled only 13.5% of the West Indian markets between 1771-73.169  The proximity 
of Newfoundland and West Country merchants gave them an edge over New Englanders in 
terms of getting their fish to market.  And whenever the Newfoundland interests glutted the 
European markets, such as they did during the 1720s and early 1770s, these markets lost their 
comparative price advantage over the markets in the West Indies.  A combination of 
Newfoundland’s control, the New Englander’s choice of curing techniques, the proliferation of 
distilleries, and the expansion of the slave plantations explains why the principal economic 
function of the New England cod fisheries in the Atlantic economy involved provisioning the 
expanding number of Southern and, more especially, West Indian slave plantations in the 
eighteenth century.  
Cod’s role in the Atlantic economy was not created with the expansion of distilleries and 
plantations.  Certain essential continuities over several centuries existed in the Atlantic cod 
fishing industry.  A traditional curing process was still used and dried cod was still shipped to 
Southern European Catholics and slaves on sugar plantations, just as it had been in the Middle 
Ages.  But North Atlantic cod fishing had shifted westward to the coastline of New England and 
Newfoundland.  Expanding New England fisheries increasingly took on the role of West Indian 
supplier, while the Newfoundland fisheries shipped to markets in Iberia and the Wine Islands.  
As the New England cod fishing industry expanded, colonists took greater control over their 
maritime commerce.  West Country merchants still commanded the Newfoundland fisheries 
                                                                                                                                                             
Salt Cod and Its Institutions in the Interwar Period,” International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. 17, No. 2 
(December, 2005), 61-85, esp. 67, and Figure 1: “Percentage Distribution of World Dried Salted Cod Imports by 
Country, 1920-1947.”  Portugal’s historic dependence on foreign cod, “the cod problem,” had become so 
pronounced by the twentieth century that, on average, 89.8% of the dried cod consumed in the region between 1900 
and 1933 had been imported.  Even during this modern period, much of this cod trade was controlled by 
businessmen in England.  Ibid., 63n, 69n.  In short, fish merchants in England dominated Iberian markets over an 
extended period of time. 
169 Carrington, The British West Indies During the American Revolution, 44, Table 30. 
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throughout the eighteenth century.  And London financiers still floated credit to the New 
England merchants to cover costs of manufactured goods not covered through sales.  Yet, the 
colonies no longer depended on supplies of transient laborers from England and catches were 
transported on local shipping.  Also, Yankee traders brokered overseas deals without England-
based middlemen.  Such expansion and autonomy came with political costs, however.  The 
political ramifications of New England’s expanding role in the Atlantic economy will be dealt 
with in the following chapter. 
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4.0  COD AND ATLANTIC ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
“A reformation [in trade regulations] is become necessary….But should such 
restraints take place as to discourage the trade, and destroy the fishery of the 
northern colonies; Great Britain, instead of benefiting itself by its conquests [i.e. 
Canada and Newfoundland, which were taken in the Seven Years’ War], has only 
added a load which it must at length sink under.”  “Montesquieu,” Boston 
Evening Post, November 21, 1763. 
“A small Weight added to a Burthen a Man staggers under, will crush and sink 
him.”  Essex Gazette, September 13-September 20, 1768, in an article on 
Parliamentary taxation.  
The origins of the American Revolution cannot be adequately explained without investigating 
why merchants and workers in the New England cod fishing industry decided to resist British 
authority.  First and foremost, it is widely recognized that the Revolution began in New England, 
especially in Massachusetts.  Riots against Parliamentary authority were particularly prevalent in 
the region throughout the 1760s and early 1770s.  In these mob activities, effigies and customs 
vessels were burned; customs officials and royal governors were forced to watch their property 
being destroyed; monopolized tea became flotsam and jetsam; and British soldiers were harassed 
to the point at which they were willing to shoot into a crowd of unarmed colonists.1  Moreover, 
                                                 
1 Alfred F. Young, The Shoemaker and the Tea Party: Memory and the American Revolution (Boston: Beacon 
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the idea to boycott British manufactured goods and use consumer power as a political weapon 
began in New England; militia units were formed here with the intention of resisting British 
authority at a minute’s notice; elites in this region first established committees of correspondence 
to unite colonists in opposition; and the “shot heard around the world” came at Concord, 
Massachusetts.2  Additionally, according to the most-cited military historian of the American 
Revolutionary War, “Massachusetts put a larger percentage of her population in the field [during 
the war] than any other state.”3   
 Massachusetts was the foremost fishing colony, yet the commercial cod fishing industry 
played an important role throughout New England’s economic life.  Dried cod represented the 
most lucrative export in the entire region.  Revenue from commercial fishing and the production 
of dried cod brought in trade goods from the West Indies and Southern Europe, foodstuffs from 
Connecticut and colonies in the Mid-Atlantic and Southern regions, along with manufactured 
goods from Great Britain.  The returns made in molasses from the West Indies alone were crucial 
in terms of fueling distilleries across the New England colonies.  And the fishing industry had an 
economic spread effect that benefited secondary industries in the region such as lumbering, 
shipbuilding, and farming.4  Coming to terms with why New England fishermen and fish 
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merchants were among the first to resist British authority will therefore go a long way toward 
explaining the very origins of the American Revolution. 
 For nearly a century, much ink has been spilled in various attempts to clarify why the 
thirteen North American colonies fought a war against their own government.  For the most part, 
historians have waded into two contested pools: the debate over ideological and material 
causations; and the contest over local and global factors behind the Revolution.5  The former 
debate is the most long-standing.  Over the course of the nineteenth century, scholars collectively 
known as the “Whig” school developed a rationalization for the Revolution that emphasized 
ideological motivations.6  These scholars tended to celebrate the Founding Fathers, who 
heroically united disparate colonies to defend freedom and liberty against a tyrannical monarch 
and his corrupt friends in Parliament.  The Whigs blamed George III for causing the imperial 
rupture, and they lauded the colonial leaders for their righteous cause.  The “Progressive” school 
then rose in reaction against this celebratory interpretation.7  They emphasized internal conflict 
over consensus and economic determinants over ideological origins.  Moreover, the Progressives 
tended to view the Revolution as a social movement more than a march of ideas.  By the middle 
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of the century, a group of scholars labeled “neo-Whigs” swung the pendulum back toward the 
ideological end of the spectrum.  While the Cold War got hotter, these scholars saw 
Revolutionary America as a bastion of liberty helping to save, and then spread, democracy in the 
world.8  Unsatisfied with Progressives’ emphasis on conflict at home and economic stimuli, yet 
disaffected with the Whigs’ focus on George III, the neo-Whigs located the British conspiracy to 
strip colonists of their political liberties in a corrupt Parliamentary faction headed by Lord North.  
In this interpretation, educated, wealthy colonial elites were once again lauded for creating a 
consensus in the colonies regarding the righteousness of revolution.  The neo-Whigs, however, 
unlike their predecessors, provided a more detailed analysis of the Founding Father’s political 
ideas that explored concern for traditional constitutional rights and fears associated with tyranny.  
Around the same time, “New Left” historians took the Progressive’s interest in material concerns 
and began to explore more deeply why those outside educated, wealthy elite circles decided to 
resist British authority during the imperial crisis.9  Through their work, it became clear that 
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laborers were less concerned with constitutional rights and more alarmed at the widening 
disparity between rich and poor in the colonies.  Colonial elites were successful at linking this 
alarm to what they perceived as a corrupt imperial political system, thus mobilizing the masses.  
Naval impressment in colonial port cities and the increasing inability of working men and 
women in the colonies to purchase their own land further inflamed public sentiment against the 
British Empire.  Currently, this debate has not shown signs of deceleration or resolution.10 
Studies emphasizing micro and macro level causations have further intensified and 
broadened our understanding of the Revolution’s genesis.  Shortly after World War I, the 
renowned British historian Sir Lewis Namier probed Parliamentary records for evidence that 
political parties had formed in early modern England and influenced the course of colonial policy 
on the eve of the American Revolution.11  Namier demonstrated that factions within Parliament, 
as opposed to organized political parties, formed around personal interests.  Internal rivalries, he 
believed, contributed to the vacillations in state policy between salutary neglect and intervention, 
ultimately leading to the imperial rupture.  Any study of the origins of the Revolution, Namier 
believed, had to start and end in Whitehall.  American scholars, on the other hand, came to 
believe that colonial rebellion could only be explained by investigating colonial town life.  The 
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town study emerged in the 1970s as a separate genre of colonial American history.12  These 
investigations primarily looked at the transition to capitalism and the impact this had on 
communal life.  The town studies then inspired inquires into the origins of the Revolution that 
focused on specific communities.13  It was found that overpopulation and underemployment in 
some towns generated large numbers of disaffected, listless youths in search of a cause.  In other 
areas, we are told, deferential politics reigned supreme and townsfolk simply acquiesced to men 
they viewed as their social-betters.  As a result of this emphasis on more localized causations, 
some historians have adopted the position that each colonial region maintained different and 
distinct justifications for revolting against the Empire that must be understood on their own 
terms.14   
 The emphasis on localized causations has not satisfied everyone.  The “Imperial school” 
of scholars were the first to react against the Whigs’ tendency to examine the colonies in 
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isolation, and they further rejected Namier’s focus on personal politics in Whitehall.  This school 
has emphasized the impact Parliamentary decisions had on political and economic development 
throughout the colonies, and in so doing they shifted our perspective of the causes of the 
Revolution from the micro to the macro level.15  Collectively, these scholars firmly situated the 
thirteen North American colonies within a distinctly British political and economic world 
system.  They argued that the British state did a fair and benevolent job of running the empire 
prior to the Revolution, as evidenced by the economic expansion that took place in the colonies 
between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the fact that the imperial rupture did not 
take place until 1776.16  The cause of the Revolution in this interpretation is laid solely on the 
doorstep of colonists who unnecessarily grumbled about paying taxes, rioted, and boycotted 
British manufactured goods all because they had been used to a system of salutary neglect and 
were now being forced to take seriously their status as British subjects.  This interpretation 
                                                 
15 Ian R. Christie and Benjamin W. Labaree, Empire or Independence, 1760-1776 (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, Inc., 1976); James A. Henretta, “Salutary Neglect”: Colonial Administration Under the Duke of 
Newcastle (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972); Lawrence Henry Gibson, The British Empire Before the 
American Revolution, Vols. 1-15, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1939-1970); Jack M. Sosin, Agents and Merchants: 
British Colonial Policy and the Origins of the American Revolution, 1763-1775 (Lincoln, Nebraska: University of 
Nebraska Press, 1965); Charles M. Andrews, The Colonial Background of the American Revolution (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1931); Leonard Labaree, Royal Government in America: A Study of the British Colonial 
System Before 1783 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1930); George Louis Beer, The Old Colonial System, 
1660-1754 (New York: The MacMillan Company, 1912).  More recent work that maintains the Imperial school’s 
focus on causations within the British Empire include Eliga H. Gould and Peter S. Onuf, eds., Empire and Nation: 
The American Revolution in the Atlantic World (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Hornsby, British 
Atlantic, American Frontier; Bailyn, To Begin the World Anew; David Armitage and Michael Braddick, eds., The 
British Atlantic World, 1500-1800 (London: Palgrave, 2002); Elizabeth Mancke and Carole Shammas, eds., The 
Creation of the British Atlantic World (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005); Andrew Jackson 
O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided: The American Revolution and the British Caribbean (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylvania Press, 2000); Alison Gilbert Olson, Making the Empire Work: London and American Interest 
Groups, 1690-1790 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992); Selwyn H.H. Carrington, The British West Indies 
During the American Revolution (Providence, RI: Foris Publications, 1988); and Egnal, A Mighty Empire. 
16 Recently, Olson has discussed Andrews’ work and she has taken it on faith that “for over a hundred a fifty 
years before they rebelled, American colonists were loyal subjects of the British monarch” because the empire 
worked for them.  Olson also states that colonists “generally obeyed the Navigation Acts” and “submitted with 
relatively little complaint to a government overseas.”  Olson, Making the Empire Work, xi-xii, 1.  
  155
further privileged the concept of mercantilism.17  That is to say, the Imperial school took for 
granted the fact that the colonies were supposed to be producing goods and wealth to be 
exchanged for items manufactured in England.  Colonists that violated this economic system 
were, in a way that would have made Lord North smile, deemed smugglers and unworthy 
subjects.   
Over the last thirty years, the Imperial school’s analytical framework has been widened 
and deepened through studies that have seriously considered the origins of the Revolution from a 
supra-imperial perspective.  J.G.A. Pocock first began to factor into causation forces beyond the 
boundaries of empire.18  By examining the impact of Italian classical republican discourse on 
English political theory, Pocock traces the long duré of ideologies surrounding liberty and virtue 
that American revolutionaries employed in their critique of the British state.  In effect, he has 
taken the Whigs and neo-Whigs’ ideological emphasis to new limits in terms of space and time.  
Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, on the other hand, have recently expanded on the 
Progressive and New Left focus on material life and history from below.  They observe the ways 
in which dissatisfaction among African slaves and multiethnic maritime workers contributed to 
demands for systemic change in the late eighteenth century.19  In addition, recent work on the 
Atlantic economy has challenged the dominant wisdom that mercantilism defined a majority of 
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eighteenth-century merchants’ activities.20  It is becoming increasingly clear that many 
entrepreneurs acted in their individual self-interests and pursued their own agendas irregardless 
of political boundaries and commercial regulations.21   
 Despite this plethora of excellent scholarship, to date no work has simultaneously 
situated New England in a wider Atlantic context and discussed the roles the fishing industry 
played in precipitating the American Revolution.  This chapter will demonstrate that the 
commercial expansion of New England’s cod fishing industry and trade along the Northwest 
Atlantic littoral and in the West Indies bears directly on the study of those material factors 
responsible for the American Revolution.  Economic pressure from outside the British Empire, 
chiefly from French Atlantic possessions, generated divisions within the Empire, particularly 
between New England and West Indian merchants.  At the same time, a greater New England 
presence in the North Atlantic posed a direct threat to the commercial interests of West Country 
fish merchants, driving a wedge between these groups.  The fact that the British state sided with 
West Indian and West Country interests exasperated these internal divisions and ultimately 
fractured colonial loyalty to the Empire.     
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4.1 NEW ENGLAND’S ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN THE WEST INDIES 
Chapter three demonstrated that New England increasingly took on the role of supplier for West 
Indian markets in the eighteenth century.  In particular, the principal role of the New England 
cod fisheries in the Atlantic economy became provisioning slave plantations.  The development 
of a sugar monoculture in the West Indies and the explosion of slave populations in the region 
generated greater and greater demand for imported food-stuffs.  The protein found in 
inexpensive, refuse grades of dried cod helped fuel coerced laborers and thereby contributed to 
the production of sugar and its byproducts.  Cod fishermen responded to this demand by 
producing even more refuse cod then the British islands could absorb.   
 Most of New England’s most lucrative export commodity, therefore, had to be shipped 
outside the bounds of the British Empire.  This point was made by Edward Payne, a Boston fish 
merchant and member of the Society for the Encouragement of Trade and Commerce in the 
1760s.  His “Own Vessels caught more Fish than the generality of the Vessels in that Town 
did.”22  He therefore understood that, “This valuable branch of our Trade, the Fishery almost, if 
not wholly, depends on our Trade to the Foreign Islands in the West Indies.”23  “In return,” 
Payne wrote on a separate occasion, “we receive Molasses & a small proportion of ordinary 
Sugars.”24   
 People who worked in the New England fishing industry consumed West Indian sugar 
products.  According to one expert witness called to testify before Parliament in 1766, “the 
poorer sort of people in North America,” which included a majority of those who worked in the 
                                                 
22 Sworn testimony of Edward Payne of Boston, merchant, dated Boston, December, 1763, Ezekiel Price 
Papers, 1754-1785, MHS.   
23 Letter from Edward Payne, Ezekiel Price Papers, 1754-1785, MHS.   
24 “In the Preamble to a late Act of Parliament,” 1764, attributed to Edward Payne, Ezekiel Price Papers, 1754-
1785, MHS.   
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cod fishing industry, “use the [imported West Indian] molasses in making small beer.”25  
Maritime laborers in the industry also had a reputation for drinking large quantities of rum.  The 
same witness testified in 1766 that West Indian molasses “imported into North America” was 
“principally to be distilled into rum which is employed in carrying on the fishery and the Guinea 
trade.”26  According to Daniel Vickers, “fishing crews departing on four-to-eight-week voyages 
normally carried about 12 gallons of rum and at least 60 gallons of cider (Imperial measure).  
Among a crew of seven or eight members (including two to four boys), this would amount to 
roughly a quart of cider and six ounces of rum per fishermen per day.”27  By this conservative 
estimate, the average seven-man schooner could consume up to 2,352 ounces, or 14.7 gallons, of 
rum (Imperial measure) per voyage.  Fish merchants counted 301 schooners in Massachusetts in 
1763.  Therefore, the off-shore fishing fleet from this single colony would have consumed 4,410 
gallons of rum per voyage.28  Typically, these types of fishing vessels made three fares each 
year.  Assuming each vessel stayed at sea for eight weeks, Massachusetts’ deep sea fishing fleet, 
the largest fleet in all of the colonies, would have consumed 13,230 gallons annually.29  This rum 
was both imported directly from the West Indies and distilled from imported molasses in the 
colonies.  Moreover, rum was consumed domestically and it was shipped to Newfoundland to 
                                                 
25 PDBP, Vol. 2, 362. 
26 PDBP, Vol. 2, 360.  The same colonial merchant later testified “that the fisheries would take off more rum 
than the Guinea trade, but that both will take off great quantity.”  Ibid., 364. 
27 Daniel Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen: Two Centuries of Work in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1630-1830 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1994), 182, footnote 61.  Vickers cautions, “This must be 
regarded as a minimal estimate since crew members sometimes purchased more in ports closer to the grounds.” 
28 Benjamin Pickman and Samuel Gardner of Salem, to John Rowe, Esq., and others Committee of the Society 
for Encouraging Trade & Commerce located in Boston, letter dated Salem, December 24, 1763, Ezekiel Price 
Papers, 1754-1785, MHS. 
29 This estimate does not take into account smaller, inshore vessels, such as shallops, nor does it include fishing 
fleets from other colonies.  Though none of these numbers would have been as large as Massachusetts’ off shore 
fishing fleet in the 1760s, they would substantially increase the amount of rum consumed in the entire New England 
fishing industry. 
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supply fishermen there.30  A writer concerned with the Newfoundland fishery explained in 1807 
that without access to “strong drink” “it would be impossible to continue the [fishing] trade [i.e. 
industry], for ten hours in the boats every day in the summer and the intolerable cold of the 
winter makes living hard.”31  New England was thus an importer and an exporter of an alcoholic 
beverage that eased the plight of the working man.   
 When the rum and molasses was imported from the West Indies, more often than not 
these sugary goods came from French islands.  Yankees developed strong commercial relations 
with French islands in the West Indies despite their religious differences and severe French 
penalties.32  Opportunistic businessmen saw certain economic advantages to trade with the 
principal competitors of British West Indian planters, especially because French planters offered 
the lowest prices for sugar and its by-products.  Throughout the eighteenth century the price 
differential between British and French West Indian sugar ranged between 25-33% in favor of 
                                                 
30 In 1763 alone, 49,140 gallons of rum were shipped out of Boston to Newfoundland.  This figure represents 
85.6% of all rum exported from the colonies to Newfoundland.  See, C. Grant Head, Eighteenth Century 
Newfoundland (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1976), 120, Table 6.10.  Ralph Greenlee Lounsbury dates 
the genesis of New England’s rum shipments to Newfoundland at 1675.  Ralph Greenlee Lounsbury, The British 
Fishery at Newfoundland 1634-1763 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1934; reprinted New York: Archon, 
1969), 191-192.  However, Peter Pope, C. Grant Head, and Bernard Bailyn maintain that Boston merchants were 
trading general supplies, of which rum may have been involved, as early as 1640.  Peter E. Pope, Fish Into Wine: 
The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 
2004), 151; Head, Eighteenth Century Newfoundland, 111; and Bernard Bailyn, The New England Merchants in the 
Seventeenth Century, 3rd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1982), 129. 
31 Quote taken from Harold Adams Innis, The Codfisheries: The History of an International Economy (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1940), 103.  According to Innis, as a result of fishermen’s great consumption of 
alcohol there were 74 taverns in Newfoundland in 1723, 50 in St. John’s alone.  The figure for Newfoundland 
increased to 122 in 1750.  Ibid., 153-154.  For an excellent discussion of seventeenth century fishermen and their 
consumption of alcohol, see Pope, Fish Into Wine, 393-401. 
32 In an effort to restrict the sale of sugar to the Mother Country, France prohibited foreign trade with its West 
Indies in 1717.  Foreign merchants who violated this general prohibition were liable, after a set of laws passed in 
1727, to have their vessels and cargoes confiscated.  French merchants who engaged in illicit trade risked being 
sentenced to labor on galleys.  Trade with foreign merchants was made legal in 1764, however French planters were 
strictly forbidden to import dried cod from New England.  Dorothy Burne Goebel, “The ‘New England Trade’ and 
the French West Indies, 1763-1774: A Study in Trade Policies,” The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. 
20, No. 3 (July, 1963), 332, 335-336.  The focus of this article is on French attempts to maintain a mercantilist 
economic policy. 
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the French.33  This comparative price advantage was the result of several factors.  France’s 
possessions enjoyed certain natural advantages, including fertile soil and better access to water 
resources with which to power mills and irrigate fields.  The French islands also maintained a 
more elaborate tax system that financed roads, canals, port facilities, and scientific research 
pertaining to improving plant variety and processing techniques.  As a result, the French islands 
became increasingly productive throughout the eighteenth century.  By 1770, the combined 
output of French sugar plantations had exceeded that of rival British plantations.34  By 1775, the 
plantations on St. Domingue (Haiti) alone surpassed the production of all the British islands 
combined.35  Increased production made French West Indian sugar readily available and 
relatively inexpensive.     
 French molasses could also be easily had and for low prices.  Molasses was a by-product 
of the process of converting raw cane into commercial grade sugar.36  French planters were able 
to produce a high grade sugar by draining-off more of the molasses through the production 
process.37  They therefore had more molasses to sell than their British counterparts.  Moreover, 
French planters were somewhat desperate to vend this particular by-product, as their choice of 
markets became greatly restricted over the course of the eighteenth century.  At the beginning of 
the century the French government prohibited the importation of molasses into France, an 
enormous market with one of the largest populations in all of Europe.  This prohibition was 
                                                 
33 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 60-65; Richard S. Dunn, Sugar and Slaves: The Rise of the Planter 
Class in the English West Indies, 1624-1713, 2nd ed., (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1973), 205; and 
Charles M. Andrews, “Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry, 1700-1750: The Western Phase, II,” The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (July, 1915), 763.   
34 Robin Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery (London: Verso Press, 1997), 432, 438; Andrews, 
“Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry, 1700-1750: The Western Phase, I,” 550-551. 
35 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 60-61. 
36 The most comprehensive description of the process involved in early modern sugar production that led to 
molasses can be found in Stuart B. Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society: Bahia, 1550-
1835 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 98-131, esp. 119-121. 
37 Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 434. 
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meant to protect the domestic brandy industry from competition.38  Prior to the Seven Years’ 
War, the French Islands could sell molasses to Canadian markets.  However, as Payne wrote in 
1764: “Molasses is a Commodity the French have no Market to vend it at since the Reduction of 
Canada.  Therefore, they allow us to bring our Fish & lumber to their Islands to purchase it.  We 
want this Article to support our Fishery & carry on our other Trade.”39  The shrinkage of 
available markets made French planters very willing to sell to New England buyers, and such 
pressures continually drove down the price of French West Indian molasses.   
 The French comparative price advantage contributed to cod’s extended purchasing 
power in their ports.  Between 1700-75, the price of New England refuse cod ranged between 
3.9-11.3 shillings per quintal.40  Between 1720-75, the price of West Indian muscovado sugar, 
for which there are the most extensive price records, ranged between 10-45 shillings per 
hundredweight in the islands.41  All things being equal, then, 100 quintals of refuse grade dried 
cod, at a median rate of 7.6 shillings per quintal, would have been worth 760 shillings in the 
West Indies for much of the eighteenth century.  However, because of the price differential that 
existed between British and French sugar at this time, New England fish merchants could buy 
                                                 
38 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 62; and Innis, The Codfisheries, 175-176.  According to Andrews, 
neither molasses nor rum was in great demand in eighteenth-century France.  “Molasses was not palatable to the 
French taste, and the French people would not use it as food, so that the French island planters were compelled to 
give it to their horses or pigs or to throw it away, while rum was not wanted, because it was too raw a liquor for 
drinking purposes, and was discouraged because it competed when used with wines and brandies, which ranked high 
among French staples.”  Andrews, “Anglo-French Commercial Rivalry, 1700-1750: The Western Phase, I,” 556. 
39 “In the Preamble to a late Act of Parliament,” 1764, attributed to Edward Payne, Ezekiel Price Papers, 1754-
1785, MHS.   
40 Daniel Vickers, "`A Knowen and Staple Commoditie': Codfish Prices in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1640-
1775," Essex Institute, Historical Collections, Vol. CXXIV, (Salem, MA: Newcomb and Gauss, 1988), 198-202, 
Table 1.  John J. McCusker has recently reminded us that we must take these cod prices with a grain of salt, as 
weights and measurements were not standardized around the Atlantic world, and as there were variations in coinage 
in use throughout the early modern period.  See, John J. McCusker’s remarks in “Roundtable Reviews of Peter E. 
Pope, Fish into Wine: The Newfoundland Plantation in the Seventeenth Century with a Response by Peter E. Pope,” 
in International Journal of Maritime History, Vol. 17, No. 1 (June, 2005), 251-261. 
41 John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607-1789 (Chapel Hill, North 
Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 1985), 157-159, esp. Figure 7.1. 
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more sugar in the French islands.  Assuming a median price differential of 29% and a median 
sugar rate of 27.5 shillings per hundredweight, 100 quintals of refuse grade dried cod could be 
exchanged for slightly more than 21 hundredweights of sugar in the British islands, while the 
same amount of cod could fetch almost 28 hundredweights in the French islands.  In this 
example, New England merchants could purchase 33% more sugar with the French planters than 
they could otherwise have done with the British planters using the same amount of fish in 
exchange.  Such purchasing power would have then carried over to by-products manufactured 
from sugar such as molasses. 
 French West Indian markets for refuse grade dried cod were also expanding at a faster 
pace than rival British markets during the eighteenth century.  To be sure, Great Britain gained 
control over French territory in the West Indies through the course of several wars and British 
planters owned more slaves than their French counterparts prior to the American Revolution 
(434,000 compared to 393,000 in 1770).  However, the slave population on French islands 
expanded 4.2 times between 1700 and 1740, and then again by 1.7 times between 1740 and 
1770.  By comparison, the slave population on British islands only increased 2.2 times and 1.7 
times, respectively.42  In other words, between 1700 and 1770, the slave population of the French 
islands grew 7.3 times (from 54,000 to 393,000), while the same population of the British islands 
only increased 3.8 times (from 115,000 to 434,000).  For New England fish merchants, these 
slaves represented prospective consumers while their owners were potential buyers.  Moreover, 
                                                 
42 Stanley L. Engerman, “Economic growth of colonial North America,” in John J. McCusker and Kenneth 
Morgan, eds., The Early Modern Atlantic Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 236, Table 
9.1A.  The table lists only “black” populations.  Here, it is assumed a majority of this West Indian black population 
were slaves.  According to O’Shaughnessy, “free people of color represented less than 2 percent of the total 
population of the islands” during the mid-to-late eighteenth century.  O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 29.  For 
more on the expansion of the French West Indian islands, see W.J. Eccles, The French in North America, 1500-
1783, revised edition, (East Lansing, Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 1998), esp. ch. 6, “The Slave 
Colonies, 1683-1748;” and Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 277-306, 431-456. 
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in terms of total land mass, the surface area on French islands available for agricultural 
production and settlement was twice that of the British islands.43  For New England sellers, these 
factors meant French markets had the potential to produce even more sugar and import additional 
slaves above and beyond Great Britain’s capacity.  Entrepreneurial Yankees able to secure 
connections and establish networks of trust early on would be all but guaranteed attractive future 
returns from such burgeoning French markets. 
 In addition to these comparative advantages, fish was a perishable commodity that 
required a buyer willing to purchase an entire shipment, or several different buyers near one 
another so as to avoid additional transportation and time in the ship’s hold.  It was a fundamental 
fact that the British islands could not purchase all of New England’s annual fish exports.  In 
1763, Payne and the Society for the Encouragement of Trade and Commerce collected trade data 
from New England fishing ports in order to lobby against passage of the Sugar Act in 
Parliament.  Payne and the Society calculated that British plantations could only purchase 1/3 of 
New England’s dried cod exports to the West Indies.44  Whether a merchant purchased dried cod 
from other merchants and paid shippers to freight the haul to the West Indies, or he outfitted his 
own schooner, hired a crew, dried the catch, and then paid the men to transport the fish south, in 
                                                 
43 Blackburn, The Making of New World Slavery, 432, 438-439. 
44 “In the Preamble to a late Act of Parliament,” 1764, attributed to Edward Payne, Ezekiel Price Papers, 1754-
1785, MHS.  Payne estimated that 60% of all the fish exported from New England went to the West Indies.  The 
other 40% “is sent to Spain, Portugal & Italy, & the net proceeds of the Fish & Freight, deducting the cost of a load 
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considerable knowledge of the Quantities these Islands consume; and according to our best Judgment all the English 
West India Islands do not consume more than 1/3 the Quantity of West India Fish we catch or take, and were it not 
for the Advantage of supplying the foreign Islands with said Fish we could not have a Market for more than 1/3 of it, 
and the other 2/3 must perish on our Hands, and the Fishery entirely drop.”  Hooper Fisheries Statement, 10 January 
1764, Misc. Bd. Manuscripts, 1761-1765, MHS. 
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either case slowly rotting cargoes of cod represented considerable, and risky, investments.  Fish 
merchants would have taken a large loss on every shipment to the West Indies in the second half 
of the eighteenth century if they restricted their sales to 1/3 of their dried cod and then allowed 
the rest of the cargo to spoil.  Because even dried, salted cod went bad given enough time, a full 
2/3 of New England’s cod exports to the West Indies had to be sold to British competitors or else 
rot.  This fish, Payne wrote, was vended “to the French & other Foreign Islands.”45  St. Eustatius, 
the “Golden Rock” of the West Indies, was a popular Dutch free port, and the Dutch welcomed 
additional business.46  But, for their part, wealthy British planters were not content to sit quietly 
and watch New Englanders sail away with fish and credit to “French & other Foreign Islands.” 
4.2 THE POLITICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF NEW ENGLAND’S WEST INDIAN 
EXPANSION 
Those concerned in British West Indian sugar production were well positioned to defend their 
economic interests at the imperial level.  British sugar planters were counted among the 
wealthiest subjects in the empire.  Many were absentee landlords who chose to live in England.  
They purchased real estate in many different parts of England, building townhouses in cites and 
great houses with formal gardens in the countryside.  Such land ownership and extreme wealth 
provided planters with direct access to political power.  They also sought – and won - election to 
                                                 
45 Ibid. 
46 Benjamin W. Labaree, William M. Fowler, Edward W. Sloan, John B. Hattendorf, Jeffrey J. Safford, and 
Andrew W. German, America and the Sea: A Maritime History (Mystic, Conn.: Mystic Seaport Museum 
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the House of Commons.  Planters were also three times as likely as anyone from North America 
to be given a title to nobility between 1701-1776, and they frequently intermarried with 
traditional English peers.  This meant that they gained considerable power in the House of Lords.  
Over the course of the eighteenth century, there were between 40-60 members of Parliament at 
any given time who were either sugar planters themselves, or who were financially involved in 
the West Indian plantations.  William Beckford, for example, was born in Jamaica, the largest 
source of sugar in the eighteenth century British Empire, and he inherited his father’s sugar 
plantation.  Beckford grew up and lived in London, where he was twice lord mayor, in 1762-63 
and 1769-70.  He was a member of the House of Commons between 1747 and 1770, and he was 
a close personal friend of William Pitt the Elder.  Among the seventy-five members of the Board 
of Trade, a group that advised the crown on colonial affairs, only five had ties to the Western 
Hemisphere between its genesis in 1696 and the beginning of the American Revolution, but four 
of these five were commercially connected to the West Indies.47  Simply put, the sugar industry 
had powerful advocates at the helm of the British ship of state.  Indeed, Lord North, Great 
Britain’s prime minister during the imperial crisis and a man not easily controlled, referred to the 
West Indian sugar planters as “the only masters he ever had.”48 
 Wealthy sugar planters could also afford to hire a group of full-time professional 
advocates, or agents, to lobby Parliament on their behalf.  By 1774, the small islands in the West 
                                                 
47 Hornsby, British Atlantic, American Frontier, 46-47, 60; O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 14-17, esp. 
Table 1; and Jacob M. Price, “Who Cared about the Colonies?  The Impact of the Thirteen Colonies on British 
Society and Politics, circa 1714-1775,” in Bernard Bailyn and Philip D. Morgan, eds., Strangers Within the Realm: 
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48 Herald: A Gazette for the Country, August 23, 1797, cited in Alice B. Keith, “Relaxations in the British 
Restrictions on the American Trade with the British West Indies, 1783-1802,” Journal of Modern History, Vol. 20, 
No. 1 (March, 1948), 16. 
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Atlantic maintained ten permanent agents in London whose sole purpose was to promote and 
defend the interests of the British sugar industry.  One of these men, Stephen Fuller, worked in 
this capacity for thirty years between 1764-94.  The agents were supported in their work by the 
London-based Society of West India Merchants.  Because most of the sugar produced in the 
British West Indies was consumed in England during the eighteenth century, London sugar 
buyers such as Richard Neave and Beeston Long, chairmen of the Society and governors of the 
Bank of England, were very interested in any effort to lobby Parliament on behalf of the sugar 
industry.49 
 New England fish merchants did not have the resources of the planters or equal access to 
political power.  Yankee merchants by and large did not own real estate in England.  They did 
not control many seats in Parliament.  Nor did they have ties to the Bank of England.  Of the 
hundreds of men who were members of the House of Commons between 1754 and 1774, only 
two individuals, John Tomlinson and Barlow Trecothick received money to represent New 
England.  They were paid to act for New Hampshire.  Five merchants who were members of the 
Commons maintained casual commercial ties to New England.50  None of these men were 
willing to sacrifice their political positions for the colonial fishing industry.  Therefore, New 
England fish merchants were forced by necessity to rely upon a small number of agents to lobby 
in favor of their interests.  By 1774, there were just three active North American agents, 
compared to ten from the West Indies.  Only two of these three, William Bollan and Arthur Lee, 
were full-time advocates for New England interests.  Ben Franklin, the third colonial agent, 
                                                 
49 O’Shaughnessy, An Empire Divided, 15-16, 60-62. 
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represented Pennsylvania, Georgia, New Jersey, and Massachusetts, and could not be expected to 
devote much time to the fishing industry.51   
 Fish was also not as valuable as sugar to the British Empire, which further restricted 
colonial fish merchants’ ability to effectively lobby Parliament.  The total value of British West 
Indian sugar, rum, and molasses exported between 1768-72 was £3,910,600.  The equivalent 
figure for New England fish was £152,155.52  William Bollan, the agent for Massachusetts for 
more than twenty-five years leading up to the Revolution, referred to lobbying Parliament as 
driving “about the wheels of Business,” which took “a considerable Expense.”  Indeed, at one 
point Massachusetts merchants paid Bollan £2,585 for four years of “attending the negotiation of 
Business here” in London.  Rotating the “wheels of Business” in the eighteenth century, it seems, 
required considerable sums of money in order to grease “negotiations” with members of 
Parliament.53  The fact that sugar elites had more grease, and more mechanics to lubricate the 
system, meant the New England fish lobby was at a decided disadvantage in any attempt to 
rotate commercial wheels in a favorable direction. 
 British West Indian planters thus operated from a position of great strength in the 
imperial contest for Parliamentary affection in the eighteenth century, and whenever their 
interests opposed those of the New England fish merchants, they usually came out on top.  To be 
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sure, over the course of the century the British state ratified certain treaties that benefited the 
New England fishing industry, such as the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 and the Treaty of Paris in 
1763.  These settlements severely limited the ability of the French to compete in the Atlantic cod 
trade, and effectively expanded the operations of colonial British fishermen, both in terms of 
fishing waters and Atlantic markets.54  Nevertheless, the West Indies enjoyed a longer and 
stronger tradition of support from the British state.  In the Treaty of Breda in 1667, Charles II 
ceded Nova Scotia to the French in exchange for Antigua, Montserrat, and the rest of St. 
Christopher’s Island.  Colonists in Massachusetts protested, citing the threat nearby French 
competitors posed to their fishing operations.  Yet, in the end a premium was placed on sugar 
production because of the wealth it generated.55  Between the Treaty of Breda and the American 
Revolution, the British state established a series of prohibitive duties on foreign sugars, 
guaranteeing planters a permanent monopoly in the home market.  In 1739, Parliament granted 
sugar, an enumerated article, an exemption from the seventeenth century Navigation Acts and 
allowed it to be traded directly to foreign ports in vessels built in and sailing from Great 
Britain.56  In 1742, this trade privilege was extended to colonial-built vessels.57  Six years later, 
an act exempted the British West Indies from naval impressment.  The same act did not mention 
the New England colonies despite their appeals for formal renewal of the 6th of Anne prohibition 
against impressment in the colonies.58  In this manner, the British state supported the sugar 
planters and encouraged the sugar industry. 
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 In the first half of the eighteenth century, when French sugar prices first gained their 
comparative advantage, the British planters were upset that New England fish merchants were 
vending their goods among the French islands and purchasing their chief competitor’s sugar 
products.  In 1701, Governor Codrington of the Leeward Islands recommended a Parliamentary 
act prohibiting New Englanders from shipping fish to the French West Indies.59  Henry Worsley, 
the governor of Barbados, one of the most productive sugar islands, complained to the Board of 
Trade in 1723 that Yankees were exchanging fish for French molasses to feed their expanding 
number of distilleries.60  Governors such as Worsley and Codrington even attempted to seize and 
condemn colonial vessels found to be trading with French islands.61  It did not matter that such 
trade was perfectly legal as long as it was conducted in British vessels.62   
 Partly because of the kinship and business ties between the planters and 
Parliamentarians, and because West Indian exports were worth more on a balance sheet than all 
of the North American mainland colonies’ exports combined, the British state passed the 
Molasses Act in 1733 despite opposition from the New England fishing interests.63  The “act for 
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the better securing and encouraging the trade of his Majesty’s sugar colonies in America” set 
prohibitive duties on foreign sugar (“Five Shillings per Hundred weight”), molasses (“Six pence 
per Gallon”), and rum (“Nine pence a Gallon”), which, if enforced and obeyed, would have 
effectively stopped New England trade with the French West Indies.64  In the preamble to the 
Act, Parliament justified its passage in the following manner: “Whereas the welfare & prosperity 
of your Majesty’s sugar colonies in America are of the greatest consequence and importance to 
the trade, navigation and strength of this kingdom; and whereas the planters of the said sugar 
colonies, have of late years, fallen under such great discouragements that they are unable to 
improve or carry on the Sugar Trade, upon an equal footing with the Foreign Sugar colonies, 
without some advantage and relief given to them from Great Britain.”65  The Act could have 
given British planters a second monopoly, this time on the colonial North American markets.  It 
was not enforced, however, and fish merchants found various ways around the letter of the law.66  
Yet, the law effectively turned legitimate colonial merchants into smugglers, and continual 
pressure from the sugar interests resulted in the renewal of the Act every five years until 1764.   
 New England fish merchants and sugar planters continued to lobby against one another 
after 1733.  Not satisfied with the Molasses Act, the sugar lobby demanded stricter enforcement 
almost from the moment it was enacted.  The Yankees, in contrast, did not want any restriction 
on their ability to sell fish.  In 1754, Bollan wrote to the Massachusetts General Court to inform 
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its merchant members that the “the West Indians,” whom he referred to as “the adversaries of the 
Province,” were “indefatigable, sparing no pains or Expense of any kind, but use their utmost 
Endeavor in every shape to carry their point.”  The representative of the colonial fishing industry 
was optimistic at this time and expected a resolution to the Act that would at last result in New 
England’s favor: “we have thus far been able to defeat all their late Attempts, and as we have 
from time to time gained Ground of them, there is in my humble opinion, the greatest reason to 
go on, and prepare for the approaching and final Trial and Determination of this Matter.”67  
However, renewed conflict with the French and the ensuing Seven Years’ War delayed the “final 
Trial” Bollan anxiously anticipated.  The war also altered the outcome Bollan expected in ways 
he could not have foreseen. 
 The Seven Years’ War was one of the first truly global conflicts, and it stretched the 
limits of Great Britain’s military and fiscal abilities.68  The war embroiled European powers in 
combat in the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans.  The British government borrowed enormous 
sums of money to equip and provision troops, to purchase and maintain weaponry, and to build 
and outfit warships.  Britannia emerged victorious over seas as well as lands, but it cost the 
nation £160 million just to fight the war - twice the gross national product.  Britain was just 
wealthy enough to pay its creditors £14 million at the end of the war, leaving a huge debt for the 
future.  Maintaining garrisons in North America alone cost £200,000 a year during the 1760s.69  
                                                 
67 Letter from William Bollan to the Secretary of the Massachusetts General Court, dated Pall-mall, April 19, 
1754, Ezekiel Price Papers, 1754-1785, MHS.   
68 According to Jonathan Israel, the Second Anglo-Dutch War (1664-1667) was a global war.  Jonathan I. Israel, 
The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, and Fall, 1477-1806, 4th ed., (Oxford, England: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 766-774. 
69 Fred Anderson, Crucible of War: The Seven Years’ War and the Face of Empire in British North America, 
1754-1766 (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), 562; Nancy F. Koehn, The Power of Commerce: Economy and 
Governance in the First British Empire (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), 5, 12; and Shy, Toward 
Lexington, 241. 
  172
The immense war debt, coupled with additional military expenditures carried over from the war, 
left the heads of the British state looking for ways to raise additional revenue. 
 In 1763, Parliament debated whether or not to make the Molasses Act permanent, and 
what, if any, alterations needed to be made to the Act to give it teeth.  In many ways, these 
Parliamentary debates represented a continuation of the commercial rivalry that existed between 
the New England fish merchants and the sugar interests, which included the planters themselves, 
their lobbyists, and the planters’ friends and relatives in Parliament, since the French lowered 
their West Indian prices.  Once more, those representing the fishing industry argued that British 
West Indian markets could not consume all of New England’s fish, nor could British planters 
provide enough sugar products in exchange.  The shrewd Yankees reminded Parliament that the 
profits from their trade with the French ended up being used in exchange for manufactured goods 
from Great Britain.  Thus, restricting New Englanders’ profits would ultimately hurt domestic 
industries in England.  The fish merchants also tried to convince Parliamentarians that colonial 
fishing vessels and maritime workers contributed to the “nursery” for naval seamen, and 
therefore the encouragement of their fisheries was closely linked to matters of military 
preparedness and state power.70   
 Meanwhile, in Boston the Society for the Encouragement of Trade and Commerce had 
been busy preparing for the 1763 debate.  Members of the Society corresponded with 
“Merchants of Salem, Marblehead, and Plymouth,” convened “diverse meetings of committees 
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from the several Towns,” and designed “Reasons against the Renewal of the Sugar Act,” which 
were “presented to the General Court…were adopted by them, and transmitted to their agent” in 
London.  In this manner, the Society played an important role in facilitating the colony’s lobby 
efforts.  At great expense, the Society “also sent copies [of their “Reasons”], fairly wrote, to the 
Merchants of six of the Neighboring Governments, and afterwards 250 printed copies to the 
Principal Merchants in London.”71   
 The fish merchants also made public their grievances in a Boston newspaper.  In a series 
of letters, a colonial dissenter writing under the pseudonym “Baron de Montesquieu,” the French 
Enlightenment figure, laid out all of the arguments that the Massachusetts’ colonial agent had 
been putting before Parliament.  In addition, “Montesquieu” reminded colonists that “The 
seasons for curing fish are some years so unfavorable, that the greatest part of what is caught is 
only fit for the West India market….The chief part of this fish we depend on the foreign sugar 
colonies to take off our hands.  The only pay they have to give therefore is sugar and molasses; 
an article of great use to fishermen.”  The dissenter who dared not publish his real name believed 
“A reformation [in trade regulations] is become necessary.  But should such restraints take place 
as to discourage the trade, and destroy the fishery of the northern colonies; Great Britain, instead 
of benefiting itself by its conquests [i.e. the Seven Years’ War], has only added a load which it 
must at length sink under.”  In short, “Montesquieu” argued that a permanent tax on foreign 
sugars would disrupt the trade in refuse grades of dried cod that were shipped to the West Indies.  
If this trade was disrupted, he reasoned, then the conquest of Canada and Newfoundland had 
been for naught.  “Montesquieu” attributed the existence of taxes on foreign sugars, and the 
plans to make them permanent and more rigidly enforced, to the powerful British sugar interests, 
                                                 
71 Letter from Thomas Gray and Edward Payne “To the Members of the Society for Encouraging Trade & 
Commerce,” dated Boston, January, 1766, Ezekiel Price Papers, 1754-1785, MHS.   
  174
or “To the aggrandizement of the planters of our sugar colonies; who, notwithstanding they have 
become so opulent, that upwards of forty of them have seats in the House of Commons, and 
numbers have formed alliances with some of the noblest families in the kingdom, do yet 
complain for want of further encouragement.  Oh fatal Policy!  Error irretrievable!”72     
 Despite fish merchants’ best efforts to publicize their arguments at home and abroad, 
Parliament ultimately found in favor of the sugar interests, just as they had done in 1733 and on 
other occasions.  The Sugar Act, also known as the Revenue Act, became the law of the empire 
in 1764.  It levied a tax of “One pound, two shillings, over and above all other duties imposed by 
any former act of parliament” on foreign white sugars imported into the colonies.  The 
importation of foreign rum was forbidden, giving West Indian planters a monopoly on the rum 
trade with North American.  To be sure, Parliament reduced the incentive to smuggle by 
lowering the duty on foreign molasses to “three pence.”  Such a move can be construed as a 
concession to the New England fishing interests.  Yet, New Englanders were not satisfied as they 
desired no tax whatsoever.  Moreover, the duties on sugar and molasses were made “perpetual” 
starting in September, 1764.73   
 The Sugar Act did not simply restrict North American trade to the West Indies.  In order 
to prevent direct trade with French possessions anywhere in the Atlantic, and thereby restrict 
North American access to inexpensive sugar products, the Sugar Act expressly forbade colonial 
trade with French territories in the North Atlantic.  As part of the 1763 peace treaty ending the 
Seven Years’ War, France retained only a few islands off the south coast of Newfoundland (St. 
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Pierre and Miquelon) and fishing rights to the western shoreline of the land of cod.74  However, 
these islands were important to New England commerce, and they had been for some time.  As 
early as 1684 New Englanders were supplying French fishermen and traders at St. Pierre with 
dried cod, rum, and molasses in exchange for West Indian goods, European manufactured 
products, and lines of credit.75  Thus, it was no small matter that the 1764 act prohibited direct 
trade with “the subjects of the crown of France in the islands of Saint Pierre and Miquelon.”76   
 In order to give the act teeth, Parliament restructured custom collection and gave new 
orders to the Royal Navy.  Absentee customs collectors, who had been collecting nothing but 
their stipends, were ordered to return to their posts.  Officials who did not comply were removed.  
Informants who aided custom collection were given greater rewards.  Customs officials who 
cooperated with smugglers were threatened with greater punishment.  More customs offices were 
created and additional manpower was added.  New certificates signed by justices of the peace 
designating the origin and quantity of all sugar products on board were required of traders at the 
port of departure and at the port of entry.  Shippers were required to post additional bonds as 
assurance their goods would be landed only in British ports.  Ships leaving colonial ports also 
had to have a “cocket,” or cargo list.  This list could only be obtained from the customs house, 
and it catalogued which goods were subject to import and export duties, and which duties had 
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been paid.  Even sailor’s private ventures were required by law to be included on the cocket, and 
were subject to duties.  Royal governors were directly ordered to be more vigilant in the 
collection of His Majesty’s customs.  The patrols of the Royal Navy were more active and more 
numerous.  Naval officers viewed themselves as enforcers of martial law on the high seas.  For 
example, any vessel caught within two leagues of a British port without a cocket was subject to 
seizure by the Navy.  These seizures were prosecuted in a special Vice-Admiralty court 
established in Halifax, Nova Scotia for the express purpose of trying violators of the Sugar Act.77   
 The Navy placed special emphasis on enforcing the Sugar Act in the North Atlantic, and 
most of its warships were positioned along the Northwest Atlantic littoral between Massachusetts 
and Newfoundland.  Neil R. Stout, the foremost authority on the naval enforcement of British 
colonial policy, maintains that the concentration of military force was primarily due to two 
factors: Halifax represented “the principal naval base” and “the only royal dockyard” in North 
America, and the British wanted to “overawe the Canadians and impress France.”78  Certainly, 
these factors cannot be ignored.  However, New England merchants were the principal violators 
of the Sugar Act and cod was the principal commodity used in exchange for French contraband.  
Thus, the British Navy positioned their forces to cut-off illicit trade at its source as well as to 
intimidate the French.  Commodore Hugh Palliser, the naval officer in charge of a portion of the 
British North Atlantic fleet and the royal governor of Newfoundland between 1764-1769, 
ordered his squadron to seize “all New England Vessels” found prosecuting such “Illicit 
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Trade.”79  In 1765, Palliser reported to the Board of Trade: “Great Numbers of New England 
Vessels are also become Fishers for the French at those Islands, and Engaged in Trade with them 
for French Goods and Manufactories; however, I believe they will not pursue it so Eagerly as 
they had begun, for we have taken & Confiscated Five of them.”80  According to contemporary 
estimates, the cost for purchasing a single deep sea fishing schooner and outfitting a crew for one 
year was £1,135.81  In 1755, £1,135 sterling was equivalent to $131,528.34 in year 2000 U.S. 
dollars.82  Thus, Palliser’s capture of five of these vessels in 1765 corresponds to a financial loss 
of over $657,000 in 2000 U.S. dollars.  That same year, Boston fish merchant John Rowe 
recorded in his diary: “Mr. [Elbridge] Gerry [a Marblehead fish merchant] came to Town & 
brought an account of the Niger, Man of War, taking three Schooners out of the Harbor of St. 
Pierre’s, one belonging to his Father & two of Epps Sargent [a Gloucester merchant].”83  One 
year later, a colonial newspaper reported: “They write from Newfoundland, that several New 
England sloops have been seized by his Majesty’s ships of war at Cape Breton, for smuggling 
with the French, and selling them large quantities of ready cured fish….by means of which 
several fishermen from Rochelle and Bordeaux got loaded in a few days, and had actually sailed 
home with cargoes of fish ready cured for the Mediterranean markets.”84  In this manner, the 
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Sugar Act, which was meant to encourage the British West Indian islands, came at the expense 
of New England commerce. 
 The British state justified the new act and the stricter enforcement measures around the 
Atlantic Ocean in two ways.  First, Parliament stated that the “Act for the better securing and 
encouraging the trade of his Majesty’s sugar colonies…should be altered, enforced, and made 
more effectual.”  This justification indicated Parliamentary preference for the sugar industry, as 
making the Molasses Act “more effectual” could only restrict trade to the British West Indian 
islands.  Second, Parliament stated that the Sugar Act was meant to raise revenue “towards 
defraying the necessary expenses of defending, protecting, and securing the British colonies and 
plantations in America.”85  Since 1733, New Englanders had made customs avoidance an art 
form, and government revenue streams from this sector had slowed to a trickle as a result.  Once 
Seven Years’ War debts began coming due, even those Parliamentarians who had given Bollan a 
glimmer of hope before the outbreak of the global conflict were now less inclined to remove the 
taxes on foreign sugar products.  After the war, Parliament was even more resolved to defend the 
sugar industry and draw revenue from the colonies. 
Royal governors and elected assemblies in the British West Indies responded to the Sugar 
Act in various ways.  Antiguans punished anyone caught smuggling French sugar into the British 
Empire with exile in 1764.86  At this time, the governor of Guadeloupe prohibited “all ships from 
coming to this Colony unless they are furnished with a written permission of the Intendant” in 
order “to put a stop to Contraband Dealings which become every Day more frequent and more 
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easy.”  Punishment for violating this regulation was “Confiscation of the Ship and Cargo, of a 
Fine of 3000 Livres to the Kings Use, and of a Years Imprisonment.”87   
 Colonists in New England considered the Sugar Act the latest in a long series of 
examples of favoring sugar over fish.  They reacted to the legislation with bitterness and 
frustration.  One colonial critic published his grievances under the nom de plume “Americanus.”  
This writer denounced the Act, as its prohibitive duties on foreign sugar and molasses and its ban 
on foreign rum effectively denied merchants in “the New England fishery” the “disposal of 
[refuse, or Jamaican, grades] to the French and Dutch.” Because of the loss of these markets, 
“difficulties fell upon the New England fishery, [and] in the chief fishing town (Marblehead) the 
vessels were reduced one half in their number.”  “All the merchants” in New England, he wrote, 
believed “that the continuance of the duty on molasses, with other duties imposed by the said act 
[the Sugar Act], will inevitably destroy” the “fishing trade.”  “Americanus” further estimated 
that New Englanders only imported “one eight part” of their molasses from the British West 
Indies because of high prices.  Thus, another result of the Act was to limit the amount of West 
India goods “had by the fishermen.”88     
  Colonists blamed the British West Indian planters for the restrictions placed on the 
fishing industry, trade, and regional consumption.  In a “Statement of the Trade and Fisheries of 
Massachusetts,” written in 1764, fish merchants in Boston stated their belief that the planters 
had, “with no other view than to enrich themselves,” forced “the northern Colonies to take their 
whole supply from them; and they still endeavor the continuance of it under a pretence, that they 
can supply Great Britain and all her Colonies with West India goods, which is perfectly 
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chimerical.”89  A newspaper in Providence, Rhode Island mourned the fact that “the Continent 
must henceforth move in the wake of the sugar planters of the British Empire.”90  
 Whiggish Parliamentarians in London agreed with colonists that the sugar interests had 
won the day.  Edmund Burke, the foremost opposition member of Parliament in the 1760s, stated 
his belief that the Sugar Act was a deliberate attempt by corrupt heads of state to generate 
revenue; to provide planters with a monopoly on North American trade; and to enforce this 
monopoly with the Royal Navy.  The Act, in Burke’s words, represented “a revenue not 
substantiated in place of, but superadded to a monopoly, which monopoly was enforced at the 
same time with additional strictness, and the execution put into military hands.”91   
 Some frustrated colonists continued to work within the system to promote change.  In 
1765, Massachusetts petitioned Parliament “for the repeal of the Sugar Act.”  This petition 
maintained “that the importation of foreign molasses into this province in particular, is of the 
greatest importance.”  The colonists believed the tax on sugar and molasses constituted a 
“prohibition” on the trade.  They noted that the importance of their ability to import West Indian 
sugar products “does not arise merely nor principally from the necessity of foreign molasses, in 
order to its being consumed or distilled within this province.”  Rather, they maintained “that if 
the trade for many years carried on for foreign molasses can no longer be continued, a vent 
cannot be found for more than one half the fish of inferior quality [i.e. refuse grade dried cod], 
which is caught and cured by the inhabitants of this province; the French permitting no fish to be 
carried by foreigners to any of their islands, unless it be bartered or exchanged for molasses.”  
The colonists further argued “that if there be no sale of fish of inferior quality, it will be 
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impossible to continue the fishery.”  The combination cure adopted throughout New England in 
the eighteenth century made it impossible to catch and cure cod without producing a certain 
percentage of fish that was not saleable in European markets.  If New Englanders could only sell 
to European markets, then they would have to raise their prices to make up for the loss of the 
West Indian markets.  As a result, “the fish usually sent to Europe will then cost so dear, that the 
French will be able to undersell the English at all the European markets, and by this means one 
of the most valuable returns to Great Britain will be utterly lost, & that great nursery of seamen 
destroyed.”92 
 There is some evidence to suggest that the reaction of the fishing interests changed 
Parliament’s sentiment regarding the Sugar Act.  Eventually, the tax on molasses was lowered.  
In 1766, the duty was lowered to a single penny per gallon, and the fishing industry must get 
some credit for the reduction.  However, as Oliver M. Dickerson points out, the change was the 
result of the slave traders saying in 1766 that the tax was preventing provisions from reaching the 
West Indian plantations and restricting the markets for slaves.93  This powerful lobby was the 
main force in reducing the tax on molasses.    
 Despite the fact that the duty had been lowered to a level at which trade could still 
continue with French West Indian markets, the tax remained and grated on Yankee sensibilities.  
New England had grown used to a policy of “salutary neglect” that gave them a degree of free 
trade.  Indeed, this is precisely why Adam Smith supported the colonists in their grievances with 
the Empire.94  Some in the fishing industry thought raising of revenue through taxes without 
colonists’ consent was evidence of a corrupt state attempting to turn its subjects into slaves.  
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Benjamin Bangs, a Massachusetts fisherman who had become a wealthy merchant and slave 
owner through the West Indian trade, recorded his anger and frustration in his personal diary.  
Following news that the Sugar Act had passed both houses of Parliament, Bangs wrote on 
October 1, 1764, “Now we may date our slavery.  Boston is all in uproar about it.  But can’t help 
it.”  A few months later, on December 15, Bangs noted that colonists were beginning to feel 
more and more like un-free men, constantly policed and watched.  In his words, there were “men 
[of] war in every port guarding us more in peace than in war.”95  For a slave owner with 
commercial ties to the West Indies, Parliament seemed to be turning the world upside down by 
forcing a prosperous merchant into bondage.     
 Even those colonists predisposed to look on the British state with favor did not like the 
Sugar Act.  John Powell provisioned the British Naval vessels patrolling the New England coast 
for smugglers in the 1760s.  His business ties eventually led him to distance himself from the 
revolutionary movement.  Yet even this Boston merchant wrote in a letter to a friend that news of 
the Act was “very Alarming To the Colonies.”  “The [Sugar] Act will prove an unformed 
monster,” he wrote, “That will Devour all before It & its makers In The End.  The principals of a 
Commercial Nation is subverted.”  He further considered the Act “An Unconstitutional Force 
Laid on the American subjects That must finally End in Riot & Discord & be more severely felt 
In Great Britain Then Even The present Generation can suffer.”  Like Bangs, Powell believed 
Parliament had sent the Royal Navy in greater numbers to their coasts, “Doubling the Cutters,” 
and had added “an Army of Excisemen” in an attempt to restrict colonial freedoms and police 
trade.  Unlike Bangs, who thought the act would convert colonists into slaves, Powell believed it 
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“will oblige us all To hold the plough, the scythe, and Reaping Hook.”96  In short, the Bostonian 
who supplied British Naval vessels saw the act as an attempt to cut-off colonists’ access to the 
sea and maritime ways of life.  John Rowe was born in England in 1715 and immigrated to 
Boston.  Like Bangs, he became a very successful merchant and slave owner who dealt in part in 
fish and the West India trade.  Unlike Bangs, Rowe became a Loyalist during the Revolution.  
On September 29, 1764, the day the provisions of the Sugar Act were to take effect in the 
colonies, Rowe recorded in his diary “The Black Act takes place this day.”97      
 While Loyalists like Rowe and Powell remained content operating within the British 
imperial political system, the Sugar Act went a long way toward convincing other colonists who 
sided more with Bangs that the British imperial political system itself was corrupt and in need of 
drastic change.  At the most basic level, the act restricted colonial fish merchants’ access to 
foreign markets through a prohibitive tax.  This meant that a majority of the dried fish processed 
in New England could not be sold.  It also meant that Yankee trade vessels would have to return 
from the West Indies with only partially filled holds, as the British islands could not produce 
enough sugar products to meet the needs of England and the colonies.  Thus, in the short run, the 
Act meant increased costs and labor costs for fish merchants.  In the long run, these lower profits 
would have meant greater unemployment in the fishing industry as suggested above.   
 The act further raised issues of taxation without representation.  In 1764, the elected 
members of the lower house of Massachusetts’ colonial legislature concluded with regard to the 
Sugar Act that “the Power of Taxing” should be “exercised with great Moderation” when applied 
to “the Dominions who are not represented in Parliament.”  “For this last is the grand Barrier of 
British Liberty; which if once broken down, all is lost….a People may be free and tolerably 
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happy without a particular Branch of Trade, but without the Privilege of assessing their own 
Taxes, they can be neither.”98   
 The Act also brought into stark relief the political corruption that seemed to come from 
the influence and money of the sugar interests.  Some believed that traditional efforts to work 
within the system and lobby Parliament through colonial agents had failed to bring about real, 
lasting change because of this corruption.  In 1764, the elected members of the lower house of 
Massachusetts’ colonial legislature collectively queried: “If a West-Indian, or any other bye 
Influence is to govern and supersede our most essential Rights as British Subjects, what will it 
avail us to make Remonstrances, or the most demonstrable Representations of our Rights and 
Privileges?”99  Extra-legal protests were coming. 
 Chief among the early colonial efforts to change the system by operating outside its 
boundaries was non-importation.  Having failed to halt the “embarrassment” of the fishing trade, 
the Boston-based Society for the Encouragement of Trade and Commerce voted on a non-
importation agreement in 1768.  Without legal sanction, this commercial consortium agreed to 
boycott British manufactured goods for one year, excepting only those items, chiefly salt, 
deemed necessary for the prosecution of the fishing industry.  The Society succeeded in getting 
other commercial ports to join in the boycott.  The agreement was extended for another year, and 
in 1769 they formed a committee of inspection to enforce the trade embargo in Boston.100  
Colonists were beginning to assume the authority of regulating their own trade.   
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Colonists also engaged in a number of illegal mob activities aimed specifically at His 
Majesty’s customs collection during the 1760s.  Those customs agents who seriously attempted 
to enforce revenue acts such as the Sugar Act were especially targeted in colonial fishing ports.  
Thomas Row, the tidewaiter for Salem and Marblehead responsible for checking vessels’ 
manifests as they entered and cleared off, was brutalized for informing his superiors that the 
schooner Neptune was bringing foreign molasses into Salem in 1768.  Row was “surrounded by 
a large Mob with a flag flying.”  Once captured, he wrote that one of the mob “waxed the hair of 
my head with Balls of Shoemaker’s Wax, and some amongst them (I cannot say which) cut part 
of it off from behind.”  Row was then taken “to the Commons, striped of my Coat, Waistcoat, 
handkerchief & hat.”  According to an eyewitness, “They had tarred his Clothes all over, and 
then covered him with feathers, & pinioned him into the Cart, and were carrying him through the 
Town as a Spectacle of Infamy; Stopping at all the Public Offices.”  Row testified that the crowd 
“fixed two boughs with spun yarn on each side of my head.”  They also “put a cross made with 
sticks into my hand, struck me several violent blows on my head, and swore they would murder 
me if I did not carry it upright.”  When the crowd finished with Row, they took him “to the 
extreme part of the town,” let him go, and told “him he must not show his face again in this 
port.”101  Similar tarring and feathering went on in other colonial ports.102 
 Colonial mobs also specifically targeted customs vessels in an effort the thwart and 
change the direction of imperial policy.  The customs officers for Salem and Marblehead 
regretfully informed the Naval Board established in Boston to facilitate customs collection “of 
the loss of the Custom house Boat, which was maliciously and in the most secret and private 
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manner set on fire about twelve o’Clock last night, and was entirely consumed by four this 
morning.”  The “Perpetrators of this act” took “the Boat from the Wharf to a considerable 
distance in the harbor.”  There, they “moored her with the Chain so that no assistance from the 
shore could possibly be given to save her.”103  In other colonial ports, mobs carried customs 
vessels to the commons, or in front of town meeting halls, before setting them on fire.   
 These extra-legal actions did not immediately precipitate armed revolt against the British 
Empire.  After the Sugar Act, Parliament taxed other goods without colonists’ consent and the 
Royal Navy continued to confiscate their property.  Yet, the American Revolution did not begin 
in the 1760s.  Additional events in the North Atlantic helped widen the gulf between the colonies 
and the metropole. 
4.3 NEW ENGLAND’S ECONOMIC EXPANSION IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC 
In the first two chapters, we saw that during the eighteenth century New England’s economic 
activities expanded in the North Atlantic.  The transition from shallops to schooners enabled 
commercial fishermen to develop deep-sea fishing operations along the Northwest Atlantic 
littoral.  Expanded crews in these larger vessels were able to catch great numbers of cod from 
this region.  In particular, more New Englanders and more of their schooners were working the 
Grand Bank off Newfoundland, the richest source of cod in the entire Atlantic.  As a result, New 
England production levels reached 350,000 quintals of dried cod in 1765, which outpaced the 
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300,000 quintals produced by the resident fishing stations at Newfoundland and the 300,000 
quintals produced by the West Country migratory fishing interests.104  
By the middle of the eighteenth century Yankee trade vessels were also transporting 
greater amounts of supplies, including lumber, fishing gear, and provisions of all sorts, to British 
settlers in Newfoundland.  In exchange, the New Englanders received mainly dried cod, 
manufactured goods from Europe, and bills of exchange.105  The number of New England trade 
vessels operating around Newfoundland increased from 31 in 1716 to 103 in 1751.106  In part, 
this expanded trade was due to increased permanent population levels at Newfoundland.  
Settlement at the land of cod began to expand rapidly in the middle part of the century.107  More 
people meant more mouths to feed, and Newfoundland’s topography was not conducive to large-
scale commercial agriculture.  As a result, there was a heightened need for imported foodstuffs 
on the island and shrewd Yankee traders sailed into the North Atlantic with full vessels to meet 
this growing demand. 
 Through a combination of fishing and trading New Englanders were thus very active in 
and around Newfoundland by the middle of the eighteenth century.  Slowly but surely, Yankees 
were seizing market share in the provision trade.  By 1763, 12% of the total quintals of cod 
caught at Conception Bay, Newfoundland, were being exchanged with colonial trade vessels for 
provisions.  At the same time, 32% of the quintals of cod caught at Ferryland and 6.5% of the 
quintals caught at Old Perlican and Trinity were exchanged thus.  In all, 13,697 quintals were 
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sold to colonial merchants, mostly from New England, in exchange for lumber and provisions.108  
In 1764, Commodore Hugh Palliser, the British Naval officer and acting royal governor in 
charge of the island, calculated “A General Scheme of the Great Fishery.”  While he did not 
distinguish between fishing and trading vessels, nor did he provide the port of origin, he 
observed that there were 105 “Ships from America” of 6,337 tons burden operating around 
Newfoundland.  Given New England’s historic association with the fishing industry and trade 
with Newfoundland, it is very likely that a large majority of these vessels were from New 
England ports.  Moreover, the average of 60 tons per vessel fits well within the range for 
schooners, the Yankee vessel of choice in the eighteenth century.  The largest number of “Ships 
from America,” 51, operated around St. John’s.  By comparison, there were 141 “British Fishing 
Ships,” which included those belonging to settlers and “all ships arriving from England and 
Ireland whether for Fishing, with Supplies, or Passengers, or for Cargoes,” of 14,819 tons 
burden.  There were also 97 “British Sack Ships,” representing only “those arriving from Foreign 
Ports, whether with Salt or for Cargoes of Fish,” of 11,924 tons burden.109  Given the fact that in 
1764 there was a total of 238 British vessels operating around Newfoundland, the principal locus 
of cod fishing operations in the eighteenth century Atlantic world, the “American,” or New 
England, presence was equal to 44% of this total.  Or, to put this figure another way, New 
England’s commercial activity around the land of cod represented almost half the level of 
activity attained by a combination of resident fishing stations in Newfoundland and West 
Country migratory interests.     
New Englanders also did business transporting passengers from Newfoundland to the 
mainland colonies.  In between 1713 and 1718, it was estimated that 1,000 migratory fish 
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servants booked passage on Yankee vessels bound for New England ports every year.110  In 
1764, Commodore Palliser observed “a constant current of seamen, artificers and fishermen 
through this country into America.”111  In 1771, it was reported “New England vessels last year 
carried out of Conception Bay [Newfoundland] upwards of 500 men, some of which were 
headed up in casks because they should not be discovered.”112  Push factors such as harsh 
working conditions and low wages motivated eighteenth-century workers to leave the land of 
cod.113  Higher wages and more temperate climes pulled these men into New England.  One 
Newfoundlander wrote in 1700, “there being great wages given to men in New England makes 
men desirous to go there, and frequently attempts it.”114  Of course, not every worker who left 
Newfoundland ended-up financially better-off.  In 1763, Thomas Clark, an Irish fishing servant, 
fled Newfoundland only to end up “representing his distressed Circumstances, and praying 
Relief” from the Massachusetts General Court in Boston.115  The fact that New England was not 
the best poor man’s country did not discourage Yankees from taking passengers’ money.  The 
immediate profits from these passages reinforced earnings from trade missions and fishing 
expeditions.  This transportation, however, yielded severe political costs over the long run.   
 New England’s North Atlantic commercial expansion generated conflict with powerful 
fish merchants in England’s West Country.  These merchants were primarily opposed to New 
England trade with Newfoundland.  They opposed this trade for two reasons: it provided an 
encouragement to permanent settlement on the island, and it posed a threat to their flow of 
                                                 
110 Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women, 29-30; and Innis, The Codfisheries, 147.  Also see Pope, 
Fish Into Wine, 243-248. 
111 Cited in Innis, The Codfisheries, 147. 
112 Cited in Innis, The Codfisheries, 104.  The date is provided by Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe 
women, 29, footnote #23. 
113 Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women, 85. 
114 Cited in Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 109.  Also, see Pope, Fish Into Wine, 159-160, 183. 
115 JHRM, Vol. 39, 146. 
  190
supplies from England.  Throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth century, merchants from the 
West Country fought against permanent settlement at Newfoundland as it challenged their 
hegemony in the region, and they viewed anyone who supported such colonization as a threat.116  
In the first half of the seventeenth century, these merchants organized the Western Adventurers, 
a commercial consortium, to lobby Parliament against authorizing plans for permanent 
plantations at Newfoundland.117  In 1668, they proposed forcibly removing settlers from the 
area.118  They had helped to finance settlement in New England, and the later generations of 
settlers were building a rival industry.  West Country merchants were thus wary of plans to 
establish additional resident fishing stations in North America, particularly on Newfoundland, 
the land of cod.  Yet, despite their best efforts, Newfoundland’s permanent population slowly but 
surely continued to increase.   
 As a result, savvy West Country merchants tacked a different course, and by the turn of 
the eighteenth century they focused their energies on stopping supplies going from New England 
to Newfoundland.  In 1696, West Country merchants complained that New Englanders were 
enabling settlers to stay at Newfoundland by providing them with supplies.119  In 1715, West 
Country merchants again petitioned Parliament for redress of their grievances, chiefly that 
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Newfoundland “inhabitants are supplied with provisions, tobacco, rum, sugar, rice, etc., from 
New England and the colonies of America.”120  At this time, tobacco, sugar, and rice were 
enumerated articles, restricted by Navigations Acts and prohibited from direct trade with 
foreigners.  But because there was no customs office in Newfoundland, New England trade 
vessels could vend these goods in open marts around the land of cod to sack ships from 
Europe.121  The West Country merchants, in short, tried to show that New England’s trade 
violated Navigation Acts and must therefore be stopped.  In another petition that same year, the 
West Country fish merchants referred to New England as “a nest of little peddlers,” and they 
asked that direct trade between New England and Newfoundland be prohibited.122   
 The English fish merchants had other grievances against New Englanders.  West 
Country merchants wanted to monopolize the sale of supplies and provisions to fishermen 
operating around Newfoundland.  They believed that year-round settlers living in the land of cod 
would procure these goods at a better price from nearby New England, so they did all they could 
to prevent this.123  As early as their 1668 proposal for forcibly removing settlers, West Country 
fish merchants argued that such removal would provide encouragement for their exports of food 
and supplies to the region.124  Over the next century, New Englanders continued to supply the 
Newfoundland region.125  It was not until 1764, when customs collection and naval enforcement 
were reformed, that this trade was seriously disrupted.126  In addition, the fact that New 
Englanders transported workers as passengers away from Newfoundland further angered 
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merchants in England’s West Country.127  At the end of the seventeenth century, the West 
Country fish merchants complained: “the worst thing is that the New England men carry away 
many of the fishermen and seamen, who marry in New England and make it their home.”128  By 
this means, the migratory fishing industry suffered a loss of manpower.   
 The British state favored West Country merchants in the eighteenth century for several 
reasons.  West Country commercial fishing interests played a significant role in early modern 
England’s economic development.  Merchants from this region provided much of the capital 
behind England’s westward expansion into the Atlantic.129  England’s chief wool producers also 
resided in the West Country.130  Moreover, the eighteenth century marked the heyday of the 
English migratory cod fisheries around Newfoundland.  During this period, cod caught off 
Newfoundland and sold in Southern European markets represented one of British North 
America’s strongest export revenue streams.131     
 West Country merchants had influential political connections.  Like West Indian 
planters, they tended to be absentee landlords.  The wealth generated through the Newfoundland 
cod fisheries, like sugar capital, enabled a genteel lifestyle in England.132  Just as their tropical 
counterparts had done, the West Country merchants used their wealth and land-ownership in 
England to control seats in Parliament.133  Benjamin Lester, for example, was one of the 
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wealthiest fish merchants in Poole, England.  He controlled a resident fishing station in Trinity, 
Newfoundland, with its own wharf space, warehouse, shop, flake yard, shipyard, sail loft, forge, 
cookroom, and vessels.  Lester also owned real estate in Poole, served as the town mayor, and as 
a member of the House of Commons.  In his mansion house in Poole, Lester had two dried cod 
fillets carved in marble on his fireplace mantelpiece to symbolize the source of his wealth and 
political power.134  They also hired professional lobbyists to protect their interests throughout the 
colonial era.135   
 Parliament also responded to the claim of West Country merchant that the migratory 
fishing industry was a “nursery” for naval seamen.136  Men such as Adam Smith equated “the 
extension of the fisheries of our colonies” with an “increase [in] the shipping and naval power of 
Great Britain.”137  The assumption among English elites was that commercial fishing trained 
men to handle wooden sailing vessels, gave them knowledge of trade winds and ocean currents, 
and familiarized them with life at sea.  Such training, it was believed, made commercial 
fishermen ideal labor pools from which to draw manpower for the navy in wartimes.  Moreover, 
the fishing industry stimulated growth in shipbuilding and other maritime trades that could 
support naval power during periods of conflict.  The expansion of the Royal Navy around the 
turn of the eighteenth century, the near-constant wars with France, and the huge demands for 
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maritime labor that resulted, only served to deepened the importance of training English 
sailors.138  The 1699 Newfoundland Act required North American colonial vessels traveling to 
Newfoundland to post a bond guaranteeing they would not bring back any passengers from the 
island.  The purpose of this bond was expressly to preserve England’s “nursery of seamen,” or 
the West Country migratory fishing industry.  In addition, the act required migratory fishing 
vessels to carry a certain percentage of landsmen on board in order to train them in the maritime 
nursery.  The act remained in effect until 1867.139     
 The influence of West Country fish merchants and the importance of the migratory 
fishing industry bore fruit in 1764, as the British Navy under Commodore Hugh Palliser began 
forcibly removing New England fishing and trading vessels from Newfoundland waters.  After 
the Newfoundland Act, British naval officers governed the land of cod through the summer 
fishing season.140  Palliser ruled the region with an iron fist between 1764 and 1769.  Instructed 
to enforce the Sugar Act and prevent clandestine trade between New England colonists and the 
French North Atlantic islands, Palliser actively supported West Country fishing interests and 
upheld the 1699 Act.141  He issued orders during his first year as governor expressly forbidding 
anyone to transport passengers from Newfoundland to the North American colonies without first 
entering on board his personal flagship and asking for his written permission.  Violators risked 
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having their vessels impounded paying a stiff penalty.142  In 1765, George III strengthened the 
instructions, ordering Palliser to prevent “the great Prejudice & discouragement of the Ship 
Fishery,” or the West Country migratory fishing industry.143  Eager to please, Palliser interpreted 
these royal instructions to include New England fishing vessels in addition to trade ships.  He 
ordered the warships under his command patrolling Newfoundland waters to confiscate any fish 
found on New England vessels operating in the region.  Palliser further authorized the seizure of 
these vessels, and the use of corporal punishment on repeat Yankee offenders.144  New England 
fish merchants complained through their agent in London.145  Palliser, however, successfully 
explained his actions to the Board of Trade.  He justified these measures by stating that he 
wanted Newfoundland and the surrounding area to be a British, “not American,” fishery.  He 
added that allowing the “Americans,” by which he meant colonists in general, but New 
Englanders in particular, to fish in Newfoundland waters, was “ruinous” to the “British” fishing 
industry.146  In short, Palliser, like the West Country fishing interests, saw the colonists not as 
fellow British subjects entitled to equal rights, but as mere interlopers.147  And Palliser’s actions 
did have a cumulative negative effect on colonial New England commerce.  The number of 
“Ships from America” operating around Newfoundland declined from 105 in 1764 to 83 in 
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1766.148   Because he was effective in defending the West Country interests around 
Newfoundland he retained Parliamentary support – he was, after all, following instructions. 
 By themselves, the incidents in the North Atlantic that increased operating costs 
associated with the colonial fishing industry and trade did not immediately lead to demands for 
independence.  Instead, the cumulative effect of efforts to restrict and regulate New England’s 
commercial expansion along the Northwest Atlantic littoral and in the West Indies contributed to 
rising sentiment among colonists that the British state violated their economic interests.  
Moreover, the state’s decisions placed additional burdens on colonial merchants and workers 
struggling to eke out an existence in a fiercely competitive industry.  The load on colonists’ 
backs was increasingly insupportable.  
4.4 THE FISHERIES BILL 
New Englanders did not have the best reputation in London during the late 1760s and early 
1770s.  To members of Parliament who understood the economic importance of the British West 
Indian sugar islands and the West Country migratory fishing industry, it seemed as though 
aggressive New Englanders were damaging imperial interests.  Moreover, the riots and non-
importation agreements in New England made it appear that the region was lawless, and in a 
state of rebellion.  As early as 1766, Lord Grenville, the head of the Treasury Department, 
declared the behavior of the colonists “highly criminal.”149  In February 1775, prior to the shot 
heard around the world, Lord North, the prime minister, stated that the New Englanders were “in 
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a state of actual rebellion.”150  In order to bring the colonists to heel, then, and in order to strike 
against the source of colonial smuggling and the threat to the migratory fishing industry, some 
members of  Parliament proposed a moratorium on the New England fishing industry in 1775. 
Lord North fought hard in Parliament to get a bill passed that would simultaneously 
“restrain the Trade and Commerce” of the North American colonies “to Great Britain, Ireland, 
and the British Islands in the West Indies,” and “prohibit such Provinces and Colonies from 
carrying on any Fishery on the Banks of Newfoundland, or other Places therein to be mentioned, 
under certain Conditions, and for a Time to be limited.”  The time limitation North had in mind 
was initially “till the New Englanders should return to a sense of their duty to the mother 
country, and submit to her supreme authority.”  Eventually, he agreed to limit the moratorium to 
one year, and he allowed colonists to apply for fishing licenses, having first given evidence of 
“their good behavior” to royal governors, “or upon their taking a test of acknowledgment of the 
rights of Parliament.”  He justified the moratorium by stating “the Fishery on the Banks of 
Newfoundland, and the other Banks, and all the others in America, was the undoubted right of 
Great Britain.  Therefore we might dispose of them as we pleased.”  He acknowledged that 
Massachusetts was the foremost fishing colony, producing the largest quantity of fish for use in 
trade for foreign contraband, and that rebellion was chiefly to be found in this region.  Yet New 
Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut were included in the moratorium because of their 
“vicinity” to Massachusetts (which he believed made them more susceptible to treason) and 
because the other colonies afforded Massachusetts’ inhabitants “an opportunity of carrying on 
the fishery.”  In a supplementary bill, North further proposed “that an augmentation of 2,000 
seamen should be made,” and “a proper number of frigates” be stationed “in the most beneficial 
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manner for commanding the whole coast of North America.”  He justified this naval 
augmentation by stating that without proper military force, “the people of New England could 
not be restrained from the fishery.”151  
 On March 21, 1775, Lord North’s Restraining Act was passed in the House of Lords by 
an overwhelming vote of 73 to 21.152  The Act was published in newspapers throughout the 
colonies.  The clause pertaining to the fisheries formally stated:  
  And it is hereby further enacted by the authority aforesaid, that if any ship 
or vessel being the property of the subjects of Great Britain, not belonging to and 
fitted out from Great Britain or Ireland, or the islands of Guernsey or Jersey, shall 
be and, after the twentieth day of July, one thousand, seven hundred and seventy-
five, carrying on any fishery, of what nature or kind so ever, upon the banks of 
Newfoundland, the coast of Labrador, or within the river or gulfs of Saint 
Lawrence, or upon the coast of Cape Breton, or Nova Scotia, or any other part of 
the coast of North America, or having on board materials for carrying on any such 
fishery, every such ship or vessel, with her guns, ammunition, tackle, apparel, and 
furniture, together with the fish, if any shall be found on board, shall be forfeited, 
unless the master or other person having the charge of such ship or vessel, do 
produce to the commander of any of His Majesty’s ships of war, stationed for the 
protection and superintendence of the British fishery in America a certificate, 
under the hand and seal of the Governor or commander in chief of any of the 
colonies or plantations of Quebec, Newfoundland, Saint John, Nova Scotia, New 
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Georgia, East Florida, or West Florida, setting forth, that such ship or 
vessel, exercising her name, and the name of her master, and describing her built 
and burthen, both fitted and cleared out from some one of the said colonies or 
plantations, in order to proceed upon the said fishery, and that the actuality and 
bona fide belongs to, and is the whole and entire property of His Majesty’s 
subjects, inhabitants of the said colony or plantation; which certificates such 
Governors or commanders in chief respectively are hereby authorized to grant.153 
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The entire British Navy operating in the Atlantic was “required and enjoined to examine, search, 
and visit, all ships and vessels carrying on the said fisheries,” and to “seize, arrest, and 
prosecute” those vessels “which shall not have on board the certificate herein before required.”  
The Fisheries Bill mandated that any persons providing customs agents or naval personnel with a 
“false certificate, cocket, or clearance, for any of the purposes required or directed by this act, 
such persons shall forfeit the sum of five hundred pounds, and be rendered incapable of serving 
his Majesty, his heirs, and successors, in any office whatsoever.”  The loss of £500 was also 
mandated for every offence of “counterfeiting, erasing, altering, or falsifying, any certificate, 
cocket, or clearance.”154  By November, all of the thirteen North American colonies were 
considered in open rebellion, and the Restraining Act was extended to include even North 
American colonists outside of New England.155  
 In April 1775, Lord North convened a special fisheries committee that specifically aimed 
to use state power to supplant the New England cod fishing industry.  In particular, the 
committee resolved to use state funds to sponsor certain bounties.  The first twenty-five fishing 
vessels above 50 tons burden to return from Newfoundland with at least 10,000 cod caught on 
the banks, and then make a second fishing expedition, would earn £40.  The next 100 vessels to 
make these two trips would earn £20 each, while the following 100 vessels to do likewise were 
to earn £10 each.  North maintained that “the design” of these bounties “was to encourage the 
going out early enough to make two voyages a year.”  He explained that “it would be infinitely 
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for the advantage of this country [i.e. England], to make Newfoundland as much as possible an 
English island, rather than an American colony.”  He further noted that these bounties would 
encourage “the bank ship fishery,” or the West Country migratory fishing industry, which he 
personally considered “the great nursery of seamen.”  Thus, the British state was willing to spend 
£4,000, “a sum not great enough to alarm anyone,” in North’s words, in order to encourage West 
Country fishing interests to catch more fish while the New England commercial fishing industry 
was closed.156  North pushed this program at the suggestion of the West Country merchants, who 
had made such a proposal during the Parliamentary debates over the Restraining Act in 
February.157 
 Opposition to the Restraining Act was immediate and fierce, both in England and in the 
colonies.  On the same day the Act passed the House of Lords, sixteen of the twenty-one 
dissenting peers signed a public declaration, using a mixture of Lockean and classical republican 
language to elucidate seven reasons for their opposition.  First, they believed “that government 
which attempts to preserve its authority by destroying the trade of its subjects, and by involving 
the innocent and guilty in a common ruin…admits itself wholly incompetent to the end of its 
institution.”  Second, the dissenters maintained that without the ability to fish, colonial debtors 
could not reimburse their creditors in England.  “Without their fishery,” which drew in the most 
export revenue into New England, they explained, “that is impossible.”  “Eight hundred thousand 
pounds of English property,” the peers warned, “belonging to London alone, is not to be trifled 
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with.”  Third, the dissenters objected to the violation of colonial New England charters, which 
made them “especially entitled to the fishery,” and “which have never been declared forfeited.”  
Fourth, they considered the offer to allow Yankees to fish again once all boycotts ceased nothing 
less than an effort “to bribe the nation into an acquiescence” by holding out “the spoils of the 
New England fishery, worth upwards of Three hundred thousand Pounds a year.”  The dissenters 
considered this “scheme” and “arbitrary act” an “indecency.”  Fifth, they maintained that Lord 
North’s belief in “the cowardice of his Majesty’s American subjects,” or the idea that colonists 
would not oppose the Act, did not “have any weight itself.”  Moreover, they stated “nothing can 
tend more effectually to defeat the purposes of all our coercive measures than to let the people, 
against whom they are intended, know, that we think our authority founded in their baseness; 
that their resistance will give them some credit, even in our own eyes….This is to call for 
resistance, and to provoke rebellion.”  Sixth, the dissenting peers objected to the fact that “the 
interdict from fishing and commerce” could only be terminated once royal governors and 
customs officials confirmed the non-importation agreements had stopped.  The peers believed 
giving governmental “subordinates” the power to “deliver over several hundred thousands of our 
fellow-creatures to be starved…without any rule to guide their discretion, with [out] any penalty 
to deter from an abuse of it,” was “a strain of such tyranny, oppression, and absurdity, as we 
believe never was deliberately entertained by any grave assembly.”  The peers believed North’s 
terms mandated that the colonies “submit to be the slaves, instead of the subjects, of Great 
Britain.”  Last, those signing the public declaration objected to the fact that the Fisheries Bill was 
presented as “a measure of retaliation” for colonial disobedience, “upon a supposition that the 
colonies have been the first aggressors.”  For the dissenters, the colonial non-importation 
associations were “no more than a natural consequence of antecedent and repeated injuries.”  
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They viewed the Act, therefore, not as “a measure of retaliation,” but as “a most cruel 
enforcement of former oppressions.”  In their prophetic opinion, the “consequence” of the Act 
would not be colonial submission, but “a civil war, which may probably end in the total 
separation of the colonies from the mother country.”158  The peers’ protest was published in 
colonial newspapers.159   
 Individual peers also gave speeches in Parliament, protesting the Restraining Act.  
Charles Prat, Earl of Camden, a Whig member of the House of Lords and the judge who 
acquitted John Wilkes, compared the Act to other Parliamentary legislation and found it to be the 
most objectionable.  It was his belief “that this was at once declaring war, and beginning 
hostilities in Great Britain.”  After emphasizing the word “war” several times, Camden stated he 
“knew no other name to give it, for that it carried famine, the worst engine of war, into the 
bowels of the [American colonies], and consequently demanded resistance from the tamest and 
most servile of mankind.”160  Charles Watson-Wentworth, better known as Lord Rockingham, a 
Whig leader during the imperial crisis, believed the Act to be one of the foremost causes of the 
American Revolution.  In a speech in the House of Lords on November 5, 1776, he explained to 
MPs such as Lord North, who were shocked at the level of colonial resistance to that point, that 
Yankee “seamen and fishermen being indiscriminately prohibited from the peaceable exercise of 
their occupations, and declared open enemies, must be expected, with a certain assurance, to 
betake themselves to plunder, and to wreak their revenge on the commerce of Great-Britain.”161 
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 Rockingham was right.  Colonial fishermen responded to the Restraining Act with direct 
action.  They helped lay siege to British forces at Boston; converted their fishing vessels into 
warships, manned privateers; enlisted in state navies and in the U.S. Navy.  They ultimately were 
able to “wreak their revenge on the commerce of Great-Britain.”162  Colonists interpreted the 
Restraining Act as a state sanction of the Navy’s earlier actions, and the clause pertaining to the 
fishing industry was known unofficially and un-affectionately in the colonies as “Palliser’s 
Act.”163  The Act affected – and outraged - workers and merchants alike.  Workers already 
hungry for employment because of underemployment and the increasingly exploitative nature of 
work in the industry lost the engine of maritime employment in New England.  Increasingly 
wealthy merchants had much to lose in having their schooners sit idle in the harbors and their 
overseas orders sit unfilled, waiting for competitors to step in and fill the void the way New 
Englanders did during the English Civil War.   
 Ultimately, a combination of the Sugar Act and the Fisheries Bill convinced those 
involved with the New England cod fishing industry that the British state no longer supported 
their interests.  The formal break between periphery and core took place in 1776.  Parliament did 
not begin with the goal of destroying the colonial fishing industry.  The moratorium imposed on 
the New England fisheries was certainly not inevitable.  But it did have economic roots in a 
series of state decisions to back West Indian and West Country interests.  Did the British state 
realize the nature of New England’s economic expansion in the Atlantic in the eighteenth century 
and its concomitant political ramifications?  In the final analysis, taxation and interventionist 
state commercial regulation of the colonial commercial fishing industry fed the fires of colonial 
animosity toward the British State and help explain why more New Englanders participated in 
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the Revolutionary War than any other regional group.  The following chapter will explore the 
ways in which New England’s most lucrative peace time industry was converted into an effective 
military machine.   
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5.0  THE SINEWS OF WAR: PROFIT AND THE MILITARY MOBILIZATION OF A 
PEACE TIME INDUSTRY  
“The New England fishery in particular was, before the late disturbances, one of 
the most important, perhaps, in the world.”  - Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the 
Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, 1776.1 
“The stagnation of the Fishery furnished us with means for cruising against the 
enemy’s property.”  - Resolve of a Boston town meeting at Faneuil Hall, 
December 11, 1781.2 
 
As Adam Smith observed, “disturbances” such as an interventionist British state and the coming 
of the American Revolutionary War spoiled the lucrative commercial fishing industry in New 
England.  Fishermen were no longer allowed to ply their trade.  Fish merchants could not invest 
their capital in customary ways.  Fleets of fishing vessels remained moored in their colonial 
harbors.  One can see in the large gaps in fish merchant’s ledger books between 1775 and 1783 
that the war caused a decline in dried cod production.3  In April 1776, merchants in Cape Ann, 
Massachusetts petitioned for financial recompense and estimated that their fleet of “80 fishing 
                                                 
1 Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of The Wealth of Nations, Max Lerner, ed., (New York: 
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Schooners” had declined in value from “£300” to “£150 Each,” because they had been idled as a 
result of conflict.  The merchants claimed a loss of £12,000 for this redundancy, in addition to 
£6,000 for “Materials for Curing fish; Lost Wholly;” and £8,000 “Loss on the Income [read 
profit] of 80 Sail fishing Vessels a[t] £100 Each.”  At the same time, Salem merchants reported 
that their fleet of fifty “Fishing Vessels” were worth half as much as a result of the war, and they 
claimed a loss of £7,500 for this depreciation.  Salemites further claimed losses of £2,500 for 
“Materials for curing & Drying fish” that were “Totally Destroyed;” and £5,000 for “the Loss of 
the Fishing 1 Year.”4  Merchants in Chatham, Massachusetts, took stock after the war and 
calculated that they lost twenty-three of their twenty-seven fishing vessels as a direct result of the 
Revolution.5  The coastal commercial cod fishing industry proved no more resistant to the 
vicissitudes of war than the inland production of colonial grain, flour, and rice.6  Yet, this 
maritime industry did not simply fade into oblivion.  As the Boston merchants who attended the 
town meeting in 1781 recognized, the disruption of the fishing industry actually contributed in 
significant ways to the American war effort.  In short, the commercial cod fishing industry was 
converted from the peace-time production of dried cod into a military machine.   
 Over the past thirty years, scholars interested in the American Revolutionary War have 
reconceptualized the nature of the armed conflict.  For the most part, military historians have 
                                                 
4 See, “Estimate of the Loss on Income & the Trade of Cape Ann from April 1775 to April 1776,” and 
“Estimate of the Loss on Income and Trade for the Town of Salem,” April 30, 1776, NDAR, Vol. 4, 1323-1325. 
5 “Description of Chatham, In The County of Barnstable, September, 1802,” in Massachusetts Historical 
Society Collections, First Series, Vol. 8, (New York: Johnson’s Reprint Corporation, 1968), 153. 
6 For more on the adverse impact the Revolution had on inland agricultural sectors of the colonial economy, see 
Brooke Hunter, “Wheat, War, and the American Economy during the Age of Revolution,” William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd Series, Vol. LXII, No. 3 (July, 2005), 505-526; and Richard Buel, Jr., In Irons: Britain's Naval 
Supremacy and the American Revolutionary Economy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998), esp. ch. 1, “The 
Grain Economy of the Revolution.” 
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moved away from a narrow focus on leadership, strategy, logistics, and battlefield tactics.7  
Increasingly, practitioners of “new” military history have examined the social composition of the 
rank and file along with the various relationships between the Continental Army and the societies 
that created and perpetuated it.8  It is now widely accepted that class, ideology, and gender 
norms informed the processes by which men and resources were mobilized for the Army.  Yet, to 
date, scholars have not considered the conversion of peace-time industries as crucial to the war 
effort.   
 This chapter will focus on how the New England cod fishing industry was transformed 
through the crucible of war.  To be sure, scholars who have explored the history of the U.S. Navy 
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  208
have widely recognized the formidable role fishing vessels played in the Revolution.9  But, even 
historians mindful of maritime matters have not explored the use of these vessels in the wider 
context of the military conversion of the commercial fishing industry.  Similarly, scholars 
investigating the colonial New England fisheries have observed the war-time transformation of 
this industry only in passing.10  Yet the Revolutionary War itself cannot be adequately explained 
without examining how the New England fishing industry contributed to the war effort for two 
fundamental reasons.  First, colonies from this region contributed more manpower to the war 
effort on a consistent yearly basis for the duration of the conflict than any other region.11  
Moreover, in any given year no state ever provided more men for service in the Continental 
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Army than Massachusetts, which had been the foremost fishing colony.12  Second, New England 
fishermen and fish merchants made a variety of important contributions to the war effort.  Trade 
routes and networks of trust were converted into supply lines for munitions.13  Colonial fishing 
vessels were transformed into armed warships.  Fish that had been used to provision free and 
slave laborers around the Atlantic world now helped to feed fighting men in the armed forces.  
And fishermen themselves mobilized for war in a variety of ways.   
 The classical Roman statesman Cicero famously recognized the age-old connection 
between the world of commerce and the way of war in his Orationes Philippicae: “the sinews of 
War are infinite money.”  That is to say, the military force with the best ability to fund soldiers, 
supplies, and technology will have more of these things, and in the end usually prevail.  
Revolutionary America generated an endless monetary supply through the power of the printing 
press.  The Continental Congress began printing paper currency in June 1775, and by the end of 
the year it had issued $6 million.  The following year, $15 million dollars were printed.  After 
just three years, a total of $72 million had been put into circulation.14  Although highly 
inflationary, these efforts helped enable Congress to mobilize an increasingly market-oriented 
society that experienced the closure of an entire industry and the economic displacement of a 
cross-section of merchants and laborers.  This is not to say that individuals decided to resist 
British authority solely out of economic self-interest.15  Rather, in addition to political grievances 
                                                 
12 Purvis, Revolutionary America, 1763-1800, 234-240, Table 8.53.   
13 For more on the important role networks of trust played in circumnavigating mercantilist boundaries in 
eighteenth century Atlantic commerce, see David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the 
Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735-1785 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 
14 Buel, Jr., In Irons, 43-45. 
15 There is a debate among military historians of the American Revolution as to why men fought against British 
authority.  Some, including Selesky, have argued “the people” fought “to protect the political rights they already 
possessed.”  Selesky, War and Society in Colonial Connecticut, 228.  Others, such as Gross, hold up as decisive 
material factors such as overpopulation, underemployment, and the British Army’s assault on colonial property.  
Gross, The Minutemen and Their World.  For a good historiographic overview of this debate, see Peter Karsten, 
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surrounding representative government and cultural friction regarding the ideals of the Protestant 
Reformation, the promise of seemingly endless earnings held an added appeal for both 
entrepreneurial merchants and unemployed workers.16  If, as has been suggested, the Revolution 
gave birth to such a thing as an “American” way of war, then surely its sinews included profits.17   
5.1 CONVERTING TRADE ROUTES INTO SUPPLY LINES 
To understand the conversion of the fishing industry, we must begin with the meeting of the 
Continental Congress convened in Philadelphia first in September 1774, and then again in May 
1775.18  This governing body consisted of the educated, wealthy colonial elite, who were elected 
to represent the interests of the thirteen North American colonies.  Congress created the 
Continental Army on June 15, 1775.  At this time, Congress officially adopted the Massachusetts 
forces surrounding Boston and chose a Virginian planter and slave owner as commander in chief 
                                                                                                                                                             
“The ‘New’ American Military History: A Map of the Territory, Explored and Unexplored,” American Quarterly, 
Vol. 36, No. 3 (1984), 389-418.  To date, no one has systematically examined this issue from commercial 
fishermen’s perspectives. 
16 For arguments resting more in the realm of ideas, see Nathan O. Hatch, The Sacred Cause of Liberty: 
Republican Thought and the Millennium in Revolutionary New England (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977); 
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); 
and Carl Bridenbaugh, Mitre and Sceptre: Transatlantic Faiths, Ideas, Personalities, and Politics, 1689-1775 (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1962). 
17 For a good overview of the military scholarship devoted to studying the “American” way of war, see Don 
Higginbothom, “The Early American Way of War: Reconnaissance and Appraisal,” The William and Mary 
Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 44, No. 2 (April, 1987), 230-273.  For studies of the sinews of war within the context of 
early modern England, see John Brewer, Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1788 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990); and Charles Wilson, Profit and Power: A Study of England and the 
Dutch Wars (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1957).  In an American context, E. James Ferguson examined the 
ways in which concerns over the size and cost of government during the war later impacted the political debates 
over the Constitution.  Ferguson, The Power of the Purse: A History of American Public Finance, 1776-1790 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1961).  However, his focus was on state expenditures and not on 
commerce and military mobilization.  For an argument that classical republican disdain for monetary incentives 
pervaded the administrative history of the American Revolutionary War, see Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure. 
18 To date, the most comprehensive work done on the Continental Congress remains Edmund Cody Burnett, The 
Continental Congress (New York: MacMillan Company, 1941). 
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in order to assuage fears that the war would be fought solely to promote New England’s 
interests.  The Army was not effectively established, however, until George Washington arrived 
at Boston on July 2.19  Thus, for the first half of 1775 the Massachusetts Provincial Congress 
financed and organized military resistance to British authority. 
 Massachusetts’ bicameral legislature went through drastic changes between 1774 and 
1775.  In 1774 councilors appointed by royal writ of mandamus displaced the upper house of the 
General Court in order to reinforce the authority of the royal governor.  In response, the 
popularly elected lower house, the House of Representatives, separated itself and met variously 
and illegally in Salem, Concord, and Cambridge, under the title Provincial Congress.  In 1775 
the Provincial Congress set up permanent shop “at the Meeting-House in Watertown,” the 
epicenter of the Massachusetts forces laying siege to Boston and later General Washington’s 
headquarters.20  Following the first military engagements of the war in April at Lexington and 
Concord, alarms were given and minutemen from the surrounding countryside gathered and 
bottled up the British forces quartered in Boston.  Over the next month, the Massachusetts men 
dug in and fortified positions around the port city, including Breed’s Hill to the north.  The 
creation of the minutemen, their military service at the sound of alarms, and their gathering 
around Boston all occurred under the direction of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress.  On 
June 20, three days after the battle of Bunker Hill, this political body called on nearby towns to 
choose representatives for a special election.  These representatives then selected men to serve 
                                                 
19 Higginbothom, The War of American Independence, 85, 98. 
20 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part I, 271; and JEPCM, i-iii. 
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on a Council that was to re-establish Massachusetts’ bicameral government.  Following the 
election, the House maintained 236 members and the Council 28 members.21   
The Massachusetts Provincial Congress formed many sub-committees in order to manage 
the revolutionary movement that had exploded throughout the region.  The Committee of 
Supplies, for example, was formed in 1774 in order to gather military stores and provisions in the 
event that armed conflict should erupt between the colonists and the British military.22  Wealthy, 
politically powerful fish merchants such as Jeremiah Lee (1721-1775) and Elbridge Gerry (1744-
1814) served on this committee.23  Lee was the son of a wealthy judge and fish merchant.  He 
served as Justice of the Peace, continued his father’s business as a fish exporter, and was 
commissioned Colonel of Marblehead’s militia in 1751, a post he would not relinquish until his 
death.  He sat on the Marblehead committee of correspondence; he represented the port town at 
the Massachusetts Provincial Congress; and he was elected to represent Massachusetts at the 
Continental Congress.  Lee owned, at one time or another, 45 ships, brigs, snows, sloops, and 
schooners.  At his death, he left an estate valued at £24,583.18.10.24  He also built and owned 
                                                 
21 See, Cornelius Dalton, John Wirkkala, and Anne Thomas, Leading the Way: A History of the Massachusetts 
General Court, 1629-1980 (Boston: The Office of the Massachusetts Secretary of State, 1984), 41-48; and JHRM, 
Vol. 51, Part I, x-xii. 
22 The term “military stores” is used here and throughout the chapter to refer to ammunition, chiefly gunpowder, 
for use in making cartridges and for cannon fodder; flints, for flintlocks; lead, for making musket balls and artillery 
shot; and arms, including artillery pieces and hand weapons.  “Provisions,” on the other hand, is used to signify food 
supplies such as fish, beef, pork, flour, corn, etc. 
23 For evidence that Lee had been chosen for this particular committee, see the entry for May 14, 1775 in 
JEPCM, 224; and “Elbridge Gerry, For the Massachusetts Committee of Supplies, to Joseph Gardoqui and Sons, 
Bilbao, Spain, Watertown, July 5, 1775,” in NDAR, Vol. 1, 818.  For Gerry, see the entry for February 9, 1775 in 
JEPCM, 91; and the “Contract between the Massachusetts Committee of Supplies and Jacob Boardman and others 
of Newburyport,” June 14, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 678-679, and the abovementioned 818. 
24 For biographical accounts of Lee, see Thomas Amory Lee, “The Lee Family of Marblehead,” Essex Institute 
Historical Collections, Vol. LII-LIII, (Salem, MA: Newcomb and Gauss, 1916, 1917), 33-48, 145-160, 225-240, 
329-344; 65-80, 153-168, 257-287; and the sketch in Phillip Chadwick Foster Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley 
Bowen (1728-1813), Vol. 2, (Portland, Maine: The Colonial Society of Massachusetts, 1973), 665.   
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one of the largest mansions in all of the North American colonies.25  He died suddenly on May 
10, 1775.26   
 Gerry, a Harvard graduate, was, like Lee, a proprietor of a fish exporting merchant house 
inherited from his father.  Dr. Benjamin Rush referred to Elbridge Gerry as “a respectable young 
merchant, of a liberal education and considerable knowledge.  He was slow in his perceptions 
and in his manner of doing business, and stammering in his speech, but he knew and embraced 
truth when he saw it.”27  Elbridge served as a selectman in Marblehead; a member of the port’s 
committee of correspondence; and a representative to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress.  
He also signed the Declaration of Independence as a representative to the Continental 
Congress.28  Fish merchants such as Lee and Gerry would use their overseas commercial 
                                                 
25 The mansion “was designed by English architects, and cost more than 10,000 Pounds Sterling.  It was stated 
in the Boston papers of the time that this was ‘the most elegant and costly furnished home in the Bay State Colony.’  
Four Presidents of the United States, including Washington, and also the Marquis de Lafayette, have been among its 
many guests.”  Lee, “The Lee Family of Marblehead,” Vol. LII, 331.  The English poet Longfellow dedicated a 
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26 Smith describes the extraordinary circumstances surrounding Jeremiah’s death: “on the night of April 19, 
1775 he, Azor Orne, and Elbridge Gerry, who had met on committee [the Provincial Congress’s Committee of 
Safety and Supplies] business, passed the night at Wetherby’s Black Horse Tavern on the road to Concord.  During 
the night British troops entered the tavern to make a search, and the Marbleheaders were forced to flee in their 
nightshirts for sanctuary in an adjacent cornfield.  As a result of his exposure, Lee contracted a fever and died three 
weeks later on May 10, 1775.”  Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol. 2, 665.  Thus, the 
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27 See, “Sketches of the signers of the Declaration of Independence by Benjamin Rush, c. 1800,” in Henry 
Steele Commager and Richard B. Morris, eds., The Spirit of Seventy-Six: The Story of the American Revolution As 
Told By Participants, 4th ed., (New York: Da Capo Press, 1995), 275.   
28 Biographies of Elbridge Gerry, who eventually became Vice President of the United States under James 
Madison, include George Athan Billias, Elbridge Gerry: Founding Father and Republican Statesman (New York: 
McGraw Hill Book Co., 1976); Samuel E. Morrison, “Elbridge Gerry, Gentleman-Democrat,” New England 
Quarterly, II (1929), 6-33; and James T. Austin, The Life of Elbridge Gerry, With Contemporary Letters, To The 
Close of the American Revolution (Boston: Wells and Lilly, 1828).  Also, see the short biographical sketches in 
Clifford K. Shipton, Sibley’s Harvard Graduates (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), 239-259; and 
Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol. 2, 654.  The editors of George Washington’s papers 
maintain that Gerry “was appointed to the committee of supplies on 9 Feb. 1775.”  PGW, Vol. 1, 212n.  However, 
according to Gerry, he acted in that capacity from at least as early as December, 1774.  Compare “Joseph Gardoqui 
& Sons to Jeremiah Lee, Bilbao, February 15, 1775,” NDAR, Vol. 1, 401; with “Elbridge Gerry, for the 
Massachusetts Committee of Supplies, to Joseph Gardoqui and Sons, Bilbao, Spain,” Watertown, July 5, 1775, 
NDAR, Vol. 1, 818. 
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connections to facilitate the transfer of much needed military stores to the North American 
colonies.   
 Gunpowder was one of the most sought-after military stores.  Even prior to the outbreak 
of war both the colonists and British officials realized that armed resistance of any sort could not 
succeed without gunpowder.  Parliamentarians directly ordered General Thomas Gage to send 
companies of British regulars into the countryside surrounding Boston in order to remove caches 
of colonial powder.29  At the same time, the British state directed its Navy under Vice Admiral 
Samuel Graves to stop vessels on the high seas and confiscate any powder thought to be headed 
into colonial hands.30  One colonial merchant later wrote “the Ministry in Britain have been 
endeavoring to keep a Supply of powder from the Colonies, well knowing that they cannot 
enslave them by any other Means.”31  For their part, the colonists attempted to get their hands on 
as much powder as they could despite the efforts of the British state.   
 As early as December 1774 the Committee of Supplies began negotiating the purchase of 
military stores through Spain.  Initially, the Spanish monarchy was unwilling to support the 
colonies openly and thereby risk war with Great Britain.  There was, however, no love lost 
between the two European powers.  After all, the British were largely responsible for defeating 
Spain’s ambitions in Florida in 1763, a British settlement in the Falkland Islands seemed to 
threaten Spanish South America in 1770, and there was no small amount of religious animosity 
between the Protestant and Catholic empires.32  Thus, the Spanish government did not take steps 
                                                 
29 Higginbothom, The War of American Independence, 29-53. 
30 Buel, Jr., In Irons, 31-32. 
31 “Elbridge Gerry, for the Massachusetts Committee of Supplies, to Joseph Gardoqui and Sons, Bilbao, Spain,” 
Watertown, July 5, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 818. 
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Press, 1985), esp. 28-30. 
  215
to forcibly prohibit trade with the North American colonies at the start of war.33  This tacit 
support opened the door to entrepreneurial merchants who were willing to take the risks of war-
time trade and to sell covertly all sorts of goods at inflated prices.34  Fish merchants played 
leading roles in importing and exporting military stores during the American Revolution. 
 The most important Spanish merchant house involved in the Atlantic fish trade with New 
England belonged to the Gardoqui family.35  Joseph Gardoqui and his sons operated out of 
Bilbao, Spain.  While most Iberian merchants maintained commercial ties to West Country 
businessmen in England who controlled the Newfoundland fisheries, the Gardoquis developed a 
transatlantic commercial network, exchanging salt, fruits, wine, and lines of credit for shipments 
of merchantable grades of dried cod from Massachusetts.  Bills of exchange were then deposited 
in accounts with English merchants, mostly in London.  Finally, manufactured goods were 
purchased in England and brought back to the colonies.36  The Gardoquis also provided colonial 
merchants with much needed information regarding the prices of various goods, including the 
demand for dried cod.  Indeed, commercial ties between colonial fish merchants and the 
Gardoqui house were so strong that in 1763 Jeremiah Lee named a ship of 110 tons burden that 
                                                 
33 “Brigadier General Nathanael Greene to Nicholas Cooke,” Rhode Island Camp, Jamaica Plains, June 28, 
1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 769. 
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36 See, Joseph Swett Jr. and Robert Hooper Jr. fonds, 1740-1747, MUMHA; Richard Derby Ledger, 1757-1776, 
JDPL; William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL; Richard Pedrick Account Book, 1767-1784, MDHS; and 
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he used to transport dried cod to Bilbao the Gardoqui, in honor of his esteemed trading 
partners.37 
 Early on, the Gardoquis sympathized with the colonials in their grievances with the 
British state.  On February 15, 1775, months prior to the outbreak of armed hostilities, the 
Spanish merchants expressed their support in a letter to Jeremiah Lee and the Massachusetts 
Committee of Supplies.  The Gardoquis were “determined at all events to assist you 
accordingly.”  They explained: “We see with the utmost concern the difficulties You labor under 
by an unpolitical Minister’s wrong direction of Affairs, But hope the Present Parliament will 
look into them with clearer light, & will find proper means to accommodate Matters, without 
going any further, allowing you your just Rights & Liberties, which we do assure you we long to 
see it settled with all our hearts; but should it be otherwise (God forbid) command freely and you 
will find us at your service.”  The Gardoquis closed with “We hourly look out for the London 
Post, should it bring any thing Worth y[ou]r notice, you may depend on being advised.”38  Thus, 
the Spanish merchants committed themselves to aiding the colonial cause even before the 
outbreak of war.  Indeed, in 1777 Lord Grantham, the British Minister at Madrid, observed “the 
House of Gardoqui is very active.  They have long had connection with Great Britain and 
America, but in the present contest, though they pretend to wish it was ended, they have adhered 
to the latter with great partiality.”39   
 The “partiality” that Grantham observed included the Gardoquis sending military stores 
to the colonies along with news of British troop movements.  On December 16, 1774, four 
                                                 
37 "A List of Vessels that have cleared outwards in the ports of Salem & Marblehead between the 10th of 
October 1763 & the 5th of January following being the quarter ending at Christmas..." Massachusetts Shipping 
Records, 1686-1765, Part III, pp. 916-1143, Box 3, MHS. 
38 “Joseph Gardoqui & Sons to Jeremiah Lee, Bilbao, February 15, 1775,” NDAR, Vol. 1, 401. 
39 Quote cited in Cuadrado, Empresarios españoles en el proceso de independencia norteamericana, 188. 
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months before the shot heard around the world, Jeremiah Lee wrote to the Gardoquis to 
explicitly suggest the Spanish merchants help the colonists acquire military stores from Europe.  
While Lee’s letter has not survived, the Gardoquis responded that they had looked into “the 
method of complying with your orders…to procure as many Muskets & pistols as were ready 
made…for the King’s Army.”  The Spanish merchants had been able to acquire “300 Muskets & 
Bayonets, & about double the number of Pair of Pistols.”  They further agreed to do “our utmost 
to get as many more as was to be found in order to serve you, & shall whenever you should 
command.”  Lee and the committee must have also requested access to gunpowder, as the 
Gardoquis wrote: “The Powder is an Article which we cannot ship unless we have timely advice, 
for whatever there is made in this Kingdom is for the Government.”40  Gerry and the Committee 
of Supplies then sent “the Rockingham [Gerry’s vessel], Capt[ain] Johnson w[i]th £1000 
Ster[lin]g in Cash, & six Hundred & fifty pounds Bills of Exch[ang]e on your House to be 
invested in good pistol & Cannon powder – half each.”41  On March 27, 1776, “Joseph Gardoqui 
and sons” sent a letter by ship to Massachusetts (it took twenty-nine days), to Newburyport, 
Salem, and finally Watertown, where it ended up in the hands of the General Court.  The letter 
stated: “No other news from England, but that 17,300 German troops were going to Boston and 
Canada, some of which embarking about 3 weeks ago.”42  In this manner, a preexisting 
transatlantic trade network involving the exchange of commercial information and merchantable 
grade dried cod was converted to the transfer of arms, ammunition, and military intelligence.  
                                                 
40 “Joseph Gardoqui & Sons to Jeremiah Lee, Bilbao, February 15, 1775,” NDAR, Vol. 1, 401. 
41 “Elbridge Gerry, for the Massachusetts Committee of Supplies, to Joseph Gardoqui and Sons, Bilbao, Spain,” 
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Similarly, the more active South Atlantic commercial networks involving the exchange of refuse 
grade dried cod were also transformed for war. 
 Prominent fish merchants were able to convert well-worn trade routes to the West Indies 
into military supply lines.43  In June, 1775, Elbridge Gerry and the other members of the 
Committee of Supplies signed a legal contract with “Jacob Boardman Merchant, John Harbert 
Blockmaker, and Joseph Stanwood Mariner all of Newbury Port in the County of Essex.”  The 
contract was to hire “the good Schooner, nam’d the Britaniae of the Portlage or Burthen of 
Eighty-Eight Tons, now laying in the Harbor of said Newbury Port, whereof Abel Coffin is at 
present Master.”  The schooner was hired “for a Voyage or Voyages…to all or any of the West 
India Islands, and directly back to any Part of New England.”  A provision was added to the 
contract formally acknowledging “the said Vessel shall be liable or subject to any Seizure, 
Detention or Confiscation.”  In order to mitigate the Newport merchants’ war-time shipping 
risks, the committee agreed that the Massachusetts Provincial Congress would be legally 
responsible for “the Sum of Four Hundred Pounds in full for the Value and worth of the said 
Schooner, and also the Freight money,” which amounted to “the Rate of Twenty three Pounds 
nine shillings and four Pence, for each and every Calendar Month.”44  Moreover, in the 
following month Gerry and the committee arranged for “One hundred & twenty hogsheads Fish, 
besides Boards, Shingles” to be shipped on board an unnamed brig from Newburyport to the 
Windward islands in the West Indies.  Merchants from Marblehead, Gloucester, and Beverly 
delivered the fish to Newburyport “free of Charge.”  There, Captain Michael Corbet, who had 
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gained fame for resisting British Naval impressment in Marblehead’s harbor during the Pitt 
Packet affair in 1769, was ordered to sell this cargo and obtain as much gunpowder, “an Article, 
so immediately necessary,” as he could among the tropical islands.  Gerry and the other members 
of the Committee felt that “the Prosecution of the Scheme in all its Parts, might lay a Foundation 
for some eminent Services in future.”45  In October, 1775, the Continental Congress 
recommended each colony/state export provisions to the West Indies in order to trade for 
military stores.46  But this was after the fact that colonies such as Massachusetts were already 
conducting such trade. 
 Fish merchants were not the only ones to send trade ships to the Caribbean for military 
stores.  Flour and rice merchants, in Pennsylvania and South Carolina, also had commercial ties 
to the West Indies, and they too drew upon their connections to gather military supplies.47  
Shippers hid gunpowder in hogsheads topped with sugar, coffee, or some other West Indian trade 
good.48  In this way, those vessels the British Navy stopped and inspected stood a chance of 
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evading capture.  Throughout much of the war, South Carolina was able to supply the New 
England colonies with provisions, mostly rice, and imported military stores.49   
 Both overseas merchants and colonial entrepreneurs grew wealthier in trading for 
military stores.  At the end of July, the Continental Congress allocated fifty thousand dollars to 
“be paid by the continental treasurers,” to merchants in New York and Philadelphia, “to be by 
them applied to the purpose of importing gunpowder for the continental armies.”  The exporters 
were allowed a “five per Cent” commission rate “for their trouble and expenses therein.”50  
Congress allowed the same five percent commission to purchasing agents in the West Indies.51  
The aggressive pursuit of profits that pervaded in the Atlantic world was bent to the way of war. 
 Such incentives successfully encouraged merchants to export trade goods and motivated 
purchasing agents to negotiate deals abroad.  In July alone, it was estimated that between five 
and six-and-a-half tons of powder entered Philadelphia from St. Eustatia.52  At the same time, 
another seven thousand pounds of powder entered Philadelphia, and five thousand pounds 
entered New Jersey.53  Washington himself believed “there are few Colonies who have not some 
Vessel out on this Errand [i.e. trading for gunpowder], and will probably bring all that is at 
Market.”54  In 1776 alone, 69,000 pounds of gunpowder left the West Indies for the mainland 
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colonies.55  By the end of 1777, 1,454,210 pounds of gunpowder had been imported into the 
colonies for the Continental Army’s use from overseas.56 
Building on the successes of these voyages, a plan was laid for sending a fleet of trade 
vessels laden with dried cod from Massachusetts to the West Indies in order to obtain military 
stores.  In December, 1775, the General Court ordered the Committee of Supplies: “to engage 
and fix out with all possible dispatch, on the Account and Risk of this Colony, Ten Vessels, to be 
laden with as much Provision [i.e., dried cod], Horses, or any other produce of this Colony, 
except horned Cattle, Sheep, Hogs and Poultry, as they may deem necessary for the importation 
of Ammunition, Sulfur, Salt-Peter, Arms and German-Steel, for the manufacturing Gun-Locks, 
&c.  And that the said Committee be empowered to give Orders to the Commander of every such 
Vessel to export the said Cargo to the foreign West-Indies, for the Purposes aforesaid.”57  The 
Court then “put into the Hands of the Committee…the Sum of Eight Thousand Pounds.”58  Some 
of this enormous investment was surely meant to compensate the committee members for their 
efforts.  This investment, like so many others, allowed colonial fish merchants to utilize their 
commercial connections around the Atlantic to obtain much needed military stores.  Without the 
fish, the preexisting networks of trust, and the promise of profits, obtaining these stores and 
prosecuting the war effort would have been much more difficult. 
The British Navy went to great lengths to stop colonists from importing military stores, 
particularly gunpowder.  On July 5, 1775, General Gage communicated to Vice Admiral Graves 
his concern regarding “the Endeavors of the Rebels to procure Powder.”  Gage informed the 
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admiral that “within these few Days they have received 37 half Barrels which was brought from 
New Haven in Connecticut, where it was imported from St. Eustatia.”59  The genial Graves 
attempted to put a positive spin on matters, responding immediately: “I am happy to find they are 
in want of Ammunition.”  In order to explain the situation to the General, the Admiral listed the 
number of ships under his command and their location.  He then wrote: “I anxiously hope to hear 
that some of them are successful in seizing the Rebel’s Supplies, as their Captains are under the 
strictest Orders to be vigilant, and I omit no occasion of sending Them every information I can 
procure for their Guidance.”60  For example, on July 5, 1775, Graves ordered Captain William C. 
Burnaby, commander of the H.M.S. Merlin, to cruise “between Cape Anne and Cape Cod [the 
location of the principal fishing ports in New England], anchoring occasionally at Marblehead or 
Salem,” and also at times “to extend your Cruise to the Isle of Shoals or Piscataqua River.”  He 
was especially to “Examine the Bay of Salem and the Harbors therein, in order if possible to 
prevent every Kind of Supply getting to the Rebels by Sea.”61  The British Navy did stop some 
of the trade in fish for military stores.  On August 9, 1775, “two schooners from the West-Indies” 
attempted to steal into Salem.  The H.M.S. Falcon, John Lindsay, Captain, captured one of the 
schooners and chased the second into Salem’s harbor, where he was forced to retreat by colonial 
forces.62  But, for the most part the fish colonists caught and processed at the beginning of 1775 
was successfully exchanged for military stores.  Even Graves had to admit that “On this 
extensive Coast some Supplies will get in, but I hope in no great Quantities.”63  
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 In the West Indies, Vice Admiral James Young, commander of the British Naval 
Squadron positioned to police the region, knew that New England fish merchants were obtaining 
military stores on his watch.  On August 30, 1775, Young wrote to Philip Stevens, the Secretary 
of the British Admiralty Board, “that a Schooner from North America arrived at the Island [of] 
St. Croix, in Order to procure Gunpowder for America; and offering any Money for the Purchase 
&c, and it having since then been intimated to me by Persons of Credit, at this place, that it is 
believed The North American Traders do procure Gunpowder and other Warlike Stores from this 
Island, and His Majesty’s other Charibbee Islands, in these Seas, as well as from the French, 
Dutch, and Danish Islands.”64  The Vice Admiral ordered the vessels under his command to 
watch for vessels “bound to North America” laden with “Gunpowder or other Warlike Stores.”65  
He then wrote to “the President and Members of the Council at Antigua” to warn them that 
“sundry Vessels belonging to North America go to the French, Dutch & Danish Islands in these 
Seas, & offer unlimited prices for Gunpowder & other Warlike Stores.”  Young was “fearful the 
vast price offered may tempt the Proprietors to run risks & dispose of it, which must prove of the 
utmost disservice to His Majesty by thus assisting the North Americans, who are now declared to 
be in open Rebellion.”66  Yet despite the tentative measures he took, Young remained fearful.  In 
his own words, he stated, “During the present Hurricane Season I can do little more with the 
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King’s Ships under my Command, then sending them to the Southern Islands for Security.”67  
Such timid leadership, North America’s expansive coastline and numerous harbors, and colonial 
merchants’ commercial connections, made it possible for Patriots to secure military stores at the 
beginning of the war.68 
5.2 REGULATING FOOD SHIPMENTS 
The exportation of food stuffs of any kind, including dried cod, posed a dilemma for colonial 
leaders at the start of the war.  On the one hand, they wanted to import military stores, and 
shipments of provisions had been traditionally used in trade with the West Indian slave 
plantations.  One the other hand, colonial leaders were nervous about provisions being sold to 
intermediaries, who would then turn around and supply the British forces at Boston, whom they 
were attempting to starve into leaving.  Moreover, colonial merchants hoped that cutting-off 
supplies to Newfoundland would put economic pressure on West Country merchants, who would 
in turn lobby Parliament to end the war.  Because of these needs and concerns, dried cod 
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continued to flow out of Massachusetts during the Revolutionary War, but fish exports were 
heavily regulated.    
 On May 17, 1775, the Continental Congress resolved to prohibit the direct exportation of 
“provisions of any kind, or other necessaries” to Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and other northern 
parts.  This prohibition was explicitly meant to increase the cost of doing business for “the 
British fisheries on the American coasts.”69  Yet, a loophole remained in Parliament’s Fisheries 
Bill, by which the Quaker merchants on Nantucket had received a special exemption for their 
whaling industry.  This meant that Nantucket whalemen operating off the coast of Newfoundland 
could sell provisions to English migratory fishing vessels in the region for inflated war time 
profits, thereby increasing the ability of the migratory fishing sector to thrive and expanding the 
likelihood that the New England fishing industry would be replaced by its inter-imperial 
commercial rival.  Nantucket whalemen were also allowed to enter British-controlled ports in the 
North Atlantic, increasing the risk of colonial provisions ending up in the hands of intermediaries 
who would then supply the British military in Boston.  As a result, Congress further resolved on 
May 29, 1775, “That no provisions or necessaries of any kind be exported to the island of 
Nantucket….The Congress deeming it of great importance to North America, that the British 
fishery should not be furnished with provisions from this continent through Nantucket, earnestly 
recommend a vigilant execution of this resolve to all committees.”70   
 These somewhat paranoid regulations made in Philadelphia were then transported to 
Watertown, Massachusetts, where the Provincial Congress reviewed them on June 9, 1775.71  
Immediately, the Provincial Congress ordered the printing of hand bills to be “dispersed in the 
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several sea port towns in this colony, that due obedience may be paid to the same.”72  These bills 
stated: “Whereas the Enemies of America are multiplying their Cruelties towards the Inhabitants 
of the New-England Colonies by seizing Provision Vessels, either the Property of, or intended to 
supply them…Resolved, That it be, and it hereby is recommended to the Inhabitants of the 
Towns and Districts in this Colony, that they forthwith exert themselves to prevent the 
Exportation of Fish, and all other Kinds of Provision.”73  Even prior to this official prohibition, 
the committee of safety in Marblehead made it known in town meetings that supplying the 
enemy with provisions would not be tolerated.74  
 The Continental Congress did establish an exemption to their prohibition on shipments 
of provisions to Nantucket.  No colony was allowed to supply the Quaker island “except from 
the colony of the Massachusetts Bay.”  The Massachusetts Provincial Congress was “desired to 
take measures for effectually providing the said island, upon their application to purchase the 
same, with as much provision as shall be necessary for its internal use, and no more.”75  
Massachusetts was the only region the Continental Congress allowed to trade with Nantucket 
because it alone could be trusted.  The center of British military operations was in Boston, and 
Massachusetts was the foremost fishing colony.  Massachusetts merchants would sell only the 
provisions that Nantucket needed for local consumption.   
 Massachusetts’s revolutionary government passed a series of resolves in order to ensure 
that any provisions shipped to Nantucket were “for the internal use of said island.”  The 
Provincial Congress further resolved that no one should be allowed to export provisions to 
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Nantucket “without a permit in writing from the committee of safety of this colony, or such 
person or persons as they shall appoint to give such permit.”76  As soon as the people of 
Nantucket began “fitting out a large fleet of whaling vessels” to exploit the Fisheries Bill 
exemption, as they did in between June and July, the Provincial Congress felt that it was simply 
too risky to provide provisions.  At this point, the Congress resolved on July 8, 1775, “that no 
provisions or necessaries of any kind be exported from any part of this colony to the island of 
Nantucket, until the inhabitants of said island shall have given full and sufficient satisfaction to 
this Congress, or some future house of representatives, that the provisions they have now by 
them, have not been, and shall not be, expended in foreign, but for domestic consumption.”77  
Yet, even this restriction could not allay Congressional fears. 
 Over the course of the next month, Massachusetts’s political leaders continued to fret 
over the Fisheries Bill exemption and shipping food to Nantucket.  In the end, the members of 
the Provincial Congress resolved that only drastic measures would suffice.  On August 10, 1775 
they determined that “from and after the 15th Day of August Instant, no Ship or Vessel shall sail 
out of any Port in this Colony, on any Whaling Voyage whatever, without Leave first had and 
obtained from the Great and General Court of this Colony.”  In effect, Massachusetts did to the 
Nantucket whalers what Parliament had done to the New England cod fishermen.  The 
Massachusetts General Court, or Provincial Congress, communicated this declaration “to the 
several Assemblies of the other New England Colonies, advising them to pass a similar 
Resolve.”  Then, in order to make sure the general public was aware of the regulation, the 
Congress ordered its resolve to “be printed in the several News-Papers of Cambridge and 
Watertown, and in Hand-Bills.”  They further established a special sub-committee “for getting 
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the same Printed and Dispersed to the several Sea Ports in this Colony.”  Members of the 
Congress justified this moratorium on whaling and these attempts to raise public awareness by 
stating the need “to take all possible Precaution that none of the Inhabitants of this Colony 
supply those who are seeking our Ruin, with Provisions, or any Materials that shall enable them 
to execute their cruel Designs against us.”78  Colonial political leaders, including the Continental 
Congress and the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, closed one sector of the coastal trade 
involving shipments of fish and other provisions, and they shut down one maritime industry.  
Surely this was done in the interests of military security.  Yet, these actions were also meant to 
prevent the West Country migratory fishing industry from profiting in the North Atlantic at New 
England’s expense.  The commercial competition that existed between the West Country and 
New England fish merchants prior to the war continued during the conflict. 
 Merchants who wanted to trade provisions for military stores were more fortunate than 
those who had supplied the whaling industry.  To be sure, there were restrictions on colonial 
exports in general.  On October 20, 1774 the Continental Congress adopted the Continental 
Association, a collective non-importation and non-exportation agreement that prohibited member 
colonies from receiving goods from areas Great Britain controlled after December 1, 1774.  The 
Association further prevented members from shipping provisions to these areas after September 
10, 1775.79  Fish, however, was still shipped out of New England ports to overseas foreign 
markets.   
 In addition to the incidents of overseas fish exportation discussed above, there is 
evidence that private, non-governmental fish merchants petitioned the Massachusetts Provincial 
Congress for special dispensations to ship their particular provision during the war.  On June 16, 
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1775, Ellis Gray and Richard Hinckley, two Massachusetts fish merchants, asked the Provincial 
Congress for permission to export “eighty hogsheads of Jamaica cod fish, laden on two vessels 
bound to the West Indies.”  The petitioners went on to explain that one of the vessels “would 
have sailed before the resolve of this honorable Congress forbidding the exportation of fish was 
published, had she not been detained by the elopement of her hands.”80   
 This shipment of fish was likely meant to be exchanged for military stores, as it was in 
June that Gerry, himself a Marblehead fish merchant, and the Committee of Supplies, had 
approved the plan to send ten vessels to the West Indies for such stores.  Word must have spread 
among the merchant community that such a plan would receive government sanction.  Moreover, 
merchants must have realized that the availability of foreign military stores among the islands, 
burgeoning demand in North America for military stores, and inflated prices for provisions in the 
West Indies meant that huge war-time profits could be made.81  According to Selwyn Carrington, 
the foremost authority on the American Revolution’s economic impact on the West Indies, the 
price of dried cod, or “saltfish,” increased by 86.7% per quintal between 1774-1775 and 1776 in 
Barbados, one of the largest markets in the British West Indies.  In smaller St. Vincent, the price 
of dried cod increased 300% between 1770-1774 and 1778-1784.82  Such price inflation was a 
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direct result of the Revolutionary War, the Continental Association, and Parliamentary 
prohibitions.  Of course, prices for military stores in the West Indies were inflated due to the 
exigencies of war as well, and this inflation cut into fish merchants’ profit margins.83  Whether 
they intended, as the Committee of Supplies certainly did, to exchange their fish for military 
stores to sell to the Continental Army for a profit, the civilian fish merchants were successful in 
getting the Massachusetts government to approve their petitions. 
 On June 16, the Provincial Congress established a sub-committee “to consider what may 
be done with respect to such vessels as are now ready to sail, with fish on board, there being a 
resolve of this Congress against the exportation of fish, &c.”  This sub-committee on fish exports 
included two additional fish merchants from Marblehead: Azor Orne and Jonathan Glover.84  
The committee members approved the petitions and went so far as to recommend certain 
measures to the Provincial Congress for establishing a system by which future merchants could 
export fish, earn inflated war-time prices, and bring in much-needed military stores despite the 
prohibitory sanctions.   
 The fish exports committee members had a very specific rationale for approving the 
petitions.  They explained that “the fish those gentlemen were about to export, is of such a kind, 
being old Jamaica fish, as, if detained, cannot possibly be of any advantage to this colony, but 
must perish.”  Orne and Glover, like other fish merchants, understood the already undesirable 
nature of refuse grade dried cod.  The committee members maintained Massachusetts was, at that 
time, “plentifully supplied with new fish.”  With stores of better grades of cod waiting in 
flakeyards, drying houses, and warehouses, there simply was no point in detaining a boatload of 
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fish fit only for slaves.  And if this refuse fish could bring military stores back to the continent 
from the islands, then so much the better.  Thus, the committee ruled “that permission be given 
by this Congress, to the owners of said vessels, for their proceeding on their voyages.”85   
 In order to pave the way for future petitions along these lines, the committee members 
recommended the establishment of certain guidelines for granting exemptions for fish 
exportation during the war.  They suggested “that toleration be given to all other owners of 
vessels, for their departure, who shall convince this Congress, or a committee thereof, that their 
vessels and cargoes are in the same predicament, as no possible advantage can accrue from their 
detention.”86  The sub-committee’s recommendations were formally adopted, and one week later 
the Provincial Congress approved the petition of Winthrop Sergeant, a fish merchant from 
Gloucester, Massachusetts, who wanted “to ship off for the West Indies, a quantity of old 
Jamaica fish, not exceeding forty hogsheads.”  The language the Provincial Congress used in 
their approval mirrored the sub-committee’s prior recommendation.  The Provincial Congress 
stated that it appeared “to this Congress that the said fish, if stopped, will be of little or no 
service to this colony.”87  Thus, fish merchants from Marblehead wrote official government 
policy during the war and helped create an avenue by which the quest for profits could 
potentially benefit the colonial cause by bringing in military stores from the West Indies.  
The Massachusetts exemption for allowing the exportation of refuse grade dried cod was 
linked explicitly to the importation of military stores in the Continental Congress.  On July 15, 
1775, Ben Franklin, himself a great supporter of Philadelphia’s trade in bread and flour to the 
West Indies, got passed an exemption allowing all merchants, from any colony, “to load and 
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export the produce of these colonies [later stated “produce of any kind”], to the value of such 
powder and [military] stores aforesaid, the non-exportation agreement notwithstanding.”  A copy 
of this resolution was then printed in the form of hand bills and sent to the West Indies in order 
to reassure buyers in the region that they could rely on North American shipments.88  This 
exemption made it acceptable for American merchants to ship provisions to all markets provided 
they trade for military stores.  As early as 1774 Parliament had forbidden loyal members of the 
British Empire to import goods from the rebelling colonies.  At the same time, the British state 
expressly prohibited anyone from exporting military stores to the colonies without “a License 
from his Majesty, or the Privy Council for the exportation thereof from Great Britain.”89  
Franklin’s exemption, however, effectively removed any legal/political obstacle from the 
American side, and the West Indian planters became increasingly desperate for provisions and 
ever more fearful of slave revolts as the war dragged on.90  Thus, dried cod, cattle, grain, and 
flour from North America continued to flow into the British, French, Dutch, and Spanish West 
Indian islands throughout the war, albeit at decreased and sporadic levels, despite Parliamentary 
sanctions and British Naval patrols.91 
 As a result of greater overseas demand, inflated wartime prices, and Franklin’s 
exemption, the number of petitions to export fish out of Massachusetts increased during the 
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initial years of the war.  Prior to Franklin’s indulgence, there were only six petitions to the 
Massachusetts Provincial Congress for permission to export fish, five of which were approved.92  
After the exemption, up to France’s formal alliance with America in 1778 (which eliminated the 
need for many petitions) there were eighteen such appeals.93   
 Why did the Provincial Congress approve or deny the petitions?  Local, regional, and 
“American” identities helped some merchants secure permission to export fish out of the 
country.  Joseph Lee of Marblehead, Nathaniel Tracey of Newburyport, John Stevens, Jr., of 
Gloucester, Captain George Dodge of Salem, and Prince Gorham of Barnstable (via Chatham) 
were all affiliated with the Massachusetts fishing industry, and their petitions were approved.  
“Messieurs” Pierre la Fitte [Lafitte], Frederick de la Porte, Domblider, and Hurel, on the other 
hand, were affiliated with the French West Indian plantations and their petitions were denied.   
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 Yet a few foreign merchants applied for and received permission to export fish.  “Viellon 
and Regnault,” two merchants from “St. Nicholas Mole, in the West-Indies,” were allowed to 
sell “a large cargo of merchandize” and purchase “a quantity of dry and pickled fish, and 
lumber.”94  Their petition differed from the others because they had asked for permission to ship 
fish out of the country in exchange for West Indian “merchandize.”95  Yet Viellon and Regnault 
were still foreign merchants applying to, and receiving favor from, American politicians.  It was 
likely that certain merchants had built up networks of trust prior to the Revolution, and were then 
the ones rewarded with government dispensations during the war.96   
 The cod trade thus continued despite Parliamentary prohibitions and the British Naval 
blockade.  The trade was circumscribed, involving only those markets willing and able to return 
military stores.  Merchants were further required by the Revolutionary government to seek 
permission to trade.  And, for the most part, only refuse grade dried cod was allowed to leave the 
continent in civilian vessels.  Some merchants, however, were able to trade at inflated prices and 
those in government positions were given extra funds to compensate them for their efforts.  In 
this manner, the world of commerce was bent to the way of war.   
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5.3 PROVISIONING THE ARMED FORCES 
The overall cost of the conflict remained a concern throughout the Revolution, and the leadership 
constantly sought ways to reduce expenditures.97  As a result, the lifeblood of New England’s 
colonial commerce itself was converted to military use during the American Revolution.  
Political and military leaders relied on dried, salted codfish in order to reduce expenses 
associated with prosecuting the war.   
Fish had been typically less expensive than other primary sources of protein, such as pork 
and beef, before the war.  In 1762, Salem merchants paid £3.0.0 and £2.4.0 per barrel for South 
Carolina pork and beef, respectively.98  At the same time, New England merchantable and refuse 
grade dried cod sold at £0.13.1 and £0.7.2 per quintal.99  Given that a quintal equaled 112 lbs., 
and assuming a barrel of pork or beef equaled a British hundredweight, also 112 lbs., then pork 
sold at 6.4 pence per pound; beef sold at 4.7 pence per pound; merchantable dried cod sold at 1.4 
pence per pound; and refuse dried cod sold at 0.77 pence per pound.  Pork was thus 4.6 times 
more expensive than merchantable dried cod and 8.3 times more costly than refuse dried cod, 
while the price of beef was 3.4 times higher than merchantable dried cod and 6.1 times higher 
than refuse dried cod.  Dried cod had supplied free and slave workers with inexpensive amounts 
of protein for centuries, and it cheaply fueled fighting men during the Revolutionary War.   
 The Continental Army had more mouths to feed than even the largest urban centers in 
British North America between 1775-1783.  Philadelphia was the largest city, with a population 
                                                 
97 For more on these concerns, see Carp, To Starve the Army at Pleasure; and Ferguson, The Power of the 
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98 Schooner Esther, 1760-68, Box 5, Folder 3, Timothy Orne Shipping Papers, JDPL.   
99 Daniel Vickers, "`A Knowen and Staple Commoditie': Codfish Prices in Essex County, Massachusetts, 1640-
1775," Essex Institute, Historical Collections, Vol. CXXIV, (Salem, MA: Newcomb and Gauss, 1988), 202, Table 
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of 33,290 in 1775.  New York City maintained a population of 21,863 in 1771.  Boston 
supported around 16,000 people in 1775.  Throughout the war, the Army’s total manpower on a 
yearly basis was: 32,625 in 1775; 78,425 in 1776; 51,175 in 1777; 39,225 in 1778; 36,700 in 
1779; 33,825 in 1780; 25,600 in 1781; and 15,250 in 1782.  On average, there were 39,103 men 
in the Army.  Thus, there were typically more people in the Army than there were in the leading 
city of Philadelphia or the entire colony/state of Georgia.100 
 These fighting men required enormous amounts of food.  In 1778, the commissary 
general for the Army estimated that a force of 81,000 would consume 203,000 barrels of flour 
each year.101  The demand for this flour contributed in part to the Continental Congress’ decision 
in 1777 to form a permanent army, enlist smaller numbers of men for the duration of the war, 
and thereby preserve the agricultural workforce for sowing and reaping.   
 But, the fighting men did not live on bread alone.  At the start of the war in June, 1775, 
the Massachusetts Committee of Supplies set down “the allowance for provisions for the soldiers 
of the Massachusetts army.”   “Each soldier” was to receive the following daily rations:  
One pound of bread.  Half a pound of beef and half a pound of pork; and if pork 
cannot be had, one pound and a quarter of beef; and one day in seven they shall 
have one pound and one quarter of salt fish, instead of one day’s allowance of 
meat.  One pint of milk, or, if milk cannot be had, one gill of rice.  One quart of 
                                                 
100 For Philadelphia, see Billy G. Smith, The “Lower Sort”: Philadelphia’s Laboring People, 1750-1800 
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101 Buel, Jr., In Irons, 27. 
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good spruce or malt beer.  One gill of peas or beans, or other sauce equivalent.  
Six ounces of good butter per week.”102   
At the same time, the daily rations for troops from Connecticut included: ¾ of a pound of pork or 
one pound of beef; one pound of bread or flour; three pints of beer “or Spruce Sufficient;” and 
one pint of milk.  Salt fish was to be substituted for the daily meat ration three times a week, and 
each man was to receive ½ pint of rice or one pint of meal, six ounces of butter, and three pints 
of peas or beans each week.103  “The Ration of Provisions allowed by the Continental Congress 
unto each Soldier” included the following: either one pound of fresh beef, or ¾ of a pound of 
pork, or one pound of Salt Fish per day; one pound of bread or flour per day; three pints of Peas, 
or Beans, or “Vegetables equivalent,” per week; one pint of milk per day “when to be had;” ½ 
pint of rice, or one pint of “Indian meal,” per week; and one quart of “Spruce Beer,” or nine 
gallons of molasses “per Company of 100 Men,” per day.  On Monday and Wednesday 
mornings, soldiers were to get a “ration” of salt and fresh meat, and two rations of bread.  Every 
Friday was deemed a fish day, and soldiers were to get a ration of “salt Fish.”104  Clearly, none 
of these soldiers were meant to live on dried cod, but Massachusetts, Connecticut, and the 
Continental Congress did recognize the added value in supplementing men’s’ diets with 
inexpensive fish.   
 The Continental Navy did not have nearly as many mouths to feed as the Army.  
Throughout the war, the Navy’s manpower per year was: 550 in 1775; 1,910 in 1776; 4,023 in 
1777; 2,840 in 1778; 2,428 in 1779; 1,726 in 1780; 1,724 in 1781; and 640 in 1782.105  On 
average, 1,980 men served in the Navy in any given year.  And fish played an important role in 
                                                 
102 JEPCM, 317-318. 
103 PGW, Vol. 1, 233, footnote #22.  
104 General Orders, Head Quarters, Cambridge, August 8, 1775, PGW, Vol. 1, 269; and JCC, Vol. 3, 322. 
105 Buel, Jr., In Irons, 293, footnote #60. 
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feeding them.  The Continental Navy was formally established on October 30, 1775, when the 
Continental Congress appointed seven men to a Naval Committee.  Four of the Committee 
members were New Englanders, including John Adams, who was familiar with the commercial 
fishing industry as he lived in the port community of Quincy, Massachusetts.106  He also 
represented fish merchants in legal cases, and became knowledgeable about the industry in order 
better to defend his clients.107  In his proud words, “My Practice as a Barrister in the Counties of 
Essex, Plymouth and Barnstable had introduced me to more Knowledge both of the Cod and 
whale fisheries and of their importance both to the commerce and Naval Power of this Country 
than any other Man possessed.”108  Hyperbole aside, Adams’ intimate knowledge and 
appreciation of the fishing industry, combined with a concern for the Continental Congress’ 
expense account, led him to insert the following clause in the very first “Rules for the Regulation 
of the Navy of the United Colonies” on November 28, 1775: 
                                                 
106 John Adams represented Massachusetts; Stephen Hopkins, Rhode Island; John Langdon, New Hampshire; 
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All ships furnished with fishing tackle, being in such places where fish is to be 
had, the Captain is to employ some of the company in fishing; the fish to be 
distributed daily to such persons as are sick or upon recovery, provided the 
surgeon recommend it, and the surplus, by turns amongst the messes of the 
officers and seamen, without favor or partiality and gratis, without any deduction 
of their allowance of provisions on that account.109 
In addition to moral prohibitions forbidding naval seamen “to swear, curse, or blaspheme the 
name of God,” and formal recognition of “the cat of nine tails” as a disciplinary tool, the fishing 
clause and other regulations were made to apply to “Commanders of all ships and vessels 
belonging to the thirteen United Colonies,” which retroactively included the armed schooners 
fitted out at Beverly and leased to the Continental Congress through Washington.110  Those 
serving on board former fishing vessels, and anyone else the Naval Regulations applied to, were 
encouraged to catch their food and thereby save the Continental Congress expense. 
 Fish was also used to feed coast guard units.  On June 28, 1775, the Massachusetts 
Provincial Congress resolved to establish permanent “companies on the sea coast.”  Thirty-five 
companies, consisting of fifty men each, were raised and stationed in port communities from 
Plymouth county in southern Massachusetts to Cumberland county in what is today Maine.111  
Then, between December 28 and January 4, 1775/1776, the Provincial Congress debated and 
resolved to expand the number of “Forces to guard the Sea Coast.”  A total of 2,650 men were 
recruited to guard coastal communities between Martha’s Vineyard and Falmouth (now Portland, 
Maine) for the period of one year.112  Although the port communities themselves were 
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responsible for recruiting the men, the Provincial Congress established the organizational 
structure for these units.  The Congress issued orders for these men; established commissary 
agents in certain regions to better provide for the men; and created a pay scale and a military 
hierarchy for what was, in effect, the first coast guard (albeit at the colony/state level) in 
American history.  The Congress assigned the following daily rations to the coast guard units: 
one pound of wheat bread, or 1¼ pounds of “other Bread;” one pound of pork, or 1¼ pounds of 
beef; “and where Salt Fish can be had, they shall be allowed one Pound of Fish one Day in 
seven, instead of one Day’s Allowance of Meat.”113  In this way, the Provincial Congress hoped 
to mitigate the costs associated with establishing a coast guard. 
Fish also played an important role in supplying the dietary needs of privateers during the 
Revolution.  In 1779, Richard and Knott Pedrick, Marblehead fish merchants, jointly owned, 
outfitted, and manned the brig General Glover.114  The vessel was provisioned in part with 50 
“fresh fish.”  In addition, she was equipped with one cod line valued at £2.8.0.  According to the 
“Bill of Fair” for the Salem privateer ship Porus in 1781, men ate beef three days a week; pork 
two days; and “salt fish” every Saturday.115  The cod line, like the Naval Regulation and the 
dietary supplements, was meant as a cost-saving measure.  Like fish in general, it helped 
improve the bottom-line of fighting the war and enabled merchants and political leaders to 
allocate funds elsewhere. 
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5.4 ARMING FISHING SCHOONERS 
In addition to transforming trade routes into supply lines and turning a saleable commodity into 
military provisions, fishing vessels themselves were converted into warships during the 
Revolution.  During the first three years of war, 1775-1777, the U.S. Navy only had four frigates, 
which usually carried twenty-four to forty-four guns on a single gun deck, in operation.116  Most 
of the vessels engaged in combat at sea with the British during this period were much smaller in 
design, and among these fishing schooners featured prominently as both privateers and naval 
warships.117  Fish merchants did not transform their property from one kind of vessel to another 
solely out of ideological commitment, but they did demonstrate another way in which their 
industry was crucial to the war effort.   
There is a long Atlantic tradition in which various regions and peoples have used fishing 
vessels for military/defense purposes during periods of war.  As early as the fifteenth century, 
indigenous peoples on the West Coast of Africa carved vessels from the trunks of tropical trees 
and used them along the coastline and inland waterways for a variety of commercial purposes, 
including fishing.  They also used these vessels for attempting to ward-off well-armed 
Portuguese slave ships.118  Similarly, Native Americans all along the Atlantic seaboard in North 
America constructed dugout canoes from fallen trees along with kayaks and umiaks from the 
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skins of walrus and seals.  These vessels were utilized for a mixture of traveling, trading, fishing, 
hunting, and fighting-off European invaders.119  The Spanish Armada, which remains one of the 
most famous flotillas in all of recorded history, included Basque, Portuguese, and Spanish 
fishing vessels.120  One of the reasons England’s Lord Baltimore moved from Newfoundland in 
the first half of the seventeenth century was the fact that he lost money by having to employ his 
fishing servants and vessels in war with the French instead of fishing and freighting cod to 
European markets.121  England’s Rump Parliament relied upon “shallops and ketches,” vessels 
primarily used to catch fish, in addition to ships of the line, to defend its newfound sovereignty 
from Royalists at home and abroad.122  Dutch fishing vessels performed military service and 
many were lost during the first Anglo-Dutch war.123  Fishing shallops and schooners were also 
very valuable to the British Naval squadron patrolling Newfoundland waters during the 1760s 
and 70s for illicit traders, as they enabled Naval officers to get in and out of smuggler’s coves.124  
The British Navy likewise found schooners valuable in their efforts to curtail smuggling around 
Boston on the eve of the Revolutionary War, and some had been previously used as commercial 
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fishing vessels.125  Virtually all maritime peoples around the Atlantic world relied on fishing 
fleets for more than catching fish.126  Thus, the decision to begin arming fishing vessels during 
the Revolutionary War cannot be seen as an innovation or a distinctly “American” way of war.  
It was in fact an old Atlantic tradition. 
 Colonial Americans desperately needed to establish a naval force in order to win the 
Revolution.  By June 30, 1775, there were 29 British warships stationed off the coast of North 
America between Florida and Nova Scotia.  These warships carried a total of 584 guns and 3,915 
men.127  Vice Admiral Samuel Graves maintained eight warships under his command for 
patrolling the New England coastline alone.128  By October 9, 1775, thirty-five British Naval 
vessels, including twelve ships of the line, patrolled the coastline of North America.  Fifteen of 
these warships, and no less than seven of the twelve rated warships, were positioned in New 
England waters at this time.129  These vessels could serve a variety of purposes: engage colonial 
positions on land, transport and evacuate troops, cut-off colonial exports, and prevent any 
supplies from entering the colonies from overseas.  For their part, the colonists had no navy at 
the beginning of 1775.  A fierce debate emerged suddenly on the subject of arming vessels for 
war.   
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 Fitting-out vessels for war occupied the attention of political leaders in the colonies from 
the very beginning of the war in 1775.130  The earliest recorded argument in favor of “some 
Armed Vessels” was made prior to June 4, 1775.  “S.L.” tried to convince the Massachusetts 
Provincial Congress that these “Armed Vessels” were necessary “to ward off the distressing 
Piratical blows that without doubt will be struck by [Vice] Admiral Samuel Graves’ small Men 
[of] war & Tenders.”  The British naval blockade of the colonial coastline posed a direct threat to 
“our inward bound Provisions, Molasses, & Salt Vessels &c.”131  Around this time, Christopher 
Gadsden, a former purser in the British Navy and a member of the Continental Congress from 
South Carolina, met John Adams, then acting as Massachusetts’ representative, at the Congress 
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in Philadelphia.  As Adams reported in a letter written to Elbridge Gerry on June 7, 1775, 
Gadsden was “confident that We may get a Fleet of our own, at a cheap Rate.”  Gadsden 
believed that smaller commercial vessels, such as fishing vessels, could be converted into 
warships, and that the expense of building an entirely new naval fleet could be avoided.  Such a 
“cheap” navy could “easily take their Sloops, schooners and Cutters [smaller vessels], on board 
of whom are all their best Seamen, and with these We can easily take their large Ships, on board 
of whom are all their impressed and discontented Men.”132  Gadsden believed that such pressed 
men would not put up much of a fight against their own countrymen. 
When Adams transmitted Gadsden’s thoughts to Gerry, the Massachusetts Provincial 
Congress went back and forth over the issue of arming vessels for war.  On June 7, the Congress 
established a sub-committee of eight merchants “to consider the expediency of establishing a 
number of small armed Vessels to cruise on our sea-coasts for the protection of our trade and the 
annoyance of our enemies.”133  Provincial Congressmen debated the issue until shortly after the 
Battle of Bunker Hill, in which British forces were able to move troops at will and bombard 
colonial positions from the sea.  On June 20, 1775, the Provincial Congress resolved “that a 
number of armed Vessels, not less than six, to mount from eight to fourteen carriage guns, and a 
proportionable number of swivels, &c. &c. be with all possible dispatch provided, fixed, and 
properly manned, to cruise as the Committee of Safety, or any other person or persons who shall 
be appointed by this Congress for that purpose, shall from time to time order and direct, for the 
protection of our trade and sea-coasts against the depredations and piracies of our enemies, and 
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for their annoyance, capture, or destruction.”  The matter was “ordered to subside for the 
present.”134  This program of arming vessels would resume in Massachusetts later in August.   
 In the interim, other plans for arming vessels emerged.  On June 27, 1775, Nicholas 
Cooke, the deputy Governor of Rhode Island, wrote to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety to 
suggest adding “a few Vessels properly armed and manned along the Coast in different parts” in 
order to protect “our own trade” and to capture “many of the provision Vessels that the Men of 
War take this way and send round to Boston; many of those Vessels are sent Round [Cape Cod] 
with but five or six hands in each and With nothing more that a Small arm a-piece to defend 
them.”  Cooke further observed that “as the Enemy think we have no force that dare put out of 
our harbors some of their Store Ships come Without Convoy and there is a possibility that we 
might pick up one of them if we had a Vessel or two to Cruise in their way.”135  Josiah Quincy 
wrote to John Adams on July 11, 1775, and suggested “Row Gallies…navigated with many 
Men…armed with Swivels, and one large battering Cannon in the Bow of each” to “convoy 10 
or a Dozen provision Vessels from Harbor to Harbor in the summer Season.”  He also asked 
“why might not a Number of Vessels of War be fitted out, & judiciously stationed, so as to 
intercept & prevent any Supplies going to our Enemies; and consequently, unless they can make 
an Impression Inland they must leave the Country or starve.”136  All of these plans for arming 
vessels were forwarded to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress or to John Adams, 
Massachusetts’ delegate at the Continental Congress, who then sent them on to the political 
leaders in his home colony.   
                                                 
134 “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” Watertown, June 20, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 724.  
Emphasis my own.  O’Connor contends “this proposal was never implemented.”  O’Connor, Origins of the 
American Navy, 14.  But, he has not considered the conversion of fishing vessels. 
135 “Nicholas Cooke, Deputy Governor of Rhode Island, to the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” 
Providence, June 27, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 762. 
136 “Josiah Quincy to John Adams, A Massachusetts Delegate to the Continental Congress,” Braintree, July 11, 
1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 859. 
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The initial colonial naval strategy, then, was worked out between June and July, 1775, 
and transmitted to the seat of war in Massachusetts.  The plan at this time involved arming and 
manning smaller commercial vessels, usually under 100 tons, which could be fitted out quickly 
and at low cost in order to capture successively larger warships, protect colonial shipping, and 
cut British military supply lines.  Such a scheme should not be conflated, however, with the 
eighteenth-century way of war known as guerre de course, or cruiser warfare, in which merchant 
vessels were targeted in hit-and-run tactics in order to bring economic and political pressure to 
bear on a government through increased maritime insurance rates, price inflation, and shipping 
losses.137  The colonist’s strategy involved these goals, to be sure, but they also hoped to reduce 
Britain’s sea power.  By cutting British supply lines and capturing increasingly larger warships it 
was hoped that British forces in Boston would run out of food and evacuate the port city.  
Colonists also believed they could carve a path through the British naval blockade in order to 
allow trade to continue unmolested. 
 On July 18, 1775, the Continental Congress officially sanctioned the conversion of 
commercial shipping into armed vessels.  The members resolved “that each colony, at their own 
expense, make such provision by armed vessels or otherwise, as their respective assemblies, 
conventions, or committees of safety shall judge expedient and suitable to their circumstances 
and situation for the protection of their harbors and navigation on their sea coasts, against all 
                                                 
137 Guerre de course is customarily equated with privateering.  See, Gardiner, ed., Navies and the American 
Revolution, 1775-1783, 66-69; Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 22-23; and Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes In Wartime, 25-
26.  Mevers argues that the first American naval strategy “relied heavily on privateers to harass British vessels,” 
rather than to capture or destroy British seapower.  Mevers, “Naval Policy of the Continental Congress,” 5.  For a 
discussion of guerre de escadre, using large warships to fight fleet engagements against enemy fleets, see Kenneth 
J. Hagan, This People’s Navy: The Making of American Sea Power (New York: Free Press, 1991), xi.  Hagan 
counters Alfred T. Mahan’s argument that American sea power was built on a strategy of guerre de escadre.  For 
Hagan, American sea power has been predicated upon guerre de course, prosecuted first in the Revolutionary War.  
I agree with Hagan that smaller vessels have played an important, even formative, role in the history of American 
sea power.  We part ways in defining the naval strategy Americans pursued in the Revolution as guerre de course.  
Commerce-raiding was only part of the strategy. 
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unlawful invasions, attacks, and depredations, from cutters and ships of war.”138  This resolution 
paved the way for all future endeavors along these lines.   
 Over the course of July and much of August, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress 
searched for vessels suitable enough to be “fixed, and properly manned” for war.139  John 
Glover, a merchant from Marblehead involved in the fishing industry and the Colonel of the port 
town’s regiment, had been assigned to guard Washington’s headquarters and the Provincial 
Congress at Watertown early in 1775.140  He must have been involved in this search, although no 
official document has survived linking Glover to the assignment.  The Provincial Congress was 
certainly aware of Glover and his position of authority in the foremost commercial fishing port in 
New England, and they had relied on him in the past.141  At some point in August, Glover 
succeeded in assembling five of the six vessels the Provincial Congress had resolved back in 
June to arm.  The vessels were all fishing schooners; they all belonged to fish merchants in 
Marblehead; and they were all converted into warships in Beverly’s harbor.  The schooners were 
the Hannah, Franklin, Hancock, Lee, and Warren.142  Then, around August 24, Glover 
                                                 
138 JCC, Vol. 2, 189. 
139 “Journal of the Provincial Congress of Massachusetts,” Watertown, June 20, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 724.   
140 For more on Glover, see Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners.  Also, see the 
biographical information compiled in Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol. 2, 657.   
141 See, for example, “Minutes of the Massachusetts Committee of Safety,” Cambridge, April 27, 1775, NDAR, 
Vol. 1, 229.  The Committee, which was affiliated with the Provincial Congress, ordered “That Colonel John 
Glover” use his authority in Marblehead “for the prevention of Intelligence” leaking to the British patrol vessels in 
the port’s harbor. 
142 The Hannah is described in subsequent sections.  The Franklin, Hancock, Lee, and Warren were owned by, 
respectively, Archibald Selman, Thomas Grant, Thomas Stevens, and John Twisden, all Marblehead fish merchants.  
The Hancock was described during the Revolution as “Seventy two Tuns; Taken up for the Service of the united 
Colonies of America…worth Three Hundred Thirty one pounds Six Shillings & Eight pence.”  “Appraisal of the 
Speedwell [renamed Hancock],” Beverly, October 10, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 2, 387.  At the same time, the Franklin was 
described as “Sixty Tuns; Taken up for the Service of the united Colonies of America…worth three Hundred pounds 
three Shillings and Eight pence.”  “Appraisal of the Eliza [renamed Franklin],” Beverly, October 10, 1775, in ibid.  
The Lee was described as “Seventy four Tuns; taken up for the Service of the united Colonies of America…worth 
three Hundred and fifteen pounds Eight Shillings.”  “Appraisal of the Two Brothers [renamed Lee],” Beverly, 
October 12, 1775, in ibid., 412.  The Warren was described as “Sixty four Tuns; taken up for the Service of the 
united Colonies in America…worth three Hundred & forty pounds ten Shillings.”  “Appraisal of the Hawk [renamed 
Warren],” Beverly, October 12, 1775, in ibid., 412-413.  According to the later testimony of a Revolutionary War 
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“informed the General [Washington] that there are 5 Vessels at Beverly.”  The Marblehead 
Colonel stated that these vessels “were fitted out for another Purpose,” presumably the resolve of 
the Provincial Congress.  It was Glover’s opinion, however, that they could support Benedict 
Arnold’s planned invasion of Quebec “equally well.”  Arnold required transport ships to carry 
his expeditionary force to the Kennebec River, from which point they would head toward 
Quebec.  “It will be a saving both in Time & Expense to make Use of these,” Glover believed, as 
the vessels in Beverly were already prepared for war.143  Glover probably intended for the armed 
schooners to serve the Massachusetts Provincial Congress by preying upon vessels carrying 
military stores and provisions into Boston for the British military until Washington needed those 
                                                                                                                                                             
pensioner, the Franklin and the Hancock “were Fishing Schooners & had no Bulwarks more than common vessels 
except Nettings with which they were accustomed to put their clothes in in time of Action.”  Cited in Smith and 
Knight, “In Troubled Waters,” 27.  All except the Hannah were re-named, in patriotic fervor, after revolutionary 
leaders.  Washington and his military secretary, Colonel Joseph Reed, mistakenly referred to the Hancock as Lynch 
in late 1775.  For a discussion of these clerical errors, see Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead 
Mariners, 216, footnote #19.  Such errors led later historians to make the same mistake.  See, Howe, Beverly 
Privateers In The American Revolution, 325. 
It is not known precisely when the Franklin, Hancock, Lee, and Warren were armed and officially taken under 
Washington’s command through Glover.  Most scholars assume that the appraisal dates of October 10 and 12 
represent the commission dates.  See, Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners, 78, 82.  
However, Reed’s letter described below in footnote #143 disputes these October dates.  It is probable that the 
October appraisals were ordered after the vessels had already been secured in Beverly’s harbor.  Such was the case 
when the British Navy captured the ship Charming Peggy on July 15, 1775 and sent her into Boston, where the 
“Two Thousand one hundred & seventy three Barrels of Flour” could be confiscated for the Army.  British General 
Thomas Gage then hired four local merchants to appraise the flour on August 19, in order to reimburse the flour’s 
owners.  The four merchants submitted their appraisal two days later, more than a month after the ship’s capture.  
“General Thomas Gage to Four Boston Merchants,” Boston, August 19, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 1180.   
143 “Colonel Joseph Reed to Nathaniel Tracy, Newburyport,” Camp at Cambridge, September 7, 1775, NDAR, 
Vol. 2, 38.  This letter, written by Washington’s military secretary, Reed, is crucial in terms of understanding 
Washington’s role in converting fishing vessels into warships.  Reed would have had access to any written 
communication between Glover and Washington, giving him intimate knowledge of what the Marblehead Colonel 
had observed on a prior occasion.  Unfortunately, Reed did not state precisely when Glover informed Washington of 
the “5 Vessels at Beverly.”  However, this information must have passed prior to Reed’s letter to Tracy on the 7th, 
and most likely occurred around August 24, when the Hannah was leased in Beverly to “the United Colonies of 
America,” or the Continental Congress, which Washington officially represented.  John Glover’s Colony Ledger, 
MDHS, item #729½.  At the very latest, the shift in the purpose of these armed fishing schooners occurred on 
September 2, when Washington issued the sailing orders for the Hannah.  See, “George Washington’s Instructions 
to Captain Nicholson Broughton,” September 2, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 1287.   In his “Instructions to Nathaniel 
Tracy” for gathering transport vessels to support Arnold, Washington referred to the invasion as “a secret 
Expedition.”  Washington to Nathaniel Tracy, Cambridge, September 2, 1775, PGW, Vol. 1, 405. 
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same schooners to support Arnold’s expedition.144  After the expedition, the schooners would 
continue to attack British military supply lines, but they would do so under Washington’s 
command. 
 On August 24, Glover leased his schooner Hannah, named after his wife, of “78 tons” 
burden.145  The schooner was built in 1765.  Glover purchased her in 1769, and, in typical 
fashion, the Hannnah and her crew transported fish and lumber to Barbados in the winter months 
between 1770 and June 1775, probably having worked the offshore banks in the spring, summer, 
and fall.  She returned bearing muscovado sugar and West Indian rum in her hold.146  Glover 
leased the fishing vessel to “the United Colonies of America,” or, in other words, the Continental 
Congress.  The Marblehead fish merchant did not lease the schooner to the Massachusetts 
Provincial Congress, nor did he lease her to Washington.  Such a lease underscores the Hannah’s 
role as the first “American” Naval vessel.  And she was not given away freely.  Glover charged 
the Continental Congress a rate of “one Dollar p[e]r Ton p[e]r Month,” or “6” shillings, which, 
“for two Months & 21 days” amounted to “208 dollars,” or £32.8.0.147   
                                                 
144 Eleven transport vessels freighted Arnold’s expeditionary force from Newburyport to Gardiner, in the 
province of Maine.  The fleet left on September 19, 1775 and had a sailing time of three days.  Abbot and Twohig, 
eds., The Papers of George Washington, 405.  The Hannah prowled the sea in early September, and then, with the 
other schooners in October.   
145 John Glover’s Colony Ledger, MDHS, item #729½.  There has been a disagreement about the schooner’s 
size.  Fowler describes the Hannah as “a typical New England fishing schooner of about seventy tons.”  Fowler, 
Rebels Under Sail, 29.  Hearn, Billias, and Clark follow Glover’s Colony Ledger in listing her at “seventy-eight 
tons.”  Hearn, George Washington’s Schooners, 10; Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners, 
74; and Clark, George Washington’s Navy, 3.  Philip C. F. Smith and Russell W. Knight have questioned the use of 
seventy-eight tons, preferring the much smaller figure of forty-five tons.  Philip C. F. Smith and Russell W. Knight, 
“In Troubled Waters: The Elusive Schooner Hannah,” The American Neptune, Vol. 30, No. 2, (April, 1970), 15, 22, 
Appendix II, 41.  They base their argument for forty-five tons chiefly on the fact that the terms of Glover’s lease add 
up to around £63, rather than his account of £32.8.0.  Here, Glover’s words pertaining to his own vessel in his own 
ledger are taken at face value, and his math skills are discounted. 
146 Smith and Knight, “In Troubled Waters,” Appendix II, 41-43. 
147 John Glover’s Colony Ledger, MDHS, item #729½.  While the amount and the form of payment varied from 
vessel to vessel, and colony to colony, the rate “per ton per month” was standard.  See, for example, “Minutes of the 
Connecticut Council of Safety,” Lebanon, August 3, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 1054; and “Stephen Moylan and Colonel 
John Glover to George Washington,” Salem, October 9, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 2, 368.   
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 Private Joseph Homan, a Marbleheader who described himself in pension records as “a 
boat fisherman,” was one of the maritime laborers responsible for transforming the schooners 
into warships.  Homan testified that in late 1775, “Col. Glover’s Regiment was stationed as 
Marine Corps at the Port of Beverly near Salem for the purpose of manning from time to time 
small vessels of War, fitted out and manned by the American troops, to intercept and capture 
British Ordinance vessels and transports bound to the British Army in Boston.”148  Ashley 
Bowen, a maritime denizen of Marblehead and close observer of town events and town 
members, recorded in his day book on August 24, 1775, that “a company of volunteers from the 
Camps at Cambridge” marched through town on their way to Beverly “in order for a cruise in 
Glover’s schooner.”149  Chester G. Hearn has detailed the work done on the Hannah at Beverly: 
After tying her up at Glover’s Wharf, they cut gunports, two to a side, in her 
bulwarks and strengthened her planking.  For speed, sailmakers increased her 
usual main, fore, and jib sails by adding topsails and a flying jib.  Workmen set a 
whaleboat amidships and expanded the large cookstove below to serve a larger 
crew.  Glover owned his own cache of arms and provided fours [i.e. four 
pounders] with carriages, a dozen swivels, and an assortment of gunnery stores.150 
Glover scrupulously documented the costs he incurred in this conversion process in his ledger-
book.  On the same day in August that volunteers arrived in Beverly, he charged £151.4.0 to “the 
United Colonies of America” for provisioning and manning the Hannah.151  Four days later, 
Glover further billed the Continental Congress £11.9.1 for Ebenezer Foster’s blacksmith work on 
the schooner.152  Foster mounted swivel guns and did other sundry work on the vessel.  In short, 
                                                 
148 Pension Records of the American Revolution, “1818 Pensions,” #1867, the David Library of the American 
Revolution, Washington Crossing, Pennsylvania. 
149 Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol. 2, 453. 
150 Hearn, George Washington’s Schooners, 10.  Also, see Clark, George Washington’s Navy, 5. 
151 John Glover’s Colony Ledger, MDHS, item #729½.   
152 Ebenezer Foster’s blacksmith bill, MDHS, item #5786.  According to revolutionary leaders in Connecticut, 
the materials used to convert a trade ship to a warship in 1775 included “sails, rigging, and furniture, and also all 
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Glover did not take a financial loss in converting his fishing vessel into a warship.  Washington 
reminded Nicholson Broughton, the Hannah’s captain, that it was Congress that had paid his 
salary, not Glover, in his official sailing orders.153  Because of his lease, Glover stood to gain 
from transforming his peacetime property into a military machine.154  Once she had been armed 
and manned, the Hannah set sail for fame and fortune on September 5.155   
 It might be argued that such former fishing vessels were now privateers.  William 
Falconer, the author of a maritime dictionary in 1769, defined a privateer as a private vessel, 
fitted out and armed in wartime, “to cruise against and among the enemy, taking, sinking or 
burning their shipping” in exchange for shares of any captured prizes.156  During the Revolution, 
                                                                                                                                                             
proper and necessary ship-stores and provisions, and…the necessary cannon, swivels, small arms, pistols, shot, 
powder, &c.”  “Minutes of the Connecticut Council of Safety,” Lebanon, August 3, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 1053.   
153 Washington took the occasion to remind Captain Nicholson Broughton that, as “a Captain in the Army of the 
United Colonies of North America,” Broughton personally fell under the commander-in-chief’s authority.  
Moreover, as “the schooner Hannah” had been “fitted out & equipped with Arms, Ammunition and Provisions at 
the Continental Expense,” Broughton was doubly beholden to Washington.  See “George Washington’s Instructions 
to Captain Nicholson Broughton,” September 2, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 1287, emphasis my own.  Broughton had been 
commissioned a captain in Colonel John Glover’s regiment on May 19, 1775.  Ibid., 1289n. 
On October 4, 1775, Washington assigned Stephen Moylan, the Muster Master General, to assist Glover in 
arming vessels for war.  Both men were to report either to Colonel Joseph Reed, Washington’s military secretary, or 
to the commander-in-chief directly.  “Colonel Joseph Reed to Colonel John Glover,” Head Quarters, Cambridge, 
October 4, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 2, 289-290; and “Colonel Joseph Reed to Colonel John Glover and Stephen Moylan,” 
Camp at Cambridge, October 4, 1775, in ibid., 290.  The two men reported to Washington on October 9, 1775 that 
the terms of the contracts they had negotiated with vessel-owning merchants included the contentious fact that 
merchants were required “they shall put their vessels in the same good order & Condition which they would be 
obliged to do, were they hired to take in a Cargo for the West Indies or elsewhere.”  For their part, Glover and 
Moylan agreed “that what extra expense may accrue from the nature of their present employment must be a public 
Charge.”  The vessel owners wanted any extra sails, over and above “three sails, Mainsail, foresail, & jib…sufficient 
for the Voyages they usually Make,” to be “a public Charge.”  “Stephen Moylan and Colonel John Glover to George 
Washington,” Salem, October 9, 1775, in ibid., 368. 
154 The owners of Washington’s schooners do not seem to have received prize shares.  One-third of the value of 
the captured vessel and its cargo, whether it was a commercial or a military prize, went to the crew, while two-thirds 
went to the Continental Congress in order to repay the cost of outfitting and manning the schooners.  Washington 
did not make the distinction between commercial and military prizes that the Continental Congress later did.  
“George Washington’s Instructions to Captain Nicholson Broughton,” September 2, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 1288.     
155 The Hannah is widely touted as the first armed vessel fitted out in the service of the United States.  See, 
Hearn, George Washington’s Schooners, 10; Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners, 73; Clark, 
George Washington’s Navy, 3; The American Navies of the Revolutionary War, 22; Smith and Knight, “In Troubled 
Waters,” 29-30; and Knox, The Naval Genius of George Washington, 8.  Fowler points to earlier “naval actions” off 
Cape Cod in Buzzards Bay as the genesis of America’s naval history.  Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 26.   
156 William Falconer, A New Universal Dictionary of the Marine (London, 1769), 353.  Gardiner defines 
privateers as “free-enterprise warships, armed, crewed and paid for by merchants who gambled on the dividend of a 
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privateers were distinguished from pirates by the fact that the former carried government 
sanctioned commissions, or letters of marque.157  And there is evidence that contemporaries 
regarded the fleet of armed schooners fitted out at Beverly as a collection of privateers.  For 
example, “Manly, A Favorite New Song in the American Fleet,” composed in Salem, 
Massachusetts in March 1776, referred to the armed schooner Lee, John Manley, Captain, as a 
“Privateer.”158  Out of exasperation, Washington even went so far as to refer to the men on the 
schooners as “our rascally privateersmen” in a letter to his secretary Colonel Joseph Reed.159  
Such evidence, combined with the facts that the fishing schooners remained privately owned and 
the crews (at least) earned prize shares, has led some naval historians to consider the vessels 
armed at Beverly to be mere privateers.160  Following this line of reasoning, the refitted ships 
were profit-driven business ventures. 
                                                                                                                                                             
valuable capture.”  Gardiner, ed., Navies and the American Revolution, 1775-1783, 66.  According to Albion and 
Pope: “profits were the raison d’être of privateers.”  Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes In Wartime, 23-24.  Beverly 
merchants printed and made public the following handbill on September 7, 1776: “Now fitting for a Privateer, In the 
harbor of Beverly, the Brigantine Washington….Any Seaman or Landsman that has an inclination to make their 
Fortunes in a few months may have an opportunity by applying to John Dyson.”  Cited in Howe, Beverly Privateers 
in the American Revolution, 338, footnote #2.  Boston merchants printed a similar advertisement in the local 
newspaper on November 13, 1780.  “An Invitation to all brave Seamen and Marines, who have an inclination to 
serve their country and make their Fortunes” was the title of the ad.  The Boston merchans shrewdly added that 
those who signed on for a cruise with the privateer would receive “that excellent Liquor called Grog, which is 
allowed by all true seamen to be the Liquor of Life.”  Boston Gazette, November 13, 1780. 
157 Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes In Wartime, 23.  British Naval officers and royal governors did not recognize 
the authority of colony/state governments or the Continental Congress.  Thus, they considered most American 
warships to be “pirates.”  See, NDAR, Vol. 1, 607-609, 720-721, 961-962, 970, 1157.  
158 Manly.  A favorite new song, in the American fleet.  Most humbly addressed to all the jolly tars who are 
fighting for the rights and liberties of America.  By a sailor. (Salem, MA: Printed and sold by E. Russell, upper end 
of Main-Street, 1776), Early American Imprints, 1st Series, Evans #43057.  Captain Manley’s surname may have 
been deliberately misspelled in the song-title in order to rally men for war. 
159 “George Washington to Colonel Joseph Reed,” Camp at Cambridge, November 20, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 2, 
1082.   
160 Gardiner references the “handful of Marblehead fishing schooners, armed with four or six tine 4pdrs and 2 
pdrs,” in his discussion of “the privateering war,” or guerre de course.  He argues that these schooners do not 
represent “the beginnings of a national navy,” as “it was conceived with a specific raiding purpose in mind.”  
Gardiner, ed., Navies and the American Revolution, 1775-1783, 66-67.  Thus, the schooners were nothing more than 
commerce raiders.  Syrett similarly refers to Washington’s schooner fleet as “the American cruiser offensive.”  
Syrett, “Defeat at Sea,” 16.  Also, see Howe, Beverly Privateers In The American Revolution. 
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 Yet the fishing schooners that were armed for war in late 1775 were not mere privateers, 
for they were leased to the Continental Congress.  Indeed, on November 25, three days before 
the Naval Regulations were formally approved, Congress specifically referred in their debates 
over the Regulations to “the Captures heretofore made by Vessels fitted out at the Continental 
Charge,” which at this time only pertained to the Beverly fleet.  The American political leaders 
maintained that these captures were “justifiable.”161  The prize money these schooners took went 
not to private investors, as it would have done with privateers, but rather to the government to 
recoup outfitting costs.  Moreover, Washington, whether he developed the idea of arming the 
vessels or not, played a national role in the process as commander-in-chief of the United 
Colonies by giving out commissions and issuing sailing orders for the schooners.  Additionally, 
the crews on the armed schooners were also given wages in addition to prize shares.  The 
standard practice for privateers in the late eighteenth century, by contrast, involved giving crews 
food but not wages.162  Thus, there is strong evidence to support the claim that the collection of 
fishing vessels at Beverly represents the first American Navy.   
 This is not to say that fishing vessels were only used for what might be considered more 
dignified, official naval warfare, although the lines were very blurred during the war.  Schooners 
were widely used as privateers.  On November 1, 1775, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress 
passed an “Act Authorizing Privateers and Creating Courts of Admiralty.”  The Privateering Act 
empowered the Provincial Congress “to Commission, with Letters of Marque and reprisal, any 
person or persons, within this Colony, who shall at his or their own Expense fix out & equip for 
the defense of America any Vessel.”  The Act established a protocol for applying for and 
receiving letters of marque.  This included paying the Provincial Congress’s Treasurer a bond of 
                                                 
161 JCC, Vol. 3, 376; NDAR, Vol. 2, 1133; and Butterfield, ed., The Adams Papers, Vol. III, 349.   
162 Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes In Wartime, 23.   
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£5,000.  The Act also established laws governing the behavior for privateers.  It set up Admiralty 
courts to adjudicate the legal seizure of prizes at sea, and the Act codified procedures for selling 
prize ships and their cargo.163  Such a system made it possible for fish merchants to apply for 
letters of marque, convert their fishing schooners, and earn prize money.164  In contrast to the 
Navy armed at Beverly, which had to give two thirds of all prize money to the state, privateers’ 
owners and crew were allowed to keep 100% of their prizes.165  The owners of privateers also 
did not give their crews wages.  Such owners were, however, responsible for paying the bond in 
addition to all of the costs associated with arming and maintaining their vessels. 
 The merchants’ petitions to the Massachusetts Provincial Congress for letters of marque 
make it possible to discern which fishing vessels were transformed into privateers during the 
Revolution.  Fish merchants in Marblehead, Massachusetts, for example, constantly petitioned 
the Congress throughout the war for these commissions.166  In all, the Congress granted nineteen 
letters of marque to Marblehead merchants.  The largest number of these commissions by far was 
                                                 
163 “Massachusetts Act Authorizing Privateers and Creating Courts of Admiralty,” November 1, 1775, NDAR, 
Vol. 2, 834-839.  Sidney G. Morse has examined the privateer bonds that were filed during the Revolution, and he 
contends that most bonds were paid not to individual states, but to the Continental Congress.  Thus, “Revolutionary 
privateering” in general, “like the Revolutionary military and regular naval organization, was meant to be a 
‘Continental’ – that is, a national – enterprise.”  Sidney G. Morse, “State or Continental Privateers?” The American 
Historical Review, Vol. 52, No. 1 (October, 1946), 72. 
164 Albion and Pope define “letters of marque” as “armed merchantmen, licensed by the government to pick up 
prizes only as by-products of normal trading voyages.”  They also refer to letters of marque as the official 
documents licensing these armed merchantmen to take prizes.  Albion and Pope, Sea Lanes In Wartime, 24-25.  The 
Provincial Congress seems to have broadly interpreted this second definition of letters of marque to mean licenses 
for armed commercial vessels to take prizes at any time at sea. 
165 On November 25, 1775, the Continental Congress established formal rules regarding prize shares for 
privateers, colony/state naval vessels, and Continental Naval vessels.  The owners of privateers were to get all of the 
prize money associated with their captures, military or commercial.  The colony/state was to get two-thirds of the 
prize money, and the crew the remainder, for their vessels.  This same distribution applied to Continental Naval 
vessels, with the Continental Congress getting two-thirds of the prize shares.  If, on the other hand, “the Capture be a 
Vessel of War,” then in the case of the colony/state or the Congress, the captors received one-half of the prizes.  
NDAR, Vol. 2, 1133.   
166 See, for example, a petition dated Boston, Nov. 28, 1777, signed by Samuel Trevett of Marblehead, asking 
that Captain John Conaway be commissioned as commander of the privateer schooner Terrible.  MSSRW, Vol. 3, 
898; and a petition dated Boston, March 29th, 1782, signed by Benjamin Stacey Glover of Marblehead, asking that 
Benjamin Ashton be commissioned as commander of the privateer schooner Montgomery.  MSSRW, Vol. 1, 317. 
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given to commanders of converted fishing schooners.  Fourteen of the nineteen commissions, or 
74%, were granted for these vessels between 1776 and 1782.167  Thirteen schooners belonging to 
the nearby fishing port of Beverly, Massachusetts were similarly converted into privateers over 
the course of the war.168   
 A fishing schooner was also used in the first coast guard unit established in 
Massachusetts in 1775.  By August 23, 1775, the people of Machias, in what is today Maine but 
was then part of Massachusetts’ eastern district, had “the armed Schooner Diligent,” and “the 
Sloop Machias Liberty…fixed for the Purpose of guarding the Sea-Coast.”  The Provincial 
Congress put Jeremiah O’Brian in charge of the coast guard vessels, and allocated “the Sum of 
One Hundred and sixty Pounds, Lawful Money of this Colony, for supplying the Men with 
Provisions and Ammunition.”  The Provincial Congress also “delivered to the said O’Brian, out 
of the Colony Store, one Hundred Cannon Balls, of three Pounds Weight each, and two Hundred 
Swivel Balls; for all which, and the Captures he shall make, he is to account with this Court.”169   
 The same schooner Diligent was then used in Massachusetts’s own navy.  Unlike the 
schooners fitted out in Beverly that took orders from Washington and were leased to the 
Continental Congress, and unlike the privateers armed at private expense, the colony/state naval 
vessels were converted into warships at the colony/state government’s expense.  The Diligent 
remained the public property of the Provincial Congress, and the warship’s crew then took their 
                                                 
167 Four letters of marque were given to commanders of brigantines, and one vessel was not identified.  For the 
nineteen petitions, see MSSRW, Vol. 1, 317; Vol. 2, 448; Vol. 3, 898, 906; Vol. 4, 679, 680, 858; Vol. 5, 277; Vol. 6, 
817; Vol. 8, 876; Vol. 9, 588, 624; Vol. 11, 309; Vol. 12, 18, 807; Vol. 13, 982; Vol. 14, 984; and Vol. 16, 109. 
168 This figure was gleaned from the list Howe compiled in Beverly Privateers in the Revolution, 405-420. 
169 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part I, 96; and NDAR, Vol. 1, 1160-61, 1195.  O’Brian made a name for himself as a daring 
sea captain earlier in May, 1775, when he led the force that repelled a British attempt to secure firewood and lumber 
in Machias.  The engagement took place on land and sea, and resulted in the capture of the H.M.S. Margaretta, 
which has been called “the first vessel of the Royal Navy to surrender to an American force.”  Fowler, Rebels Under 
Sail, 28.  Both Fowler and Miller strongly imply that the two Machias vessels and O’Brian were precursors to the 
U.S. Navy.  Fowler, Rebels Under Sail, 26-28; and Miller, Sea of Glory, 29-35.  However, in 1775 these vessels 
were explicitly armed and manned for the purposes of guarding the coast around Machias. 
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orders and their pay from this government.  Because Washington had appropriated the Beverly 
schooners, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress formed a special committee on December 29, 
1775, “to consider and report” on the possibility of arming additional warships at the Congress’s 
expense.170  The “Committee for Fitting Out Massachusetts Armed Vessels” reported their 
findings on January 11, 1776, and the following day the Provincial Congress debated and 
resolved “that two Ships be built,” one of “Thirty-Six Guns” and the other “to carry Thirty-two 
Guns.”171  However, the Provincial Congress then “re-considered” these resolves on January 29, 
and at that point “no Establishment has been made for Cruisers.”172  On February 6, the 
Provincial Congress expanded their naval building program and resolved “That there be built at 
the Public Expense of this Colony for the Defense of American Liberty, Ten Sloops of War, of 
One Hundred and Ten Tons, or Fifteen Tons each, suitable to carry from Fourteen to Sixteen 
Carriage Guns, Six and Four Pounders.”  Another special committee was formed at this point, 
“to provide Materials and employ proper Persons to build said Vessels as soon as may be, for the 
Purpose abovesaid, and that the Sum of Ten thousand Pounds be delivered to the said 
Committee, to enable them to proceed in building, rigging, and finishing said Vessels as soon as 
possible.”173  As the fleet expanded, the members of the Provincial Congress decided to use 
vessels they had previously assigned to guard the coast around Machias as a stop-gap measure.  
On February 7, 1776, the Provincial Congress resolved that “the Sloop Machias-Liberty, and 
                                                 
170 “Journal of the Massachusetts Council,” December 29, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 3, 291.  The editor, William Bell 
Clark, considered this date “the beginning of the Massachusetts Navy.”  Ibid., footnote #2.  However, no vessels 
went to sea at this point.  Nor were officers commissioned, nor had pay rates been assigned. 
171 “Report of the Committee for Fitting Out Massachusetts Armed Vessels,” January 11, 1776, NDAR, Vol. 3, 
734. 
172 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part II, 219; and NDAR, Vol. 3, 1028-1029. 
173 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part II, 253-254.  This fleet was cut to five sloops on February 16, 1776.  See, NDAR, Vol. 
3, 1315-1316.  It was found to be more cost effective to provide leases to vessel owners rather than to build new 
vessels. 
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Schooner Diligent, now lying at Newbury-Port,” be manned with fifty men each.174  These 
vessels had been moved from Machias to Newburyport; given new officers and crews; and their 
mission was formally changed from coast guard duty to colony/state naval service.  Another 
special committee was then established to recommend officers for these vessels.175  The vessel 
owners received the same leases as the owners of Washington’s schooners, with prize shares 
going to the crew and the Provincial Congress.176  This was the beginning of a fleet of vessels 
that sailed under the Provincial Congress’ control.177 
 Revolutionary leaders effectively used the profit motive to get merchants to invest their 
capital in the war.  From September 1775 to October 1777, the Hannah and seven other 
schooners like her captured 55 vessels, including eighteen brigs, thirteen ships, fourteen sloops, 
and ten schooners amounting to over 6,500 tons of shipping capacity.  Thus, the British loss 
amounted to thirty-eight vessels.  Eleven captures were judged illegal, as they were found to 
belong to merchants who were not supplying British forces, and four more were recaptures.  The 
prizes varied in size from a fifteen-ton fishing schooner carrying pilots who were helping the 
British Navy navigate coastal waters, to the 400-ton merchant ship Concord carrying dry goods 
                                                 
174 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part II, 256; and NDAR, Vol. 3, 1156.  The idea to use these two vessels in the 
Massachusetts Navy until the other warships could be built may have come from Jeremiah O’Brian in Machias.  
See, “Petition of Jeremiah O’Brian to the Massachusetts General Court,” February 2, 1776, NDAR, Vol. 3, 1095.  
Indeed, O’Brian was ordered to assist the Newburyport Committee of Safety in manning the two vessels.  NDAR, 
Vol. 3, 1156; and Vol. 4, 63-64.   
175 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part II, 256-257; and NDAR, Vol. 3, 1157.  The officers were to “be Commissionated by, 
and follow such Directions as they shall receive from Time to Time from the Council of this Colony.” 
176 With regard to their navy, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress did not get around to officially confirming 
the Continental Congress’s late 1775 legislation until February 7, 1776.  JHRM, Vol. 51, Part II, 256-257.   
177 In 1776, there were three vessels being built in Massachusetts: the brigs Rising Empire and Massachusetts, 
and the sloop Tyrannicide.  NDAR, Vol. 4, 259n, 668, 1405; Vol. 5, 1209.  Two pre-existing vessels, Washington 
and Yankee Hero, were also taken into the Provincial Congress’s service at this time.  NDAR, Vol. 4, 19, 417.  
“Green & White” uniforms were established for the colony/state navy on April 29, and “the [ship’s] Colors be a 
White Flag with a Green pine Tree, and an inscription ‘appeal to Heaven.’”  Ibid., 1303. 
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and coal to the British forces at Boston.178  One of the legal prizes, the brigantine Nancy, 
contained a cargo valued at “Fifteen Thousand Pounds Sterling,” including: 
“1 Large brass 15 Inch Mortar already fixed for service;” “a Number” of smaller 
brass mortars; “a number” of “Brass Cannon from 24 lb down to 4 lb, with 
carriages &c all ready;” “a number” of iron cannon of equal size and readiness; 
“2500 Stand of Arms, Bayonets, & Pouch’s complete &c.;” “30 Tun of [one] 
ounce [musket] Balls;” “10 Tun of swan shot” for the muskets; “A Great number 
of carke’s already fixed for use to fire the town;” “Large & small Shot without 
number;” “A great number of Hogsheads, filled with cartridges in flannel for the 
cannon mortars, instead of paper;” and “A great number of Hogsheads of 
cartridges in paper for the small Arms, with everything of this kind we could have 
wished for.”179   
                                                 
178 See, “Prizes Captured by Washington’s Schooners,” Hearn, George Washington’s Schooners, Appendix, 
241; and Clark, George Washington’s Navy, 222-224, and Appendix B, “Prizes Taken by Vessels of Washington’s 
Navy,” 229-236.  The colonists were also very successful at using whaling boats in coastal raids throughout the 
siege of Boston.  On July 24, 1775, Vice Admiral Samuel Graves wrote to the head of the British Admiralty Board: 
“The Rebels have collected near three hundred Whale Boats in the different Creeks around this Harbor [Boston], 
and begin to make little Expeditions to the Islands.  A few days ago one hundred and five Boats, full of men, landed 
on Long Island and carried off all the [live]Stock….From their Lightness and drawing little Water, they [the whale 
boats] can not only out row our Boats, but by getting into Shoal Water, and in Calms, they must constantly escape.”  
He then observed that “the Design of the Rebels in bringing so great a number of Whale boats here, Robbing the 
Islands and burning the Houses and Hay thereon” included distressing “the Garrison [at Boston] by depriving them 
of fresh Meat, Vegetables, Milk, Fruit and many other Advantages.”  According to Graves, the large frigates in his 
squadron were at risk of being boarded and captured by these many whaleboats during the night, as manpower was 
short.  “Vice Admiral Samuel Graves to Philip Stevens, Preston, Boston, July 24, 1775,” NDAR, Vol. 1, 961-962.  
At this early date, it is most likely these whaleboats to which Thomas Jefferson referred when he optimistically 
wrote to a friend: “The New Englanders are fitting out light vessels of war, by which it is hoped we shall not only 
clear the seas and bays here of everything below the size of a ship of war, but that they will visit the coasts of 
Europe and distress the British trade in every part of the world.  The adventurous genius and intrepidity of those 
people is amazing.”  “Thomas Jefferson to Francis Eppes,” Philadelphia, July 4, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 815.  More 
work needs to be done on the whaling industry’s conversion during the Revolutionary War.  Syrett has 
provocatively referred to “the whaleboat” as “one of the most effective of American weapons systems.”  Syrett, 
“Defeat at Sea,” 14. 
179 “Edward Green to Joshua Green,” Cambridge, December 3, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 2, 1247.  Brigadier General 
John Thomas was so excited at this prize, that he wrote his wife about it on December 1, 1775: “I have to Inform 
you of one Thing that is agreeable, viz. one Captain Manly of a Privateer out of Marblehead has brought in to Cape 
Anne a Fine Large Ship from England Laden with warlike Stores of all Kind Except Powder; a very valuable Prize 
Indeed; the Particulars I Can’t Enumerate.  I saw the Invoice which Contains Two Sheets of Paper; this you may 
Depend that I write nothing of News but what [you] may Rely on for Truth.”  “Brigadier General John Thomas to 
His Wife,” Roxbury, December 1, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 2, 1219. 
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These military stores were meant to supply the British forces at Boston.  The armed schooners 
also stopped provisions from reaching the British military in Boston.180  The timing of these 
captures was important.  Twenty-three of the thirty-eight legal prizes were taken in 1775, at the 
start of the war.  These captured vessels contained military stores, clothing, and provisions worth 
£31,000, which contributed significantly to the colonist’s ability to wage war.181   
The Massachusetts Provincial Congress also hired fishing vessels for use on special 
missions.  Such was the case with Salem fish merchant Richard Derby, Jr.’s schooner Quero 
(most likely named for the Quero Bank of the northeast coast of Nova Scotia).  Between April 
and July, 1775, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress hired Derby’s schooner to take 
“Depositions relative to [the] Battle of Lexington” to Parliament in London.182  Similarly, in 
July, the Provincial Congress approved Salem fish merchant George Dodge’s petition “to export 
80 Hogsheads of Old Jamaica Cod-Fish from Salem to the West Indies.”  In return for granting 
this permission, the Massachusetts political leadership demanded Dodge “order the Master of 
said Vessel to undertake the Conveyance of a Letter or any other Service that this House may 
think fit to appoint him to.”183  The Salem merchant captain was thus allowed to set sail for 
profits in return for carrying the Provincial Congress’ correspondence. 
The British Navy also converted fishing schooners into armed warships during the 
Revolution.  For example, on January 8, 1775, Vice Admiral Graves ordered the purchase of the 
schooner Diana “of 120 tons, about eight Months old, so exceedingly well built that she is 
allowed to be the best Vessel of the Kind that has been yet in the King’s Service; her first cost is 
                                                 
180 “George Washington to John Hancock,” Cambridge, November 30, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 2, 1199.  Also, see 
“Prizes Taken by Vessels of Washington’s Navy,” Clark, George Washington’s Navy, Appendix B, 229-236.   
181 Clark, George Washington’s Navy, 222. 
182 “Sch[ooner] Quero.  Express to England – to Forestall Gen. Gage’s Dispatch about the Lexington Fight – 
(Successful),” NDAR, Vol. 1, 967-968. 
183 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part I, 15. 
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£750 Sterling.”  “I have thought it best for his Majesty’s Service that she should be an 
established armed Schooner,” he informed the Secretary of the Admiralty Board, therefore “I 
have directed the necessary alterations to be made in her Hull, and for her to be fitted in all 
respects like other Vessels of her Class; She will have the St. Lawrence’s Guns.”  He then 
appointed one of his family members, Lieutenant Thomas Graves, to command the new 
warship.184  By October, 1775, five of the thirty-five British warships patrolling the coastline of 
North America were schooners, most of which had probably been fishing vessels in a former 
life.185  In these ways, schooners contributed much to the initial war effort. 
5.5 FROM FISHERMEN TO FIGHTING MEN 
Unemployed commercial fishermen became fighting men during the Revolutionary War.  The 
time they spent at sea on fishing fares and trade voyages gave them practical sailing experience 
and knowledge of winds and tides, all of which made them better equipped than more land-based 
workers for maritime military service in privateers and naval vessels.  Disaffected and put out of 
work by the Fisheries Bill, and motivated by a mixture of revenge, the promise of a decent wage, 
and certain financial bonuses, fishermen flooded the decks of fighting vessels in order to strike a 
blow at the British Empire.  Their familiarity with coastlines, harbors and approaches also made 
fishermen ideal laborers for building seacoast defenses and serving in coast guard units.  
Fishermen even fought on land during the war.  In short, these maritime laborers participated in a 
variety of military activities during the Revolution. 
                                                 
184 “Vice Admiral Samuel Graves to Philip Stevens,” Preston, Boston, January 8, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 59-60. 
185 NA CO 5/122/35. 
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Just as the use of commercial fishing vessels for military purposes was an Atlantic 
tradition not an American invention, so too was the fishing industry seen around the Atlantic as a 
training school, or “nursery,” for fighting men.  The enormously successful early modern Dutch 
maritime complex had been established, according to early seventeenth century English 
observers, on the foundation of its commercial fishing industry.186  “The way to win” economic 
preeminence and protect it on the European stage was to follow the Dutch model and first 
develop a large fishing fleet.  It was believed that such a commercial armada would provide 
vessels that could be used in fishing, trading, and warring, along with the manpower and 
expertise necessary for these activities.  The French were able to emulate the Dutch model 
through their domination of the commercial fisheries around Newfoundland.  “The whole 
increase of the naval greatness of France had its foundation from this trade [i.e. commercial 
fishing],” an English observer wrote in 1745.  He continued: “The French by this trade had so far 
increased their riches and naval power at that time [i.e. the seventeenth century], as to make all 
Europe stand in fear of them.”187  England had waged war against the Dutch, built up its fishing 
industry and navy, waged war against the French, and slowly engrossed the fisheries at 
Newfoundland.  By the mid-eighteenth century, the author of The British Merchant could 
proclaim: “The history both of France and England will show you that it is since their procuring 
leave to fish at Newfoundland that they have grown so formidable at sea; that their navy royal 
                                                 
186 See, William Petyt, Britannia Languens (London: 1680); William de Britaine, The Dutch Usurpation 
(London: 1672); Gerard Malynes, Lex Mercatoria (London, 1622); and Tobias Gentleman, England’s way to win 
wealth, and to employ ships and mariners: or, A plain description of what great profit, it will bring into the 
common-wealth of England, by the erecting, building, and adventuring of [Dutch herring] busses, to sea, a-
fishing… (London: 1614).  For more on the economic success the Dutch experienced, see Jan De Vries and Ad Van 
Der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 
187 Anonymous, Considerations on the Trade to Newfoundland (London, 1745).  A contemporary writer 
referred to the French as “our most prejudicial rivals in the fishery of those parts [i.e. Newfoundland].”  
Anonymous, A Short Answer to an Elaborate Pamphlet (London: 1731). 
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has augmented in proportion to the numbers of ships employed in that fishery.”188  In the late 
seventeenth century, Sir Roger L’Estrange observed  “The only (and the Common) Nursery of 
Seamen is the Fishery….And it is well enough observed, that all Princes and States, are stronger 
or Weaker, at Sea, according to the Measures of their Fishery.”189  And in 1722, William Wood 
similarly stated: “It is a certain maxim that all states are powerful at sea as they flourish in the 
fishing trade.”190  Such European precedents firmly linked manpower in the fisheries to naval 
supremacy.  And, as the English explorer and promoter of New World plantation, Sir Walter 
Raleigh (1554-1618), put it, “he who rules the sea, rules the commerce of the world, and to him 
that rules the commerce of the world belongs the world itself.”191 
 The correlation between the size of the commercial fishing industry and naval power was 
also made in the mid-to-late eighteenth-century North American colonies.  The number of men 
and vessels involved in the New England cod fishing industry declined between 1743 and 1763 
as a direct result of the use of these resources in the British Navy.192  This declension led 
“Montesquieu” to query in a Boston newspaper in 1763: “What is become of this nursery of 
sailors, by which [Great Britain] have been of late aggrandized, and rendered the arbitress of the 
world?”193  In order to convince Parliamentarians not to pass legislation in 1764 and 1767 that 
they felt would discourage the fishing industry, members of the Boston-based Society for the 
                                                 
188 The British Merchant, 2nd ed., (London, 1743), II, 257.  Cited in Innis, The Codfisheries, 174, footnote #90. 
189 Sir Roger L’Estrange, A discourse of the fishery briefly laying open, not only the advantages, and facility of 
the undertaking, but likewise the absolute necessity of it, in order to the well-being, both of king, and people… 
(London: 1674).   
190 William Wood, A Survey of Trade (London: 1722). 
191 Quote taken from O’Connor, Origins of the American Navy, 2.  In the late-nineteenth century, the U.S. Naval 
officer and historian, Alfred Thayer Mahan, echoed Raleigh’s sentiments: “The due use and control of the sea is but 
one link in the chain of exchange by which wealth accumulates; but it is the central link, which lays under 
contribution other nations for the benefit of the one holding it, and which, history seems to assert, most surely of all 
gathers itself riches.”  Alfred Thayer Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History, 1660-1783 (New York: 
Dover Publications, Inc., 1987; originally published by Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, in 1890), 225-226. 
192 Innis, The Codfisheries, 161. 
193 Boston Evening Post, November 21, 1763. 
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Encouragement of Trade and Commerce reminded members of Parliament on both occasions 
that “This Valuable Branch of our Trade,” our “Fishery,” represented a “Nursery for Seamen.”194  
The Society argued that “the North American Cod & Whale Fishery is a capital Article not only 
with respect to this Province, as it is their largest Fund for Remittances to Great Britain in 
payment for British Manufactures, but it’s National Importance is conspicuous, not only as by 
means of it Great Britain is furnished with those Remittances, but also by its employing annually 
so great a number of vessels it constitutes a respectable Nursery of Seamen for the Navy, a 
principal Bulwark of the British Nation.”195  Then, on December 11, 1781, Boston merchants 
lobbied Massachusetts’ General Court to compel the state’s representative in the Continental 
Congress to guarantee American fishing rights in the North Atlantic in the peace treaty then 
being written.  They couched their demand in the following language: 
For though the inhabitants of the other States are not so immediately affected by 
the Loss of the Fishery, yet we conceive it not less important to the whole 
Confederacy, than to us, in its political consequences.  Their future rank among 
the Nations of the Earth will depend on their Naval Strength; and if they mean to 
be a commercial people, it behooves them to be able at all times to protect their 
commerce.  The means by which they can procure that protection and naval 
strength, is to give encouragement to that kind of trade among themselves, which 
will best serve as a nursery for seamen.  The importance of the Fishery in this 
                                                 
194 “In the Preamble to a late Act of Parliament,” 1764; and “State of the Trade & Observations on the Late 
Revenue Acts,” 1767, Ezekiel Price Papers, 1754-1785, MHS.  The Society sent the following words to Jasper 
Mauduit, Massachusetts’ colonial agent in London in 1763: “Let it be further Considered that if the Fishery here and 
at Newfoundland should fail, Great Britain will be deprived of a nursery for Seamen, and in a few years will want 
hands to Navigate her fleets.  At the same time the French will have a fine opportunity to Increase their Fishery, to 
promote the growth of their Colonies, and put their Navy upon a respectable Footing.”  Letter from Thomas Cushing 
to Jasper Mauduit, dated Boston, October 28, 1763, August to December 1763 file, Jasper Mauduit Papers, 1760-
1767, MHS. 
195 Petition from the Society to Parliament, sent through Dennis DeBerdt, colonial agent, dated 1767, Ezekiel 
Price Papers, 1754-1785, MHS.  The link between the fishing industry and “national” defense was recognized earlier 
in 1746, by William Bollan, Massachusetts’ colonial agent in London, who wrote: “It need not be here observed 
how much this Trade of the Fishery has been the Object of the Attention of the Nation on all Occasions….We look 
upon it as the chief Nursery for Seamen; and are so much interested in the other Benefits of it, that we annually send 
one or more of His Majesty’s Ships of War, to protect our Subjects, and their Vessels, during the fishing Season.”  
William Bollan, The importance and advantage of Cape Breton: truly stated and impartially considered (London: 
Originally printed for J. and P. Knapton, 1746; New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1966), 90.   
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view is obvious from the valuable acquisitions made in the beginning of the war 
by our privateers, seven-eights of which were manned from this source.196   
On both sides of the Atlantic, then, throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
fishermen were viewed as potential and actual fighting men.   
The mobilization of these maritime workers for war during the American Revolution 
should come as no surprise.  As we saw in the first chapter, Joshua Burnham and the schooner 
Polly went to work for the Continental Navy shortly after the Declaration of Independence had 
been signed.  Four men joined Burnham on December 7, 1776, in agreeing to “ship ourselves” 
and “Follow all the regulations of the American Congress & be under such regulations as is 
Customary for Seamen & Mariners.”197  In all, four of the five men – Joshua and Samuel 
Burnham, Isaac Law, and Daniel Andrews – had been active commercial fishermen in Ipswich 
prior to the war.198  Andrews was born in Ipswich on November 17, 1754, the son of John, Jr., 
and Mary.199  Just before he turned twenty, Andrews worked on the summer and fall fares on 
board the Polly in 1774 on the Grand Bank off Newfoundland.  He caught 1,384 cod in the 
summer and 901 in the fall.  Then, on December 15, 1774, Andrews signed ship’s articles along 
with four other men to sail on the Polly on a trade voyage to Virginia in order to exchange fish, 
West Indian sugar products, and salt for beans and wheat.  There were three witnesses to “each 
Man’s Signing,” and Andrews earned £1.6.8 per month as a “seaman.”  In 1776, by contrast, he 
                                                 
196 Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union… (Williamsburg, VA: J. Dixon & W. Hunter, 1778), Early 
American Imprints, Series I: Evans #16105. 
197 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, JDPL. 
198 For more on Burnham, see chapter two.  Seth Story was the only non-fisherman to sign this document.  Story 
signed on as the schooner’s cooper for £5.6.8 per month.  Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Schooner Polly, 
1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, JDPL.   
199 EVREC, Vol.1, 17.  His death was not recorded in the vital records. 
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earned £3.12.0 per month working as a twenty-two year old “seaman” for the Navy.200  For his 
part, Law fished on the schooner Neptune, Joshua Burnham, skipper, for at least one fall fare in 
1768.  He then went as “seaman” on the same schooner, with Burnham again in charge, on a 
trade voyage to Virginia between December 1768 and March 1769.  Like Andrews, Law earned 
£1.6.8 per month.  However, Law was allowed to stow 35 bushels of trade goods in the hold as a 
“privilege.”  In addition, he was forced to pay £0.2.9 out of his wages in Greenwich hospital tax.  
And so, for the entire four months and twelve days “time on board,” the fisherman-turned-
mariner earned £3.19.4.201  By contrast, Law, like Andrews, earned £3.12.0 each month working 
as a “seaman” for the Navy in 1776.202   
 There are some striking similarities between the two common seamen on board the 
Polly.  Both men worked on local fishing and trading voyages for an Ipswich skipper, and 
commanded inflated war time wages in Ipswich.  Such comparisons tentatively suggest the 
localized nature of labor pools from which the Navy drew its manpower during the war.  Men 
signed on with captains they knew, on vessels they trusted, for work they were familiar with.  
Moreover, their earnings history hints at the existence of a narrow labor market in Ipswich that 
enabled workers to command higher wages during the war.  And there is evidence that such 
increased earnings were not restricted to common seamen.  Joshua Burnham, for example, had 
earned £2.8.0 per month as a “master” for the trade voyage to Virginia at the end of 1774.  He 
then earned £5.8.0 per month as “master” in the Navy.203   
                                                 
200 Andrews’ fishing, trading, and warring experience can all be found in Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, 
Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, JDPL. 
201 Joshua Burnham Papers, Schooner Neptune, [c.1766-1770], Box 1, Folder 3, JDPL.  There are two fares in 
1769 and one in 1770 in which the initials “I.L.” are listed among the fishing crew of the Neptune.  Law’s birth and 
death records could not be found.  Source checked: EVREC, Vols.1-3. 
202 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, JDPL. 
203 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, JDPL. 
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 Samuel Burnham was born in Ipswich on November 10, 1754, the son of Thomas and 
Judith, and he died “an officer in the American army” on March 15, 1782.204  At age nineteen, he 
went with his older relative on two fares each year in 1773 and 1774 to the Grand Bank.  During 
the fall fare in 1773, he caught 1,478 cod.  Over the following summer, he caught 2,000.  Then, 
in the fall of 1774 he caught 1,083.  In 1776, one year after becoming a legal adult, he earned 
£4.16.0 per month as “mate” in the Navy.205  Like Andrews, he enlisted in the Navy in his early 
twenties.  However, because of his family connections, Samuel entered at a higher rank and 
made more money.  Collectively, the Ipswich fishermen on board the Polly were not the first, nor 
were they the last, to make the transition from commercial fishing to naval service. 
Fishermen from Marblehead, the foremost fishing port in the thirteen British North 
American colonies on the eve of the Revolution, also made the transition to fighting men during 
the Revolutionary War.206  The port town employed more men, more vessels, and larger amounts 
of capital than any other port in the region.  If fishermen were going to join the Revolution 
anywhere in colonial America, they would do so in Marblehead.  Indeed, Ashley Bowen, that 
ubiquitous observer of town events in the fishing port, recorded in his diary on Monday, May 22, 
1775, “the fishermen are enlisting quite quick under the Congress [for the Continental 
Army].”207  Such a port community therefore represents the best case study for determining 
fishermen’s military service.   
 It is extremely difficult to establish the identities of individual workers in early America.  
Poorer, un-propertied workers do not often show up on tax records, or in inventoried lists upon 
                                                 
204 EVREC, Vols.1-2, 63, 508. 
205 Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, JDPL.  It is not 
immediately clear what Joshua and Samuel’s relation to one another.  Source checked: EVREC, Vols.1-3. 
206 See, Magra, “‘Soldiers…Bred to the Sea’,” 538-539. 
207 Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), Vol. 2, 440. 
  268
their death.208  Yet, establishing these identities is fundamentally necessary for determining who 
did what.  Merchant account books, probate records, and a useful appendix Phillip Chadwick 
Foster Smith compiled in The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), help to construct a list of 
laborers who worked in the commercial fishing industry in Marblehead on the eve of the 
Revolution.209  If a person worked on a fishing vessel prior to the war, or if he was from a known 
fishing port and showed up on in the probate records listed as a fisherman, then his occupational 
status was recorded as such.  By themselves, however, these sources only provide a list of names, 
residences, and occupations.  Frequently, several men with the same name lived in the same 
town simultaneously.  Moreover, a man with a probate filed in 1810 could have been born 
slightly before, during, or even after the Revolution.  Thus, it is essential to triangulate the data 
compiled in the abovementioned manner with vital records, including birth dates, marriage 
records, and death records.  Even with these records, there are instances when one is left with 
multiple birth-date possibilities for men with the same name, and it is not possible to isolate the 
individual being researched.  In other cases, no vital records have survived for a given name.  
And, in certain situations the man was born too late to serve in the war.  If any of these examples 
occurred, then the entry was removed from the database.  The remaining list of Marblehead 
fishermen was then compared with military service records.   
 These records have been compiled in the massive seventeen-volume Massachusetts 
Soldiers and Sailors of the Revolutionary War.  Here, one can find information on a soldier’s 
                                                 
208 According to Alan Kulikoff, who used tax lists to evaluate the widening gulf between rich and poor in 
colonial Boston, “most fishermen, sailors, and laborers had no taxable wealth at all.”  Allan Kulikoff, “The Progress 
of Inequality in Revolutionary Boston,” in Blanche Wiesen Cooke, ed., Past Imperfect: Alternative Essays in 
American History (New York: Knopf, 1973), 112, 117. 
209 The merchant account books for Marblehead are: William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL; Richard 
Pedrick Account book, 1767-1784, MDHS; Thomas Pedrick Account Book, 1760-1790, MDHS.  The probate 
records can be found in MPR.  For Smith’s Appendix, see Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813), 
Vol. 2, 639-685. 
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rank, length of service, commanding officers’ identities (typically the company captain and the 
regimental colonel), and place of enlistment.  Maritime service records for privateering, state and 
Continental Naval service also provide ship classifications, ship names, captain’s names, 
prisoner-of-war status, and prizes taken.  In addition, there are lists of men entitled to prize 
shares and “descriptive lists” of officers and crew members sworn into service  These lists detail 
age, stature, complexion (light, ruddy, sanguine, brown, dark, or black), and on rare occasions, 
nationality.  The descriptions of age and residence can be very helpful in isolating which of the 
five John Smiths born in Marblehead before the war actually fought in the conflict.  In short, this 
is the single best resource for determining Marbleheaders’ military service in the Revolution.   
 Having said this, the resource has its limitations.  The service records do not always 
specify whether a particular military unit was attached to the local, state, or Continental levels.  
Likewise, the service records do not consistently detail whether the vessel a man served on was a 
privateer, a state or a U.S. Naval vessel.  These problems can only be mitigated by familiarity 
with the source, and with the names of commanding officers and particular vessels.  Whenever 
unfamiliar names were encountered, they were added to a separate list along with the man’s 
service record then being examined.  Later, when more information about the unfamiliar name 
could be found in searches for other records, then the unknown schooner could be designated as 
a privateer, or the unidentified commander could be labeled the Colonel of a Salem militia 
regiment.  The ten volume collection Naval Documents of the American Revolution contributed 
to identifying certain vessels and military commanders.210  In addition, there are oftentimes 
alternate, phonetic, spellings for surnames in the military service records.  This situation 
necessitates locating such alternate spellings.  Then, it is essential to follow-up on each variant 
                                                 
210 NDAR. 
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and verify every record to see if John Smith from Marblehead is the same as John Smyth and 
John Smithe with different types of military service.  Town affiliation, the identity of a subject’s 
commanding officer, and the use of vital records all aid in this process.  Whenever town 
affiliation and the identity of the commanding officer were not provided, names were removed 
from the database.  In those instances when a fisherman’s identity could not be concretely 
matched with the identity of a man who fought in the war, then the man’s name was removed 
from the database.  All together, this process of elimination yielded a short (N=55), but very 
reliable list detailing the fishermen from Marblehead and the different types of military service 
they performed, or did not perform, in the Revolution.211 
 We already know a great deal about the Marblehead men who fought in the war.  They 
tended to be younger men in their early-to-mid twenties, with little taxable income or property 
and an average height of 5’7.”  While it was typical for 22-35% of a town’s adult male 
population to participate in the Revolution, Marblehead sent 39%.  Such men commonly re-
enlisted for at least one more tour of duty after their initial experience in the war.212  It has even 
been suggested that many of these men were fishermen.213  However, to date, no one has 
demonstrated the occupational status of fighting men from Marblehead, nor has anyone 
discussed the linkages between this status and the different types of military service 
Marbleheaders performed. 
                                                 
211 To date, the most comprehensive study of Revolutionary soldier’s pre-war occupational identities relies on a 
data set of 43 men.  Edward C. Papenfuse and Gregory A. Stiverson, “General Smallwood’s Recruits: The 
Peacetime Career of the Revolutionary War Private,” William and Mary Quarterly, Third Series, Vol. 30, No. 1 
(January, 1973), 117-132.   
212 Sargent, “Answering the Call to Arms,” 226, Table 6.5, 228, Table 6.8, 229, Figure 6.9, Table 6.10, 232, 
Table 6.12; and Baller, “Military mobilization during the American Revolution in Marblehead and Worcester, 
Massachusetts,” 20, 27-28, 366, Figure 4, 367, Figure 5.  For the typical town mobilization percentages outside 
Marblehead, see Higginbotham, The War of American Independence, 389-390. 
213 Baller, “Military mobilization during the American Revolution in Marblehead and Worcester, 
Massachusetts,” 13-14; and Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners, 59. 
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 Of those men who were positively identified as having worked in the commercial cod 
fishing industry prior to the Revolution (N=55), 82% could be documented as having fought in 
the war in some capacity.214  This participation rate represents two-to-four times the typical rate 
for most towns during the war, suggesting that fishermen as an occupational group mobilized in 
very high numbers during the conflict.  Such involvement is not surprising given the fact that the 
Fisheries Bill specifically targeted the commercial fishing industry. 
 Of the Marblehead fishermen who did military service in the war (N=45), 78% 
performed some service at sea, including work in the coast guard, the Massachusetts Navy, the 
Continental Navy, and on privateers.  In their work in the coast guard, fishermen were 
responsible for building and manning seacoast defenses during the war.215  These defenses 
consisted primarily of forts constructed at harbor entrances.  Built of breastworks and field 
pieces, the forts guarded inbound and outbound vessels, and prevented British warships from 
entering coastal waters unchallenged.  Permanent coast guard units were stationed in these 
defensive positions for the duration of the war.216  Marblehead, for example, maintained three 
“Sea Coast Defense” companies, consisting of fifty men in each company.217  In 1775, the men 
earned the following wages: Captains earned £5.8.0 each month; 1st Lieutenants £3.12.0; 2nd 
Lieutenants £3.3.0; Sergeants £2.4.0; Corporals, Fifers, and Drummers each earned £2.0.0; and 
Privates earned “$36 [roughly £0.18.0] per month.”218   
                                                 
214 A few fishermen (N=2) worked only on privateers, and they were included in the database.  This decision 
was made on the justification that these men risked their lives to contribute to the war effort. 
215 Magra, “‘Soldiers…Bred to the Sea’,” 554. 
216 See the discussion above. 
217 The three companies were: Captain Francis Felton’s 1st Sea Coast Defense Company; Captain William 
Hooper’s 2nd; and Captain Edward Fettyplace’s 3rd.  See, MSSRW, Vol. 5, 605, 641; Vol. 8, 230.  For the size of 
these companies in 1775 and 1776, see JEPCM, 412-413; and JHRM, Vol. 51, Part II, 87-91, 96, 112. 
218 JEPCM, 413.  The conversion rate of $1=6 pence in Massachusetts in 1775 is drawn from John Glover’s 
Colony Ledger, MDHS, item #729½.   
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 As mentioned above, the coast guard units also maintained vessels for use in patrolling 
harbors and harbor mouths.  Like the two Machias coast guard vessels, other vessels made 
captures at sea and seized supplies meant for the British military.  On June 12, 1776, for 
example, Nathan Smith reported that he and “other persons belonging to a Sea-coast company, 
stationed on the Island of Martha’s Vineyard,” captured “and brought into port, the Bedford, a 
schooner, laden with provisions and other stores, for the fleet and army.”  Smith petitioned the 
Provincial Congress for a share in the prize, in return “for their risk and service.”219  Apparently, 
a system of prize shares had not yet been codified for the coast guard units.  The men in these 
units, however, operated in the expectation of prize money.   
 Marblehead fishermen such as Twisden Bowden served in the coast guard.  The Bowden 
family had been very involved in the port’s fishing industry prior to the war.  Twelve different 
Bowdens worked for either William Knight or the Pedrick brothers during the 1760s and early 
1770s.220  Twisden was born March 17, 1745, and he married into the family of a prominent 
local fish merchant at age twenty.221  He worked for Knight on at least two fares in 1770 as a 
sharesman on board the schooner Barnett, Robert Knight, Jr., skipper.  For fishing that year, 
Bowden earned £33.0.8.222  Thirty-years old and married, he enlisted as a Sergeant in Captain 
William Hooper's Second Marblehead Sea Coast Defense Company on July 15, 1775, and served 
in this capacity until December 31, 1775.  His family status may have influenced his decision to 
join a local coast guard unit as opposed to the Continental Army, which would have taken him 
away from town for long periods of time.  As a Sergeant in the coast guard, he would have 
                                                 
219 JHRM, Vol. 52, Part I, 28. 
220 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL; Richard Pedrick Account book, 1767-1784, MDHS; and 
Thomas Pedrick Account Book, 1760-1790, MDHS.  Twisden was also described as a fisherman on a probate filed 
for him on November 7, 1787.  MPR. 
221 EVREC, Vols. 1-2, 59, 46.  He married Sarah Orne on December 19, 1765. 
222 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
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earned £2.4.0 per month, or £13.4.0 for the six months.  Bowden then enlisted for a second tour 
of duty in Hooper's company on January 4, 1776, served for another eight months, and earned an 
additional £17.12.0.  Up to this point, then, he had earned £30.16.0 for fourteen months of coast 
guard duty, which was comparable to his earnings while fishing.  The following year he served 
in Captain Edward Fettyplace’s Third Marblehead Sea Coast Defense Company.  At some point 
in 1777, while attempting to make a capture at sea and earn additional prize money, Bowden was 
himself captured by the British Navy and sent to a prison in Halifax, Nova Scotia.  In December 
he was released in a prisoner exchange, and he does not appear to have gone back into the 
military.223  Such men contributed to the military defense of the coast during the war, and their 
service has gone largely unexplored.224 
 Other fishermen fought in Massachusetts’s navy.  Eleven states had their own navies 
during the war.225  As discussed above, Massachusetts began arming vessels in 1775 and 
formally established its own navy in February, 1776.  The wages for the officers and men in the 
Massachusetts navy were as follows: Captains earned £4 each month; 1st Lieutenants made £3 
per month; 2nd Lieutenants and Surgeons each earned £2.10.0 per month; Masters earned £2; 
Boatswains, Carpenters, Gunners, Pilots, Quartermasters, Stewards, Master-at-Arms all earned 
£1.10.0 each month; while “Foremast Men” made £1.4.0 per month.  In addition to these wages, 
and for “further Encouragement to the said Officers and Seamen,” the crew was to receive “one 
                                                 
223 MSSRW, Vol. 2, 320. 
224 To date, no scholarly article or book-length study has been done on the sea coast defense companies that 
served in the American Revolution. 
225 New Jersey and Delaware were the exceptions.  O’Connor, Origins of the American Navy, 14; and Albion 
and Pope, Sea Lanes In Wartime, 39.  For an argument that both of these states did have their own navies, see 
Robert L. Scheina, “A Matter of Definition: A New Jersey Navy, 1777-1783,” The American Neptune, Vol. 39, 
(July, 1979), 209-218.  More work needs to be done on these state navies to determine precisely how many vessels 
were involved; which type of vessels; and to develop crew lists for those vessels. 
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Third the Proceeds of all Captures.”226  Such prize shares provided a lucrative incentive over and 
above wages that were already attractive for unemployed fishermen. 
 Thomas Johnson fought in this regional navy.  He was born on March 30, 1755.  At age 
thirteen, he worked for Thomas Pedrick as a cuttail on at least one fare on board the Marblehead 
schooner Vim.  Johnson earned £7.6.11 for this fare.227  After the Massachusetts navy was 
formed in 1776, he signed-on as a seaman on board the state brig Massachusetts at the first 
opportunity in 1777.  Johnson continually re-enlisted, and served on three cruises under two 
different commanders for a total of six-and-a-half months.228  Given the monthly rate for fore-
the-mast men in Massachusetts’s navy of £1.4.0, Johnson earned £7.16.0 for his time in this sort 
of service, plus a share of any prizes that were taken. 
 Out-of-work fishermen could also earn money fighting in the Continental Navy.  The 
Hannah, and others like her, held out to maritime laborers enormous potential for profits.  These 
vessels took prizes at sea and crews earned profits from prize shares over and above their 
individual wages, which were already inflated in certain ports due to the war.  In Salem, 
Massachusetts in 1753, just before the Seven Years’ War, masters of schooners on trading 
missions earned £1.17.4 per month; mates £1.12.0; and mariners £1.6.8.229  In Ipswich, 
Massachusetts in 1774, on the eve of the Revolutionary War, similar masters earned £2.8.0 per 
month; mates £1.12.0; and mariners £1.6.8.230  While the pay rates for the Hannah’s crew have 
not survived, the crew on board the Connecticut armed brig Minerva in August, 1775, earned the 
following wages: the captain made £7.0.0 per month; the 1st lieutenant £5.0.0; the 2nd Lieutenant 
                                                 
226 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part II, 256-257; and NDAR, Vol. 3, 1157. 
227 Thomas Pedrick Account Book, 1760-1790, MDHS. 
228 MSSRW, Vol. 8, 964. 
229 Schooner Molly, 1751-57, Box 7, Folder 10, Timothy Orne Shipping Papers, JDPL. 
230 Schooner Polly, 1771-1776, Box 1, Folder 4, Joshua Burnham Papers, 1758-1817, JDPL. 
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£4.0.0; the master £4.0.0; the mate £3.0.0; the gunner £3.0.0; the gunner’s mate £2.8.0; the 
boatswain £3.0.0; the boatswain’s mate £2.8.0; the steward £3.0.0; the cook £3.0.0; the carpenter 
£3.0.0; along with forty seamen who earned £2.5.0 per month; and forty marines, soldiers 
serving at sea at this point, who earned £2.0.0 per month.  The seamen and marines were also to 
be offered one month’s wages in advance prior to “any cruise in said service.”231  Around the 
same time, the Continental Congress in Philadelphia established the following pay scale for the 
American Navy: Captains earned £9.2.0 per month; Naval “Lieutenants” £6; Masters £6; Mates 
£4.10.0; Boatswains £4.10.0; Boatswains’ first mates £2.16.0; Boatswains’ second mates £2.8.0; 
Gunners £4.10.0; Gunners’ mates £3.4.0; Surgeons £6.8.0; Surgeons’ mates £4.0.0; Carpenters 
£4.10.0; Carpenters’ mates £3.4.0; Coopers £4.10.0; Captain’s clerks £4.10.0; Stewards £4.0.0; 
Chaplains £6; Able seamen £2; Captain of marines £8; Marine lieutenants £5.8.0; Marine 
sergeants £2.8.0; Marine Corporals £2.4.0; Fifers £2.4.0; Drummers £2.4.0; and “privates or 
marines” £2.232  Such war-time inflation of maritime wages was typical throughout the 
eighteenth century Atlantic world in those labor markets in which naval authorities and 
merchants competed for manpower.233  However, in Massachusetts on February 7, 1776, the 
crew of the armed schooner Diligent, “now lying at Newbury-Port,” was given the following 
rates: the Captain earned £4 per month; 1st Lieutenant, £3; 2nd Lieutenant, £2.10.0; Surgeon, 
                                                 
231 “Minutes of the Connecticut Council of Safety,” Lebanon, August 3, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 1052-1054.  At 
this time, a system was laid out for requisitioning funds for this naval service, and a protocol for offering 
commissions was established.  In effect, Connecticut had its own navy.  The Continental Congress formally 
established a national Marine Corps on November 10, 1775.  See, Morison, John Paul Jones, 36. 
232 “Rules for the Regulation of the Navy of the United Colonies,” Philadelphia, November 28, 1775, in NDAR, 
Vol. 2, 1178.  These figures have been converted from their dollar amounts using the conversion supplied in 
Glover’s ledger for August 24, 1775: $1 = 6 shillings.  John Glover’s Colony Ledger, MDHS, item #729½.   
233 Marcus Rediker, Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 
121-124.  Vickers maintains that prior to the Revolution merchant mariners in Salem were not given higher wages 
during wartimes, as opposed to their counterparts in England.  This contrast, he believes, was due principally to the 
fact that the British Navy sailed out of England each year and frequently pressed workers from the merchant marine 
in local, not colonial, ports.  Daniel Vickers, Young Men and the Sea: Yankee Seafarers In the Age of Sail (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2005), 81-82. 
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£2.10.0; Master, £2; the Boatswain, Carpenter, Gunner, Pilot, Quarter-Master, Steward, and 
Master at Arms each earned £1.10.0; while the “Foremast Men” earned £1.4.0.234  Such earnings 
did not compare favorably to the peacetime wages listed above.  Thus, recruiters in Connecticut 
and Philadelphia may have had a more difficult time securing manpower for their naval forces 
than Massachusetts during the war.  Whether or not these wages were higher or lower in 
wartime, they were all supplemented with prize money. 
 In order to encourage the “Activity, and Courage” of her crew, Washington spelled out 
the distribution of prize money the Hannah’s crew would receive “over and above your Pay in 
the Continental Army.”235  First, the prize was to be sent “to the nearest and safest Port,” and the 
commander-in-chief informed “immediately of such Capture, with all Particulars and there to 
way my further Direction.”  As of yet, no Admiralty courts had been established for the 
adjudication of legal prizes.236  In effect, Washington was telling the Hannah’s crew that he 
                                                 
234 JHRM, Vol. 51, Part II, 257. 
235 “George Washington’s Instructions to Captain Nicholson Broughton,” September 2, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 
1288.  On April 9, 1776, Massachusetts raised eight companies for the Continental Army.  The following represents 
the monthly pay scale at that time: “To the Colonel, twelve Pounds; to the Lieutenant Colonel, nine Pounds twelve 
Shillings; to the Major, eight Pounds; to each Captain, six Pounds; to each First-Lieutenant, four Pounds; to each 
Second-Lieutenant, three Pounds ten Shillings; to each Sergeant, forty-eight Shillings; to each Corporal and 
Drummer, forty-four Shillings; to each Fifer and private Soldier, forty Shillings.”  The men were further allowed 
“for their Return Home, that is to say, at the Rate of one Day for every twenty Miles Travel; also there shall be 
allowed one Penny per Mile to each Man, to compensate his Expenses in his Travel to the Place of Rendezvous, and 
at the same Rate to bear his Expenses to the Camp, to be paid by himself.”  Also, each “Non-commissioned Officer 
and private Soldier” were to be given “a good effective Fire-Arm and Bayonet, a Cartridge-Box, Knapsack and 
Blanket; and no Non-commissioned Officer and private Soldier, shall be allowed to pass Muster, without he is so 
equipped and provided.” JHRM, Vol. 51, Part III, 99, 100.  The Hannah’s crew had been literally drummed out of 
the Army from Glover’s regiment, as Homan noted in his pension record cited above.  For this reason, Morison 
refers to the Hannah and her sisters as the “Army’s Navy.”  Morison, John Paul Jones, 35.  He does not explain 
how Washington could be the “Founder of the United States Navy,” while this initial fleet was the “Army’s Navy.”  
Indeed, Morison further complicates the matter by referring to October 9, 1775, the date the Continental Congress 
established a seven-man Naval Committee, as “the birthday of the Continental and United States Navies.”  Ibid., 36. 
236 Thomas Cushing, a Boston merchant and Massachusetts delegate to the Continental Congress, wrote to a 
friend on October 23, 1775: “I am glad to find General Washington is fitting out some vessels of war.  This is a 
necessary measure, as our enemies are daily pirating our vessels.  I have frequently urged it here.  As to the 
establishment of Courts of Admiralty, that will come on of course; but it will not do to urge it here at present.”  
Thomas Cushing to William Cooper, Philadelphia, October 23, 1775, Massachusetts Historical Society Collections, 
Fourth Series, Vol. IV, (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1858), 365. 
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would be their ultimate judge.  In the event that a prize was judged legitimate, meaning that it 
was neither a re-capture nor a vessel belonging to a Patriot merchant, the crew was to earn one-
third of the value of whatever cargo was taken on a prize ship, except “military and naval 
stores.”  These things, along “with vessels and apparel are reserved for public service.”  In 
addition, the Continental Congress, which had paid for the conversion of the fishing schooner, 
and Washington, as their commander-in-chief, received two-thirds of the cargo’s remaining 
value.  Washington then divided the crew’s one-third share in the following manner: the Captain 
earned six shares of the one-third; the 1st Lieutenant earned five shares; the 2nd Lieutenant four; 
the “Ship’s Master” 3; the Steward 2; the Mate 1.5; the Gunner 1.5; the Boatswain 1.5; the 
Gunner’s Mate and the Sergeant each earned 1.5; and the “Privates” earned a singe share.237   
 Such prize shares could amount to a princely sum for workers.  In 1777, the armed 
schooner Franklin and her crew captured the powder ship Hope.  The Hope’s precious cargo was 
valued at £54,075.17.2, one third of which amounted to £18,025.5.8.  One of the common 
crewman’s shares for this prize, taken from the one third, was worth £487.3.4, or eight years of 
work in the commercial fishing industry for the most experienced sharesmen.238  In this way, a 
huge sum of money might be offered as an incentive for unemployed, poorer working men to go 
to sea to capture British military supply vessels and smaller warships.239  Such incentives came 
                                                 
237 “George Washington’s Instructions to Captain Nicholson Broughton,” September 2, 1775, NDAR, Vol. 1, 
1,288.   
238 The American government only provided the crewmen with half their legitimate shares, or £243.11.8.  Clark, 
George Washington’s Navy, 221.   
239 Poorer workers did not solely rely on fishing schooners for these captures.  Between October 9 and 
November 11, 1775, the Massachusetts Provincial Congress debated and resolved an “Act for encouraging the 
fitting out armed Vessels.”  JHRM, Vol. 51, Part I, 151-152, 216, 250, 264, 271.  The Act included a clause that 
encouraged “the Confiscation of all armed and other Vessels, that shall be taken and brought into this Colony, 
together with their Cargos, Appurtenances, &c. which shall have been found making unlawful Invasions, Attacks or 
Depredations on our Sea Coasts or Navigation, or improved in supplying the Enemy with Provisions, &c. or 
employed by them in any other Respect whatever.”  Moreover, the Act mandated “that all Vessels and Cargoes that 
shall be taken by said Inhabitants or others, properly authorized to take the same, and that shall be legally 
condemned in this Colony, shall be the Property of the Captors, they paying the Charges of Condemnation.”  
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on top of bounties men had previously qualified for through their enlistment in the Continental 
Army.240   
 Marblehead fishermen such as Richard Tutt, Jr. signed-on for cruises in the American 
Navy during the Revolution.  Tutt was the son of a fisherman.  He was born on February 11, 
1759, and while records of his fishing exploits have not survived, he is listed in probate records 
as having lived his life as a fisherman.241  Tutt enlisted in the Marblehead regiment at the start of 
the Revolution, and fought on land until March 20, 1776.  At some point after that, he signed-on 
as seaman on board the “U.S.” brigantine General Gates, John Skimmer, captain.  His name 
appears on a list of men entitled to prize shares.  Tutt was promised 1.25 shares of the crew’s 
one-third share in addition to his monthly wage of £2.242   
                                                                                                                                                             
Finally, the Act called for the establishment of “a Court for the Trial and Condemnation of all Vessels, Cargoes, &c. 
as aforesaid, that shall be taken and brought into this Colony.”  Ibid., 151-152.  According to a letter written from 
Elbridge Gerry to John Adams, dated Watertown, December 4, 1775, this act unleashed a wave of profit seekers 
against the British military.  Gerry wrote:  “The late Act of Resolve for encouraging the fitting-out of Armed 
Vessels in this Colony I apprehend will have a good Effect, having already animated the Inhabitants of the Seaports 
who were unable to command much property, to unite in Companies of twenty or thirty Men & go out in Boats of 8 
or 10 Tons Burden, which they call ‘Spider Catchers.’  One of these the last Week brought in two Prizes; the last of 
which was a Vessel of 100 Tons from Nova Scotia, loaded with potatoes & 8 or 10 head Cattle.”  Elbridge Gerry to 
John Adams, Watertown, December 4, 1775, Elbridge Gerry Papers II, 1770-1848, MHS.   
240 It was common in 1775 for men to receive “a bounty coat or its equivalent in money” for enlisting in the 
Continental Army.  See, for example, the service records for Thomas Barker, MSSRW, Vol. 1, 504, 622; Thomas 
Brown, MSSRW, Vol. 2, 692; and George Cash, MSSRW, Vol. 3, 187-188.  On July 5, 1775, the Massachusetts 
Provincial Congress had ordered 13,000 coats “made of good plain cloth…in the common plain way, without lapels, 
short, and with small folds.”  JEPCM, 456-457.  As a cost-saving measure, the practice of giving men coats was 
abandoned at the end of 1775 and the beginning of 1776, as the responsibility for clothing the Continental Army 
shifted from the Massachusetts Provincial Congress to the Continental Congress.  According to Washington, “the 
Continental Congress” ordered “Hunting Shirts as an outside Dress – under which, a warm Waistcoat will be 
cheaper, and more convenient.”  George Washington to the Massachusetts General Court, Cambridge, August 12, 
1775, in PGW, Vol. 1, 297.  The Provincial Congress had supplied troops with “Shirts, Shoes, and Stockings, 
Breeches and Waistcoats” in 1775.  General Orders, Cambridge, August 24, 1775, in PGW, Vol. 1, 357.  
Additionally, prior to the Continental Congress’ adoption of the army laying siege to Boston, the Massachusetts 
Provincial Congress offered men advance pay of 40 shillings on May 20, 1775, as an incentive to fight.  JEPCM, 
246.  The Continental Congress experimented for a short time in 1776 with eliminating recruiting bounties.  
However, the resulting lack of interest in military service soon brought the bounties back.  Royster, A Revolutionary 
People At War, 64-65. 
241 EVREC, Vol. 1, 527; and MPR. 
242 MSSRW, Vol. 16, 201.  For the monthly wage of seamen in the U.S. Navy at the end of 1775, see footnote 
#232 above.  Tutt’s “seaman’s” share was slightly higher than the “private’s” single share on board Washington’s 
schooners in 1775.  See footnote #237. 
  279
 Fishermen also engaged in privateering during the American Revolution.  William Le 
Craw was born into a (most likely French, Jersey Island) fishing family in Marblehead on May 
26, 1736.243  Two other Le Craws can be found listed in probate records as having worked as 
fishermen in Marblehead, including Phillip Le Craw, who worked as a sharesman and skipper for 
William Knight on board the schooner Molly in the 1760s.244  Like Phillip, William probably 
became a skipper prior to the outbreak of war.  Unfortunately, the records of William’s career in 
the fishing industry beyond his probate record have not survived.  However, he commanded two 
Marblehead privateers during the war: the schooner Necessity (1776), and the brig Black Snake 
(1777).  And fish merchants and vessel owners such as John Selman and Joshua Orne, who 
owned Necessity, would not have trusted their property and their enterprise to someone with little 
experience.245  As captain of these privateers, Le Craw would have enjoyed the highest share 
among the crew of any prizes taken.246 
 While it might be expected that fishermen would fight at sea, 76% of those Marblehead 
fishermen who fought in the war performed military service on land.  The local militia regiment 
provided the first way by which fishermen could supplement or replace the earnings they had 
lost as a result of the Fisheries Bill.  As discussed above, some members of the Marblehead 
regiment left the ranks to board Washington’s schooner fleet at the end of 1775.  Others re-
                                                 
243 He died September 20, 1802 at age 66 years, 3 months, 25 days.  He was listed as "Captain."  A probate was 
filed for him on October 13, 1802.  EVREC, Vol. 2, 601; and MPR.  It was not uncommon for French fishermen 
from the island of Jersey to settle in Marblehead in the eighteenth century.  Christine Leigh Heyrman, Commerce 
and Culture: The Maritime Communities of Colonial Massachusetts, 1690-1750 (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1984), 214, 246.  
244 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL; and MPR. 
245 MSSRW, Vol. 9, 624; and Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813) of Marblehead, Vol. 2, 
664-665.  Orne and Selman petitioned the Massachusetts Provincial Congress “that the Commissary General grant 
him [i.e. William Le Craw] 200 pounds of powder and 200 grape-shot from the laboratory at Boston as he could 
obtain none at the forge.”  The Congress, however, ordered “that the Commissary General deliver 200 pounds of 
powder from the powder-mill at Andover and 200 grape-shot from the laboratory at Boston to said Orne, he paying 
for the same.”  MSSRW, Vol. 9, 624. 
246 For first-hand accounts of life on board a privateer during the Revolution, see Sidney G. Morse, “The 
Yankee Privateersman of 1776,” The New England Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 1 (March, 1944), 71-86. 
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enlisted in the regiment when Washington re-organized the Continental Army in January, 1776.  
The Marblehead regiment took leading roles in some of the most famous events of the war.247  
Marbleheaders served in a supporting role at the Battle of Bunker Hill; fought on Long Island, 
and at Pell’s Point during the White Plain’s retreat; they fought at Trenton; it was their 
reconnaissance work that led to the capture of British General John Burgoyne at Saratoga; and 
later they fought to retake Rhode Island from the British.  Moreover, Marblehead fishermen were 
responsible for certain inland maritime activities, such as evacuating Washington and the 
Continental Army from Long Island and transporting those same land forces across the Delaware 
River prior to the Battle of Trenton. 
 Joseph Courtis fought on land during the Revolutionary War.  He was born on October 
31, 1756.248  At age seventeen, he worked for William Knight as a cuttail on board the schooner 
Molly, Robert Knight, Jr., skipper, for four fares.  Courtis earned £34.18.0 for fishing in 1773.249  
Two years later, he enlisted as a private in Captain Joel Smith's Company One of the 21st 
Massachusetts Regiment of Foot in the Continental Army under the command of Colonel John 
Glover on July 24, 1775.  His name appears on a muster roll for August and on a company return 
for October.  Courtis was then in the Continental Army camp at Cambridge, Massachusetts on 
December 20, when he applied for “a bounty coat or its equivalent in money.”250  Working as a 
private in the Army he earned £2 per month, £10 over five months in addition to his bounty.251  
The Army was the first alternative employer for out-of-work fishermen in 1775.  Comparable 
pay and the promise of prize shares lured men into sea service as the war dragged on. 
                                                 
247 For more on the Marblehead regiment’s military accomplishments, see Magra, “‘Soldiers…Bred to the 
Sea’;” and Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners.  
248 EVREC, Vol. 1, 128. 
249 William Knight Account Book, 1767-1781, JDPL. 
250 MSSRW, Vol. 4, 265. 
251 This pay rate is based on the wages established on April 9, 1776.  JHRM, Vol. 51, Part III, 99, 
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 Slightly more than half (53%) of the fighting fishermen from Marblehead fought on both 
land and sea.  Like those in the coast guard, they performed military service on both elements.   
William Main, for example, was born on October 12, 1740.252  At twenty-nine years of age he 
worked on an unspecified number of fares for Richard Pedrick, and earned £22.11.4.253  On 
February 20, 1776, Main enlisted as a matross, a gunner’s assistant who aided in loading, firing, 
sponging and moving the guns, in Captain Fettyplace’s sea coast defense company.  Given his 
title, it is most probable that Main spent a majority of his time in the fort guarding Marblehead’s 
harbor.  He served six months and ten days “in defense of the seacoast.”  Assuming the pay for a 
matross in Massachusetts’s coast guard in 1776 was equivalent to that of a private in the same 
type of unit in 1775 (£0.18.0 per month), Main earned roughly £5.14.0.  Such money may not 
have impressed the fisherman, and it is possible he was eager to get out of the coast guard, for 
eleven days before his tour of duty expired, Main signed on as a private (most likely in a marine 
company as his rank was not that of seaman) on board the brigantine Massachusetts, Daniel 
Souther, captain, in the Massachusetts state navy.  He served in this capacity, probably hoping 
for a chance at prize money, from August 19 to December 21, 1776.  Assuming he earned the 
same as a fore-the-mast man, £1.4.0 per month , Main made roughly £4.16.0.254  In total, Main 
earned £10.10.0 for almost a year fighting on land and sea.  Main’s dual military service was 
typical.  He and other Marblehead fishermen were among the first Marines in American 
history.255 
                                                 
252 He died on January 29, 1816, "in an Advanced Age."  EVREC, Vol. 1, 330; Vol. 2, 608.  A probate was filed 
for him on October 1, 1816, and he is listed there as a fisherman.  MPR. 
253 Richard Pedrick Account book, 1767-1784, MDHS. 
254 MSSRW, Vol. 10, 142, 143. 
255 Magra, “‘Soldiers…Bred to the Sea’,” 556-557; and Charles R. Smith, Marines in the Revolution: A History 
of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775-1783 (Washington, D.C.: History and Museums 
Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, 1975), 12, 32-33, 80.   
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Not every fisherman in Marblehead participated in the Revolution.  There are several 
reasons why 18% of Marblehead’s fishermen did not fight in the war.  Age played a significant 
role in a man’s decision to not fight.  Of those who did not serve (N=10), the average age was 
32.  This was higher than the average age of those who did serve (N=45), which was 26.  
Significantly, cod fishermen typically were the most physically productive in catching fish, and 
thereby reached their peak earning potential, between the ages of 25-30.256  In other words, the 
Marblehead fishermen who fought lost more as a result of the Fisheries Bill.  Those over the age 
of thirty, by contrast, were usually realizing fewer and fewer profits from the fishing industry.  
There were also minors such as thirteen-year-old Thomas Ingalls, and fifteen-year-old Thomas 
Dolliber, whose parents or legal guardians may have been prevented them from serving.  Sixteen 
was the standard age young lads were allowed into militias, although there were boys under 
sixteen in the armed forces during the war.257  Political preference and patriotic devotion to the 
Empire may have played a role in this decision.258  Yet, it is not clear why even the staunchest 
Briton working in the colonial fishing industry would chose to support the government that had 
stripped away his livelihood.  It is also possible that those who did not fight maintained religious 
ties to the Church of England, were pacifists, or simply wanted to remain neutral.259  Ashley 
                                                 
256 Vickers, Farmers and Fishermen, 178-180, esp. Figure 2. 
257 Soldiers were also supposed to be taller than 5’2.”  Higginbotham, The War of American Independence, 391.   
258 Linda Colley argues that laboring peoples in eighteenth century England developed a sense of British 
nationalism from anti-French, anti-Catholic sentiments.  Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837 (New 
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1992). 
259 Robert M. Calhoon, the dean of historians of Loyalism, has suggested that Loyalists’ motivation cannot be 
reduced to a single factor.  Robert M. Calhoon, Timothy M. Barnes, and George A. Rawlyk, eds., Loyalists and 
Community in North America (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1994); Robert M. Calhoon, The Loyalist 
Perception and other Essays (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press, 1989); and idem., The Loyalists 
in Revolutionary America, 1760-1781 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973).  For an argument that 
emphasizes commercial ties to Great Britain in order to explain Loyalism, see Edward Countryman, “The Uses of 
Capital in Revolutionary America: The Case of the New York Loyalist Merchants,” William and Mary Quarterly, 
3rd. Ser., Vol. 49, No. 1 (January, 1992), 3-28. 
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Bowen, a Marblehead fisherman turned ship rigger, took the last of these positions.260  He 
explained his rationale for this decision in the form of a poem: 
As for opinions, I confess 
I never upon them laid stress 
Sometimes a Whig, sometimes a Tory 
But seldom steadfast in one story. 
The reason is, I’m not yet fixed 
So my religion is but mixed.261 
 
Bowen, it should be emphasized, supported the fishing industry as a ship rigger.  He had stopped 
going to sea by the time of the Revolution.  In addition, during the Seven Years’ War he served 
in the British Navy and genuinely enjoyed the experience.  It should also be stressed that Bowen 
did not go out of his way to convince his neighbors not to resist British authority.  Those who 
chose to publicly support the Crown and Parliament were persecuted and ridden out of 
Marblehead very early in 1775.262  
There is no evidence of African-American fishermen having served in the war, but then 
again there is very little evidence of African-Americans working in the cod fishing industry.263  
However, there is strong evidence that African-Americans served in the Marblehead regiment.264  
In addition to the pension record for a freed slave named Cato Prince, who fought in the 
Revolution, Alexander Graydon, an officer in the Continental Army, observed and described the 
forces from Massachusetts early in 1776.  Graydon derisively singled out the Marblehead 
                                                 
260 Daniel Vickers, “Ashley Bowen of Marblehead: Revolutionary Neutral,” in Nancy L. Rhoden and Ian K. 
Steele, eds., The Human Tradition In the American Revolution (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2000), 
99-115. 
261 Smith, ed., The Journals of Ashley Bowen (1728-1813) of Marblehead, Vol. 2, 522. 
262 See the first-hand accounts described in “Journal of Rev. Joshua Wingate Weeks, Loyalist Rector of St. 
Michael’s Church, Marblehead, 1778-1779,” Essex Institute Historical Collections, Vol. 52, (Salem, MA: Essex 
Institute Press, 1916), 1-16, 161-176, 197-208, 345-356; and “Essex County Loyalists,” Essex Institute Historical 
Collections, Vol. 43, (Salem, MA: Essex Institute Press, 1907), 289-316.   
263 See the discussion in chapter two. 
264 Magra, “‘Soldiers…Bred to the Sea’,” 549-550. 
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regiment, noting that “in this regiment there were a number of Negroes, which to persons 
unaccustomed to such associations, had a disagreeable, degrading effect."265  African-
Americans’ service in this port town’s regiment was probably a function of fish merchant’s 
commercial ties to the Southern and West Indian plantations.  Slaves could have been purchased, 
as they were in Rhode Island, and imported as chattel.266  Prior to the war, when an abolitionist 
fever swept Massachusetts, they, like Cato Prince, could have been manumitted.  Like the slaves 
in the Southern plantations who fled to Lord Dunmore after his emancipation proclamation, 
slaves in New England probably decided to fight for whichever side they believed offered them 
the most freedom.267  
 Since there was no indication of women having worked in the industry prior to the war, 
it comes as no surprise that there is no evidence of female workers in the fishing industry in 
Marblehead providing military service.268  Women certainly played supporting roles as camp 
followers for the Continental Army, and a few females masqueraded as men and actually fought 
for the Army.269  The same gender norms that kept women on the margins of the commercial cod 
fishing industry in New England seem to have shaped the contours of their military service and 
relegated them to the home front in fishing ports. 
                                                 
265 Quoted in Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the American Revolution (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1961), 72. 
266 Robert K. Fitts, Inventing New England’s Slave Paradise: Master/Slave Relations In Eighteenth-Century 
Narragansett, Rhode Island (New York: Garland Pub., 1998). 
267 Cassandra Pybus, Epic Journeys of Freedom: Runaway Slaves of the American Revolution and Their Global 
Quest for Liberty (Boston: Beacon Press, 2006); Michael Lee Lanning, Defenders of Liberty: African Americans in 
the Revolutionary War (New York: Citadel Press, 2000); Sylvia R. Frey, Water From The Rock: Black Resistance in 
a Revolutionary Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991); and Quarles, The Negro in the American 
Revolution. 
268 See the discussion in chapter two. 
269 See, Mayer, Belonging to the Army; and Alfred Young, Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah 
Sampson, Continental Soldier (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004). 
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The British almost certainly also used fishermen in their military.  The ebb and flow of 
the war effort for the British took on some of the characteristics of the migratory fishing industry 
in peacetime.  Whereas West Country migratory vessels, and their naval convoys, typically 
picked up laborers in Ireland before heading to Newfoundland, the British Navy and Army 
stopped in Irish ports and recruited thousands of Irish men for military duty before heading to 
Boston in 1775.270  It is very likely that at least some of these men were among the same 
maritime laborers who had gone to Newfoundland prior to the Revolution.271   
 In sum, fishermen wore numerous hats and played many significant roles in the 
American Revolutionary War.  The hats fit precisely because they labored as jacks-of-all trades 
prior to the war.  The increasingly market-driven, exploitative nature of the commercial fishing 
industry in colonial New England motivated desperate workers to take up day labor and work in 
the merchant marine in addition to their fishing fares in order to provide for their families.  The 
nature of work in the commercial fishing industry provided workers, and, in turn, the American 
military forces, with a wide-based set of labor skills that could be employed in a number of 
useful ways.  The closing of the commercial cod fishing industry, the backbone of the New 
England economy, provided workers with scant means to feed their families and earn a living for 
themselves.  The various forms of military service at the colony/state and national levels offered 
                                                 
270 For more on the employment of Irish fishermen in the migratory fishing industry at Newfoundland in the 
eighteenth century, see W. Gordon Handcock, Soe longe as there comes noe women: Origins of English Settlement 
in Newfoundland (St. Johns, Newfoundland: Breakwater Books, 1989), 30-31, 133-134.  For evidence that British 
Naval vessels stopped at Irish ports for manpower before coming to America, see NDAR, Vol. 1, 333-336.  
271 More work needs to be done on the role fishermen and the fishing industry played in the British armed forces 
during the Revolution.  Current research on the British military has not explored the role the commercial fishing 
industry played in providing manpower and vessels for the war effort.  See, Buel, Jr., In Irons; David Syrett, The 
Royal Navy In American Waters, 1775-1783 (Brookfield, Vt.: Gower, 1989); Nicholas Tracy, Navies, Deterrence, & 
American Independence: Britain and Seapower in the 1760s and 1770s (Vancouver: University of British Columbia 
Press, 1988); and Sylvia R. Frey, The British Soldier In America: A Social History of Military Life in the 
Revolutionary Period (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1981).  The same neglect can be found in a recent 
study of the French Navy.  Jonathan R. Dull, The French Navy and American Independence: A Study of Arms and 
Diplomacy, 1774-1787 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975). 
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wages, prize shares, and bounties for these unemployed men and their families.  Merchants on a 
never-ending quest for profits were able to reap monetary rewards from war-time inflated prices, 
government contracts, and commission fees.  As Lord North so aptly explained to Parliament in 
1776, service on the American side offered workers and merchants the added incentive of being 
able to wreak their revenge on the British state for trying to destroy the cod fishing industry.272  
By bending the world of commerce to the way of war and by converting the fishing industry into 
a military machine, America was able to develop its own navy, guard its coast, win battles on 
land, supply its fighting men with military stores and provisions, and achieve its independence 
on land and sea. 
                                                 
272 See the end of chapter four. 
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6.0  CONCLUSION 
Young Alexander plundered India. 
He alone? 
Caesar beat the Gauls. 
Was there not even a cook in his army? 
Philip of Spain wept as his fleet 
Was sunk and destroyed.  Were there no other tears? 
Frederick the Second triumphed in the Seven Years’ War.   
Who triumphed with him?   
- “A Worker Reads History,” Bertolt Brecht.1 
 
One of the most enduring images of the American Revolutionary War is the painting of George 
Washington crossing the Delaware River just before the Battle of Trenton.  Most Americans 
have almost certainly seen it, but most probably do not know that the artist was not an American 
citizen.  Emmanuel Gottlieb Leutze, an artist from Dusseldorf, in what is today Germany, was 
energized by the European revolutions of 1848 and sought to capture in his art the essence of 
revolutionary spirit.  The failure of democratic revolutions in Europe, combined with Leutze’s 
personal admiration for American freedom, inspired him in 1851 to paint his now iconic classic 
George Washington Crossing the Delaware.2   
 The painting itself is a masterpiece of heroic representation.  The image depicts 
Washington standing proudly as he crosses an ice-choked Delaware River.  He is the great man, 
                                                 
1 Bertolt Brecht, Selected Poems, translated by H.R. Hays, (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1947), 108-109. 
2 For more on Leutze, see Barbara S. Groseclose, Emanuel Leutze, 1816-1868: Freedom Is The Only King 
(Washington: Published for the National Collection of Fine Arts by the Smithsonian Institution Press, 1975). 
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lionized at one of his finest hours.  One of his legs is thrust forward, as he leans against a 
longboat’s gunwale, his clenched fist silently defying both the inclement nature and the British 
forces he will soon face.  Leutze made Washington the focal point of the painting.  With the 
American flag unfurled to his right, Washington stands amidst a rising sun in the backdrop, 
reflecting Leutze’s hope in revolutionary fulfillment.  Below Washington (in every sense) and in 
the shadows are nine workers rowing the General across the river.  They are Marblehead 
fishermen. 
 The focus on Washington, in Leutze’s painting and in scholarship of the war in general, 
obscures the accumulated knowledge and labor skills required to transport the Commander-in-
chief and the Continental Army across an icy river in the dead of night without a single mishap.  
General Henry Knox recalled the dramatic crossing later during a meeting of the Massachusetts 
legislature.  He stated: 
I wish the members of this body knew the people of Marblehead as well as I do.  I 
could wish that they had stood on the banks of the Delaware River in 1776, in that 
bitter night when the Commander-in-Chief had drawn up his little army to cross 
it, and had seen the powerful current beating onward the floating masses of ice, 
which threatened destruction to whoever should venture upon its bosom.  I wish 
that when this occurrence threatened to defeat the enterprise, that they could have 
heard that distinguished warrior demand, ‘Who will lead us on?’ and seen the men 
from Marblehead, and Marblehead alone, stand forth to lead the army along the 
perilous path to unfading glories and honors in the achievements of Trenton.  
There, sirs, went fishermen of Marblehead, alike at home upon land or water.3 
His impassioned, patriotic rhetoric aside, Knox saw, first-hand, the men and the maritime labor 
skills required for the hazardous winter crossing.  Yet, the most recent systematic treatment of 
                                                 
3 Quoted in Samuel Roads, Jr., The History and Traditions of Marblehead, Third ed., (Marblehead: N. Allen 
Lindsay & Co., 1897), 177.  An abridged version can be found in George Athan Billias, General John Glover and 
His Marblehead Mariners (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1960), 16. 
  289
the crossing only briefly mentions the fishermen.4  Such neglect is symptomatic, characteristic of 
historical scholarship that has privileged the roles well-educated, propertied, wealthy elites 
played in the struggle for American independence.5 
The American Revolution, much like “Washington’s crossing” of the Delaware, did not 
succeed because of the actions of a few colonial elites.  Maritime laborers in the fishing industry 
put their labor skills to use in a variety of ways during the war.  They fought at sea on coast 
guard vessels, state and Continental warships, and privateers, helping to secure American 
military command of the sea and permit overseas supplies of gunpowder to pierce the British 
naval blockade.  Fishermen also built sea-coast defenses and fought on land.  Some laborers 
fought on both land and sea in various capacities.  Workers in the fishing industry took leading 
roles in the formation of the first American Navy, the first American coast guard, and the first 
American Marines.  They were also at the siege of Boston and enlisted in the Continental Army 
in 1775.  Collectively, these efforts helped secure American independence.  Fishermen 
consciously contributed to the making of history.6 
 It is impossible to understand how colonial fishermen were able to perform so many vital 
military roles during the Revolution without coming to terms with the nature of their maritime 
labor.  The commercial fishing industry became increasingly market-driven during the eighteenth 
                                                 
4 David Hackett Fischer, Washington’s Crossing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 21-22.  This book 
won the 2005 Pulitzer Prize in history.  For more on this event, and the role Marbleheaders played, see George 
Athan Billias, General John Glover and His Marblehead Mariners (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1960).  
Billias mentions the fact that the men were fishermen, but he does not discuss life and labor in the commercial cod 
fishing industry. 
5 Recent scholarly accounts of the Revolution that privilege one social group over another include Gordon S. 
Wood, Revolutionary Characters: What Made the Founders Different (New York: Penguin Press, 2006); and 
Bernard Bailyn, To Begin the World Anew: the Genius and Ambiguities of the American Founders (New York: 
Knopf, 2003). 
6 One the same page that he famously cited “the enormous condescension of posterity” for historians’ failure to 
integrate laborers into a study of the Industrial Revolution, E.P. Thompson defined “agency of working people” as 
“the degree to which they contributed by conscious efforts to the making of history.”  E.P. Thompson, The Making 
of the English Working Class (London: Gollancz, 1963), 13. 
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century as the means of production expanded far beyond the purchasing power of individual 
workers.  In their struggle to earn a living for themselves and their families, fishermen frequently 
did day labor and work in the merchant marine in addition to their employment on commercial 
fishing vessels.  Such occupational variety provided men with a set of labor skills that prepared 
them to earn money and provide political support in a variety of ways during the Revolutionary 
War.  George Washington himself recognized that unemployed maritime laborers possessed 
knowledge and skills that could be mobilized for war in various and important ways.  On 
October 13, 1775, the commander-in-chief acknowledged fishermen’s multi-functional 
occupational identity and diverse skills when he wrote to his brother, John Augustine 
Washington, that Marbleheaders were “soldiers…bred to the sea.”7  Investigating the 
commercial fishing industry helps us make sense of the maritime dimensions of the American 
Revolution, and gets us closer toward understanding the intimate relationship that has always 
existed between the world of commerce and the way of war. 
During the Revolution, a cross-section of the colonial fishing community played 
important roles in the war effort.  Wealthy, educated fish merchants such as Elbridge Gerry, who 
was one of the “Founding Fathers” that signed the Declaration of Independence, contributed their 
capital and vessels to the war.  Fish merchants were also able to convert trade networks into 
military supply lines and thereby import much needed military stores from abroad.  Yet their 
stories cannot completely account for the colonial victory.  Nor can we attribute the origins of 
the Revolution solely to their efforts and ideology.8 
                                                 
7 John C. Fitzpatrick, ed., The Writings of George Washington, 1745-1799, Vol. 4, (Washington: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1934), 27. 
8 For example, see Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution, 3rd ed., (Birmingham, 
Ala.: Palladium Press, 2001; orig. pub. 1967). 
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 The United States was born into an Atlantic world as a result of pressures from within 
and without the British Empire.  It did not rise from the hearts and minds of a few great men.  
The maritime commercial expansion of the cod fishing industry in New England generated fierce 
economic rivalries between colonial fish merchants, West Indian planters, West Country fish 
merchants, and British governmental officials who had to regulate these competing, even 
contradictory, people and interests.  The New England cod fisheries developed primarily as a 
result of trade with West Indian slave plantations and especially, even illegally, with French 
merchants.  The Yankee cod trade to the French West Indies in turn grated on British planters’ 
nerves and moved them to apply for, and win, Parliamentary protection throughout the 
eighteenth century.  New Englanders wanted to use oceanic highways to distribute their staple 
commodity to markets where demand and purchasing power were high.  The British state, on the 
other hand, wanted to control their use of Atlantic shipping lanes and restrict trans-oceanic 
commerce to imperial political boundaries.  Colonists also wanted to use the sea to fish for and 
process cod.  The best place to do this in the eighteenth century was the Grand Bank off the coast 
of Newfoundland, but the British state did not want New Englanders to interfere with West 
Country migratory fishing operations in the region.  This quest for commercial control of the sea 
caused conflict within the British Empire that resulted in the imperial crisis.  Such an account of 
the origins of the American Revolution moves the sea to center stage and broadens our 
perspective on this formative event.   
 Leutze’s celebration of the American Revolution, like scholarship that puts Founding 
Fathers on pedestals, does not spotlight the multitude of actors who performed vital roles in the 
war for independence.  The more we know about workers that risked their lives in the 
Revolution, the closer we will come to realizing the successes and failures of this formative 
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event.  Bertolt Brecht was surely right to ask whether anyone helped Alexander the Great and 
Frederick the Great achieve their military victories.  The German poet and the German painter 
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